



SIR JAMES OUTRAM.

LIEUT.-GENERAL, G.C.B., &c., BARONET.
HIS LIFE WAS GIVEN TO INDIA:

IN EARLY MANHOOD HE RECLAIMED WILD RACES BY WINNING THEIR HEARTS,
GHAZNI, KELAT, THE INDIAN CAUCASUS, WITNESSED THE DARING DEEDS OF HIS PRIME:
PERSIA BROUGHT TO SUE FOR PEACE, LUCKNOW RELIEVED, DEFENDED, AND RECOVERED,
WERE FIELDS OF HIS LATER GLORIES.

FAITHFUL SERVANT OF ENGLAND:
LARGE MINDED AND KINDLY RULER OF HER SUBJECTS:
IN ALL THE TRUE KNIGHT:
"THE BAYARD OF THE EAST."

BORN 29TH JANUARY, 1803, DIED 11TH MARCH, 1863.

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JAMES OUTRAM

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BY

MAJOR-GEN. SIR F. J. GOLDSMID, C.B., K.C.S.I.

'Who would not let a fire
Even to the dull of eye and to the deaf'

SHAKESPEARE, *Henry IV.* Pt. II. Act 1, Sc. 1

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CHAPTER II.

1815-1850.

Satára—Baroda—Egypt—Return to Baroda.

COLONEL OUTRAM took up his appointment of Resident and Commandant of Troops at Satára on May 26, 1845. As in the eyes of the natives of India much of the value of these high official posts depends on the amount of rupees which they secure to the respective holders, so was this particular berth esteemed a prize, irrespectively of its honour and responsibilities. But the position of the new comer, however honourable, was not in a lucrative sense equal to that of his predecessor, because each drew the pay of his military rank in addition to the allowances attached to the office, and Outram was unfortunate in the ordinary routine of promotion. After twenty-six years of service he had only attained the regimental grade of Captain. It was a question, indeed, whether he was not in this respect the most notable instance in the Bombay army of the unequal distribution of Fortune's favours. At Satára, the consequence of his ill luck was that, while fulfilling the same duties, and put to the same expense as other incumbents of his post, he did so on an income less by 700*l.* a year than that of the former Resident. On the other hand, he had there many comforts to which his constant camp life had long kept him a stranger. Joined by Mrs. Outram, whose arrival in Bombay, for the third time, we have already mentioned, he soon realised that

he was in the pleasantest of his temporary homes, where work was not excessive, and relief from the extreme heat was procurable within his own territorial limits at Mahableswar. But the cup was not without bitterness: the very rest and calm that he outwardly enjoyed, while affording opportunity for reflection and retrospect, made the memories of a stormy past additionally unpleasant by contrast. His mind dwelt upon the vicissitudes of his old friends the Amirs; and the recurring rumours of military movements in the country of which they had been dispossessed, filled him with anxiety. His too thin skin and innate hatred of falsehood kept him in a state of worry and irritation at the personal attacks levelled at him by anonymous writers in Sind and Bombay; for the 'infant Press' of the former province vied with some of the more experienced papers in the Presidency in misrepresenting his acts and words.

But the subject which most engrossed his attention was the preparation and publication of his 'Commentary,' in reply to the 'Conquest of Scinde,' a work the spirit and conclusions of which were opposed to his own reason and judgment, and to which personal concern and knowledge of the subject treated, bound him, as it were, in honour to reply. Writing to his mother on the eve of his departure from the Southern Konkan, and informing her of the success of his campaign, and congratulations thereon of the Governor-General, he had thus clearly expressed what were the drawbacks to his satisfaction:—"I cannot rest under the misrepresentations cast upon me in the Napier work, and hope it may induce Government to permit me to defend myself; in which case I have no fear of the result. . . . I have been so incessantly occupied since the first volume of William Napier's "Conquest of Scinde" came out, that I have had no time to turn my attention to the subject, and purposed waiting for the second . . . but the second does

not appear likely to come out. . . . There is too much in the first for me to pass over, but as soon as released from my present duty, I shall turn my attention to it.'

The occasion appears a fit one to notice the fact, that of the Sind prize-money to which Outram was entitled as a Major—a sum which apparently amounted to rupees 29,941, annas 7, and pái 9, or somewhat short of 3,000*l.*—he did not himself derive any personal benefit. To maintain the high principles which guided him in this matter, he made, as it has been correctly stated, 'a material sacrifice;' for he refused to accept a rupee of the booty 'resulting from the policy he opposed.'¹ His first impulse had been to make it over to the benefit of his ward, *Mír Husáin Ali*; but later consideration, and consultation with friends, caused him to abandon this plan which was beset with difficulty, and to substitute a simpler arrangement. The amount was wholly distributed in charitable objects. Among other recipients were Dr. Duff's² Indian Missionary Schools, his grant to which laid the foundation of an exceptionally warm mutual regard and esteem between those two large-hearted men, drawn together by human sympathies, yet outwardly walking in very different paths of life. An extract from one of his first letters (dated March 17, 1846) to this chivalrous soldier of the Gospel—whose sympathy in his righteous cause had been warmly expressed—gives a fair sample of the tone and substance of Outram's extensive private correspondence during these days of trial:—

. . . the favour I have to ask of you is, either that you would review my book yourself in the 'Friend,' or induce Mr. Marshman to do so. . . I do think that in your hands much may be done, while advocating the cause of the Ameers, or rather, disapproving of the course of violence and injustice pursued towards them and their

¹ *Standard*, March 26, 1863.

² The Rev. Alexander Duff, D.D., L.L.D., the first Missionary to India of the Established Church of Scotland—afterwards of the Free Church. His biography, written by Dr. George Smith, has lately appeared in two volumes.

country, to forward the interests of philanthropy, and to deter future rulers from so recklessly trampling on the rights of their equals in the eyes of the Almighty. I rejoice in the forbearing course which our present Governor-General has pursued towards even wanton transgressors against us (though there is some excuse even for them, afforded by our previous acts to others). What a contrast to *our* wanton attack on the Ameers, and greedy appropriation of *Sinde* !¹ Sir H. Hardinge's measures will be a salutary example to future Governors-General, who will I hope turn the resources of this vast empire to better purpose, than forming costly armaments to subjugate our neighbours ; expending the resources placed at their disposal in great works, calculated to ameliorate the condition of the wretched lower classes of our subjects, and to promote the welfare of the interior of neglected India ere further attempts are made to extend our dominions. . . . I have yet another favour to ask of you ; it is for your advice how to dispose of my *Sinde* prize money, to the best advantage of my unfortunate ward, Meer Hoosain Ali, to whom I consider myself bound to restore this mite out of what has been taken from him. I wrote to Captain Gordon on the subject long ago, but we have yet come to no definite understanding. My share is estimated at about 4,000*l.*, which of course I never for a moment intended to take to myself. I have a good mind for the benefit of the captives to claim share as 'commissioner' on the same scale as was, I understand, granted to Mr. Robertson after the Rangoon war.

¹ The gradual development of the 'Sind question' is graphically indicated in one of Outram's undated memoranda which explains, as follows, how he first suspected that the property of the Amirs of Sind would be appropriated as PRIZE:—

'On the evening before I left Sir Charles (February 20, 1843), he and some other officers and myself were standing together, when some swords were brought from the Guard for the purpose of my selecting one for purchase, at the sale of the prize property taken on the field of Meancee, which was to take place in a few days ; Sir Charles Napier having kindly said he would buy for me the one I preferred. Having selected one, Sir Charles asked me what price I would authorise him to bid for it. I replied, "Buy it in at any price, and I will throw my share of prize money into the prize fund in lieu of the sword, which I believe will about cover the purchase money, which cannot, I suppose, exceed 200 or 300 rupees." On this Sir Charles expressed some dissent as to my estimate of the value of my share, which first caused me to suspect that *further* appropriation was contemplated ; and I exclaimed, "Why, surely nothing can be considered prize property beyond what was actually

Towards the close of 1845, however, his attention was drawn away to the state of affairs in the Panjáb. Suddenly it became known that the Sikh army had crossed the Satlaj; and, as an immediate necessity, war followed. Outram could not resist the impulse: at the first prospect of this eventuality, he applied to the Governor-General, through the private secretary, for employment in the field. The letter was transferred to the Commander-in-Chief, who intimated that he would be happy to see the applicant in his camp, if he could obtain leave of absence from his own Government. On receipt of this reply, he had already addressed himself to that Government for six months' leave of absence; and the Bombay authorities told him they had forwarded his application to the Supreme Government, with a remark that they did not feel justified in granting the leave, though fully appreciating the object for which it was sought. Finally, the Government of India signified to the Government of Bombay concurrence in its views, 'that it would not be right to grant the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram,' adding the judicious words, 'whose services at this time are more than ordinarily required at his present post.' Pending this correspondence, or from December 18 to February 11 inclusive—we give the dates of Outram's first application and the final letter on the subject from the Bombay secretariat—the battles of Múdkí, Firuz-Shah, Aliwal, and Sobraon had been fought, and the overthrow of the Sikhs had been effected in an unusually brief and brilliant campaign.¹

found on the battle-field." The General did not reply, but from his look I judged that my suspicions were well-founded, and this caused me then to beg Sir Charles to excuse me from a duty which he had previously assigned to me, *i.e.* to go on his behalf next morning to take formal possession of the fortress.'

¹ How he would have travelled had he been permitted to proceed to the Panjáb, we are thus told by Colonel (then Captain) Balcarras Ramsay, who was to have been his companion: 'He offered to take me with him, riding camel-dák 100 miles a day. Fortunately for me this did not come off. I afterwards tried twenty miles one day, and was almost dislocated by the motion.'

Outram was one of those who, with all his military ambition, was not desirous of war, for the mere sake of obtaining opportunities of distinction as a soldier; nor was he captiously prone to criticise, as do many otherwise good warriors, the victories of generals in which he had personally borne no part. A year had not expired since he had assumed charge of the Satára Residency, when we find him expressing in a letter to Lord Jocelyn his apprehensions lest the retention of so many troops as were then employed in Sind should lead to mischief, on political and other grounds.

‘I do hope,’ he wrote, ‘the advocates of war will be unable to fan the flame, and I think we have every reason to be satisfied with the settlement which has been effected. . . . I, in common with every practical man in India, not blinded by self-interest in advocating extension of empire and increase to the army, rejoice heartily at the result of the most formidable war we ever have been engaged in here, and deeply feel how much we owe to Sir Henry Hardinge, whose extraordinary merits at this momentous crisis will hardly, I fear, be appreciated as they deserve, nor until the whole facts of the case are—if, indeed, they ever can be—placed before the public. I have not a doubt that the Governor-General’s moderation towards the Sikhs will have the most beneficial effects on every Hindoo State in India, each of which would have regarded our appropriation of the Panjáb as the prelude to its own absorption. The princes of India will now repose, *for a time at least*, in confidence and content.’

His duties at the Residency were not more exciting than laborious. The Rajah Shahji, *alias* Appa Sahib, a middle-aged Maratha, whom it was his province to advise and keep as much as possible in a straight path, had special cause for good behaviour, and was perhaps as fairly loyal to the foreign arbitrators of his destiny, as any descendant of Sivaji was

likely to be. Enthroned by British authority in 1839, in place of his brother Partáb Singh, he was himself a living example of British justice and adherence to those treaty engagements, violation of which had caused the deposition of his predecessor. The Jágirdárs who, under Government guarantee, were his acknowledged feudatories, 'bound to contribute towards the dignity and security of his principality either by tribute, by contingents of horse, or by the aid of all their force when required,'¹ gave little, if any more trouble than their neighbours to the supervising English officer. During the government of the Peshwa, they had exercised the powers of life and death, but the conquest of the Dekhin by the British Government had subjected their proceedings in this and other respects to a wholesome supervision; and it became as much the Resident's duty to watch over the Jágirdárs in their minority, and control the financial condition and civil and criminal administration of their estates, as to attend to the interests of the Rajah himself. The work of the British officer was not, as we have said, excessive; but what with the occurrence of murder on one estate, robbery on another, charges preferred of bribery and corruption, and incessant petitions submitted on miscellaneous matters, there was generally some special question pending, for investigation or under investigation, to which the Resident might devote more or less of his time as he saw fit. The main

¹ *Memoir on the Satára Territory*, by Mr. T. Ogilvy, late Commissioner of Satára, Bombay, 1854. See also narrative of the *Early History of the Bhonslays of Satára*, by Mr. H. B. Frere, Resident (1848). The Jágirdárs with whom agreements had been entered into by the Honourable East India Company, shortly after conditional restoration of his territory to the Satára Rajah in 1819, were five in number: viz. the Rajah of Akalkot, the Pant Sacheo, the Pant Pratiniddhi, the Deshmukh of Phaltan, commonly called the Nimbalkar; and the Deshmukh of Jath and Daflápur called the 'Daflé.' There was also a separate agreement containing certain land alienations to a second class Jágirdár, Shaikh Mira Wáikar, conditionally on his keeping up a contingent of ten horse 'constantly in the service of his Highness the Rajah of Satára.'

element of trouble in the Satára State may be said to have been the existence, at Banáras, of the ex-Rajah, whose 'Wakil' was, in Outram's time, promoting or striving to promote his master's interests in England. That the proceedings of these persons affected Rajah Shahji's peace of mind may be judged from the Resident's reports to Government, one of which, written in 1847, contains the following passage:—

Although his Highness is ever willing to do whatever the British Government requires of him, he very possibly may not now have the future prosperity of his country so earnestly at heart, as most undoubtedly he formerly had; being led, I suspect—by the reports promulgated by the ex-Rajah's Vakeels in London giving exaggerated representations of the effect of their agitation in favour of the ex-Rajah—to apprehend that his tenure of the *Raj* is by no means secure, and feeling, as he does, not a little chagrined at the late demands upon him on behalf of the ex-Rajah, which he conceives will be principally employed in promoting that very agitation. [Allusion is here made to a remission of 12,000 rupees in an annual sum of 1,20,000, deducted from the reigning Rajah's revenues for the support of his exiled relative—which remission was afterwards revoked]. At the same time (Outram continues), it is due to his Highness to add that he in no way neglects the performance of his public duties, to which he is as attentive as ever; and I certainly cannot but concede to him from this fact the quality of an excellent disposition which might be turned to the best account under more encouraging circumstances.

There is little of general or of lasting interest to extract from Outram's official correspondence at this period, though throughout the volumes in which it is contained, there is evidence of the same conscientious care and attention to details which is found in his fulfilment of all Government duty. If instances were required of his scrupulous regard to the interests of his employers, one is apparent in an application to Bombay for the Governor's sanction to his letting 'a

detached garden' belonging to the Residency, so as to provide funds for keeping in repair certain buildings heretofore maintained at the cost of the State. He was informed that the garden being at his disposal while holding his appointment of Resident, he might make such arrangements regarding it as he pleased.

At Satára, he settled down into those sedentary habits, without exercise, which characterised him ever afterwards, when not employed in the field. His health can hardly be said to have been uniformly good, for we find him, in March 1847, obtaining a month's leave to the Presidency on medical certificate: but it does not appear that he suffered from any serious ailment. In the previous year he had been absent for a few weeks at Ahmadnagar on court-martial duty. The two closely printed volumes of the 'Commentary' will be sufficient evidence of how little leisure he allowed himself from harassing head-work during the years 1845 and 1846, independently of current duties and the routine of office. One was printed for private circulation, at Bombay, in the former, and one in the latter year. His brother-in-law, Mr. George Sligo, and his warm and single-hearted friend, Colonel Barnewall, looked after the publication of the book in England, where it underwent a course of condensation and trimming to meet the tastes of home readers.¹

In May 1847, Colonel Outram was appointed by Sir George Clerk, who had succeeded Sir George Arthur in the Government of Bombay, to be British Resident at Baroda. A letter addressed to his mother from the Mahableshtar

¹ In the preface to the Bombay edition he says: 'To literary elegance I make no pretensions; artistically to construct a narrative, is an accomplishment which I do not possess, and I have deemed it better to entrust my labours, in their present bulky and crude form, to friends in England on whose judgment I can rely for their reduction to a more elegant shape and readable character, than to attempt the task myself; lest in attempting to condense I might overprune, as by too much amplifying I fear I have diluted.'

hills, on the 17th of that month, informed her that Mrs Outram and he were about to start, 'all well and quite reconciled to the change—though,' he added, 'we certainly shall look back to these pleasant hills with regret.' A steamer was to convey them from Bankot, the nearest port, to Tankaria on the coast of Gujrát, about forty miles from their destination. They expected to be about three days at sea, and to do the land journey in three stages. He expressed himself well satisfied with his transfer to the new Residency, which he justly called 'the highest political situation under the Bombay Government.' The nomination was, moreover, significant of the estimation in which his services were held by his own official superiors.

Baroda was not quite a new field to Outram. During his period of service in the Máhi-Kánta—the Political Agency of which district, as that of the Rewa Kánta and Kathiawár, was subordinate to the Political Commissionership of Gujrát—he had had some experience of its Gáikawár and people; and though the association had scarcely been promising, he hoped it might be in his power to effect wholesome reforms in the interests of ruler and subjects, and to the satisfaction of the Government of Bombay. The rampant evil of the place was the existence of a system of bribery and corruption to which we have already alluded¹ under its familiar local name of *Khatpat*. In Hindustani, the word signifies 'contention.' According to one authority—'employed in some of the languages of India to denote active, toilsome, vexatious business—it is conventionally and most frequently used in the sense of endeavouring to accomplish private purposes by means of corrupt and hidden interest; chiefly bribery is understood.'² But whatever the true verbal meaning, the thing signified

¹ Chapter V. Vol. I. Book I. p. 146.

² Mr. John Chapman, author of *The Cotton and Commerce of India, considered in Relation to Great Britain*.

was unfortunately a local institution. Like the dragon of classical and fabulous times, it poisoned the atmosphere, and defied all but extraordinarily gifted assailants. Dangerous to oppose in any circumstances, it could only be overcome by deliberate and continuous warfare, for it was hydra-headed and, to be destroyed, must be beaten in detail. Outram had taken note of this monster in 1835. His report on the affairs of the Māhi-Kānta, prepared at Baroda in that year for Sir Robert Grant's information, refers to it vaguely, perhaps, but with evident meaning,¹ in its concluding paragraph from which the following is an extract :—

I am not quite certain whether it is the wish of Government that I should enter into details respecting what I conceive to be the origin and causes of the existing disturbances in Guzerat : but I may perhaps be permitted to state, that every authority that I had an opportunity of consulting, attributes them in a great measure to the decline of our influence at Baroda, and to the very opposite system of policy pursued towards his Highness the Guickwar by the Governments of Sir John Malcolm and the Right Honourable the Earl of Clare. I greatly fear that our character for integrity and good faith has received a severe shock—not that I pretend to pass any opinion upon the merits of the measures pursued by either Government. A general bad feeling exists, and this is not surprising, when it is considered how many interests have suffered from our change of policy. The payments to the Baroda Sowkar are reported to be fictitious—those who held our pledges preferring rather to trust to the Guickwar, than to believe in guarantees which they saw, or fancied they saw, we had no disposition to enforce ; and all the officers who adhered to us, connected with the Guickwar contingent, have either been dismissed, or have been compelled to pay large fines (in the shape of *nuzzcranas*), for their services to us, and for readmission to favour. Several hundred men have been discharged, who propagate accounts through-

¹ In his famous report of October 1851, he distinctly states that 'the existence throughout Guzerat of a firm belief in the efficacy of *khutpat* was brought to his notice soon after assuming the office of Political Agent for the Māhi-Kānta, in 1835.

out the country (no doubt exaggerated) of the unworthy treatment (as they naturally consider it) they have received from us. The consequence is that the European character is no longer respected as it used to be in Guzerat, and I fear it will be a long period before a more favourable impression can be created. Certainly not while those who support us are not efficiently protected.'

One cause for the deterioration of the British name in the eyes of the natives he assigned to the supposition that our public officers could be swayed in the administration of justice by secret influences—that favouritism could be purchased by gold, or gain of some kind—that *khatpat*, however openly an acknowledged idol of the Hindu, might meet with a certain regard from even the Christian legislator. As regards his own early proceedings in the matter, the story is a long one and somewhat out of date. We shall therefore only attempt it in outline.

Sarabhái, a Nagar Brahman, influential among his fellows from caste and position, was *kārbāri*, or managing clerk and confidential native agent of the Political Commissioner in Gujrát, when Captain Outram took charge of the Máhi-Kánta in 1835. This man's relatives, connections, and friends had been planted here and there in Government offices within his immediate range of personal supervision, and also in comparatively distant localities where British administration prevailed. Hence had been obtained a *personnel*, which the support of wealthy bankers and, it might be, of the Gaikawár himself (their sleeping partner), had enabled to grow into a secret family association, working a considerable amount of mischief. A disputed claim to succeed to the property and chieftdom of a deceased Thákúr soon enlightened the new Political Agent on the character of their intrigues. The elder widow in this case pleaded the right of a relative of her own whom she had adopted: the younger

widow claimed the inheritance for a posthumous son. On seemingly conclusive evidence that the child put forward by the second was illegitimate, the British adjudicating officer in Gujrát decided in favour of the former. Outram had cause for doubting the justice of this decision, which was consequently called in question, and, on a fresh inquiry, reversed. It was found that bribery and subornation of perjury had been resorted to; and the two suspected parties were the brother-in-law and successor in office of Sarabhái, and another Nagar Brahman, also employed in the commissioner's establishment. Contrary to Outram's wishes, these men were not formally tried on the evidence brought forward against them; and the investigation which was substituted for the trial was transferred from the hands of the political officers to those of the sessions judge, or from Sadra to Ahmadabad. As a result of the inquiry, one, the more important offender, escaped conviction, though his conduct was admitted by Government to have been 'not free from suspicion.' The other was convicted and dismissed from his official situation; but here his punishment ended: Government declined to adhere to the practice of a public notification of dismissal, which they preferred to reserve for more 'extreme cases.' Outram's view of the effect produced upon the native mind by these proceedings is clearly recorded in the published retrospect which forms the first part of his 'Khatpat Report' of later years. 'Can it be wondered at,' he writes, 'that the natives of Guzerat, cognisant of the circumstances above detailed, should have believed the Nagurs, when they pointed to this act of clemency as a new illustration of the secret power they exercised over the members of Government? They beheld the accomplice of Sarabhoy's brother-in-law made one of the first exceptions to the rule of public proclamation. And the Nagurs took good care to inform them that, three weeks

prior to the refusal of Government to proclaim Dowlut Ram, Mr. Sutherland, who had then become Political Commissioner, had sought permission to investigate the authenticity of a document which, if proved genuine, would have convicted Sarabhoy himself of disgraceful corruption; but that his letter remained unanswered.' ¹

It was, indeed, the story of the hydra. Outram was to cut off the heads, looking to Government for the fire, without the application of which other heads would arise from the maimed neck: but which, if instantly applied, would be the means of the monster's total destruction. The first effectual wound had been given, but the champion of right had not been supported, and new enemies appeared. And so on for the remainder of the 'khatpat' story. Outram followed up the case of the two native Government *employés* by further cases of perjury, subornation of perjury, and corruption arising out of it; and more than one honest fellow-countryman lent his aid to the cause where such was available, or his sympathy where he could not lend his aid. On the other hand, the members of the local government were unwilling to play the required part. They either could not, or would not, see with the eyes of their zealous representative, or admit the presence of an evil such as he described. They were supine, when he would have had them active; indifferent, when he would have had them indignant; and weakly lenient when he would have had them justly severe. At length the time drew near for his departure to Afghanistan, and matters had not improved. There was much comfort in the thought that he might be useful in his new sphere; but he could not feel otherwise than sad at the ill-success which had attended his efforts to do honour to the British name in Gujrát. One letter from Government especially distressed him: it was a tardy reply to a request which he had made

¹ *Baroda Blue Book*, pages 1344-45.

for the punishment of an offending Thákur. He had used language, stronger, perhaps, and more dictatorial than customary for a subordinate to adopt in addressing a higher authority; and, after six months, he was informed that the 'judgment of Government was not to be influenced by public opinion;' that 'its object was alone to do justice,' and more to the same effect—in other words that he would do well to agitate himself less, and have more confidence in the discrimination and good sense of his passive official superiors. As a parting venture, he determined, in acknowledgment of this communication, on making a new appeal to the feelings of those who so little appreciated his acts and motives; and, thus resolved, indited a long letter, through the Commissioner of Gujrát, to the Bombay Government in the 'Secret Department.' Those who knew the writer's ways were not surprised that this missive partook rather of the character of an *argumentum ad hominem* than of a regulation despatch.

Outram explained the reason for putting his letter into the 'Secret Department' to be that he was, in it, 'reluctantly compelled to tell unpleasant truths' which it might be 'deemed unadvisable to place on record.' He also expressed his readiness to suppress the letter, provided its justice were admitted, and Government 'impressed with the necessity of adopting measures to remedy the evils' exposed. 'Otherwise,' he added to the Political Commissioner, 'I must solicit permission to proceed to Baroda, where I require the assistance of the records of your office to prove, beyond the power of refutation, the facts I advance; and this I pledge myself to do.' The better to accomplish this most unpleasant duty, he proposed, with a self-denial which needs no comment, to sacrifice his most cherished ambition: viz. the opportunity of field service first offered to him under the most favourable auspices.

What this would have cost him, and how the proposal fell through, will be seen in the following selection from the paragraphs of his own report :—

In the event of Government doubting the accuracy of any of the foregoing propositions (he is here referring to fifteen carefully summarised statements of fact)—I avowed my readiness to substantiate them beyond the possibility of cavil, even though to do so would have involved the relinquishment of an object very dear to my heart. For preparations were then making for the invasion of Affghanistan; Lord Auckland had done me the honour to express a wish that I should serve on that expedition; and Sir John Keane had kindly enabled me to do so. And as I expressed myself to Government, ‘Having fully acquitted myself of the task assigned to me in the Mahee Kanta, and having seen the reformed police of Guzerat secured on a permanent footing, I could now depart with a free conscience, in the happy conviction of the continued and increasing prosperity of Guzerat,’ were I only assured that Government would at length arise, put forth its strength, and utterly crush the corruption it had hitherto so leniently dealt with. But till I had such an assurance, I had expressed my determination not to avail myself of the opportunity now presented to me of enjoying the exercise of my profession in the field, but to resume the arduous, distasteful, and seemingly thankless sphere of labour in which I had latterly been occupied.

My letter, as has been already said, was sent through the Political Commissioner, the prescribed official channel of my communications with Government. Soon after its despatch, I myself repaired to Bombay; and, lest some delays or doubts should occur to Mr. Sutherland, in respect of its transmission, I carried with me two copies of it. These I lost no time in placing, demi-officially, in the hands of the authorities. . . . One of the copies was submitted, through his private secretary, to the acting Governor, the other to secretaries of Government, and both were meant to be considered deliberate verbal communications of facts and opinions about to be submitted to them, on my behalf, by Mr. Sutherland. It was not long ere I discovered that my observations had made a considerable impression in the quarters where they were designed to produce that effect; and it was equally obvious that those who had perused my letter felt that, in volunteering to

substantiate my fifteen propositions, I had offered to do no more than I was fully competent to perform.

Such being the case, there was no necessity for sacrificing the opportunity of proceeding on active service—but, at the same time, I was hardly satisfied that the points thus gained entitled me to suppress my letter, as I had expressed my readiness to do, provided its justice was admitted, and Government was 'impressed with the necessity of adopting measures to remedy the evils I have now to represent.' But I was urged by my friends in office to do so, on the score that, officially speaking, Government was ignorant, and could take no cognisance of my letter till the original was received from Mr. Sutherland, which was then not the case; that the letter would thus come before Government in my absence, when I should not have it in my power to justify, qualify, explain, or apologise for the many strong phrases I had employed; and that having indirectly communicated my sentiments, I might safely rely on full justice being done by Government and Mr. Sutherland to the objects I had in view. At length, on the very day the force was to sail, the original not having arrived from Baroda, I agreed to leave a letter for Mr. Sutherland in the hands of one of the secretaries, in which I expressed myself as follows:—

'I have been anxiously looking out for the arrival, in Bombay, of my secret despatch, sent through you on the 26th ultimo, that I might have answered in person any remarks that Government might have to make; but, as it has not yet reached Government, my friends think that I should be placed at a great disadvantage by the letter coming after my departure, and I thus precluded from the possibility of defending myself. They have strongly advised me, therefore, to withdraw my letter, and to content myself with informing the Governor of my sentiments verbally. The latter I have accordingly done, and I do hope that Mr. Farish¹ will now see the necessity of doing something to destroy the power of *Nagurs* to do evil in future, and to clear us from the imputations under which we now suffer. . . . And I informed Mr. Sutherland that I had authorised Mr. Willoughby to return my letter to him.'

Not to find the reader perplexed on a later reference to the subject, we will add one more incident of Outram's early

¹ Acting Governor of Bombay at the time (1838).

sojourn in Gujrát. Venáik Moreshwár Farki, commonly called Bábá Farki, had accompanied to Baroda in 1831 the daughter-in-law of his deceased relative or connection, Hari Pant Farki, once commander-in-chief of the Peshwár army. His client had claims upon the Gáikawár and the banking-house of Hari Bhúgti, a settlement of which it was Bábá Farki's province to obtain, if practicable. He had, moreover, a personal claim of his own against the same defendants. After a period of fruitless negotiation, however, the lady returned home, leaving a deed of attorney in her kinsman's hands empowering him to act for her. In 1836, for some cause not apparent, the Gáikawár expelled Farki from the city of Baroda, and applied to the acting Resident to have him further excluded from the dominions of his Highness. Mr. Malet, the officer addressed, seeing that the man was a British subject, declined attending to the requisition until the personal claim had been adjusted. This was accordingly done, though not until many months had elapsed; and the Gáikawár renewed his application for Farki's expulsion from the territory. A qualified order to this effect was given; but the matter was referred to Bombay—the Bombay Government asked for more information—and the measure was never carried out in its entirety. Eventually, in 1837, Mr. Malet appointed Farki head *kárkum*¹ in the establishment of the first assistant commissioner at Rajpípla, an office which he discharged to the Resident's thorough satisfaction up to the departure of that gentleman in August 1839. Before this date, Outram had left Gujrát; but he had not failed to take note of Bábá Farki. 'That which most commended him to my own admiration,' he afterwards wrote, 'and that for which I think a deep and lasting debt of gratitude is due to him by Government, was the bold and

¹ Clerk, or native manager.

valuable assistance rendered by him to Mr. Malet and myself, in our attempts to trace out, expose, and crush the wholesale and detestable system of corruption, some of the features of which I have endeavoured to disclose in the foregoing sections. Without the zealous and unflinching assistance of Bábá Fudkey during the years 1837, 1838, and 1839, it would have been utterly impossible to convict the delinquents. No other native of any grade or caste, not in the public service, dared to render us open assistance at Baroda; but this man stood boldly forth as our co-operator before he had any office under Government, in defiance of all the power, wealth, and unscrupulous villainy by which the delinquents were supported. Keen, deep, and unforgiving was the hostility he thus drew on himself from all who were implicated in any degree in the hitherto rampant corruption of Guzerat; and these, as I have shown, embraced not only the leading people in the city and court of Baroda, but almost, if not every, individual in the native political establishments of Guzerat and Kattywar.'

So long as Mr. Malet officiated as political commissioner in Gujrát, and indeed for three and a half years after his departure from Baroda, Bábá Farkí's star was in the ascendant; but Fortune subsequently ceased to bestow her favours upon him. Falling under the displeasure of his immediate superiors, he was lowered in position, mulcted of salary and, because he did not readily accept degradation, turned out of office altogether. In a petition addressed to Government, he set forth the hardship of his case, and solicited that he might be appointed native agent; but his papers were referred for report to the very authority ruling his degradation, and the reply was such that Government, on receiving it, intimated an opinion that the petitioner was 'a very unfit person to be employed in any political capacity.' Notwithstanding this heavy blow, Farkí remained at Baroda in the hope that the

who felt it obligatory on the Resident to seek from his more fortunate competitor the aid and information he could himself have so well supplied. Narsu is described by Outram as 'a man of most winning manners, plausible and unobtrusive in his demeanour;' and the description is borne out by the testimony of other officers under whom he served, some of whom have confirmed their verbal opinion by more substantial advocacy of his merits. But the value of this outward glitter would not stand the test to which it was necessarily subjected. 'I had not been long in office,' wrote the same observer, 'ere I had good grounds for suspecting that my native agent was a rogue;' and, as the suspicion had reference to probable collusion with certain parties in an intricate case then under investigation, Outram 'sought for, but failed to obtain extraneous aid.' The only person coming up to the standard required was the dismissed Farki, but a ban had apparently been set upon him. Honesty was a scarce article in Baroda, and without honesty, any amount of ability would be useless.

It was not, however, clear to the new Resident upon what grounds the decision had been passed to his late *employé's* detriment; so he resolved to look into the matter and judge for himself. The result of a careful study into the proceedings satisfied him that 'Government had been misled into an act of great injustice. . . . Impressed with this conviction,' he wrote, 'I should have appealed on his behalf for a reconsideration of his case, had I not discovered that the prohibition against his re-employment had been virtually annulled by the permission granted to him, on July 5, 1847, to apply to the local authorities on the recurrence of a vacancy—a permission which appeared to me to be a tacit acknowledgment on the part of Government that its former condemnation had been hasty and unmerited.'

Outram accordingly sought his aid in investigating the

case then before him. 'At first,' he added, 'he objected . . on the ground that by exposing the rascality of Nursoo Punt, he would assuredly bring on himself a series of persecutions so soon as I left Baroda ; and, in justification of his fears, he reminded me of what he had already suffered in consequence of his exposure of the Nagur intrigues. I laughed at his fears. I assured him that no such persecutions as he dreaded would be tolerated at the present day ; and I succeeded in securing his services, much to the alarm and indignation of Nursoo Punt, my native agent, whose conduct the investigation placed in a very unfavourable light, and who, aware that I had obtained a general idea of his real character, and that I never forgave rascality in a political servant, thought it well to get his house in order, and to make arrangement for retiring on his pension.' The zeal and ability displayed by his assistant were such that Outram, trusting to the support of the superior authorities in Bombay, felt himself justified in recommending him for the office of native agent about to be vacated by Narsu Pant at his own expressed intention.

Before completion of the first year of his residential labours, the condition of the Panjāb again gave Government serious cause of anxiety. When Lord Hardinge left India towards the end of 1847, Northern India was outwardly calm ; but the new Governor-General was soon to discover that the vast empire committed to his charge could enjoy no permanent peace until the process of annexation had been applied to the more turbulent of its neighbours. In April 1848, the murder of Mr. Vans Agnew and Lieutenant Anderson by the soldiers of Diwan Mulraj, and the treachery of the native artillerymen and escort, who should have protected them, commenced the all-engrossing series of important events which abruptly recalled the attention of all India to the country of the Five Rivers. The subsequent action of Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes soon caused the

movements of that distinguished young officer to become the central point of interest and admiration. About a month before the battle of Kineri, Outram suggested to Sir Frederic Currie, then Resident of Lahor, the propriety of making a requisition for the services of the Sind camel corps and one regiment of Sind horse for the protection of Bhawalpúr from the inroads of the Multán rebels. He himself, if permitted, would undertake, in concert with Major Jacob, to carry out the proposed arrangements in detail. 'If you entrust my friend Jacob and myself with this duty,' he wrote, 'depend upon it we shall not lay idle, nor allow the Mooltanees to cross to this side of the river with impunity, and shall so puzzle Moolraj by our feints and movements as to deter him, in a great measure, if not altogether, from attempting any distant operations until our regular army can come down upon him.'

This proposal was afterwards somewhat modified into a more general suggestion that the two should be entrusted with a roving commission, in conjunction with the chief of Bhawalpúr, to distract the attention of the rebels to the utmost, pending preparation for their thorough subjection.¹ Later again, Outram submitted copies of his letters to Sir Frederic Currie, in an official form, to Lord Dalhousie, through the private secretary, with an offer of service. The reply was to the effect that the Governor-General would gladly see the applicant's services made available in any operations to be undertaken against Multán; but that as a force would probably be despatched from the Bombay Presidency to co-operate with the Bengal troops, he would do better to apply for active employment to his own Government. The

¹ On learning that the siege of Multán had been raised, Outram proposed a measure for strengthening General Whish's force by 800 sabres of the Sind horse and its light field guns, 8 flank companies of native regiments, and 450 bayonets of the Sind camel corps, with 500 camels for carriage purposes, to be thrown into the camp, on his own responsibility, within twenty days after receipt of order.

course indicated was followed, but with no success, although there was a lengthened correspondence on the subject, concluding with an expression of regret on the part of the Governor that advantage could not be taken of his offer.

As incidentally expressed in his first letter to Sir F. Currie, the loss of a dear and valued relative, by an act of perfidious treachery, gave additional stimulus to his hopes in volunteering for military duties. Lieutenant Anderson was Mrs. Outram's brother, and the intelligence of his death had shed a gloom over the residency circle at Baroda. In a letter to his mother from that place, dated May 16, 1848, Outram thus alludes to the circumstances of the murder:—
‘It is indeed a sad, sad termination to the career of one of the noblest young men I ever knew, when he thought he had attained a sure path to fame and honour. Our last letter from him, written the day he embarked at Lahore to sail down to Mooltan, was full of hope and joy. . . .’¹

Once more Outram addressed himself to the private secretary of the Governor-General; but at this juncture the state of his health rendered a change of scene and climate imperative. We gather from one of Mr. Willoughby's many letters to his address that he had suffered from an attack of erysipelas in the autumn of 1847. Again, at the same season in the following year, as we read in the printed *Memoir* from which we have before quoted, ‘the excessive mental fatigue’ he had undergone, ‘co-operating with the proverbial unhealthiness’ of the locality in which the Gāikawār had established his court, ‘developed symptoms of an alarming nature.’ Egypt had been recommended to him by his medical advisers as a suitable climate, and his application for leave to proceed thither had been in the hands of the local Government before receipt of his request

¹ See Appendix I.

for employment in the field. The circumstance had called for comment; and to this he had replied: 'Were the cause of my availing myself of this leave (my first absence from India in thirty years, except once for nine months to England) of such a nature that my health might be endangered by changing Mooltan for Egypt, it need be of little consideration where the risk of death itself is of course disregarded by a soldier; but it happens that active exertion is what my medical advisers consider most beneficial for me, wherever obtained, to avert recurrence of the malady which nearly caused my death about this time last year, on which account they have recommended Egypt as affording the means of active occupation and relaxation for a time from sedentary duties. . . . I trust his Lordship will bear in mind that, in wishing to substitute hard service with the army for pleasant travelling in Egypt, I could only be actuated by the same zeal for the public service which has ever heretofore impelled me to seek service in the field, at whatever sacrifice of personal comfort or pecuniary cost.'

He embarked, with Mrs. Outram and his recently-widowed niece, Lady Harris, early in November, and reached Suez during the same month. Those were the days of vans, when parties of six were made up on board ship for selected companionship in the journey, to and fro, across the desert. It was quite natural and easy for the outward-bound to stop the homeward-bound, should one convoy cross the other between Suez and Cairo. Such incidents, notwithstanding the delay occasioned, could not be otherwise than agreeable to travellers uninfluenced by special motives for hurry or seclusion. To some the mere temporary cessation of jolting, obtained by accident to horse, van, or harness, necessitating a halt, was a welcome relief; and many a pleasant half-hour has thus accrued to the weary Anglo-Indian traversing Egypt

by van. We learn from a recently-published memoir of exceptional interest,¹ that the van containing the Outrams on this occasion met that in which Sir Henry and Lady Lawrence were returning towards India from a brief sojourn in England. Lawrence, we are told, 'got out, and, in the twilight, had ten minutes' talk with Colonel Outram.' The much esteemed lady who records the circumstance, in a letter to her son, adds:—'They have long known each other by character, and corresponded pleasantly, but have never met before. There is much alike in their characters; but Colonel Outram has had peculiar opportunities of protesting against tyranny, and he has refused to enrich himself by ill-gotten gains. You cannot, my boy, understand the question about the conquest of Sindh . . . but I wish you to know that your parents consider it most unjust. Prize-money has been distributed to those concerned in the war. Colonel Outram, though a very poor man, would not take money which he did not think rightfully his, and distributed all his share in charity—giving 800*l.* to the Hill Asylum at Kussowlee. I was glad, even in the dark, to shake hands with one whom I esteemed so highly.'

Singularly enough, this was the first meeting between two men who, with all their diversities of taste and disposition, were, despite of separation, instinctively drawn to each other. James Outram could not but admire so true a man as Henry Lawrence, and did not hide his appreciation of his noble qualities. Lawrence not only admired and spoke his admiration of Outram, but recorded his opinions of him in widely circulated contributions to periodical literature. On reaching Cairo after the incident above noted, Outram seems to have written to his natural friend, proposing to discard the superficial formality which a newly-acquired title might

¹ *Life of Sir Henry Lawrence*, by Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale, C.B. (Smith, Elder and Co.)

have introduced into their correspondence, had it not been fairly brushed away by the chance interchange of personal greeting. For in Sir Henry's reply from Suez, thanking him for his 'kind letter,' we read: 'You seem to have forgotten that before we met we had got beyond the ceremonies in addressing each other. I hope our hasty glance at each other's faces by starlight will not make us more ceremonious. My luck having been greater than yours is certainly no reason; for no man is more of opinion that *you* ought to have been a K.C.B. years ago than myself.' Allusion is made to the sum paid to the Kasauli Institution, in a few lines from Lady Lawrence, added as a postscript to her husband's letter just quoted:—'We have received newspapers telling us who is the benefactor of our Hill School Asylum. Your benefaction is not the less acceptable because it comes in the form of allegiance to what we believe a righteous cause.' The subject had clearly been broached at the brief interview, but Outram had then veiled, as he was always accustomed to veil, his own identity when dispensing charitable gifts.

Mrs. Outram left Egypt to return home in December. 'I longed to get off from Alexandria, which was intolerable after you left,' he wrote to her on the 19th of that month, 'but was obliged to stay four days on a steamer offered, and then I came up in the same little steamer in which we went down the Nile, much more crowded than before, almost entirely with Turks and foreigners. Fortunately we had rather a quick voyage—twenty-seven hours and a half.' In the same letter he referred with interest to his proposed land route to Tunis, and mentioned that, through the aid of the Rev. Mr. Leider, the well-known missionary at Cairo, who had procured him a teacher, he had commenced the study of Arabic. But he thus diffidently expressed his doubts of attaining proficiency in that most difficult language:—

‘As I have had no practice in learning languages for thirty years past, I fear I shall prove a very stupid pupil.’

Of Outram’s life in Egypt during the year 1849, we are enabled to form a tolerably good idea from his home correspondence and the bulky volume of his Confidential Memoir on the country of his sojourn. The first gives us an insight into his varying tone of thought and outdoor occupations; the second supplies in itself conclusive evidence of the serious nature of his labours with the pen. One of the earliest annoyances which he experienced on being left alone, was the receipt of a disappointing letter from the Governor-General’s private secretary. It was a reply to his renewed application for employment in the field, explaining that, as his own Government had considered compliance with his request ‘inexpedient with reference to the public service,’ so would it ‘be contrary to all precedent and propriety for the Governor-General to interfere’ in the matter. This abrupt disposal of his suit—coupled with other indications of disfavour—jarred upon his sensitiveness. He looked upon it as virtual shelving—a slight from superior authority such as he had in no way merited.¹ There was no better remedy than turning to the best account his presence in the land of the Pharaohs. He would study that region, not as shrouded in the mist of antiquity—for he was no antiquarian—but in its modern political and military aspect. He would not go

¹ One of the annoyances to which he was subjected about this period arose from a claim erroneously made against him by the Pay Department for a refund of Sind prize money, on the plea that, as he held a civil appointment when the battle of Miáni was fought, he was not entitled to draw any. This matter was all the more serious, as the money, having been all distributed in charity long before, he possessed no funds whence to make good so ruinous a demand; and the large sum required could only have been recovered by instalments out of his pay—no pleasant prospect for a sick and wearied man! Nor was it until the Court of Directors had pointed out the mistaken interpretation put upon his position by the local authority, that the difficulty was removed.

back to Cambyzes and the Ptolemys, but confine his retrospect to the more distinct and intelligible period of Napoleon and Kleber. At the same time he would learn the Arabic language, so commonly spoken or understood in the cities and surrounding country; and if opportunity offered he would explore routes of international traffic. Travel and practical investigation—with the knowledge that he was working for a purpose, and in the hope that his recorded experiences might be advantageous to his country—these would, perhaps, enable him to shake off the disappointment occasioned by want of active professional occupation such as it had been a solace to him to dream of in the corrupt atmosphere of Baroda.

But the distant Panjáb war-note, while, in one sense, it had healthily diverted his mind from the less obvious hissing of the dragon of 'Khatpat,' had in other respects disturbed his equanimity for regarding things immediately before him. And much more was this the case in Egypt, where he was holding no recognised official position. The intelligence from the seat of war distressed him; he feared lest our ill-success at Ramnagar might have a bad effect throughout the interior of India; he wrote to Mr. Willoughby to have a news letter waiting for him at Cosseir on the north-western shores of the Red Sea, meaning to terminate the first section of his local wanderings at that point, and, if necessary, embark there for Bombay. Mr. Willoughby did write, but his letter was not delivered to Outram until he had returned from Cosseir to Cairo on March 3. As in this and other communications from Indian correspondents, the critical state of our affairs in the Panjáb, notwithstanding the battle of Chilianwala, was described in gloomier colours than those shown by the writers in the public press, he deemed it his duty to repair at once to his Indian post, thinking, as he himself expressed it to his wife, in the idiom of the day, 'that every officer who

has eaten the Company's salt is bound to do so likewise, in whatever part of the world he may happen to be situated.' Thus reasoning, 'I have determined,' he continued, 'to return to India with the mail expected from home the day after to-morrow, being quite sure you will approve my resolve. Indeed, as a man of honour, I could not do otherwise, were I tenfold more enamoured of Egypt than I really am; but I regret much not having time left me to visit Rosetta and Damietta, with which and all the western coast I wished to be thoroughly acquainted—as well as with the route between Alexandria and Tunis. That, however, I now find by my Indian letter is a sealed book to me, for, in reply to the queries I sent to Bombay, I am informed that my tether extends only to 36 degrees of north latitude, and 30 longitude E. of Greenwich.'

So that after about sixteen weeks, the invalid was re-crossing the sea to his work again, when his health required that he should have remained for at least as many months. As it happened, his voyage eastward ended this time at Aden.¹ There he learnt full particulars of the success obtained by Lord Gough over the Sikhs at Gujerát; and its effect had been to dissipate the cloud in which defeat, or doubtful victory, had begun to envelop the British name. He had nothing now to do but retrace his steps. In any case, had he proceeded direct to Bombay, he could not have rejoined the office of Resident at Baroda; for his *locum tenens* was entitled to a year's tenure of the acting appointment, and half that time would not have expired until late in May. On his return passage to Suez, he passed the H. C. steamer 'Firúz,' the signals from which vessel communicated the circumstance

¹ The present biographer can certify the fact from personal knowledge, having been an outward passenger by the 'Oriental,' which conveyed Colonel Outram from Suez on this particular occasion. The passage occupied some seven or eight days, and the steamer had consumed all her coal before reaching Aden.

that Sir Charles Napier had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the army in India. Though he could hardly be indifferent to a nomination which augured little advancement to his interest at head-quarters, Outram afterwards admitted that the Court of Directors could not well have done otherwise, under the popular pressure resulting from a *quasi* panic.

Returning to his self-imposed labours in Egypt, Outram visited Damietta: coming back to Cairo for the English and Indian mails due early in May, then proceeding to Rosetta, to inspect its fortifications as he had done those of Damietta.¹ In June, at Alexandria, he was seriously ill from acute spinal rheumatism, brought on by imprudently bathing, when a sufferer from a slight attack. To shake this off he took a cruise to the coast of Syria, embarking for Syra, in an Austrian Lloyd's steamer, on the 20th of the month. For the first few days he described the 'excruciating agony suffered' to be such as, had he not experienced it himself, he 'should have thought mortal frame could not bear;' food he could not 'touch of any sort,' living 'entirely on tea;' and he had become so reduced as to be unable to 'walk without support.' But after completing his quarantine at Syra, his health began to improve, and at Smyrna, under the care of 'an excellent physician,' Dr. Wood, he found himself 'almost free from rheumatism,' and, though still very weak, 'able to sit up and write.' After a further cruise, he finally left the last-named place on the 13th, and arrived at Bairût on the 17th August. Hence he rode up to the Lebanon, where he had once contemplated passing the hot weather, but the trip was enough to satisfy him, and he forthwith rode down again. The possibility of meeting his friend Mr. Bax, on his outward journey to India, may have hastened somewhat his return to Egypt; but in a letter to Mrs. Outram from Cairo, dated

¹ On this occasion he was too ill to leave his boat, but he revisited Damietta and Rosetta both, at a later season of the year

October 2, he says that he was never better in bodily health ; so that he may have considered the object of his trans-Alexandria tour to have been accomplished, and that there was yet work for him to do in putting a finishing stroke to his Memoir. Moreover, in the same letter, he mentions his intention of making 'one more trip to Damietta, to complete survey in neighbourhood.'

From this time until re-embarkation at Suez in the 'Ajdaha,' on January 21, 1850, his letters home were not long or many. But we remark in them his naturally-expressed disinclination to remain in Baroda, where he was placed so unfortunately in opposition to his own Government. To such extent, indeed, was he influenced by this feeling, that he applied to Lord Dalhousie for an exchange to Nagpur, on the occurrence of an expected vacancy ; though he entertained little hope of receiving a favourable reply. 'It went much against my grain,' he wrote, 'to make the application—the first time I ever asked for anything :¹ but I would submit to much rather than return to Baroda.' He 'longed for' home, and indulged in visions of some quiet retreat there, in which he and his wife and son might live together in peace, until time should bring about a more propitious state of things—probably a change in the *personnel* of Governments. His only practical course, however, was to return to India for a while alone, and by 'saving every penny' (to him an entirely new process), scrape together enough to eke out his furlough pay for two or three years. He would have almost preferred retirement from the service altogether, had his means permitted : and to have become Lieutenant-Governor of Addiscombe, in succession to Sir Ephraim Stannus, then shortly to retire, would have been to him a

¹ This, of course, alludes to a distinct substantive appointment, and can have no reference to service in the field, for which he was always ready to volunteer.

most acceptable contingency. Readers will not be wanting to sympathise with and appreciate Outram's feelings at this time. There is no doubt, however, that physical suffering served to heighten the despondency with which he beheld, and to darken the colours in which he depicted, the vexations of his position in India.

We have already said that Outram's 'Memoir on Egypt' bears on the face of it evidence of heavy work at the desk. But it is also indicative of much thought and research; and is an admirable example of the useful account to which an able and active-minded soldier may turn a twelve or fifteen months' furlough in a foreign country. The body of the Memoir consists of more than a hundred pages of closely-printed foolscap, divided into twelve sections. Of these, the first deals mainly with the fortifications of Alexandria, but is in other respects a political review; the second is a valuable notice of the resources of Egypt, touching on military establishments, revenues, agricultural products, and means of transport; the third is a retrospect of French campaigns under the first Napoleon; and the remaining nine may be generally classed together under the heads of political, strategical, and hypothetical. The appendices are more bulky than the Memoir itself. Unlike the latter, however, which underwent revision at the hands of a friend unnamed, they were submitted as first put together, the original matter being transcribed from entries in a commonplace book, or 'memoranda made on the backs and margins of the documents to which they refer.' Outram was anxious to lay before Government, as soon as possible after his return to India, the data he had collected, and there was much statistical and geographical information to be imparted in these rough accompaniments to his main report. 'To have attempted,' he wrote, 'to correct and prune the masses of appended matter which accompany this Memoir, would have entailed a

delay in its presentation which I was most anxious to avoid, and I have consoled myself with the reflection that, if the information contained in my appendices is, as I believe it to be, worth obtaining, the labour and time spent in traversing its details, pursuing its repetitions, and overcoming its hasty style of expression, will not be grudged, or, at all events, will not be entirely misspent.’¹

In the preface to the whole collection of papers he acknowledges his obligations to Mr. Thurburn, the Hon. Mr. Murray, then British Consul-General, and his brother Captain Murray, R.N., Captain Stoddart, R.N., Mr. Lane, and his nephew Mr. Stuart Poole, the Rev. Mr. Lieder, and the leading members of the English community in Egypt; also the valuable co-operation which he received from Colonel Le Messurier, Lieut. Constable I.N., and Lieut. Playfair of the Madras artillery. Of one of the friends above named, Mr. Stuart Poole, Outram wrote that ‘his knowledge of the country and its languages was of great service’ to him; moreover, that he accompanied him in the most important of all those journeys to and fro, for which sufficient explanation must be found in ‘a tourist’s whims’ and the injunctions laid on him by his medical attendants ‘to keep constantly on the move.’ To this gentleman we are now indebted for a few reminiscences of the subject of our biography at the period under review, which we make no apology for presenting to the reader, in completion of the present chapter:—

‘My recollections of Sir J. Outram when I first met him in 1849, though vivid as to his appearance and character, do not supply much of the details of his history. The strength and individuality of his disposition, his warmth of heart, his great unselfishness, his absolute confidence in me, and his fatherly kindness, have made an ineffaceable impression on me.

¹ This Memoir will be further noticed in the penultimate chapter.

'At that time he seemed to me in full strength of body and mind. He struck me as not unlike Cromwell in face, though of a far more refined type, marked in the firm and delicate modelling of the mouth, especially in the upper lip. He had a soldier's piercing eyes, changing in a moment from command to gentleness. In speech he was hesitating, but when he was warmed by his subject he could speak forcibly. He was consumed by ambition, yet I never knew a more modest man.

'Our journey up the Nile, in January and February 1849, was undertaken with a view to reporting on the practicability of the route across the Desert from Kuseyr to Kinè, followed by the Indian contingent of our expeditionary force in the war with the French at the beginning of the century. To carry out the mission, Colonel Outram not only examined the route, but took note of every good military position on our voyage to Thebes. He would say of a fine temple, "What a splendid position!" With a great respect for learning he cared very little for antiquities. In starting for the trip across the desert from Kinè he mounted his camel wearing a regulation sword. I said, "Colonel, don't wear that; they will find you out!" "Do you think," he answered, "I will wear anything but the Queen's sword?" So he went undisguised, and the suspicions that his frankness excited nearly led to my being carried off during his absence.

'At, or soon after our start for, the return voyage, the news of the disaster of Chilianwallah reached us. Outram was excited to the verge of madness. "I will go back at once," he said, "and serve as captain in my old black regiment." During the voyage, he kept the boatmen at work night and day. Sleeping in the cabin next to his, I was constantly roused by his shouts to the exhausted men to go on rowing. A mutiny broke out, and the men were taken before a Turkish governor, who politely offered to have them bastinadoed all

round. Outram, of course, could not consent, and the old state of things returned. When we reached Cairo, the news of the victory of Gujerat had come, and Outram was full of regret for the discomfort his impetuosity had caused. An incident of the voyage made a lasting impression on me. One day when we had no meat for dinner I shot a pigeon. Outram, ardent sportsman as he was, said to me sadly, "I have made a vow never to shoot a bird." He would not eat the bird, which was given to an old peasant woman, and we dined as we could.

'At Cairo he completed the materials for the report which is to be found in the confidential papers of the E. I. C. My uncle (Mr. Lane) and my brother were of good service in its preparation. At this time I saw much of Colonel Outram. His conversation usually turned on the wrongs of the Ameers of Sind, the Baroda bribery, and not seldom on the native races and how they should be governed. It now strikes me that he lost mental strength from the power an *idée fixe* had of getting entire command of him. On native questions I may add that without being sympathetic, owing possibly to his want of linguistic facility, he was full of a desire for equal justice to all, and commented on acts of spoliation or harshness with the keenest indignation. He was so sensitive to fair play that he spoke of being hurt with his brother-officers for picking off Afghan matchlock-men who innocently came within range of their rifles. He never could be made to tell or verify any story of his own achievements. Whatever I knew came out by accident. Thus once he said, "I like that stick, I took a hill-fort with it!" Another time he told how, as a subaltern, he had called out the Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, for not giving him a chance of active service in Burmah, when that gallant old officer, while regretting he had not the chance of a shot at Outram, whose challenge no one at Poona would carry, yet sent him at once to the front.¹

¹ Probably to Kittur. See vol. i. p. 43.

Even the incidents of his tiger-hunts were withheld from us. The deep scars on his head were admitted to be the marks of claws, but he would never acknowledge or deny the story that his head was once in a tiger's mouth, when a well-directed bullet from a friend's gun relaxed the brute's jaws. He lived sparingly, but lavished everything in presents to his friends. His only amusement was chess, and his only indulgence smoking either a hookah, of which he took half-a-dozen whiffs, or a cigar. I wish I could remember his conversation on political matters, but except in the cases of Sind and Baroda and his strong indignation against those who would not have rescued our captives in Afghanistan, I cannot venture at this distance of time to put on paper what he said of those high in office. He had a strong feeling of personal responsibility, and spared no one who was not true to this test. Consistently he was the first to see and reward merit in young men.'

CHAPTER III.

1850-1854.

Return to Baroda and results.—England revisited.—Baroda, a third time.

COLONEL OUTRAM returned to Bombay from sick leave to Egypt, on February 7, 1850; but he did not immediately proceed to Baroda. Special duty, having reference to military matters and the completion of his Egyptian Report, kept him until the month of May at the Presidency. The Memoir was officially submitted on April 20; and in conveying to its author the thanks of Government for the ‘very valuable document’ received, the Chief Secretary thus expressed himself:—‘I am directed . . . to communicate to you the highest commendation of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council for the distinguished and honourable zeal for the service of your country which you have so energetically exercised under the pressure of ill-health and other unfavourable circumstances; and his Lordship in Council, in transmitting by the mail of this day your Memoir to the Honourable the Secret Committee, will have much satisfaction in expressing his sense of the value and importance of the information it contains, and of the intelligence and ability which you have displayed in its preparation.’¹ From other parts of India he also received highly flattering testimony to the work

¹ The Governor-General’s reply to the despatch of the Bombay Government forwarding the Memoir, communicates Lord Dalhousie’s ‘full concurrence in the praise which the Right Honourable the Governor in Council has very justly bestowed upon Colonel Outram and the officers named by him as his associates.’

he had so ably and gratuitously undertaken when on his year's leave. Nor were his labours unrecognised by Cabinet Ministers at home. He had written, before leaving Cairo, to his warm and steady supporter, Lord Jocelyn, giving a summary of the data collected and views formed thereon, and he was told in reply that Lord Palmerston considered his information 'most valuable,' and that, had the Russo-Turkish differences continued, he would no doubt have been requested to remain in Egypt.

Outram's presence in Bombay soon became known and acknowledged by both European and native acquaintances. He had put up on first arrival with his old friends the Willoughbys, and when the weak state of Mrs. Willoughby's health caused their removal to Mahableshwar, the worthy member of Council—his unfailing correspondent through a long series of years—wrote to him repeatedly from the hill sanatorium in terms of affectionate friendship, interspersing the ordinary chit-chat of letters with words of wise and kindly advice. Pleasant written greetings also reached him at this time from the Lawrences. In one letter dated from Lahor, which Sir Henry had left his wife to complete owing to a sudden call for his services in camp, Lady Lawrence thus referred to their former meeting :—' We often talk of our *ten minutes'* acquaintance with you in the Desert, and only wish it could be carried somewhat further.' Of his native correspondents, the most noteworthy was Bábá Farkí, the receipt of a communication from whom caused him great annoyance. He had taken this individual, on conscientious grounds, under his special protection, and, on leaving Baroda, had recommended him for the office of native agent at the Residency. He was now, it appeared—fifteen months later—a vagabond and an outcast. Not having obtained the employment suggested from the British Government, he had taken service under the Gaíkawár, but, after some months, having

incurred that Prince's displeasure, he had been imprisoned and subjected to much personal indignity. His degraded position—that of a bailed prisoner at the Gáikawár's capital—rendered him liable to be confounded with the many petitioners, whether in the *Mufassal* or Presidency towns of India, writing themselves, or getting others to write for them, long, high-flown petitions to the local ruler—called in Bombay the 'Lát (Lord) Sahib,' as in Calcutta. But his words and sentences were more happily chosen than those usually produced from the conventional mould which has long served, and may still serve, for the multitude of his fellows: and Outram, naturally well-disposed towards him from old association, was at once struck by the seeming truth of his appeal. As for Narsu Pant, who, when the Resident handed over his charge in 1848, was to have resigned the native agency, in mild requital of malpractices, that individual had reconsidered his intention, and was still holding the post in 1850, when the Resident was about to resume his functions. It was clear that the tables had been turned as regards Farki and his more successful rival: and a change of the kind could not have been effected without the sanction of high authority.

The petition to Colonel Outram was submitted to Government, who referred it to the acting Resident; but it was not until the return of the former officer to Baroda that he was enabled to investigate the case. The reversal of his condemnation of Narsu Pant was then discovered to have been so far irregular, that it had been effected on a petition sent directly by that smart native to a friendly member of the Governor's Council,¹ and not through the prescribed official channel: and its writer had thus received a moral support over and above that to which he would have been entitled in

¹ It should be observed that Outram, however he may have criticised this gentleman's action in the *khatpat* proceedings, regarded him as 'a man of incorruptible integrity;' whom he would as soon have believed 'capable of cannibalism as of bribe-taking.'

the ordinary course. Such support had been sufficient to procure for him the option of recalling his resignation: the exercise of which option was tantamount to declaring secret criticism of European superiors by native subordinates to be a legitimate act, and worthy of encouragement—a dangerous and revolutionary doctrine which, if applicable to the Resident at a native State, should be equally so to the Governor of a Presidency in India. Another blow to Outram's influence—not the less serious because less direct—was the omission of Government to refer to him the complaint which questioned his proceedings, when it was within their power to do so without the smallest inconvenience—for he was at Bombay from September 17 till November 3, 1845. He had left Baroda on September 12, and no sooner had his back been turned than the enemies of Bábá Farkí set all their wits to work to enlist the sympathies of the new *régime* on behalf of his opponent; to frustrate the good intentions which had been entertained for the eradication of *khatpat*, and to mar the programme prepared for the cleansing of an Augéan stable. The plausibility of Narsu, and the preconceived opinions in his favour of more than one high official at the Presidency, whose word on the subject would be law, were in themselves powerful means towards attainment of the desired end. Under the circumstances the result is not surprising. In bare outline the following are the facts:—Two natives were contesting the coveted office of British agent at Baroda. Outram supported one, because he pinned his faith on his goodwill, and he had satisfactorily tested his capabilities; while he rejected the other in the conviction that he was an untrustworthy public servant, though an outwardly prepossessing and undoubtedly clever official. The exigencies of the Resident's position demanded the presence of an assistant possessing as much honesty as could reasonably be credited to the native Indian character, and the moral

courage to subordinate caste to conscience: and his selection was carried out accordingly. It was not, however, ratified, but annulled by his immediate superiors. We have no occasion to discuss their motives in the procedure, for their acts have been since condemned by the home tribunal.

It is difficult, almost impossible, to tell the whole story of these two men without introducing a number of other actors, each of whom represents an individuality needing careful description; and the drama in which so many persons bear a part is of too complex and wearisome a plot to lay before the reader in detail. We may however say, without fear of contradiction, that the dragon of *khatpat*, the existence of which at Baroda had been proclaimed to the Bombay Government, was no myth or imaginary creation of Outram's brain; nor could any right-minded Englishman deny that its destruction was essential to the credit of our Government in India. And thus persuaded, we cannot well understand how the authorities could so far weaken the hands of their recognised representative in his legitimate attempts to put an end to the monster, by taking occasion of his absence to disavow his proceedings, to support one man whom he had openly denounced for fraud, and to imprison and otherwise degrade another whom he had sought to promote on account of service well and faithfully performed to the State.

Even if such result had been arrived at by a process the justice of which could not have been gainsaid, it was hardly desirable that the Resident, whose errors of judgment had been so glaringly advertised, should be sent back to the scene of his failure to resume inquiries which it must have been apparent he could conduct in no other spirit than that which his conscience approved. And was there no humiliation to him to find himself attended by other advisers and other assistants than those he had himself chosen—nay, by

those whom he had actually pronounced unworthy of trust? This was very much the position in which Outram would find himself on return to the Residency at Baroda, however earnestly his loyal nature and the solicitude of his friends might strive to keep it out of sight.

He left Bombay, and resumed charge of his office in May. In the following month he addressed a long communication to Government, soliciting a reconsideration of Farki's case, and pleading that the persecution which the petitioner had suffered arose from the assistance rendered by him in exposing the depravity of the more corrupt native officials. The Governor of Bombay regarded this letter as 'intemperate and indiscreet,' and saw 'no reason whatever for the interference of our Resident between Farki and his Highness the Gaikawar.' One of the two members of Council recorded a minute much to the same effect, and a reply was despatched accordingly. The other member was Mr. Willoughby, who knew and understood both Outram and Baroda better than his colleagues. It is not surprising that he dissented from their verdict; and we feel both justified and constrained by a sense of duty, in extracting the following passages of his able minute on the subject:—

The extent of bribery and corruption among our native establishments in Guzerat, and especially at Baroda, is unhappily notorious. Some cases of this kind have very recently been before the Board, and more may soon be expected, in connection with the case of Joitabhaec, the widow of the wealthy banker, belonging to the firm Hurree Bukty & Co., at Baroda, who has for a long time past failed to obtain a hearing by the most corrupt means, to the great discredit, I fear, of the British Government.

It is evident that Lieutenant-Colonel Outram believes, and I have not a doubt honestly and in good faith believes, that Baba Pherkeea has been subjected to oppression and ill-treatment for having aided him in bringing corrupt practices to light. . . .

With reference to paragraphs . . . of Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's present report, so far from considering that officer, with the impressions therein stated, to have acted indiscreetly and intemperately in submitting this representation to Government, I do not see how, as a man of honour, he could have avoided doing so.

I cannot therefore concur in the censure passed upon the Resident; but in order to support his meritorious exertions in the exposure of corruption, and in order that other persons may not be deterred from assisting those exertions by seeing, from the example of Baba Pherkeea, that maltreatment instead of reward is the result, I think the case should, as proposed by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, be fully investigated.

The story of Jetha-Bái, to which Mr. Willoughby here alludes, has been recorded with sufficient fulness of detail for the general reader, in a despatch of the Court of Directors, reviewing its merits on the whole evidence before them, and noting its main features. It is there stated, as an established fact, that the said lady, the younger widow of the head partner in the firm of Hari Bhugti,¹ had been 'the victim of a nefarious plot concocted by one Baba Nafra,' the managing *gumáshta*, or agent of the house, 'and of which the instruments were forgery, coercion of witnesses, subornation of perjury, and the forcible abduction of a child.' This infant, acknowledged for eighteen months as the legitimate son of Jetha-Bái, had been delivered over by Baba Nafra to certain persons alleged to be his real parents, under pretence of spuriousness, and had died in their hands.² The widow, 'kept for nearly three years under a guard, without any provision for her support,' had been disgraced and expelled from caste. Baba Nafra's 'powerful influence

¹ See *ante*, Chapter I., Book II., p. 20.

² Baba Nafra was the principal trustee of the will of Jetha-Bái's husband; and he was charged with endeavouring to set this aside to the prejudice of the widow, visiting the treasury in which were the moneys of the estate, unattended by his two co-trustees, and appropriating to his own use a portion of the trust funds. These events occurred in 1845-46, when there was an acting British Resident at Baroda.

with the ministers and servants of the Gaikawár' has enabled him to practise his villainy with success; and though Jetha-Bái had claimed British protection, under guarantee given to the banking-firm, her complaints have been unavailing.

There had been petitions to the Bombay Government from this lady referred to Colonel Outram in 1847; and her grievances had been further agitated during his absence in 1849; but the truth was not elicited until his return in 1850, when 'a quarrel among the conspirators led to disclosures,' which he 'followed up under great difficulties with an indefatigable industry and zeal' entitling him to 'high commendation.' His labours resulted in a 'long and elaborate report' eventually laid before the Court, who thus eliminated what may be considered to be the main issue:— 'Baba Nafra having been tried by a *punchayet* appointed by the Guicowar, has been found guilty of a part of the charges preferred against him, and has been sentenced by the *punchayet* to a fine of 15,500 rupees and seven years imprisonment, to which his Highness has added the further penalty of irons. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram contends with some appearance of justice, that the *punchayet* was unduly influenced in favour of Baba Nafra. But . . . we are fully satisfied that the guilt of that individual is established to an extent sufficient to justify the punishment to which he has been sentenced by his sovereign. And as it was reported . . . by Lieutenant-Colonel Outram that Baba Nafra's confinement was almost nominal, we approve your having directed the Resident, if the statement should be confirmed on inquiry, to represent to the Guicowar the impropriety of any indulgence to this criminal.¹ . . .'

One of the papers upon which the foregoing decision of

¹ Reply of the Honourable Court of Directors to Letters of the Bombay Government in the Political Department, dated June 2, 1852.

the Court was based is a minute by the Governor himself, who, although he does not see occasion to support the Resident, is constrained to admit his conscientious ability in the following terms: 'I now turn to the case itself, which the more it is studied must more and more impress the mind with admiration of the extraordinary ability and patience displayed by Colonel Outram, in investigating the obscure and secret conspiracies which are the subject of his report, dated 30th March 1851, in baffling native intrigue upon its own ground, and in unravelling with much ingenuity, if not always successfully, the frauds, perjuries, and the mass of contradictory depositions which have been taken and committed. . . . The task he undertook to perform may indeed be termed an extraordinary one. Once persuaded that Joitabae's tale was true, and that she was the victim of a foul conspiracy, he has alone and unaided stood by her, has opposed the active machinations of her powerful enemies, deriving a strong support, as they must have done, from their success with the acting Resident, and through him with this Government; has openly met the secret hostility of the Baroda Durbar (for the Gaékwar himself, however well-meaning he may have been, has been evidently and wholly passive in the matter), and finally unveiled and exposed the treachery of the native agent, which would appear to be but too clearly established by the facts and reasoning of this report.'

But Outram had a heavier task to fulfil at Baroda than the defence of a native subordinate. He would have to consider the whole question of *khatpat* and illustrate it by cases such as that of Jetha-Bái, and other sufferers from the unrestrained iniquity of their fellow-mortals. In May 1850, the very month of his return to the Residency, the ruling powers at Bombay addressed this locally famous circular to

the Political, Judicial, and Revenue Departments respectively, in the following terms:—

Government has been led to believe that an impression prevails in some parts of the Mofussil, that, by means of intrigues at the Presidency, the arrangements of local officers can often be defeated or superseded by the parties interested secretly obtaining the friendship of persons in power, who, it is expected, will, irrespective of right and wrong, interest themselves for the party soliciting their favour; and that, by these means, objects are attainable which, if left to be sifted and reported on in a deliberate and regular manner, could never be secured. This species of intriguing is termed, in the Mahratta and Canarese districts, 'making *khutput* in Bombay;' and it is stated to be regarded as a remedy under difficulties of whatever kind. It is even held to be considered as effectual in obtaining the restoration to place of official servants who, for incapacity or dishonesty, have been discharged from Government service, and to be even capable of effecting the release from gaol of a convicted felon. A belief in the existence of a system of this nature is calculated greatly to embarrass the officers of Government, and to undermine the confidence of the ryots in the justice of the system by which they are governed. I am accordingly directed to request, that you will have the goodness to report, after making any inquiries you may deem requisite, whether you have reasons for supposing that any such belief prevails generally, or amongst any particular class of persons, within the limits of your charge; and, if so, that you will offer any suggestions that may occur to you, as to the best means of eradicating the same.

We propose briefly to summarize the purport and results of Outram's reply to this important call, in itself a huge volume; after which little more will remain to be said on a matter already detailed in blue-books and pamphlets. But as this procedure will take us to the beginning of 1852, a glimpse of the Baroda Residency during the two preceding years, and while the great work was progressing—obtained by the medium of family letters unrestricted to official sub-

jects, though, towards the end, insensibly drifting into them—may not be unacceptable to the reader.

On first return, the Resident, now reduced to bachelor discomforts, found all outer things much as he had left them: one regiment was the same, while another had been replaced: there were only two ladies in camp. ‘Fortunately,’ he wrote, ‘the day after my arrival the Fulljames’s came . . . and stayed with me, which somewhat broke the melancholy of the great house.’ His ‘quiet, steady routine,’ was to rise at 4 A.M., ride till sunrise, breakfast at 9, work more or less till sunset, when he would drive to the parade-ground, ‘to avoid the intermediate dust,’ walk for half an hour, and return to dinner at dusk. Lieutenant Battye, Assistant Resident, ‘kind and honest-hearted as ever,’ was his regular evening companion; there were sometimes one or two from camp, but ‘never more than six.’ A little later, the number was increased—for he speaks of having ‘occasionally had from eight to ten at table, by which means I have now gone through the whole society.’ But his sociable and hospitable nature has not been satisfied thus far; for we also note, in the letter just quoted, the following passage, which reads to us more like the unconscious revelation of a generous act than the explanation of a diplomatic expediency:—‘I am about to perpetrate one piece of extravagance you would think uncalled for, did I not explain that I have a political object in view, i.e. to remove the impression that I purpose going away immediately—consequently, to put an end to intrigues which would be prosecuted under that supposition. Ostensibly, however, I have merely the welfare and amusement of the officers in view, for the grand undertaking is a bathing-tank, to be erected beside the well near the flagstaff: it is to be 40 feet long and 12 broad, which will be a great luxury to all, for at present there is no place where they can get a swim.’ In October he described his life to be exactly

as before shown, 'very jog-trot.' Not a single lady was at the station: 'Battye dines with me almost every night, and occasionally two or three others. . . I never go to the mess.' The messes were good, and he liked the officers: 'but as I always go to bed at nine to enable me to get up before day-break, I cannot suit myself to the late hours.' He was then 'still engaged in corruption cases—a thankless office,' but one which afforded him abundant occupation. Failing the support of Government, he proposed to resign his post and go home so soon as his means would allow. His military pay and 1,000*l.* would, he reckoned, suffice for three years, 'by which time,' he wrote, 'I should be sure of a brigade on my return to India, which, after all, is perhaps better, though not perhaps so well paid as my present position, being free from responsibility and vexation.' The year 1850 closed with apparently little change in the routine of his Baroda life. In the first of two letters written to his wife during the month of December, he acknowledged the receipt of 'a charming, cheerful letter' from his mother, to whom he sent the following message relating to the Jetha-Bái case: 'Say I am bringing my battle . . . on behalf of the widow, which she so much approves, to a successful termination.' And he added: 'My crusade against corruption goes on. No light work . . . which so incessantly occupies me that for three months past I have been at my desk from sunrise (when I return from my ride), till nine (when I bathe and dress): breakfast over by half-past, and again at the desk till half-past five, besides generally writing after dinner two and three hours.' He did not, however, complain of this: quite the contrary. Such occupation, he declared, agreed with him 'better than the greatest exercise out of doors,' and he 'never was better.' But he disliked the shallow forms and ceremonies and outer routine of his office, and would have been glad of any excuse to get away from a place 'the petti-

fogging duties of which' he found as 'distasteful' as the climate was 'disagreeable.' In the second December letter, dated three days after Christmas, the thought of the festive season was inseparable from that of home. His heart yearned towards his wife and son, and those whom he knew to be with them. 'Oh, how I wish I could be of the party!' was the outburst of his heart: 'what a contrast to a happy Christmas is my solitary condition here!' Lieutenant Battye had left him for two months, owing to ill-health; and he was alone, still incessantly employed in 'prosecuting corruption cases,' in the teeth of a strong opposition from natives of all ranks and classes, who hated him, as he expressed it, for exposing a state of things in which all were more or less concerned. Especially did this alienation apply to the members of his own establishment, 'debarred from their unholy gains.' He thus further expressed himself on the character of the prospect before him: 'I am progressing slowly but surely in spite of every obstacle, and assuredly shall succeed; but the villainy, hypocrisy, and unblushing perjury I meet with at every turn—together with the apathy of the Government—so thoroughly have disgusted me that I am determined to shake the dust off my feet, and leave Baroda when I have finished the work. . . . Hereafter I shall confine myself to my profession, which insures the command of a brigade to me when I return to India, and a handsome competency, though scarcely half the salary of my present position.'

In April 1851, he ran down to Bombay, to take leave of Mr. Willoughby, then about proceeding to Europe. Shortly before accompanying this gentleman, his 'oldest friend,' to the homeward-bound steamer, he wrote:—'with his departure I feel as if almost my last tie to India were severed.' In the same letter he referred to a likeness of himself which

he was sending home. 'Such a grim old fright they picture me!' are his words: 'but not more so than I really am. The last two years have aged me more than ten.' Before the end of May he was back at the ungenial Residency. His stay at Bombay had not been satisfactory in respect of official progress. 'After receiving the strongest assurances that Government had every desire to aid and support' his 'endeavours to uproot and expose the corruptions of Baroda,' and after he had been 'induced by such assurances to expunge' from his 'Statement of Facts,'¹ then under preparation, all obnoxious passages calculated to make those who should have supported him become opponents in self-defence, all had ended in the appointment of a special Commission to re-try the cases which he had himself investigated. By this arrangement Narsu Pant, against whom Outram had sent in five charges, with full particulars—and whom he had wished to keep in arrest until actually placed on formal trial—was enabled to appear in the Gáikawár's capital, a fortnight before the arrival of the Commissioner in the middle of June, 'with free liberty to do whatever he pleased, and attended by a train of peons, &c., as if in the full power of his office.' In such a condition of affairs it was not unnatural for the Resident to believe that his own resignation was aimed at, and that 'every man at Baroda, from the Gáikawár downwards,' was satisfied that Narsu had 'the secret support of Government.' The Commissioner, Mr. William Frere,² of the Bombay Civil Service, was fortunately an officer who could be designated 'an upright and just judge, acute and indefatigable, and not likely to be influenced by party

¹ This statement related mainly to the case of Narsu Pant. It was restored to nearly its original shape when afterwards embodied as a section of the general report.

² Since Member of the Governor's Council at Bombay, and, more recently still, one of the Royal Commissioners appointed to inquire into the treatment of Indian immigrants at Mauritius and elsewhere.

feeling.' But the action taken warranted Outram in preparing so full a statement of the *khatpat* case, without respect of persons, for submission to the Court of Directors, that it would serve, if necessary, for eventual submission to the British Parliament and public. One appeal to the Court against the Bombay procedure had been purposely drawn out by him and dated before the sitting of the Commission, that it might not appear to be an ebullition of temper at the result of any of the coming trials. In November, Outram mentions that this is reserved, as it may not be found necessary: but he has sent in his '*Khatpat* Report,' and will anxiously await the result. Captain Battye and the Fulljames's were then with him; and he had used the Residency as a hospital for the sick in camp during the rains.

In December, the long-pending blow had fallen. His Report had called down the wrath of Government. He had received 'a very angry letter,' announcing the resolution of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to remove him from the office of Resident at Baroda, but leaving it to him 'to withdraw in the manner least offensive' to his own feelings, and 'least calculated to embarrass Government, or affect their amicable relations with H.H. the Guicowar.'¹ His reply was a request for

¹ As Secretary to Government, Mr. Arthur Malet had to send the official *congé*: but as a private friend, he at the same time addressed a kindly note to Outram, who thus replied:—'I, of course, bow to the blow which I well knew I risked by what I considered the performance of my duty; and the consciousness that I have performed my duty to the best of my ability, and with a sole view to the real interests and honour of Government—however, I might be mistaken in the means I adopted to carry out that view—bears me up under the infliction. Where is the merit of seeking to do good, if our exertions are to be confined to the limits of our personal interests? My interests have been sacrificed, perhaps necessarily—but I trust good to this country and people will result from the sacrifice: for I am satisfied Government must now be convinced that the belief in *khatput* does prevail, and that it is most necessary to take steps to remove that belief, and to substitute therefor a more wholesome faith in the honour of my countrymen and purity of my

permission to proceed to the Presidency on a month's leave from December 15, with the understanding that his successor be appointed at the expiration of that time. In the letter which conveyed the intelligence to his home circle, and his intention of immediately returning to England, he thus reviewed his altered position:—

‘Do not fancy that I am at all cast down by this. I fully expected it, and am not sorry to get away from this sink of iniquity; though, of course, I should have preferred a more honourable retreat. . . . I really believe I shall be quite contented to lead a very humble and retired life, different from what we passed when last together in London. A very small lodging (in London at first, where I may have much to do in the India House) will suffice: nothing so expensive as what we had in Lower Brook Street—for I shall shun all great people, and indeed the fewer acquaintances of any sort the better. . . . You must not think that I am coming home to *agitate*, or to induce the Court to censure or annul the measures of the Bombay Government. Under any circumstances I should never be induced to place myself in opposition to my own Government; and the wording of their present letter certainly would not warrant me in doing so now. All that I shall do is . . . to submit to the Court a respectful appeal as to whether I could . . . have pursued, in duty, and with a clear conscience, any other course than that I have followed; and I shall then throw myself entirely under their protection—for I am certain that a careful perusal of the whole correspondence, and especially of the *Khutput* Report, upon which the Government's letter is based, will assure the Court that however right Government may be in removing me from hence, there rests not the shadow of a Government. If such be the result, my removal, to make room for a better man, will not be regretted by me.’

stain on my character as a man, or as a diplomatist. You will know the intense labour I have undergone in the vindication of the high principles which I have endeavoured to inculcate at Baroda, and you will not, I think, be sorry that I am about to leave a station where my health has suffered a good deal, and where, as you know, I have so long remained much against my inclination, because I considered it an imperative duty—*since I had been sent here*—to carry through the arduous and hazardous task, which, having happened to devolve on me, I had no right to shirk and leave to others who should come after me. I have little doubt every member of the Court will appreciate my endeavours and applaud my motives in their hearts individually, however they may be compelled as a *body* outwardly to support the Government; and as there is nothing in the Government letter which should tend to exclude me from political employment elsewhere, especially under the supreme Government, I doubt not that in a selfish point of view I shall not eventually have cause to regret even in this world having pursued an upright course, although nothing can ever efface from my memory the ill-effect my absence will have in respect of the public interests here. . . . But nothing the Bombay Government could do would diminish one jot my devotion to the Court, who have ever proved themselves just and kind masters to all their servants in India—whether high or low: to them alone shall I look therefore, not to the public of England, for any redress they may be pleased to afford me, in their own way. And I shall do my utmost to prevent the press of Bombay from raising a cry against the Government, which they are ever so prone to do, and have been doing of late a good deal in respect of Baroda matters.'

But on this subject he wrote privately to the Secretary, begging him to assure the Government that he had had

nothing whatever to do with any attacks upon them on account of the Baroda intrigues, or indeed any allusions to those intrigues, which had appeared in the local papers. He was in no way, directly or indirectly, cognisant of them; they were to him a source of vexation, as calculated to irritate against himself those whom it was his wish, and most certainly his interest, to conciliate.

The *Khatpat* Report—or, as it was called, ‘Report on the Popular Belief in *Khutput*’¹—was submitted to Government, accompanied by a transmitting letter, dated October 31, 1851. It was in two parts, one in ten and one in six sections. Of Part I., the two first sections, while introductory, stated the writer’s conviction that the ‘doctrine of *khutput* was generally accepted throughout the country,’ and that ‘its general acceptance was mainly owing to the singular leniency with which Government treated those servants whose guilt had been established’—a leniency which caused the native public to form an erroneous estimate of the moral character of their rulers. The remaining sections reviewed the occurrences in Baroda up to Outram’s connection with that State in 1835, when called away to Afghanistan. Some of the principal actors have been spoken of in the last chapter. Of others it may be sufficient to mention two of the more notorious—Dhákji Dádaji and Moti Lál Parshotum—agents selected by a native potentate to bribe a British governor with 100,000*l.*, and a British councillor with a quarter of that amount, to betray the trust reposed in them and defeat the ends of justice. Fortunately, we may still believe that neither governor nor councillor could be found to accept, or entertain the project of accepting, *douceurs* on any pretence, whatever the amount.

¹ This and following quotations, marked by inverted commas, are from the Report itself.

The second part of the Report described the situation at Baroda on Outram's assumption of office in 1847. Section II. is devoted to Bábá Farkí, and Section III. to Narsu Pant. The remaining three sections exhibit the action of Government after the Resident's charges against the latter had been submitted, and are, more or less, the later history of the *khatpat* campaign up to date of writing. They vividly relate the story of the Commission, while sitting at Baroda—and when it was the current idea 'that in reality the Resident, not the accused, was on his trial'—together with Narsu Pant's vain attempts to enlist the Commissioner in his favour; but space will not here admit of extracts from this remarkable record. A supplementary section indicated, in a more direct manner than the preceding sections, the mode by which the perpetuation of the doctrine and 'practice of *khutput* might be most effectually prevented.' The first step proposed was for Government to address the Gáikawár, asking his cordial co-operation with the Resident to put a stop to the prevalent system of corruption acknowledged in his dominions. His Highness was to be urged to dismiss his adviser, one Bháo Tambayker, whose connivance and support had enabled the enemies of order and good government effectually to obstruct the Resident's investigations. He might also be induced to proclaim his resolution to punish severely any of his subjects seeking to tamper with British officials in furtherance of their own unlawful designs; or purposely to thwart the objects and embarrass the proceedings of a British court or commission. The other proposals were, to address a communication to the Resident himself, to be read in open *darbár*, expressing the interest of Government in his efforts to destroy *khatpat*; to reward Bábá Farkí for his services in a substantial and public manner; similarly to acknowledge the zealous co-operation of the then native agent, especially his rejection and exposure of Bábá Nafra's

attempt to bribe him; publicly to notify Narsu Pant's offences and their punishment; to authorise the Resident to express the sympathy of Government with the persecuted Jetha-Bái; to establish a court at Baroda before which Government officials could be tried and punished for bribery and corrupt breach of trust—failing the latter institution, to pass a legislative enactment providing a punishment for such offences; and finally, to amend a particular Act, then in local force, so as to render it more applicable to Baroda in certain specified instances.¹

We have said that Outram had applied for leave of absence from December 15. Press of work previous to giving over charge of office and breaking up his personal establishment delayed his actual departure until the 20th of the same month. On the former date, however, he addressed a long despatch to Government, tendering his formal resignation of his appointment, and vindicating himself from the injurious interpretation which his privileged censors had put upon the letter before stated to have accompanied the *Khatpat* Report. That letter, it was alleged, more than the Report itself, had been the cause of his dismissal. Doubtless it had been unacceptable; but it could not well have been otherwise. Couched in strong, plain language, it set forth the mischief that had resulted from the little regard paid to the British Resident at Baroda by his official superiors. The credit of Government, it urged, had, owing to the policy pursued, been seriously impaired; and the wishes and authority of its representative had been set at nought by a clique of native intriguers, at the head of whom was no less a person than the minister of the Gáikawár. Nay, more, the writer's life

¹ A singular comment on the conduct of the Bombay Government, in removing Colonel Outram from his Baroda appointment, is afforded in the fact that the greater part of these proposals, however disregarded at the period of their submission, was actually carried into effect in 1854 and 1855, under orders of the Government of India or Court of Directors.

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had been attempted by poison: three medical men who attended him at the time pronounced that it was so; and on more than one occasion had this villainy been practised.¹

Having taken friendly leave of the Gaikawár after the approved form, and received from his Highness his expressions of regret at the discontinuance of their personal relations, Outram repaired to Bombay, which he reached about the close of the year. When there, he met the members of the Governor's council and secretaries in the same spirit as before, but, for some motive apparently unexplained, the Governor himself declined to see him. Perhaps it was well that an interview was thus avoided, which could scarcely have been satisfactory on either side. In fact, during Outram's whole stay at the Presidency, while his time was much taken up with the preparation of a memorial and its voluminous accompaniments, besides other papers in support of his case, Government was engaged on the other side in making out a case for themselves. Especially worthy of notice is a third part of the *Khatpat* Report, in five sections, bringing the narrative of the Resident's proceedings

¹ For Outram's own account of one of these attempts, by tobacco, see facsimile of P.S. to letter to Captain Eastwick annexed. It seems that poison was tried twice, if not three times. One 'Amir,' who had been his servant from a boy, actually stood convicted of being the agent, and the effects were only too decided. Serious derangement to the constitution was evinced, though the slow poison had not been sufficiently long administered to produce fatal results. His life was, unquestionably, saved by the watchfulness and skill of his devoted friend Dr. Ogilvie, who, in addition to other precautions, combined with four or five associates in an arrangement that one of the band should partake of every dish which the Resident tasted—a task of some risk in more ways than one, for he seemed to have a preference for what was most indigestible. It was understood in Bombay that at least one previous Resident at Baroda (Mr. Sutherland) had been removed by poison. The more recent attempt to dispose of her Majesty's representative at this perilous court—Colonel Phayre—in the same way, which resulted in the trial of the Gaikawár and his deportation to Madras, will recur to the reader's mind. The doctor came to the conclusion that the serious and mysterious illness which drove Colonel Outram to Egypt in 1849, the nature of which they 'could not comprehend,' was attributable to the same subtle cause.

up to the date of his departure from Baroda. This important supplement, though nearly completed at that time, could not be despatched in draft; and its transcript had been unavoidably delayed from want of a fitting amanuensis, only procurable in Bombay. It includes a copy of the despatch in which Outram tendered his resignation of office, and concludes with a copy of his memorial to the Court of Directors.

‘We proceed in the “Achilles” to Suez on the 17th, and from Alexandria in the “Ripon,” which will reach Southampton about the 17th proximo,’ he wrote to Mrs. Outram on February 3, after explaining the causes of his detention at Bombay. He foresaw that his furlough would not be one of repose or amusement: he had work to do and battles to fight which would either keep him to London, or within easy reach of London and its public offices; and after stating what were his plans on first arrival, and his intention to proceed North as soon as possible, he alluded to his probable stay in Scotland as necessarily short. The conditions of his second return home looked indeed very similar to those of the first. Rest and recreation would be exceptional: work and mental anxiety would be the rule. Even supposing him to gain the day in the appeal against his official treatment, the chances were that his victory would be almost immediately followed by his return to the East. The portmanteau, and etceteras of travelling paraphernalia, would be ever at his side. There was no prospect of settling down anywhere, during the continuance of the coming struggle, and still less for the period after declaration of the final issue.

And thus it happened. When he rejoined his wife, they remained in London till the middle of summer, then went for a while to Brighton, then to Dover, Boulogne, and Paris—returning to London in November, in time for the

Duke of Wellington's funeral, which Outram attended, at St. Paul's Cathedral. At each place visited, it was the same restless life. He liked the sea both from the variety of its aspect, the out-of-door liveliness of the beach, and the charm of boating. He delighted in a rough sail, and would bribe the boatmen to brave the waters when it was too stormy for them to go willingly. If he could readily tire of a long life on board ship, he was generally set up as well as pleased by a short voyage. We continue the sketch of his home life in these days, as supplied by a most reliable informant.

At watering-places and in Paris it amused him to sit out on the frequented promenades, and watch what was going on —always with a cigar in his mouth, and, if possible, with an Indian friend. But his acquaintances were not necessarily Anglo-Indians: he had a great faculty of attracting strangers and making the most of their society. His frank and open manners and quiet fun made him an agreeable companion, and wherever he went he picked up friends who retained an unusually permanent interest in their fellow-traveller.¹

During this, as in the previous visit to Europe, he was, on the whole, in good health, saving a cough to which his active habits frequently exposed him, and which took its course unheeded. But his mind was full, and his life was one of disagreeable preoccupation, hard work and, perforce, mere time-passing. He could not tolerate idle moments, and, having no special resources, liked to be where 'something was going on'—he did not mind what, so long as there was not quiescence or stagnation. When anything occurred to cheer or interest him, his spirits would visibly rise, and he would shed his brightness around. His town

¹ Shown in after years by kindly attentions when he was from time to time comparatively helpless as an invalid.

lodgings were small, but in a good situation, generally in or about Mayfair, i.e. Brook Street, Green Street, or Curzon Street. He liked a friend to drop in there to breakfast or dinner, and to meet people at the club or other places of rendezvous. But he disliked parties, and shirked them persistently. Being made a lion of he could not endure, and as his name had attained considerable notoriety (now more than in 1843), he was subjected from the first to what he looked upon as a painful persecution in this respect. Such demands on his patience made London distasteful during the season. He liked to attend places of amusement for the sake of passing the time, and was a shrewd observer, as his many anecdotes testified.

In the morning, after a punctual breakfast, he would sally out to the Oriental Club. Some of his son's friends, who lived in a house a few doors from his lodgings in Green Street, noticed that at almost the same minute every morning, as regularly as clockwork, when they were at breakfast, he would come up and light his fusee on a particular part of the railing in front of their window. In the evening, he would often return to the Oriental, to read and hear the day's news; then go on with a friend to the Cosmopolitan Club, the mixed society of which interested him. Though a member of the Senior United Service, he seldom went there at this period. The Exhibition pleased him: for, when at Baroda, he had been active in encouraging the despatch of products thither; and a bronze medal had been awarded him for his exertions. He had also been instrumental in the presentation, by the Gáikawár, of two tigers to the Zoological Society in London, a circumstance which called forth expressions of gratitude and a free ticket from the officials of that institution.

At home, and during the day, he was generally occupied with his disagreeable Baroda recollections; annotating

blue-books; hunting up matter, often from out-of-the-way sources; corresponding or having interviews with his many parliamentary or India Office friends; and filling up wakeful hours at night, or odd times in the day, by miscellaneous reading. Mrs. Outram (then in very indifferent health) and her son had plenty of work, copying out notes into blue-books or accomplishing similar 'impositions'—as they may well have been considered when the novelty had worn off, and the multiplication of copies seemed infinite. Finances were very low, even below zero; and to economise on nothing in such unsettled circumstances was no easy problem, apart from printer's and bookseller's bills, which were no trifles in themselves. Old Mrs. Outram was with her son and daughter-in-law during a great part of their sojourns in London, and enlivened many a sociable breakfast by her wit and freshness. Mrs. Sligo also came up from her temporary home at Exeter shortly before her brother's departure in 1853, completing the family circle, and a remarkable trio the mother, son, and daughter were, both for talent and for energetic individuality of character.¹

From the time of his return to London, in November 1852, till July 1853, a short visit to Scotland in the spring was perhaps the only occasion of his absence from the metropolis. In the last-named month he left England—nominally for Calcutta, but really in the fond hope of something turning up for him in the impending hostilities with

¹ Of his French life, he has been heard to describe a scene which presented itself during one of his daily walks upon the pier at Boulogne—where, as at Dover, he made the most of that promenade, waylaying friends on arrival or departure. On one occasion of these marine rambles he was surprised by seeing an unfortunate Englishman, *in puris naturalibus*, pursued along the beach at top speed by a mob of stalwart portresses, whose delicacy had been outraged by his proceeding to bathe after the English fashion. Wooden shoes and French screams assailed the wretched fugitive as he made for the shelter of the pier.

Russia. Knowing his anxiety to be so employed, his near relatives and friends had united in entreating him not to press himself forward in such a sphere. In this they were influenced even more by consideration of his peculiar and critical position with respect to Baroda, and the prospect of advantageous re-employment under the Government of India, than by their natural reluctance to see him exposed to unnecessary physical dangers.

But let us follow out the story of the *Khatpat* Report, for on the nature of the reception accorded to this paper may be said to have depended the issues of Outram's future career. His position—that of a distinguished Indian officer, removed by his own Government from a lucrative and responsible post on the ostensible grounds of over-conscientiousness, involving disrespect to his superiors, and a disposition to exceed his powers as Resident—had, from the first, called forth strong expressions of sympathy on the part of his brother-officers and others in India, who knew something of, if not all, the particulars of his case. Letters from men of more than local reputation—some whose names were very household words—assured him that, in his seeming degradation, he stood higher than ever in their esteem. ‘What are my small troubles,’ wrote one of India's best soldiers and administrators, ‘to the loads of vexation you have manfully endured? Yours has indeed been a hard case. You have, however, the satisfaction of having risen above your enemies.’ Another, referring to Outram's treatment in a letter to a third party, thus expressed himself:—‘It is by far the worst thing that has happened to Guzerat since I have had to do with it, and the great mischief it will do is incalculable.’ A constant correspondent of his own, long since deceased—whose name we may not mention, because he would not himself have sanctioned the disclosure—writing from an Indian frontier station, which his energy had

organised out of a mere hamlet in the desert—thus gave vent to his feelings, and interpreted the sentiments of others gathered around him:—‘You have seldom been absent for a day from our thoughts and conversations. . . . You have nothing to reproach yourself with : let then nothing shake you. As to friends, you have many, I am certain, besides poor me, who would be more proud to stand by your side in any danger, difficulty, or evil report, than to command all imaginable success with your opponents. . . . Return to India, and to work, if necessary, with your regiment. The more lowly your outward position, the more, believe me, will your real greatness shine forth. . . . Genuine greatness of soul appears, and actually becomes greater in misfortune than in prosperity.’ The same writer, knowing the pecuniary loss to his friend involved in the Baroda business, had, shortly before, placed at Outram’s disposal a sum of 300*l.* left him by will in England, which he had not himself drawn, and of which he stood in no immediate need. That his friend did not avail himself of this generous offer is no proof that his finances were in a flourishing condition. Such, indeed, was far from the reality.

At home there was no want of interest in his case ; but, except in respect of individual Directors and certain private acquaintances, the sympathy was less personal. It was rather for the destroyer of *Khatpat* as an historical figure—a modern St. George—a champion of Truth—than for James Outram, the soldier-political, now known and admired throughout the length and breadth of India. In June 1852, the Court replied to the references of the Bombay Government on the question of their Resident’s removal from Baroda, in three separate despatches. The latest of these discussed the *Khatpat* Report, and was a brief, unsatisfactory missive : indecisive if significant, and enigmatical if suggestive. Paragraph 9 recorded the opinion that Lieutenant-

Colonel Outram's communications 'were not conveyed in terms consistent with that respect for the Government under which he was serving, which ought to be observed in all such representations,' together with the regret that he had not been reprimanded at an earlier opportunity, and required 'to withdraw or modify any objectionable expressions which rendered him justly liable to . . . censure.' The next and final paragraph gave 'Lieutenant-Colonel Outram credit for the zeal, energy, ability, and success with which he prosecuted inquiries attended with great difficulty;' and expressed the hope that on that officer's return to India, a suitable opportunity would be found of employing him 'where his talents and experience . . . prove useful to the public service.' A remarkable dissent to this despatch was recorded by Lieutenant-Colonel Sykes in a paper of considerable length. The reader, not 'coached-up' in the Baroda Blue-Book, will obtain some idea of its contents from the following passages in the last paragraph :—

Sufficient notice has been taken of cases, facts, and dates, without entering into elaborate details, to demonstrate in the clearest manner the comparatively eminent success of Colonel Outram, under the most embarrassing difficulties, in his praiseworthy and honourable efforts to relieve the British Government from the scandal attached to its name of being indifferent to the corruption of its servants and agents, and to discriminate and to fix upon the proper parties, not only criminality, but the punishment due to criminality. It appears to me, therefore, that the draft does not sufficiently dwell upon the eminent services and persevering zeal of Colonel Outram; that it does not make a natural and reasonable allowance for the irritation consequent upon finding his efforts for a great public object through a course of years constantly thwarted, or inadequately supported; and, above all, that it does not take that elevated tone befitting the character of a great Government, in reprobation of corrupt conduct on the part of any of its servants, and in reproof of parties, however high their stations, whose apathy, prejudices, or misjudgment, may have led

to the continuance of an odium and a scandal which a vigorous manifestation at an early period might have either obviated or crushed at once.

This was followed by a separate dissent on the part of Mr. Mangles, concurred in by three other Directors, thus brought to its conclusion :—

It appears to me that, in the case before us, the general policy and duty of supporting the Government falls into a secondary place in comparison with the paramount obligation upon the Court to take no step, and allow no step to be taken, calculated to damp the spirit with which officers of high station and trust ought to be encouraged to maintain the honour and vindicate the character of our administration, when labouring under suspicion, or tending to afford even plausible ground for the continued prevalence of such suspicion in the minds of our native subjects.

Wherefore I am compelled to dissent from a despatch which appears to me to lose sight, in a great measure, of the great interest at stake, namely, the honour of the British Government of India ; to censure heavily the zealous and honest public servant, who was doing his utmost to vindicate that honour, for lapses of respect, and for an error of judgment, which, however gravely to be condemned, are of little importance when compared with the vast moment of the one grand object in view ; and to give at least implied approbation to proceedings on the part of the Government of Bombay, which appear to me to be of very questionable policy, and to be fraught with consequences most injurious to the character of our administration of British India.

A third dissent, bearing the signatures of Mr. William Butterworth Bayley and eight of his colleagues, mainly referred to paragraph 9 of the despatch which has been already quoted. The cause of objection was because the paragraph, as originally drafted, had better expressed the sentiments of the dissentients than an amended form which had been accepted by the majority. In the first instance, it had pointed out that, had the objectionable expressions in

Colonel Outram's letter been indicated to that officer, his removal might have been rendered unnecessary, and 'the prosecution to a more complete and satisfactory issue of the very important inquiries in which he was engaged,' might have been secured. Although only fourteen names appear as signatures of the protests, there is every reason to believe that eighteen out of the twenty-three Directors actually voted against the despatch which was transmitted to Bombay.¹

Discussion of the Baroda scandals was, however, not limited to Leadenhall Street. On June 30, 1852, only four days after the date of the Court's despatch just noticed, the Commons, on the motion of Mr. Chisholm Anstey, ordered a return of 'copies of all correspondence and papers on the subject of Colonel Outram's removal from the office of Resident at the court of the Guicowar, or on the alleged corruption of officers of the Bombay Government with bribes from Baroda.' The mover had, some two months previously, broached the subject to the House in a speech to which Outram, with his wonted chivalrous loyalty, had felt constrained to take exception. In the statements put forward

¹ The story told is a singular one, and we give it as it reached us on trustworthy evidence:—When the despatch was submitted to the Court by their chairman, the large majority of eighteen to five was opposed to it, as insufficiently marking their disapprobation of the proceedings of the Bombay Government. They therefore substituted another despatch, so strongly animadverting on those proceedings, that the chairman implored them to withdraw it, on the ground of the political embarrassment which would ensue at a time when discussions were pending on the Indian Charter. As the majority, however, were not to be turned from what they deemed strict justice and right by any considerations of expediency, and adhered to their decision, the chairman was obliged to submit the substituted despatch to the President of the Board of Control (Mr. Herries). This gentleman rejected the latter, and maintained the original despatch. The Court were compelled—by the anomalous law which then existed—to adopt and send out to India the very despatch which they so strongly disapproved. Thirteen out of the eighteen dissentients recorded their protests, which the remaining five were only prevented from signing by being obliged to leave town.

he had read, as it were, imputations on the personal honour and integrity of certain officers of position in India, which might be supposed to have had foundation in his own writings—and, although placing himself by the act in dangerous antagonism to a parliamentary champion of his cause, he had at once come forward to disavow the possible connection. As a servant of the East India Company, he admitted the submission of a memorial to the Court of Directors through the legitimate channel: but having done this, he relied on receiving redress from those to whom he had appealed, nor would he, in the then existing circumstances, take any part in bringing the question before the public. Once made known or asked for by the outer world, the case was different.

Late in October the return was published. Two enormous blue-books, containing 1514 folio pages, were presented to Parliament, and to as many readers out of Parliament as the question was likely to interest. The size of the volumes was fatal. Few of the uninitiated would look at them a second time. Setting aside the controversial correspondence, there was interest and even romance in the illustrative narration: but interest was absorbed in bulk, and the element of romance had become imperceptible in official chaos. Old Mrs. Outram foresaw the result of this unwieldy and ill-arranged publication as prepared by Government, and warned her son accordingly. He thus replied to her in a note of affectionate greeting on New Year's Day 1853: 'You tell me not to be disappointed if few take interest in the Baroda papers. I expect *none* to do so, even after all the expense I shall have gone to in getting them condensed.'

The case dragged slowly on in official circles; and towards the end of May 1853 remained outwardly much in the same state as in the previous June. Yet Outram had then received the assurance of the Directors, or those connected

with them to whom he had had access, that the Court's feeling in his favour had been greatly strengthened by the perusal of the papers which had gradually come in from Bombay, and otherwise accumulated before them; and his friends led him to believe he would have a complete triumph. But, pleased as he may have been at the reality of his support from individual functionaries of high character and position, he could not be sure that these gentlemen would collectively do anything so impolitic and unconventional as to proclaim the victory gained by a servant over his Government. How they were to administer justice in the matter was the problem to be solved.

In May 1853, Outram, naturally impatient for action, addressed a letter to the Court, soliciting their intervention to recommend him for political employment under the Government of India. He referred to the hope expressed in their despatch to the Bombay Government, that employment would be found for him in which his 'talents and experience might prove useful to the public service;' he showed that the Baroda Residency was really the only appointment he could accept from the said Government without official humiliation and degradation in the eyes of the natives; he argued that it was most unlikely he would be reinstated, by those at whose hands he had received his dismissal, into the very office for which they had pronounced him disqualified; he recapitulated the more favourable sentiments of the Court on his conduct in the unpleasant matter which had so long occupied their time and attention; and concluded by reporting that, owing to the treatment he had experienced, his pecuniary losses had amounted to 'a virtual fine of not much under 6,000*l.*,' for an offence which was nothing more than 'the theoretical expression of an opinion' with respect to his authority as Resident, and 'the use of terms to the Government of Bombay which were deemed

disrespectful, but which resulted from an earnest and honest desire to overcome difficulties in carrying out ' what he believed ' the sincere wish of Government, to have corruption in every branch of the political department detected and punished.' A reply, dated June 9, acknowledged the request, and stated the intention of the Court, on Outram's return to India, to recommend him, in such a manner as was ' consistent with their practice . . . to the Governor-General in Council for political employment.' Consequent on this correspondence, the following despatch was addressed to the Governor-General of India, dated June 22:—

Para 1. Lieutenant-Colonel Outram, lately resident at Baroda, has received our permission to return to his duties in India by way of Calcutta.

2. You are fully acquainted with the circumstances under which Lieutenant-Colonel Outram was removed from the Baroda Residency, and you are aware that while we considered him to have taken, in one respect, a mistaken view of the extent of his official powers, and while we regarded the tone of some of his representations as objectionable, we gave him credit for the zeal, energy, ability, and success with which he prosecuted inquiries attended with great difficulty, and expressed our hope that on his return to India he would be re-employed in a capacity suitable to his talents and services.

3. In any ordinary case we should not feel ourselves called on to make any further reference to the future employment of an officer so situated, but you are no doubt aware that unless Lieutenant-Colonel Outram were restored to the very office from which he was removed (a course which we do not think it expedient to direct) there is not at present, nor is likely soon to be, any arrangement in the power of the Bombay Government, by which that officer could be placed in any employment approaching, in point of political importance and of emolument, to that which he last held; while under the Government of India (to which also Lieutenant-Colonel Outram has rendered distinguished services) employments suitable to his standing, and to which he is eligible by the rules of our service, are much more frequently at the disposal of Government.

4. In these peculiar circumstances, without desiring in any degree to fetter your discretion in the choice of the officers for whom you are responsible, we think it due to Lieutenant-Colonel Outram's past services to express our hope that you will include him among those whose claims to employment deserve, on any suitable occasion, to be favourably considered.

Outram had written to Lord Dalhousie in January, offering himself for employment in 'any part of India' where he could be useful, and the Governor-General had promptly replied; but no hope was held out of compliance with the applicant's wishes, owing to the presence of claimants who could not be passed over, in the circumstances, without apparent supersession. In June, however, on receipt of the intimation that Lord Dalhousie would be addressed by the Court on his behalf, he was able to solicit his Lordship's good offices on a sounder plea than before. He added his intention of personally paying his respects at Government House, Calcutta, in about two months from the date of writing. We shall presently note the reply given to this later application. In the meanwhile, Outram asked and obtained permission to return to his duty in India, viâ Calcutta, on July 4.

All was arranged for his departure. His position was too unsettled to take Mrs. Outram with him: so he was to return alone. On the morning of July 3, while engaged in dressing, a note was brought to him from Lord Clarendon, who had recently taken charge of the Portfolio of Foreign Affairs, asking him to call on that day. He went at the time appointed, and learnt that, instead of proceeding direct to Suez and Bombay, he would be requested to await at Alexandria a communication from Lord Stratford at Constantinople. The probability of a rupture with Russia had caused her Majesty's Government to seek the best officers available for special employment in Turkey; and Outram's established

reputation as a soldier and political, added to his recent experience and proved knowledge of Egypt, had naturally marked him as a foremost man for the occasion. The Minister was kind and courteous, and said he would write to the Governor-General to insure that his visitor's detention should not prove detrimental to his professional interests. His Lordship further expressed the hope that Lord Stratford would yet be able to avert hostilities between Russia and the Porte. The following day, Outram took leave of his family, but neither to his mother nor his wife did he say a word of the confidential interview to which he had been summoned on the eve of his return to the East. This reticence was thus explained in a letter from Malta:—‘You would, I feared, be occupied with gloomy fancies enough, without my adding to them by informing you of a circumstance, which I thought it better on that account to defer telling you from hence—when you will be surrounded by your kind, cheerful relatives.’ Then, after revealing the matter in detail, he added:—‘As it appears, the European Powers are not to consider the passage of the Pruth by Russia a *casus belli*, I have little doubt the latter, after effecting that object, will be more open to reason, and that negotiations will then commence which will end in a pacific solution of the problem. I have little expectation therefore that Lord Stratford will summon me. He cannot have had time to write to Malta, at any rate, so I shall go on to Alexandria. There of course I must wait till I hear from him, but that will involve the delay only of a fortnight, for I must hear from him before the next Indian mail arrives from England.’

To the Ambassador Outram had addressed a letter from Malta on July 14, but it was not until August that he got a reply. As Lord Stratford held out no immediate prospect of employment—though he substituted a most hospitable invitation, should his correspondent be ‘inclined to come

she would have been as much surprised as he was, 'at the ease and fluency with which he addressed the party for upwards of half an hour, without the slightest hesitation, and in a voice which filled the room.' The speaker was doubtless inspired by the ovations which he received. We are told by one paper, that when Sir James Colville 'depicted the proud and brilliant career, and the gallant actions of their distinguished guest,' he was frequently interrupted by 'thunders of applause;' and that the latter, before commencing his return address, stood 'for some time to let the reiterated bursts of welcome and cheering that greeted his rising subside.' Even the 'Friend of India,' which objected to the entertainment 'as a political dinner,' admitted that 'the respect paid to Colonel Outram was as honourable to Calcutta as to the officer on whom it was bestowed.'

Not until late in February could Outram leave the City of Palaces. He had become heartily tired of the place, and of what he considered the 'utter idleness' in which he passed his time, 'literally doing nothing but reading' books, procurable 'to any amount at the rate of six rupees per mensem subscription to the library.' He had, however, to make response to a call from the Governor-General, on return from Birmah, for certain information, which he supplied in the shape of a 'Memorandum on the Invasion of India from the Westward.'¹ This reference had been occasioned by the receipt of letters from home, showing the probability of a European war and much consequent political disturbance. It was natural that the state of forced inactivity to which he had been doomed in Calcutta should have led the referee to revert to Lord Stratford's invitation to himself when in Egypt,

¹ Appendix K. Though written under circumstances hardly analogous to those of the present day, especially as regards the position actually attained by Russia in Central Asia and Armenia, these extracts may doubtless still be read with interest and profit.

and regard it as a missed opportunity to be deplored. . ‘ Had I not made that promise to you not to go to Constantinople,’ is the beginning of a regretful passage in a letter of this period to Mrs. Outram : and further on is this expressive retrospect :—‘ What a chance : sent there under the auspices of the Cabinet of England ! ’

On March 19 he was again at Baroda. Once reinstated, his victory in this, his last official campaign, had indeed proved complete ; still it was not his wish to remain long at that most distasteful and indeed dangerous post ; and, among other projects for the future, he had contemplated an early renewal of his home furlough. But on the way to rejoin his old appointment under its new conditions, an offer was made to him of employment in a different field. Of this we shall have to speak in the next chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

1854 - 1856.

Farewell to Baroda.—Appointed Political Resident and Commandant at Aden.—Chief Commissioner in Oudh.—Home.

LORD ELPHINSTONE had succeeded Lord Falkland as Governor of Bombay on December 26, 1853, when Outram was in Calcutta in expectation of orders to return to Baroda. This amiable and, at the same time, resolute and clear-sighted nobleman had already had some experience of India during a five years' tenure of the Government of Madras; but his duties in the Southern Presidency had been of a far less active and important character than those which he was required to undertake, at a later period of life, on the Western coast. Fortunately, he was found equal to the occasion, and history will give him an honoured place among men rendered eminent by the ordeal of a great political and military crisis. The friendliness and confidence which, from the first, marked his relations with Outram, continued to the last unshaken. At the time of which we are now writing, the dark Indian storm-cloud had not appeared in sight, and the Russo-Turkish complication drew the attention of Indian Governors from their more immediate surroundings to the critical state of affairs in Europe.

At Bombay, Colonel Outram met with a most cordial reception in all quarters—more especially from Lord Elphinstone in person. At the first meeting, the Governor, taking

him aside after dinner, informed him that a reply had just been received from Lord Dalhousie, regarding a proposed transfer of his services from Baroda to Aden. He himself had suggested the advisability of offering him the Political Agency at the latter place, which had fallen vacant, and, in the event of acceptance, the military command would be combined with the civil responsibility. The Governor-General had expressed his willingness to sanction the proposal, provided Outram would first go to Baroda—a proceeding held indispensable on public grounds.¹ How the offer was received, we gather from the following passage in a home letter:—‘I said I should be happy to go wherever my services should be deemed desirable, only that I thought the intention . . . should not be made known for the present, as the effect of my return to Baroda would be weakened thereby.’ Another passage shows that, from a private point of view, the change of locality was considered convenient, under new furlough regulations, for a run home to see the old Mrs. Outram, who longed for her son’s society:—‘I shall hope to pay her a hurried visit after we have been a year or so settled in . . . Aden—which being a fortnight nearer . . . would enable us to visit home for two months, going and returning through the continent.’

Outram, accompanied by his former Assistant, Lieutenant Battye, reached Baroda, as we have said, on March 19; and the following day visited the Gáikawár. The latter was at

¹ After arrival at Baroda, Outram received through Lord Elphinstone the Governor-General’s friendly and flattering letter to himself on the subject. In this he read with reference to Aden:—‘The great importance of that position in the event of a war being commenced in Europe, which may take any imaginable turn in the course of its progress, has caused me to enter fully into Lord Elphinstone’s anxiety to see you there, and to share with him the anticipation of the confidence which your presence in such a position would give to all of us.’ Nor did Lord Dalhousie fail to point out how favourable to his public character was the circumstance that his selection for the office had been the act of the Governor of Bombay.

first confused, but, before the termination of the interview, had regained his self-possession; and personal relations were resumed much on the old footing of mutual cordiality. One source of necessarily unpleasant feeling was the retention in office of the 'Bháo,' who was obnoxious to the Resident and, through the Resident's reports, to the Government of India; and it was impossible that their conversation should avoid allusion to the subject. The removal of this person both from the high post of Minister which he then held, and from 'any situation whatever' in the *darbár*, was insisted upon by Lord Dalhousie; and Outram felt that, in spite of protest and evasion, the order must be obeyed. He, therefore, from the first, took a firm attitude in the discussion of the dangerous favourite's case, and turned a deaf ear to the Gáikawár's entreaties to be spared a concession unwisely declared to be a disgrace. Two or three days later he had received the Chief's return visit without abandoning an inch of ground. A month afterwards, all had been satisfactorily settled: no matter of unusual importance demanded the presence of a special British Agent; and arrangements were in progress for a change of Residents at Baroda. 'The Guicowar has not only dismissed the Bháo as required to do'—so ran the faithful, if non-official report—'but has gone much further, having expelled him from the country, and dismissed all his allies besides, solemnly pledging himself never to re-admit any of them to his counsels.

Amid current events of local interest, perhaps the most worthy of record during the weeks immediately succeeding Outram's reappointment to his unenviable post in Gujrát, are the deaths of Narsu Pant, and a *Khatpat* agent, deputed by the Gáikawár to Calcutta at the instigation of his dismissed Minister; together with the robbery of a mail containing an important packet on Baroda affairs addressed to the Government of India. In the Resident's own account of the

former circumstance—which had ‘had considerable effect on the superstitious minds’ of the natives, and would have much strengthened his hands had he then ‘to commence a campaign against corruption-mongers’—he notes the ‘extraordinary coincidence’ that the said Narsu, the man who had been the chief cause of his removal from Baroda, died suddenly at a place distant seventy miles from that city, at the *exact hour* on which he himself re-entered his official quarters. The other individual was taken so ill on the road to Calcutta that he had to be brought back to Baroda, where he died about the time of Outram’s arrival in Bombay.

We need not enter more fully into the details of Baroda duties. Before the close of April, Lord Dalhousie had written to Outram giving him authority to summon his successor, and permission to leave as soon as he pleased after relief. The officer appointed in his room was Major Malcolm, Agent at the Court of Sindia, whose nomination had been quite in accordance with his own wishes. Indeed, of the Governor-General’s three nominees for the post, all were his personal friends, a fact which might reasonably be interpreted as an evidence of kindly feeling towards the vacating Resident. Lord Dalhousie’s appreciation of the way in which the reins had been again, for a brief interval, taken in hand by his representative at the Gáikawár’s court, will be seen in these few lines of his letter written in May from Calcutta:—

‘The mingled sternness and consideration with which you have treated the Guicowar, will, I hope, have a lasting effect on the Guicowar himself; and will teach both him and those about him, that while the Supreme Government is desirous of upholding him, it must be obeyed in all things. . . . You must accept my personal congratulations and thanks in regard to the complete success of your return to Baroda.’

His training for the politics of Yeman, though com-

menced in India, had not been long or complete. That it was entered upon with a will and energy may be taken for granted; but the following extract from a letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated Baroda, April 16, supplies interesting particulars of the spirit in which he buckled on his armour. The Governor had sent him a summary of a recent despatch from Brigadier Clarke—the officer whom he was about to relieve from a temporary charge—affording ‘some little insight into the nature of the work’ before him:—‘I had previously been studying the Aden Blue-Book; but I shall have to go through the intermediate correspondence up to the present time, to which perhaps the Political Secretary will permit me to have access when I arrive in Bombay, ere I can well understand the state of our relations with the Arab tribes, and theirs with each other. When I have mastered the subject, and had the advantage of hearing your Lordship’s sentiments respecting the course of policy you wish to be pursued towards the Arabs, I shall proceed to Aden with so earnest a desire to carry out your views and do good, that I trust my exertions may meet with success.’ A letter of hearty and unreserved congratulation, addressed to him on April 24 by Sir Charles Wood, shows that his acceptance of the post had been thoroughly welcome intelligence to the India Board at home.

Early in June, he embarked from Bombay for his new destination in the H. C. steamer ‘Ajdaha.’ As the monsoon had fairly broken, the passage across was long and unpleasant. But the storms might have been better weathered with better means at disposal. The vessel was badly manned for a voyage at that particular season. Two thirds of the native crew were worthless, coal was insufficient, and there was available but a single set of sails.¹ On reaching Cape

¹ The situation is thus described by Outram in a letter to Lord Elphinstone:—‘Had they (the sails) been ever so strong or so necessary, the crew

Guardafui, there was left only one day's fuel—not enough to accomplish half the remaining distance to Aden. But the Captain wisely stopped the engines, and, taking advantage of the light breezes and currents known to be then prevalent along the north-western coast of Africa, worked on for three days under canvas, hugging the land, until he had reached a favourable point whence he could safely steam again. By this judicious management he made his port on June 23, 'the sixteenth day after leaving Bombay,' with scarce a ton of coal to spare.

Aden at any time is an unattractive residence. In June it is to be carefully avoided; and when Outram disembarked there to take up his appointment, no improvement in respect of climate could be anticipated for at least three months longer. On leaving Baroda he had assured his relations at home that all with him was as 'merry as a marriage bell;' yet he was not apparently in good bodily condition. He thought he had again been tampered with by the poisoners. Dr. Ogilvie had entreated him to be on his guard against their iniquitous intrigues, and to pay due attention to his health; but it was probable that he had not implicitly followed these instructions, nor could it be said that the most scrupulous regard to them would have ensured him from the apprehended harm. In any case, removal across the water was rather prejudicial than otherwise; and he had not been three months on the Arabian Peninsula, when he was informed by his medical attendant that, unless a change for

were utterly unequal to their management; even in very moderate weather it took them several *hours* to set the main and topsails (once only, I think, they ventured to set the fore-top-gallant-sail)—and as they could not have taken them in without much delay and difficulty had the wind increased, the officers never dared to carry "stunsails," or half the allowance of canvas they otherwise would have done, so that we were unable to avail ourselves of the full advantage of such favourable slants of wind as would have enabled us to economise our fuel, which Captain Barker, by his judicious skirting of the cyclones, generally secured for us,'

the better were effected in one month longer, he would have to seek a temporary leave of absence. We must not, however, anticipate the glance which we propose to take at the work accomplished during his brief tenure of office at the dreary station called by Lord Dalhousie his 'Patmos.'

Colonel Outram received charge of the duties of Political Resident and Commandant at Aden at a period of political difficulty. Our relations with the Arabs in that neighbourhood had long been conducted on a most unsatisfactory footing. The land approaches to our fortified position were unsafe; our occupation was regarded with disfavour and jealousy; and the behaviour towards us of some of the chiefs had become 'menacingly insolent.'¹ Moreover, the repeated stoppage of supplies from the interior, and the murder in cold blood, not far from the fortifications, of several of the garrison, gave direct and palpable evidence of hostility on the part of those whose respect and good-will it was our interest to secure.² But no satisfaction had been exacted for

¹ 'We obtained possession of Aden thus: A Madras ship, belonging to the niece of the Nawab of the Carnatic, and under British colours, went on shore a few miles distant from Aden. She was plundered, and her passengers forced to submit to every kind of indignity. The Government of Bombay sent Captain Haines, I. N., to demand reparation, and, if he could not obtain it otherwise, to purchase Aden. The Sultan of Labej paid an indemnity, and after signing a bond to cede the peninsula to the British for an annual pension of 87,000 dollars, proved treacherous. Captain Haines was reinforced by a body of 700 troops from Bombay under Major Baillie, and took the place by assault on January 16, 1839. Since then the Sultan has been continually setting up the other tribes, the Foudtheli and Akrabi, against us, and there have been not a few assassinations.'—*Calcutta Review*, No. lxiv., June 1859.

² In 1850, from a boat's crew of H. C. steamer-frigate 'Auckland,' a man was killed and a boy wounded by Bedouins, and a Madras *sipahi* was wounded by a fanatic Arab. In 1857, on one occasion, Captain Milne was murdered and two of his companions wounded; on another the life of Lieutenant Delisser was attempted; on another a *sipahi* was wounded; and on another the mate and one seaman of a wrecked merchantman were murdered by one or more of the inhabitants of the interior. See pp. 169, 170, Captain Playfair's *History of Arabia Felix*, in No. xlix. *Bombay Government Records*, 1859; and pp. 166, 167,

the deeds of violence committed; and our correspondence with the responsible chiefs, however active, had resulted in no definite understanding, nor added to the prestige which it was so manifestly essential for us to maintain. In the word of one,¹ whose services were made available for the introduction of a more vigorous diplomacy, and from whose recorded reminiscences we are enabled to profit:—‘a better man than Outram to remedy this state of things could not have been selected; and it was Lord Elphinstone’s just estimate of his remarkable qualities in dealing with such wild tribes that led him to make the appointment.’ The new Political Agent lost no time in drawing up an elaborate report of the different causes which had brought about the then existing phase of our relations with the interior; ‘wherein he reviewed our past policy towards the Arabs, pointed out its defects with unflinching truthfulness, and suggested the best means of winning over that most difficult race to appreciate the advantages of amity with the British.’ Meantime he corresponded in his own way with, and received deputations from the different chiefs, ‘and by his firm yet conciliatory manner entirely gained their confidence.’

Without entering into any discussion of the policy which he may be said to have inaugurated for dealing with the Arab tribes, we may note that its main feature was ‘decision.’ There was to be no misapprehension of the meaning of British Government writings. If they contained a promise, that promise was to be fulfilled; if they held out a threat, that threat was to be put in execution; if they entered into treaty engagements, we were to abide strictly by the letter of agreement. Of the chiefs in the interior,

Captain Hunter’s *Account of the British Settlement of Aden in Arabia* (Trübner, 1877).

¹ The Reverend J. Percy Badger, D.C.L., an old personal friend, whose long residence at the station, and perfect acquaintance with the language and temper of the Arabs, Outram well knew how to value.

there were three with whom we had had much to do. One was the Sultan of Láhaj: the head of the Fúdhli tribe and the Shaikh of Bir Ahmad were the others. The treatment suggested for each met with the unanimous approval of the Supreme Government, who urged the Home authorities to withdraw certain restrictions which they had heretofore seen fit to set in these matters upon the discretion of their politicals at Aden. Lord Dalhousie's Government went still further, in applying the general rule to particular instances. The Bombay Government had authorised Colonel Outram to assist the Sultan of Láhaj, if he should be attacked. In Calcutta, our treaty obligations to this ally were considered to be more binding than any home or local order; and the Resident was to be, accordingly, empowered, in the spirit of his own proposal, to aid the Sultan with an armed force, provided only that the measure was, in his own judgment, warranted by circumstances. On first acceptance of his Arabian Residency, Outram had obtained Lord Elphinstone's consent to the nomination of Lieut. Playfair, of the Madras Artillery, as Assistant Resident—an officer of ability and experience, who amply justified his selection, and to whom we are indebted for an historical account of Aden and the neighbouring country, antedating to the commencement of the Christian era. He also applied for the services of Mr. Hormuzd Rassam, as interpreter—an appointment which received the sanction of Government, and was turned to good account.

Again, Dr. Badger relates that, 'while busily employed at Aden in restoring our prestige among the Arab tribes, Outram was not unmindful of its internal affairs, and to his persevering efforts the garrison there were first indebted for a daily ration of sweet water.' From one cause or another, we learn that 'most of the best wells in the place had fallen into the hands of private individuals, and the troops were

obliged to drink what has justly been described as "a strong solution of salt." Outram appointed a special committee to investigate the whole question of the water supply . . . ; the abuses which had so long prevailed were speedily abolished, and every soldier received a gallon of fresh water a day, the greatest boon which could have been conferred on the garrison.'

The report of the Committee, whose inquiries were restricted to the wells and water tanks within the cantonment, was drawn up with creditable care and system, and received the marked commendation of the Political Resident, when submitting it to the Bombay Government with a forwarding letter. But the comfort and requirements of the occupants of the Peninsula were further studied by their official Chief, whose report on the capabilities of a particular locality he had selected for the growth of potatoes and other vegetables may vie in length and analysis with a State paper. Captain Hunter, in his account of Aden, published in 1877, thus notices the circumstance :—

'In 1851 Sir James Outram suggested the establishment of a garden at the Hiswah, which is a piece of ground on the northern shore of the harbour, about four miles long by two broad, watered by the torrents that occasionally descend from the neighbouring hills and here discharge themselves into the sea. Government sanctioned the employment of two gardeners; a supply of seed was sent, and an additional sum of sixty rupees per annum was allowed for contingencies. The garden preserved a desultory existence for a few years.'

One project which interested him when at Aden, and to the development of which he would gladly have given his support, was that of Captain Allen, R.N., to drive a canal from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Akaba, viâ the Jordan and Dead Sea. The scheme found favour in many influential quarters, and Outram had offered to place a vessel at the

projector's disposal for the survey of Akaba; but even had the levels and physical conditions essential to success been favourably certified, the completion of a Suez Canal would have seriously affected the political and commercial usefulness of the undertaking contemplated; and a 'Palmyrene' railway would have almost wholly deprived it, in any sense, of a *raison d'être*. Another object which appears to have attracted his attention at this same period was the existence of *guano* on the Kuria Muria¹ (and other) islands off the eastern coast of Arabia. But these islands were claimed by four distinct tribes; and how to negotiate with the rightful owners was a question which Dr. Badger reported to be full of complication for would-be speculators.

Outram informed Lord Elphinstone of his failing health in September; and reports to the same effect must have reached Bombay from other quarters. Among those outward-bound 'overland' passengers who had been struck by his changed appearance was General Fraser, so long British Resident at the court of the Nizam, who no sooner reached Galle than he wrote to the Governor-General on the subject. 'I regret extremely to read the accounts you give of Colonel Outram's health,' was Lord Dalhousie's reply. 'The interest you take in him will make it agreeable to you to learn that by the last mail I wrote to offer him the Residency at Lucknow, which will be vacant till November 1855, and to which he will no doubt permanently succeed.' But long before the date of this letter the same intelligence had been despatched to the person chiefly interested, from Bombay and Calcutta. 'Of course I cannot grudge you a promotion which you have well earned; but I may confess to you,' wrote Lord Elphinstone, 'that I shall regret losing you at Aden, and that I

¹ The actual sovereignty of the Kuria Muria islands was made over by the Imam of Maskat to the British Government by deed of cession dated July 14, 1854.

shall not find it an easy matter to replace you there.' The Governor-General remarked that the Oudh appointment was the best thing in his gift, and he knew no one who better deserved it than he to whom it was offered.¹

Though loth to revert, except casually, to incidents of a purely domestic nature, we cannot render justice to Outram's filial regard and affection, without quoting the letter in which he announces to his mother this piece of deserved 'good fortune':—'Margaret will have told you of the good fortune which has befallen me, but which I had only time to write in a postscript. . . . Lord Dalhousie having selected me for the highest political office in India, the Residency of Lucknow. . . . You can now therefore have no scruple to receive from me whatever may be necessary to your comfort. I formerly said 500*l.* a year, but I can well afford much more than that, if you could but be prevailed upon to expend it. . . . I am in all the bustle of preparing to move, giving over office, &c.; and I suppose Lord Dalhousie will require me to proceed to my post with the least possible delay. . . . Lucknow is a delightful climate I am told, and we have a favourite hill station within three days' march to go to in the hot weather, where the climate is equal to that of Italy. We are looking for the English mail, and I trust it will bring a letter from you giving a good account of yourself, and assuring me that you will now keep a maid and a carriage.' Again, at the close of the letter, we read:—'I hope this will find you comfortably settled for the winter . . . but *with a carriage and maid*; this I must now assume the privilege of *insisting* on.'

It was a satisfaction to the departing Resident to hand

¹ In acknowledging the distinction thus conferred on him, Outram, with his own inimitable frankness, confessed that he was utterly ignorant of Persian; and that if his Lordship had nominated him under the impression that he was conversant with that language, he would relieve him of all difficulty in the matter by declining the appointment.

was then a comparatively small territory compared to the important 'Subah' of Shuja'u-d-daulah and other less famed predecessors. His elevation had been effected at the cost of his own and his country's independence: for the treaty with the paramount power which he had been compelled to accept pronounced him to be, to all intents and purposes, a vassal of England. Further treaties and concessions rendered his position more subordinate still; but, in spite of territorial losses and diminished revenues, he was enabled to gratify his avaricious tastes, and accumulate a vast amount of treasure. On his death, in 1814, Gháziu-d-dín Haidar, his eldest son, was invested with the hereditary dignity. As a matter of political convenience, this Nawáb was proclaimed a sovereign prince, and allowed by the Governor-General to assume high-sounding titles, which aroused the indignation of the Court of Dehli. He lent much of the money derived from the paternal hoardings to the British, and converted one sum of 1,000,000*l.* into a loan in perpetuity at five per cent. interest; but notwithstanding these outward evidences of friendly feeling, at a time when our Indian treasury stood in need of replenishing, he complained of the treatment of our Proconsuls, and disliked the scrutiny and supervision which they claimed authority to exercise in his affairs. Lord Amherst visited him in 1826; and in the following year he died, to be succeeded by his son Suliman Jáh, under the title of Nasru-d-din Haidar. With the latter, British relations did not improve. Our interference on behalf of a disgraced minister, whom we had constituted the recipient of 25,000*l.* annually—or half the interest on the loan of 1,000,000*l.*—was distasteful to the king, who wished to lay hands on his whole property. After vainly seeking to carry on the duties of government, at first in his own person, and secondly by the aid of a Wazir not without ability, the Ruler of Oudh was threatened by Lord William Bentinck with de-

privation of his perplexed and ill-administered inheritance and reduction to the position of a mere pensioner. Nasru-d-din and his new minister promised to do better; but when the latter asked assistance from the British Government, no response was made to the call, and interference, which had been readily practised on other and seemingly less urgent occasions, was withheld. The king died childless in 1837, and his death was followed by contention and confusion. There were at this time put forward the claims of an adopted son, two cousins of deceased, sons of the next elder brother of Ghaziu-d-din, and of the uncle, Nasru-d-daulah.¹ The last was acknowledged by Colonel Low, the British Resident, founding his arguments on Muhammadan law; and though forestalled by the action of the 'Padshah Bigam,' or queen mother, in declaring her own candidate, the title of our *protégé* was eventually made good, owing to the intervention of troops. The new rule was inaugurated by a fresh treaty, which, among other innovations, admitted the nomination of English officers to fulfil the administrative requirements of the Province in the event of continuous native mismanagement. Had not the war in Afghanistan and Sind, and other momentous events drawn off attention from Oudh, it is probable that active measures would have been set on foot for checking the gross abuses which prevailed there. As it happened, no decisive step in this direction was taken during the reign of Nasru-d-daulah, or of his son and successor, Suriya Jah. But when the last-named prince was succeeded in 1847 by his son Wajid Ali Shah, Lord Hardinge, then Governor-General of India, was constrained to take into serious consideration the question of applying some practical remedy to a state of things which had become a public scandal. Visiting the king at Luckhnan, he conferred with him on the critical situation brought about by his neglect and selfish indifference; and caused to be read

¹ Third son of Ghaziu-d-din before mentioned.

out for his information and guidance a carefully prepared Memorandum justifying the renewed interference of the British Government, suggesting a plan of action which the monarch was invited to carry out, and fixing a period of two years for further testing the royal intentions. At the expiration of the said term, Lord Dalhousie was governing India. He called upon the Resident for his Report, after making a tour through Oudh, and ascertaining its condition by personal inspection. The following is extracted from Sir W. Sleeman's letter addressed to the Governor-General at the termination of his work:—

No part of the people of Oude are more anxious for the interposition of our Government than the members of the royal family; for there is really no portion more helpless and oppressed; none of them can ever approach the king, who is surrounded exclusively by eunuchs, fiddlers, and poetasters, worse than either, and the minister and his creatures, who are worse than all. They appropriate at least one half of the revenues of the country to themselves, and employ nothing but knaves of the very worst kind in the administration. The king is a crazy imbecile, who is led about by these people like a child, and made to do whatever they wish him to do, and to give whatever orders may best suit their private interests. At present the most powerful of the favourites are . . . two eunuchs; . . . two fiddlers; two poetasters, and the minister and his creatures. The minister could not stand a moment without the eunuchs, fiddlers, and poets, and he is obliged to acquiesce in all the orders given by the king for their benefit. The fiddlers have control over the administration of civil justice; the eunuchs over that of criminal justice, public buildings, &c. The minister has the land revenue; and all are making enormous fortunes. . . . What the people want, and most earnestly pray for, is, that our Government should take upon itself the responsibility of governing them well and permanently. All classes, save the knaves who now surround and govern the king, earnestly pray for this—the educated classes, because they would then have a chance of respectable employment, which none of them now have; the middle classes, because they find no protection or encouragement, and no hope that their children will be

permitted to inherit the property they may leave, not invested in our Government securities; and the humbler class, because they are now abandoned to the merciless rapacity of the starving troops and other public establishments, and of the landowners driven or invited into rebellion by the present state of misrule. There is not, I believe, another government in India so entirely opposed to the best interests and most earnest wishes of the people as that of Oude now is; at least I have never seen or read of one. People of all classes have become utterly weary of it.

But the Resident who painted his picture in such strong colours was averse to extreme measures. He thought we might control the country without appropriating to our own use its revenues, or wholly superseding a native agency. In this sense he wrote to Lord Dalhousie, and in this sense he wrote to the Chairman of the Court of Directors. To the latter he pointed out that a line of conduct 'most profitable in a pecuniary view' might be 'most injurious in a political one.' And he expressed his conviction that the doctrines of what he called 'the absorbing school' must sooner or later produce a crisis in British India. Colonel Sleeman's health gave way in 1854, and his appointment was, as we have seen, immediately offered to Colonel Outram, in a semi-official letter from Lord Dalhousie. 'Oude has long been in a ticklish state—the *sic* man may be any day on our hands,' were the only passages in that letter hinting at, in some way, the work to be done, though scarcely foreshadowing, in any way, the kind of policy to be pursued. But questions were not asked on this score, and the offer was accepted. We are told that the arrangement made was 'some solace' to the retiring officer, who felt 'that his place would be well and worthily filled;' and that he thus wrote to the Governor-General on the subject: 'Had your Lordship left the choice of a successor to me, I should have pointed out Colonel Outram; and I feel very much rejoiced that he has been selected for the office, and I hope he will come as soon as possible.'

We now come to the instructions furnished to Outram for his guidance on proceeding to Oudh. They were twofold and, as Wájid Ali Shah was in a precarious bodily condition, they embraced two contingencies—the king's death and the king's recovery. In the former case the Resident was authorised to place the eldest son and heir apparent on the throne, leaving for the time the Minister to conduct the affairs of State under the control vested in himself by treaty. In the latter case he would simply exercise the functions of his office on the principles which had guided his predecessors. These were the remaining paragraphs of the letter:—

But, however desirous the Government of India may be to avoid all interference in the affairs of Oudh which is not forced upon it, yet it cannot ignore the fact that the Government of Oudh is still in that state of probation in which it was solemnly placed by the Government of 1847. The king was then informed by the Governor-General in person that, unless within two years from that time the miserable condition of the people of Oudh had been much improved, and unless the oppression under which they had long groaned was at least in the way of being removed, it would be the duty of the British Government to have recourse to those extreme measures which, sixteen years before, Lord William Bentinck had declared must be enforced for the protection of the people of Oudh.

The occurrence of successive wars, and an unfeigned reluctance to have recourse to those extreme measures to which allusion has just been made, have concurred to induce the Government of India to take no action on the final warning given to the king, now seven years ago, in 1847.

But the Honourable the Court of Directors during that period have more than once called for the opinion of the Governor-General in Council as to the course which ought to be pursued in regard to the kingdom of Oudh. Our former warning is still in force—we have every reason to believe that the State of Oudh shows none of that amendment which the Governor-General in 1847 declared to be indispensable; and yet our threats remain unfulfilled.

Averse as the Governor-General in Council is to enter on this large question, his Lordship in Council feels that it cannot be left in its present indefinite and unsatisfactory condition.

I am accordingly directed by the Governor-General in Council to instruct you to apply yourself on your arrival at Lucknow to an inquiry into the present state of that country; with a view to determine whether its affairs still continue in the state in which Colonel Sleeman from time to time described them to be; whether the improvement which Lord Hardinge peremptorily demanded seven years ago at the hands of the king, in pursuance of the Treaty of 1801, has in every degree been effected; and whether the duty imposed upon the British Government by that Treaty, a duty recognised by Lord William Bentinck in 1831, and reiterated by Lord Hardinge in 1847, will in truth any longer admit of our honestly indulging the reluctance we have felt to have recourse to those extreme measures which alone can be of any real efficacy in remedying the evils from which the State of Oudh has suffered so long.

It will thus be seen that Outram had a delicate and difficult duty to fulfil. Fortunately, his prestige was great, his heart was in his work, and he had the full confidence of the Governor-General. Moreover, he enjoyed the privilege of free and unreserved communication with two former Residents at Lakhnau, his friends Colonels Low and Sleeman—men who have left their mark behind them, and who will not be forgotten in the annals of British India. The first-named was then a member of the Governor-General's Council; the second, whom severe sickness had driven from Lakhnau in the previous month, was, when Outram reached Calcutta in November 1854, at Mirat. Both officers readily placed at the new Resident's disposal the results of their Oudh experience; and great was the value of their practical aid and suggestions. Colonel Sleeman, ill as he was, fluently describes, in many well-covered pages of note-paper, the more important persons moving in or about the precincts of the Lakhnau *darbār*, putting his correspondent *au courant*

of local gossip and politics. Colonel Low's good offices were notably exercised at the outset of Outram's Lakhnau career—for, understanding that, on his first arrival, it had been provided that 'the Prime Minister and other dignitaries would meet him outside the city, and conduct him to the Residency,' he was careful to show that the custom, in his own time, and with all his predecessors, was very different. The Minister and Assistant, he admitted, should meet the new comer outside, and far outside the city; but only to conduct him to a spot, still outside the city, where he would be met by the king in person,¹ enter the royal *hauḍa*, and, sitting on the same seat with the king, proceed *thus* to breakfast at the Palace. After breakfast, the Minister would accompany the Resident to the Residency, when, after a brief visit, he would take his leave. It need hardly be said that these points of etiquette are, in Oriental countries, questions of high diplomacy; and that the five pages of foolscap written by Colonel Low on this particular matter are in their way a curious and valuable record. He has also explained that one reason for placing the British Resident at Lakhnau on a quasi-equality with the local sovereign, a dignity not accorded to our representative even at the Rajput *darbārs*, must be looked for in the early history of our connection with Oudh. In the first treaties between the British and the ruler of that province, the latter held only the rank of 'Wazīr;' but when Lord Hastings authorised the assumption by Gházīu-d-dīn of sovereign titles, it was expressly stipulated that the increased personal distinction should not affect in any way the forms before observed between the king and the British Government, or local Resident. These, therefore, remained intact, and in original strictness.

¹ In the event of illness of a serious kind, or such as to prevent the king from sitting on an elephant, the heir-apparent, however young, became the *locum tenens* for the occasion, but never the minister.

to do honour to Colonel Outram, and to salute the Heir-Apparent : for, to the great grief of all his Majesty's subjects, the king was unfortunately too unwell to appear in person. Let the reader imagine a procession of more than three hundred elephants and camels, caparisoned and decorated with all that 'barbaric pomp' could lavish and Asiatic splendour shower down ; all the princes and nobles in the kingdom blazing with jewels, sparkling with gems, and gorgeous in apparel, with footmen and horsemen swarming round on all sides ; pennons and banners dancing in the sun's rays ; and a perfect forest of gold and silver sticks, spears, and other insignia of imperial and royal state. Slowly and stately the procession wound its way, until it entered the royal park of Dilkushá. As it approached the centre of the park, Colonel Outram's *cortège* moved forward to meet the Heir-Apparent. At the spot indicated the two processions met, and nothing could exceed the splendour of the *coup-d'œil* at this moment. When the British officer and the Native Prince met and shook hands, the guard of honour under Major Troup presented arms, the horse artillery of his Majesty thundered forth a royal salute, and amidst the solemn strains of the National Anthem, the clangour of trumpets, and the rattle of drums from his Majesty's cavalry and infantry, Colonel Outram took his seat in the royal *hauda*, and on the right hand of the Heir-Apparent ; and the gorgeous procession, at a stately pace, retraced its steps towards the city. Everybody was delighted to see the Colonel looking so well, and many an anxious glance was turned to read the countenance of the Bayard of India. He is a small man, with dark hair and moustache, and the eyes of a falcon, with gentleman and soldier stamped in every feature. He was in full diplomatic costume, which sparkled with numerous decorations, records of many a well-fought field, and of great and distinguished services. As the procession left the Dilkushá Palace and entered the city, nothing appeared but a sea of heads towering one above another, from the street to verandahs, and from verandahs to roofs, the people being all dressed out in gala costume, and enjoying the splendid scene. In compliance with a good old rule, the Heir-Apparent presented the Resident with a bag containing 3,200 rupees for distribution amongst the crowds of beggars and *vauriens* shouting around the royal elephants. Colonel Outram handed over the silver coins to Captain Hayes who was on his right, and who rained down silver as

the procession moved onwards. . . . The procession, on reaching the king's residence, turning off to its right, wended its way over an excellent road to the Shah Manzil, a spacious and elegant palace, situated by the margin of Gúmti's blue water, in a lovely garden wherein the citron, lemon, and orange mingled with the rose and pomegranate in endless profusion; and where were fountains and statues, with gold and silver fish flashing in pools of the clearest water.

Here a magnificent breakfast was provided, to which we learn that 'justice was done by the European and native gentry.' In the evening a small party of friends was invited by Captain Fletcher Hayes to meet the Resident, who thus auspiciously entered upon the duties of his office.¹

A serious and an anxious time was immediately before him; and although the ordinary routine of work he had to perform may not have been heavier than in Baroda or Satára, the year 1855—an extraordinary one—was full of special care and grave responsibility. One of his first official acts was to strike at his old enemy *khatpat*, reappearing under the form which had so aroused his indignation in Gujrát. He got information that certain natives of position had been misleading some of their less sharp-witted countrymen with a story that he himself and other British officers were to be won over to commit certain acts of favouritism for money considerations; and it was clear to him that, irrespectively of personal slander, there was secret mischief at the bottom of these falsehoods. Addressing, therefore, Wájid Ali Shah by letter, he urged the dismissal of the detected intriguers from

¹ On January 11, the Brigade and Society of Lakhnau gave a banquet to the Resident, to celebrate his accession to office. Captain Hayes, in an eloquent and appropriate speech, proposing Outram's health, thus referred to his previous reputation:—'In the field, daring, valiant, and skilful; in diplomacy, conciliating, far-seeing, and successful, he has shown that he has a head to conceive, a hand to execute, and a temper to conciliate; he has trampled upon corruption, disarmed envy, and deservedly enjoys the extreme goodwill and heartiest good wishes of all his numerous friends, and the applause of his countrymen.'

Lakhman, and obtained a royal mandate to this effect, notwithstanding the king's endeavour to disprove the offence alleged. Unlike the case of his Baroda references, he received the full support of Government in this as in other acts of the day; and his hands became strong accordingly. Another evil, on the prevention of which his time and attention were anxiously bestowed, was the recurrence of deadly conflicts between the Muhammadans and Hindus of Oudh. If the former were more dangerous as fighting fanatics, the latter had the advantage of numbers; and although the king's sympathies were naturally on the side of his co-religionists, he could not afford to ignore the existence of a population composed of some two-thirds of his whole subjects. In one engagement near Faizabad, when the Hindu Bairágis considerably outnumbered their opponents, it was stated on good authority that nearly seventy Muslims were killed, and it was conjectured that as many fell on the other side. A certain Maulavi, Amir Ali, had attained a great reputation among the chief disturbers of the peace, and his movements were a constant cause of trouble. It was only after several interviews with the king and his minister, and a tedious, protracted correspondence, that the Resident could get the royal troops to act against so determined a leader. This man's doings were especially prominent in the year 1855.

In March, the report which Government had required at Outram's hands was submitted. That so long and elaborate a paper was prepared in less than four months after his receiving charge of the Lakhman Residency is a remarkable instance of the writer's industry, zeal, and ability. And yet he apologised to the Governor-General for the delay which had taken place in its completion. From want of personal experience in Oudh, he naturally placed great reliance on such information as he could obtain in the Residency records,

and through the channels which had supplied his predecessors; but a sense of the high accountableness of his office caused him to test the accuracy of all his data by every available means; and he put a series of questions to the magistrates of neighbouring British districts, the replies to which materially helped him in arriving at a sure conclusion. These questions he rightly considered as 'calculated to elicit the opinions of those gentlemen as to the extent of misrule and anarchy prevailing within the Oude territory' during the few preceding years, in so far as the prosperity or otherwise of their own districts was affected thereby—'their position in the immediate vicinity, the nature of their duties, which bring them into constant intercourse with the Oude people, and their honourable characters rendering them peculiarly capable of forming a tolerably correct judgment.' He also procured from competent officers, attached to the military or police forces of Oudh, much sound and useful information on the state of affairs in the interior of the province. Captain Hayes, in addition to other valuable assistance, supplied him with a *précis* of the history of our connection with the Oudh Government from the earliest period.

Outram arranged his report under the following seven heads:—1. The Sovereign and Minister. 2. Revenue and Finance. 3. Judicial Courts and Police. 4. The Army. 5. Roads and Public Works. 6. Statistics of Crime, &c. 7. Oppression, Cruelties, &c. With regard to the first, it is not to be wondered at that he agreed in the view generally expressed by preceding Residents on the unfitness to govern of a prince for whom their conscientious supervision had worked so little good. After quoting passages from the official writings of Captain Shakespear, and Colonels Richmond and Sleeman, throwing light on the character and conduct of the monarch before he came to the throne, and, since his accession, on various occasions during a period of ten years,

and summing up the steps which he himself had taken to become acquainted with the whole case before him, he finds it impossible to form any other opinion than that recorded by his immediate predecessor, whose very words he repeats as quite applicable to the occasion :—‘ His Majesty continues to confide the conduct of his affairs to the same worthless and incompetent characters, to devote all his time to personal gratifications and frivolous amusements, and to manifest the same utter disregard of his duties and responsibilities.’ Too much space would be occupied were we to enter into the details of malversation and misrule subsequently given; nor can we attempt to illustrate the later heads of the report; but Outram pleads on the king’s behalf that, ‘ while lamentably regardless of the interests of his own people,’ he had appeared ever ‘ anxious to meet the wishes of the British Government,’ where its own interests were concerned. As instances in point, the establishment of a frontier police, from which our neighbouring districts derived great advantage, and an annual disbursement of 4,700*l.* for the benefit of Europeans, are cited.

The concluding two paragraphs describe the general result of Colonel Outram’s inquiries; but the terrible effects of the king’s incapacity and indifference can only be appreciated by a contemplation of occurrences over which the veil is here necessarily drawn. As regards the internal state of the country, he considers the condition of Oudh to be ‘ most deplorable;’ and he has demonstrated that this condition has been brought about by ‘ the very culpable apathy and gross neglect of the sovereign and his *darbár.*’ He adds :—

‘ I have shown that the affairs of Oude still continue in the same state—if not worse—in which Colonel Sleeman from time to time described them to be; and that the improvement which Lord Hardinge peremptorily demanded

was not recommended in words by Lord Dalhousie. The Governor-General had proposed that a new treaty should be negotiated with the king of Oudh, annulling all former treaties; leaving the sovereignty over Oudh and British possessions *in statu quo*; vesting the whole civil and military administration, 'with all power, rights, and claims thereto belonging,' in the hands of the Honourable East India Company; providing for maintenance of the king's honour and dignity by an adequate annual stipend from the revenues; providing for all the members of the royal family as for the king; and placing the residue of the revenues at the disposal of the East India Company, after payment of cost of administration, stipends, and sums considered essential for the improvement and benefit of the province. Prior to specifications of this proposed Treaty, the minute had thus distinctly expressed the writer's aversion to annex:—'I, for my part, do *not* advise that the province of Oude should be declared to be British territory.'

In India, the possibility or likelihood of the king's refusal to accept the terms proposed was urged with a view to shaping our future course according to circumstances. Home instructions solved the main difficulty. The case became much more simple when the question of transfer was no longer one of administration, but of actual, if not nominal, sovereignty. There would be a military demonstration of some kind, whatever the contingency presented. Refusal or acceptance of treaty would therefore imply the actual use of force, or its restriction to a mere display.

The Annexation took effect in 1856. 'At midnight on January 2' of that year, we read that 'the Governor-General mastered'¹ the contents of the despatch, in which it was decreed by the Court of Directors. Prior to this date, expectation of the event—or one which would have involved more

¹ Kaya.

complication and no less trouble—kept all concerned busy and anxious. Subsequent thereto, those on whom it fell to carry out the wishes of Government had indeed a hard time of it. But the state of things in Oudh was too evident to require demonstration. A king was to be deprived of his sovereignty, and a people deprived of their king; the old system—or rather no-system—of government, which, in spite of its oppression and injustice, would have been upheld by thousands, was to be overthrown and demolished; a new administration was to be organised in every department; the disposition of troops was to be regulated according to the requirements of the civil power and the popular feeling in the annexed district; all this, and much more, was to be accomplished to the satisfaction, if possible, of the main sufferer, who was to be indemnified for his losses by a pension and the retention of his title. Among all who laboured to achieve the desired end, none did so more conscientiously and heartily than the Governor-General to whom the order for annexation was addressed, and the Resident in Oudh to whom the Governor-General looked as his executive in giving effect to that order.

Early in 1855, Lord Dalhousie, compelled by failing health to seek change of air and scene, had quitted Calcutta for the Nilgiris. He had at one time felt that the work of effectual reform in Oudh must be accomplished under other supervision, or, to use his own words, by ‘stronger hands’ than his own; but he could not make up his mind to abandon the reins so long as the horses were restive, nor could he impose an exceptionally weighty burden upon his successor without making an effort to remove it. His private secretary, writing to Outram from Utakamand in March, had held out faint hopes that the benefit derived from hill air would be of a permanent kind. The letter,

that his Majesty's good sense would induce him to meet the wishes of Government. The Resident was bound, by the solemn discharge of his duties, to announce to his Majesty that the Treaty of 1801 no longer existed. The systematic oppression and misrule . . . in Oudh, ever since its ratification, the violation of all the solemn obligations which the rulers of Oudh had faithfully bound themselves to perform, as one of the high contracting parties to that Treaty, had necessarily caused its infraction, and rendered it imperative on the British Government to adopt a policy which should secure the lives and properties of his Majesty's suffering subjects. That policy had been commended by the Honourable the Court of Directors; it had been sanctioned and approved of by her Majesty's ministers unanimously; and the Most Noble the Governor-General of India had been directed to carry into effect the measures alluded to prior to his Lordship's departure from India. Under these circumstances, the Resident was persuaded that his Majesty would readily acknowledge that the Indian Government had no authority whatever but to give effect to the commands of the Home Government, and with this view had directed that a treaty should be prepared for submission to his Majesty, which, embracing every suitable, adequate, and ample provision for his Majesty's maintenance, and omitting nothing which could in any degree redound to the king's honour, titles, and dignity, transferred the administration of the government of Oudh into the hands of the East India Company.

A copy of that treaty the Resident had now the honour to submit for his Majesty's perusal and consideration, in the belief that the king would acknowledge the liberality of the British Government and justify its expectation.

His Majesty received the treaty with the deepest emotion, and handed it to Sahibu-d-daulah with directions that it should be read out aloud; but that confidential servant of the king, overcome by his feelings, was unable to read but a few lines, on which the king took the treaty from his hands and carefully perused each article.

His Majesty then gave vent to his feelings in a passionate burst of grief, and exclaimed, 'Treaties are necessary between equals only. Who am I now, that the British Government should enter into treaties with me? For a hundred years this dynasty has flourished in Oudh. It has ever received the favour, the support, and protection of the British Government. It has ever attempted faith-

fully and fully to perform its duties to the British Government. The kingdom is a creation of the British, who are able to make and to unmake, to promote and to degrade. It has merely to issue its commands to ensure their fulfilment. Not the slightest attempt will be made to oppose the views and wishes of the British Government : myself and subjects are its servants.'

Muhsibu-d-daulah hereupon observed that his Majesty had issued orders that all his guns should be dismounted and his troops disarmed, a statement which his Majesty immediately repeated, declaring that the Resident must have seen how defenceless and incapable of resistance were his subjects and soldiers.

His Majesty then again spoke of the inutility of a treaty, he being in no position to sign one. It was useless, his honour and country were gone, he would not trouble Government for any maintenance, but would proceed to England, and throw himself at the foot of the throne to entreat a reconsideration of the orders passed, and to intercede for mercy. The Resident begged his Majesty to reflect that, unless the king signed the treaty, he would have no security whatever for his future maintenance or for that of his family ; that the very liberal provision devised by the British Government would evidently be reconsidered and reduced ; that his Majesty would have no guarantee for his future provision, and would have no claim whatever on the generosity of the Government. The Resident's instructions were concise, clear, and definitive ; the resolution of the Government irrevocable and final ; and the Resident entreated the king to consider what evil consequences might alight upon his Majesty and family, by the adoption of any ill-judged line of conduct. The Prime Minister warmly seconded and supported the Resident's advice, and protested that he had done everything in his power to induce his Majesty to accede to the wishes of the British Government. Hereupon his Majesty's brother exclaimed that there was no occasion for a treaty, for his Majesty was no longer independent, or in a position to be one of the contracting powers. His office was gone, and the British Government was all-powerful. His Majesty, who was moved to tears, recapitulated the favours which his ancestors had received at the hands of the British Government, and pathetically dwelt upon his helpless position ; uncovering himself, he placed his turban into the hands of the Resident, declaring that now his titles, rank, and position were all gone it was not for him to sign a treaty or to

enter into any negotiation ; he was in the hands of the British Government, which had seated his Majesty's grandfather on the throne, and could at its pleasure consign him to obscurity. He touched on the forlorn fate which awaited his heirs and family ; and declared his unalterable resolution to seek in Europe for that redress which it were vain to expect in India.

The Resident felt himself unable to act in any other way than by the tenor of his instructions, and assured his Majesty that at the expiration of three days, unless his Majesty acceded to the wishes of the British Government, the Resident would have no alternative but to assume the government of the country.

After some further conversation, and the expression of the unalterable reluctance of the king to sign the treaty then and there, the Resident intimated that no further delay than the three days could be permitted, and then, with the usual ceremonies and honours, took his leave of the king.'

To this opening scene of a drama, the last act of which was to be marked by catastrophe and bloodshed, succeeded other scenes more or less exciting of their kind, in which Outram played a conspicuous part. The king was to be restrained, if possible, in those impulses which would naturally sway a person of his position and antecedents at the first realisation of virtual dethronement. He must not be allowed to proceed to England, nor to Calcutta ; nor to send his mother, brother, son, or *wakils*, to either place if dissuasion were practicable. If he could not be dissuaded from carrying out one of these several projects, then he must be led to choose the least inconvenient to all parties interested. Outram did his best, and did well in the conduct of these matters ; and it was with wonderful quiet that, under his guidance, the transfer was effected of five millions of people from the rule of Wájid Ali Shah to that of the East India Company. But the introduction of British ways and appliances into the reorganisation of the newly acquired territory was a still heavier duty than this, and one perhaps less in the Resident's particular line. The administrative

details, which were comparatively new to him, would have been sufficient to break down his health without the aggravations which every day brought forth to vex his mind. The process of assumption of government from such a lavish and imbecile *darbâr* involved small and great measures of retrenchment and dismissal, which entailed loss if not hardship upon many, and which therefore were repugnant to him, though, of course, he saw their necessity, and himself recommended them. But he worked none the less zealously and successfully. It need hardly be added that many liberal arrangements for which he pertinaciously contended were distasteful to red-tape departments.

Mrs. Outram joined him at Lakhnau in January 1855, and remained in Oudh throughout the very trying months of that and the following year. His habits were industrious as ever. He used to rise before it was light, and, after a few minutes' walk on the flat roof of the Residency, set to work, pausing only to eat a hurried breakfast, till time for the evening drive, which he underwent as a necessary penance. In the morning he was occasionally and with difficulty persuaded by his wife to accompany her in the carriage, but such an act was the mere pretence of an airing. Though by dint of much persuasion he had been led to purchase a riding-horse, to get him upon it was quite another matter. He is said to have only accomplished one or two rides; and these apparently because he wished to inspect some buildings. In 1855, he was distressed not a little by the death of his excellent Indo-Portuguese servant, Lawrence, who had accompanied him to Egypt and England, and whom he valued with good reason as the perfection of a personal attendant. The kindness of heart evinced by his sitting up with the poor fellow for some nights during his last illness, at a season of pressing official business, made a great impression on observers.

The Residency was a perfect hotel in the early months of 1856. Civil and military men poured in to take up their appointments, and remained some for weeks, some for days, some for only a few hours, before being packed off in palanquins to rough it in their uncivilised districts, where house and ordinary comforts were not procurable. Others again were welcome guests until dwellings had been routed out and fitted up for them in various quarters of the city and its suburbs. The capacity of the house itself—and it was not a small one—was the only limit to the number of its occupants, some of whom were ladies left for a longer or shorter period while their husbands were putting up mud quarters for them in the *jungal* stations. The hurry, skurry, and bustle thus occasioned may be imagined, but the principal burden of it rested on Mrs. Outram, as ‘landlady of the inn.’ There was, however, equal hurry and bustle in the thousand and one administrative and personal details to be attended to incessantly in the little den which Outram reserved to himself.

Apart from the process of annexation, he liked his appointment, and, as we have shown, there was no lack of work for him to do or of society to amuse him; but in the midst of the complicated affairs which, during that year, so occupied his attention, he was not happy. The campaign against Russia still remained uppermost in his thoughts, and he longed to take a part in it. Writing to a friend from Lakhnau on March 20, he said, ‘I must confess I am beginning to despond regarding the war. . . . I don’t like trusting to any co-operation with the Turks from Eupatoria. They certainly will be defeated by the Russians if they move out of their entrenchments, and I see not how otherwise we can assemble sufficient forces to complete the investment of Sevastopol, and at the same time keep in check the enormous army Russia will now have in the Crimea. Affairs are very gloomy also at Kars, and I regret much I did not go there

instead of coming here. All the pomps and luxuries I here enjoy are grating to my feelings, for I feel that I ought to be sharing the dangers and privations of my comrades in the field.' Four months later, the intelligence of our successes in the Crimea induced him to take a more cheerful view of the subject. The only fear he now expresses is that 'Russia may succumb before we have expelled her from Georgia and Circassia,¹ which ought to be accomplished ere we concede peace to her, if we look to our own interests and those of Turkey, which are more seriously jeopardised, so long as that door of aggression remains open, than even were she in possession of the Danubian principalities.' He had purposed that the mountain tribes of Kurdistan should have been organised for the relief of Kars, and to co-operate generally in resisting the encroachments of Russia in Asia Minor; but he agreed with Lord Dalhousie that it would be highly imprudent to despatch any additional reinforcements from India. He seems to have had an intuitive perception of impending danger, and was anxious that we should be ready to meet it. Writing from Lakhnau on July 28, he observes: 'And now it is doubly certain that his Lordship would not sanction the despatch of more troops from India, since the insurrection which has lately broken out in Bengal—which, though not very formidable, will take time and considerable troops to put down—shows how well prepared we ought to be for such *émeutes*, this of the Sonthals being the last that could have been anticipated, they being the least warlike, and naturally the most peaceable, of our Indian subjects.'²

¹ Many years before this (in 1839 or 1840) when a war with the Czar appeared imminent, he had turned his thoughts to Russia's most vulnerable point, and elaborated a project for raising a force in Circassia—then of course independent—and operating in that quarter, in the event of war being declared. The details were complete, even to the nomination of his staff of assistant officers. We find, however, no record of its having been officially submitted to Government, either in India or at home.

² We are indebted to a memorandum by Dr. Badger for the above ex-

In accordance with Lord Dalhousie's wish, expressed in a friendly letter despatched shortly after return from the Nilgiris, Outram had run down for a few days to Calcutta, at the dawn of the new year (1856), to consult with the Governor-General on arrangements then pending in reference to Oudh. On going back to his Residency, he had been warned to use every precaution in his power against personal injury; and, owing to outward appearances at Lucknow and the reports of her friends, Mrs. Outram earnestly entreated him to be attended from Kanhpur by a very strong escort. 'The people,' she wrote, 'know what is coming as well as we do, and the Mahommedans may get enraged and do something rash. There is a very bad feeling at work just now, and every precaution ought to be taken.' He was, at this time, charged with the official communication which he afterwards made personally to the king in the manner already described.

Lord Dalhousie's parting letter to Outram was addressed from Point de Galle on March 14. The concluding lines refer to the knighthood with which the latter's exceptional services had just been acknowledged from home; and we reproduce them, as full of genuine feeling, and honourable to the subject of our biography. 'It is some comfort to me for other mortifications that I am able, by the Gazette which I found here, to hail you as Sir James Outram before I cease to sail under the Company's flag. I congratulate you very heartily on the well-earned honour, and trust you may wear it with pleasure, until you exchange it for a higher. And now let me bid you farewell. As long as I live, I shall remember with genuine pleasure our official connection, and shall hope to retain your personal friendship. A letter now
Se

arr. from Outram's correspondence at this period. Many readers will
gloom over the outbreak in the Southal country to which reference is here

and then from you, when you can find time, would be a great gratification to me.'¹

Lord Canning had not long assumed office before he was in frequent semi-official communication with his Resident at Lakhnau; and he opened the correspondence by recalling to Outram's mind that they were not entire strangers to each other, having met some few years before in the society of Lord Jocelyn. But the somewhat formal intercourse was not yet to ripen into intimacy: Outram's health gave way as at Aden. The pressure of work and anxiety had been too much for him. He felt his head failing him to an alarming extent; acute rheumatism in the neck and shoulders bowed him down; and warnings of congestion of the brain showed that there was no time for delay in seeking restoration. Fortunately, the cessation of work and run home were not too late to be resorted to, and strength of constitution could still shake off the threatened attack. Though not seemingly alarmed about himself, Outram was greatly depressed at the mental symptoms, and on April 11 intimated to Lord Canning that it would be necessary he should leave for a time his post. The reply stated the very great regret felt by the

¹ How far Lord Dalhousie had himself contributed to the grant of this richly-merited distinction of K.C.B. (Civil) may be judged from the following extract of a minute under his signature, dated September 20, 1855:—'From the Presidency of Bombay, I have the honour to recommend the name of Major-General James Outram. I feel that it would be utterly superfluous for me to recite at length the services of General Outram. From the time when, as a young man, he took in hand the wild tribes of the Bheels, to the day when he attained to the Residency of Lucknow—which has always been regarded as the foremost place in the whole range of political office in India—General Outram has left the mark of his abilities and of his value to the State on every conspicuous page of the public records. Moved by no personal feeling, but having regard only to the brilliant record attached to his name, I do not hesitate to express my opinion that General Outram has not received the reward that was his due. I venture humbly to express my hope that, before quitting the shores of India, I shall enjoy the deep gratification of seeing the gracious favour of the Crown extended to this most gallant and distinguished officer.' Sir John Lawrence was gazetted K.C.B. at the same time.

Governor-General, on private as on public grounds, at the intelligence, and entered into the question of his *locum tenens*. Eventually matters were arranged, and, while Lady Outram prepared to go to the hills and await his return in the cold weather, he took his departure without reluctance, glad to be relieved of a burden of work which had latterly become insupportable. His meeting with Lord Canning in Calcutta is noteworthy, if only from the circumstance that he took that opportunity of strongly urging his Lordship to garrison Allahabad with a wing, or a certain number of companies, of a European regiment. We believe that Sir Henry Lawrence subsequently made a similar representation. Had the suggestion been acted upon, the course of events in 1857 might have assumed a very different aspect. As it turned out, the personal influence of Colonel Brasyer over his wavering Sikhs alone saved the lives of all the Europeans in Allahabad. Comment would be superfluous on the disastrous effect upon the campaign which the loss of the fort must have occasioned. But so important to history is the right understanding of these things, that the story will be told in Outram's own words:—

During the three days I passed at Calcutta when on my way home on sick leave, in May 1856, I had an interview with Lord Canning, my chief object in seeking which, was to entreat his Lordship to take immediate measures for the better security of the Fortress of Allahabad. I informed him that the gates were held only by sepoy guards, and that if a Sevajee should arise, he might any day obtain possession, by corrupting the sepoys, or by introducing any number of followers with concealed arms among the crowds of Hindoo devotees who were allowed access on certain festival days to pay their devotions at the shrines within the Fort. True, the rule was to leave their arms at the gates; but then those gates were only protected by sepoys, and, even if they had not been gained over, how very easy it would be for determined men to overpower them by a sudden rush from the interior, wielding knives, *kookrus* and other weapons they might have concealed

on their persons, while allies distracted the garrison's attention from the outside. So urgent did I consider the necessity, that I arranged with General Penny, as I passed through Cawnpore, to have 200 European troops in readiness to despatch by bullock train to Allahabad so soon as he should receive the order from Calcutta, and I entreated his Lordship to send the order without delay. He made a note of my suggestion, and appeared impressed with the advisability of carrying it out. I then wrote to General Anson, Commander-in-Chief, informing him of what I had recommended, and begged his Excellency to see it done without delay. I then sailed, and was astonished to find on my return to Calcutta from Persia, that *nothing had been done*—that the Fort of Allahabad had been saved by a miracle! Had it fallen, the garrison of Lucknow would inevitably have been sacrificed like that of Cawnpore, for Havelock's troops could not have passed Allahabad to the rescue. And as it would have taken many months to equip an army at Calcutta, for the siege of Allahabad, the Delhi force also must have been sacrificed, and India lost. Whereas, had the precautions I proposed been adopted, a European regiment must have been retained at Cawnpore to supply the Allahabad garrison, and General Wheler's party would have been saved.

He embarked at Calcutta in May. The letters which reached him prior to embarkation from his many friends, mostly holding responsible office under Government, were full of sympathy at his bodily sufferings and kindly wishes for the future. None could well have been more grateful to his feelings than those which bore spontaneous evidence of the good service he had rendered the State by his mode of carrying out the ungracious task of annexation committed to his hands. Captain Hayes wrote from Lakhnau on April 29:—‘You will be gratified by hearing that the most profound tranquillity reigns throughout the Province, and that no signs show themselves of anything being wrong. The police is rapidly filling, and the force is almost complete; the artillery have received their guns, and arms for all infantry &c. have arrived. . . . About 800 men of all sorts and regiments

who have been absent and scattered about the country remain to be paid, and these *are all*. Everyone else has been paid.¹ Another officer, a civilian bearing a well-known and distinguished name, wrote from Baraich: 'The credit of having completely pacified the country and introduced our rule without the slightest attempt at opposition, and having got rid of the disorderly native troops, rests with you. We are now firmly seated, and can pursue our administrative reforms at leisure. There is not a Rájá in the province I would not undertake to arrest by a single *chaprásí*.'² We might add much more to the same effect, but are warned to draw the chapter to a close. In doing this, however, we will briefly notice Sir James Outram's uncomfortable visit of a few months to Europe, necessitated by failing health in 1856.

From a letter, dated May 30, addressed to his mother on board the 'Bentinck' prior to disembarkation in the evening at Suez, we learn something of his first movements beyond Egypt. He wrote:—'As sea air, change of scenery, and relaxation have been prescribed by the faculty as my best medicine, I shall occupy myself at first, I think, in coasting from port to port along the shores of the Mediterranean—going, in the first instance, viâ Beyrout and Smyrna, to Constantinople, and thence, viâ Greece, to Malta . . . thence I should coast along Italy, going inland to Rome and Milan, staying a few days at Naples, Leghorn, Genoa, and Marseilles, and thence . . . to Paris and home.' He reckoned on reaching England in about two months and a half, or the middle of August, hoping to return to India by the end of the year,

¹ Colonel Sykes, writing from the India Office to Outram in Italy in July 1856, says:—'You will be glad to learn that tranquillity obtains throughout the Oude territory: your arrangements, therefore, to secure order have been eminently successful. I see some of the members of the Supreme Council do not approve of your having paid the Oude public servants and soldiery their arrears—an act in my opinion not less honourable than politic; and we shall support you in it—at least if the Court and Board let my despatch pass.'

² A belted messenger, wearing a *chaprás*, or plato upon his breast,

'in renovated health.' One cause for deferring the visit to his native land was thus explained:—'Were I to go home at once, I know I should, as usual, become involved in discussions at the India House, &c., which would keep me in London, and defeat the object of my sea trip . . . to set me up.' Then, as though apprehensive of having written in a strain likely to arouse anxiety, he added:—'Do not think me at all ill, my dearest mother; there is little the matter with me, and my holiday from office is more to *prevent* my getting ill than from my actually being so.'

But this occasion of leave-taking from Indian duties was productive of even less enjoyment to him than either of his two previous furloughs to Europe. He had no mental troubles to disturb him, but physically he was miserable and depressed, in constant torment, and suffering more acutely, when going to and fro, than when remaining quiet at home. To a man of his restless temperament such a state was almost intolerable. It was a continual and apparently endless struggle with pain, as well as derangement of system. In vain he sought relief in mud baths and other practical remedies, or the more æsthetic *agrémens* of Italian towns, or, again, in the charms of Italian landscape. He passed rapidly from one place to another; but not to see or enjoy anything—for he hardly left his room during halts—only to divert his mind from paralysing anguish of body. Returned to England not much better for his travels than when he had left Calcutta, he placed himself under medical treatment, and was confined for some days to the house. He was not, however, considered to be labouring under any organic disease; his chief enemy was rheumatism. The visit which he paid to his mother and sister in Edinburgh was memorable, owing to his narrow escape from being stifled. A Portuguese servant who had accompanied him from India, instead of turning off the gas when leaving his master's bedroom at

night, in his ignorance blew it out. Fortunately, old Mrs. Outram, who was in the adjoining room, smelt the mischief, and went in to ascertain the cause. Her son was sleeping, wholly unconscious of what had happened; though in another half-hour the vapour might have done its deadly work upon him, or the house have been blown up. How Sir James Outram, according to his own account, became suddenly and completely restored to health, when on a visit to his kind friends, Mr. and Mrs. Mangles at Brighton, will be explained in the next chapter.

But we are reminded that, under the distribution of our work laid down at the outset, we have arrived at the close of a definite period, rather than of a mere chapter. Outram has now attained the ordinary goal of striving man's distinction. In the words of an old-fashioned but unforgotten poet,¹ he has climbed 'the steep where Fame's proud temple shines afar,' and—under good and evil report, through propitious Fortune and despite 'the influence of malignant star'—won for himself a resting-place within its precincts. To the up-looking world he has reached the summit of ambition. But the actual toiler thinks otherwise: he has yet strength of mind and limb to go further; and to his eye there are yet ascents to be surmounted, undiscernible to the gazers below. This new cry, then, of 'Excelsior' will mark the third and last division of our subject.

¹ Beattie.

BOOK III.

THE EXPERIENCED SOLDIER AND
STATESMAN.

1856-1863.

the India Board. When I got there, Mr. Vernon Smith and the Chairs of the Court of Directors were in conclave. Mr. Smith then informed me that it had been decided in the Cabinet yesterday that I was to be offered the command of the army which had gone from Bombay to Persia, with diplomatic powers and the rank of Lieutenant-General. I expressed of course my readiness and gratification; and was told that I should be required to go by the first mail if I possibly could, which I declared myself ready to do.'

Although prior to this intimation of the proffered honour, the coming event may have cast but an uncertain shadow before him, it is not improbable that Outram may have been sounded on the subject; and there is strong reason to believe that the 'invigorating air' of Brighton had been materially assisted in working his sudden and complete recovery by an intuitive sense of impending employment.¹ Indeed, he had written to Lord Canning from his Sussex *sanitarium*, expressing his intention of immediate return to India, 'having perfectly recovered from the illness' which had driven him home. At the same time he had thus confessed how he himself had smoothed the way to the offer which afterwards met him:—'In the supposition that I may be more usefully employed with the army about to proceed to Persia, than necessary to your lordship in Oude, where everything is progressing so satisfactorily, I have offered my services to the President, should it be deemed advisable to entrust to me diplomatic powers in conjunction with the military command; and I believe that, should your lordship be disposed so to

¹ The story, as related by Mr. Stuart Poole, is that, on the determination of Government to declare war against Persia, Colonel Sykes, then an East India Director, went to Outram, who was lying ill at Brighton. 'I am glad to see you,' said the sick man, 'for it may be the last time.' 'I am sorry for that,' replied the Colonel, 'for I had come to tell you that we had decided to offer you command of the expedition against Persia.' 'What! Persia?' exclaimed Outram, 'I'll go to-morrow.'

employ me, the Home authorities would probably not object. In that case, your lordship's orders would meet me at Aden, whence I would at once proceed to Bombay.'

A satisfactory interview with Lord Clarendon followed the acceptance of a post which could not be otherwise than tempting to an officer of rank, and a soldier by nature as by profession. One week later, his letter to Scotland was dated from off Gibraltar; and four days later still, from off Malta. He spoke in glowing terms of the ship's arrangements and fare, as well as of the society in which he was suddenly thrown. The 120 passengers on board were described as 'an agreeable set;' and, notwithstanding the large number, they were 'not at all crowded.' Beautiful weather and calm seas had combined to make it appear 'one of the pleasantest voyages' he could recall. 'I continue,' he added, 'free from any return, or symptoms of return, of rheumatism; and I never felt better or stronger in my life—quite equal to any campaign.' They were not to await, according to custom, the arrival of the Marseilles mail at Malta, but to push on at once to Alexandria; so that the warm clothing which they were conveying for the troops employed in the Persian expedition might reach Suez in time to accompany the outward-going letters. Leaving Sir James Outram well on his way to Bombay, whence he was to re-embark for the purpose of taking up command of the forces in the field, we will briefly revert to the circumstances of the dispute which had terminated in England's declaration of war against Persia.

At the end of 1855, our relations with the Court of Tehran were anything but satisfactory. Even the outward semblance of civility towards the English representative was disregarded, and, in like manner, the veneer of courtesy was wanting in the official communications bearing the sign-manual of the Shah or his responsible minister. So great was the tension of ill-feeling occasioned, that our Envoy withdrew to Baghdad,

declining to resume the functions of his office until ample apology had been made, by certain persons named, for certain offences charged, after a manner detailed by himself. A crisis such as this may, it is true, be brought about in Persia by ourselves, through defective diplomacy and ignorance of the native character, ways, prejudices, and, to some extent, language; but it may also arise from many other causes—among others, a wilful pre-determination on the part of the local Government. Once instructed to give offence to strangers and provoke a rupture, the Persian is a wonderful adept in fulfilling his instructions; and will prove as capable in bandying insult and innuendo as in the more complex and refined game of compliment and cajolery. In the present instance, there was in the attitude of Persia evidence of wilfulness and an exhibition of more than ordinary temper; for not only were the Shah's own words full of insult, but his expressions were supplemented by deeds. Finally, by sending a large military expedition under his royal uncle, Prince Murád Mirza, to take possession of Herat, he showed his contempt of treaties, and aimed a blow at England's Eastern policy in the most sensitive part.

This occurred in December, the same month in which the British Envoy quitted Tehran. In the first week of 1856, negotiations were opened at Constantinople, when the Persian *Chargé d'Affaires* in that city related his version of the quarrel to our well-known Ambassador there. Discussion was prolonged for some months in 1856, during which an 'ultimatum' from Lord Clarendon had been put forward without avail; and in October, a Plenipotentiary named Farrukh Khan arrived at the Porte with the Shah's instructions to settle the whole matter in dispute. But although this personage went so far as to sign a declaration that Herat should immediately be evacuated by the troops of his sovereign, other engagements were required from him which

he could not undertake, and the attempt at a settlement failed. Lord Stratford presented a new 'ultimatum' on November 22¹; but it was then too late to avert an outbreak. The news that Herat had been captured on October 26, and that three proclamations declaring war against Persia had been issued by the Governor-General of India on November 1, soon reached Constantinople, and Farrukh Khan's occupation was, for the moment, gone. But the Persian diplomatist had other strings to his bow, and soon took his departure, *viâ* Marseilles, to Paris. While retaining his old character of negotiator, he would seek a new scene for the display of his powers.

Directions to prepare a force, for warlike operations by land and sea, had been received in Bombay ten weeks before

¹ '1. Persia engages immediately to withdraw all the Persian troops from Herat and its territory, and to pay compensation for all damages done by them therein. 2. Persia shall enter into a formal treaty with England, by which Persia will renounce all pretensions of any kind to interfere in the affairs of Herat, or of any portion of Afghanistan; will engage not to receive, at any time, overtures to interfere in the internal affairs of the Afghans; will admit their absolute independence; and will agree to refer to British mediation any differences Persia may hereafter have with them. 3. Persia shall negotiate and conclude a new treaty of commerce with England, by which all questions which have hitherto given rise to discussion between the two Governments shall be settled, and the right be conceded to England of appointing consuls in any part of Persia. 4. All debts due to British subjects shall forthwith be paid, and an understanding come to on disputed claims. 5. Persia shall make an arrangement respecting Bandar Abbâs, satisfactory to the Imâm of Maskat, the friend of England. 6. His Majesty, the Shah, in consideration of the part taken by the Sadr Azim in the late differences between the two countries, shall dismiss him, and replace him by a minister more likely to maintain a good understanding between England and Persia. . . . Upon the conclusion and ratification by the Shah of these engagements as regards Herat and Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of the whole of the Persian troops within the frontier of Khurasân—and upon the solemn engagement, under the seal of his Majesty, that (the sixth condition having been complied with) the remainder of the conditions shall be carried into effect six months after the return of the British Mission to Tehran, and that the return of the Mission shall be attended with all the apologies and ceremonies already specified, except those which the removal of the Sadr Azim renders impracticable—the British Mission will return to Tehran, and the British forces will be withdrawn from the Persian territory within a period not exceeding six months after the return of the Mission.'

the date of the proclamation, and the utmost activity had prevailed in all the departments of that Presidency which it concerned, to provide an expedition fitted in every respect for the purpose required. On the other hand, the orders for the actual despatch of troops did not arrive until October 23; nor did the final instructions on the subject from the Government of India reach Lord Elphinstone until November 9. Yet within four days from the latter date, the flagship, with the head-quarters and main body of the expedition, had sailed. On December 3, the Governor of Bombay, having received reports of the departure of the last of the transports engaged, was enabled to express, in public orders, his high satisfaction at the manner in which the naval and military departments had accomplished their laborious task. A force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, comprising 5,670 fighting men (of whom 2,270 were Europeans), with 3,750 followers, 1,150 horses, and 430 bullocks, together with a fleet, consisting of eight war-steamers of the Indian Navy, seven hired steamers, and thirty sailing ships, had been embarked at four points; and the embarkation had been so perfectly arranged and ordered, that the whole operation had been 'completed at the appointed time, without the slightest embarrassment, difficulty, or confusion, and without the occurrence of a single serious accident.' Major-General Foster Stalker was in command of the troops; Rear-Admiral Sir Henry Leeke, Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy, was at the head of the naval force, and Commander Jones, I. N., was Political Agent.

At this time, Sir James Outram was not clear of Egypt; for he did not embark at Suez until December 7. But during the voyage out, as for the last week of his stay in England, he had devoted himself to a careful study of the problem it had been given him to solve. Not the least notable trait of his genius was the desire to grapple at once, and deal ex-

haustively in all its bearings, with every difficulty presenting itself, or likely to present itself, in the accomplishment of any task he had undertaken; and once master of his subject, he would not lose an instant in treating it with a view to effective disposal. Two alternative plans had suggested themselves to him at the outset for dealing with the Persian imbroglio. One, on which he had written to the President of the Board of Control before taking leave, was an advance into the interior from the Persian Gulf, to be facilitated by the engagement of mounted Arab levies to supply the want of auxiliaries to our own much required but little available cavalry. For carrying out this object, and with regard to the health of European troops, Shustar, on the river Kárún, he pointed out to be the fittest head-quarters. The other was a plan which he had personally discussed with Sir George Clerk (then Under-Secretary to the India Board). It was to advance an army of some 10,000 men¹ upon Herat, by the Bolan Pass and Kandahar—Shikárpur being the place of assembly. But whilst the former was based on the supposition that Government would never sanction the passage of troops through Afghanistan, the latter was, in Outram's opinion, the sounder and less costly scheme. Letters written on board the outward-bound steamers, or at Malta, Suez, or Aden, to Mr. Vernon Smith² (the late Lord Lyveden), Colonel

¹ Students of Oriental politics who are familiar with Sir Henry Rawlinson's exhaustive volume on *England and Russia in the East* (published in 1875), will remember that this is the *maximum* figure given in that work for a force intended to move from 'our base in Upper Scinde to Herat.' The passage referred to is as follows:—'Under no circumstances need the expeditionary column, as far as I can form an opinion, exceed a strength of 10,000 men (the greater part being, of course, Europeans): 5,000 being allotted to the garrison of Herat, and 3,000 to Candahar, while 1,000 men might occupy Quetta and Pishin, keeping up the communications in the lower section of the line; and the remaining 1,000 would be distributed between Girishk and Farrah, so as to connect Candahar with Herat.'

² President of the India Board, to which Sir George Clerk was appointed Under-Secretary in 1856.

Sykes, Sir George Clerk, and Lord Dalhousie, express more or less his ideas on the work before him and the nature of those detailed arrangements for which he solicited the warrant of higher authority. In any contingency—whether the move were to be made from the shores of the Persian Gulf, or from Shikárpur and the Indus—he saw no prospect of advancing far into the interior before the middle of autumn, owing to the near approach of the hot season, when operations would be impracticable. But the force already despatched to Bushahr he would wish to be augmented, if only to make diversions from the sea-board, supposing the main advance to be from Kandahár. To Mr. Edmonstone, Secretary to the Government of India in Calcutta, he wrote at the same time urging the good policy of sending additional troops to the Persian coast, to enable him to make such dispositions as would admit of pushing on his soldiers to whichever of the more readily attainable positions inland he might find most suitable on reaching the scene of action. This was done, both with the object of securing the health of the Europeans and making a demonstration of contemplated progress upward. In the midst of these all-important questions, the following passage of his letter reads like an unconscious revelation of the inner life, and illustrates anew his unselfish and tender consideration for others. Injustice was always hateful to him, but that he himself should have been the instrument by which it was committed was intolerable. And if thus in the abstract, how much keener would be the sentiment in the case of a brother officer with whom, thirty-seven years before, he had been a brother cadet, and in whose company he had made his first voyage to India¹ :—

¹ See vol. i., p. 24 (*note*). As a Major-General, Stalker was senior to Outram; but the latter was awaiting his special rank as Lieutenant-General. This indeed had already been accorded, though, owing to some strange oversight, it had been limited to India only.

'Should Bushire, contrary to expectation, hold out, and not yet be in our possession when I join the army—and should General Stalker then be conducting operations against the town—it would be the wish of his lordship, I presume (as it would be my own), that he should not be deprived of the credit of taking the place; and in that case I would, with his lordship's permission, defer assuming the command until after it had fallen. I know not whether General Stalker would wish to continue with the army after I have taken command; but should he choose to do so, I might place him in command at Bushire, while I myself take the advanced division to Mohumra and Shuster. Serving under me would be the less galling, I hope, to Stalker, inasmuch as we have been intimate friends ever since we entered the service together, *on the same day*, thirty-seven years ago.'

As regards the separate command, he wrote much to the same effect, but in terms of considerate friendship, to General Stalker direct, adding: 'I can only say it will be a source of much gratification to me to be associated with you in the field, and I am sure we should get on well together.'

On December 22, Sir James Outram landed at Bombay, and found active preparations in progress for the despatch of a second division to Bushahr. His arrival to take command of the Persian Expeditionary Force was a welcome surprise to Lord Elphinstone—who would, however, have unhesitatingly recommended him for the appointment, had he been in India and available for the duty. As it was, an officer had been selected in whose conduct of the projected campaign every confidence was placed; but the political part of the question did not come within the range of the local authorities; and Outram now appeared on the scene, vested with greater powers than could have been given to their merely military commander. Lord Canning had been in like

ignorance of the proceedings of the Home Government, until the despatches from England reached him by the same mail which took Sir James's letter from Suez to Mr. Edmonstone. He had replied to the letter addressed to himself from Brighton, congratulating his correspondent on his reported recovery, explaining the limited character of the Persian command, and setting forth that, should offers be made by Persia which would necessitate the exercise of diplomacy, General Stalker's instructions were to refer to Calcutta, and stand his ground in the meanwhile. Under the circumstances the Governor-General could not propose the transfer of Sir James's services to a field where they would have so little scope. He added:—‘Oude is completely tranquil and generally prospering. Nevertheless, I shall be very glad to see you resume your command there.’ This letter did not reach its destination for more than two months after it was written, and, having been sent to Aden, must have crossed Outram on his outward voyage.

But intelligence of the proceedings of the force already in the Persian Gulf now reached the Presidency; and on December 27 the Governor in Council was enabled to announce the surrender, on the 10th of the month, of the fort of Bushahr, which, together with the neighbouring island of Karak, had been occupied by our troops. The landing had been effected at Halila Bay, about twelve or thirteen miles south of Bushahr, on December 7, and two days later there had been, as described in the Major-General's despatch, ‘a smart affair in dislodging the enemy from a strong . . . position in the old Dutch Fort of Reshire.’ On that occasion, the despatch further stated that Brigadier Stopford and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet had been killed, gallantly leading on their men, and three officers had been wounded, of whom two (Lieutenants Utterson and Warren) had died of their wounds.

Sir James Outram lost no time in communicating to

General Stalker the proposed plan of operations, for which he had obtained the sanction of Lord Elphinstone and his colleagues. This was done in the form of a postscript to the letter from which we have already made a short extract—the despatch having been delayed from the want of a steamer for its conveyance. He forwarded also a Foreign Office packet, for transmission by express steamer from Bushahr to H. M. Envoy at the Persian Court, and to Captain Kemball the British Resident at Baghdad. To General Stalker he wrote as follows:—

I congratulate you most heartily on the brilliant victory at Reshire, and on the successful occupation of Bushire. Your summary discomfiture of the enemy will cause the latter to exaggerate your strength vastly, in order to excuse their own defeat to the Shah, and may have a wholesome effect on the Royal mind when deliberating on the choice now left to him—of submission to our terms or fighting it out. I know not which to admire most, the handsome style in which you polished off the foe, or the modest, unpretending style of your despatch. It is admirable! . . .

I hope you will think the move on Khisht¹ advisable. Being so elevated, it ought to be more healthy than Bushire for the Europeans—and the detachment there would be regarded at Tehran as the advanced guard of the great army they will hear is coming from India.

In the meanwhile, pray contrive to make it believed that our sole object for the present is the seizure of Shiráz, and that you are only awaiting the reinforcements from India to advance.

I hope you will be able to effect a survey by the Quarter-master-General's Department so far as Khisht. But the party will require strong escort, and should keep a sharp look-out against attempts at surprise—ambuscade and night attacks

¹ The road from Bushahr to 'the fertile and well-cultivated plains of Khisht' was described by the late Colonel Patrick Stewart, R.E., C.B., in his report on the 'Respective Merits of a Land and Sea line of Telegraph to connect England with India,' addressed to H.M. Minister in Persia on June 16, 1862. Extracts bearing upon this particular section of the Bushahr-Tehran route will be found at pages 183 and 185 of my volume entitled *Telegraph and Trade* (Macmillan, 1874).

especially. It would be prudent for the party to proceed as rapidly as possible to Khisht in the first place, and then survey leisurely back, to prevent time for any preparation for resistance, to which they might be exposed should they survey as they advanced. It would be well if Captain Jones, or some one well accustomed to the people, could accompany the party. I have recommended that Jones shall retain his position as 'Resident in the Persian Gulf.'

I fear it will be a month, at least, after I join you before all the reinforcements can be assembled at Bushire, until when, I suppose, you would not think it advisable to move the troops to Khisht—but of course your opinion on the matter will guide me.

It has been said that our Minister at the Court of Tehran had withdrawn to Baghdad. The diplomatist who then discharged the duties of that office was the Honourable Charles Augustus Murray.¹ He had been British Consul-General at Cairo at the period of Outram's sojourn in Egypt; and the intimacy which had arisen out of their first relations augured well for any further association likely to be brought about in the settlement of the Persian complication. As in the case of General Stalker, so did Sir James act with Mr. Murray. He wrote to him from the outward-bound steamer, and added a postscript after arrival at Bombay. In this communication he expressed pleasure in observing that the advance to Shustar was a measure which the Minister approved, and he dwelt upon the necessity of letting the Persians suppose that Shiráz was really the point of attack intended.

But his letter to Captain Kemball² supplies, perhaps, the most practical indication of the action he proposed to take on first arrival in Persia. He asked this competent and energetic officer for information on the harbour and

¹ Now the Right Honourable Sir Charles Augustus Murray, K.C.B., who, since retiring from Persia, has held high diplomatic office in Saxony, Denmark, and Portugal.

² Now General Sir Arnold Kemball, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., an officer highly distinguished, both in his political and military capacity.

town of Muhamra; the capabilities and means of resistance at that place and Shustar; the opposition likely to be met with on ascending the river Kárún; the amount of force supposed to be with a certain Shahzáda at the important post of Dizful, west of Shustar, and on other points acquaintance with which would materially assist his early operations. 'The force to be employed,' he wrote, 'will probably be about equal to that under General Stalker at Bushire (rather stronger in cavalry—i.e. 14th Dragoons and one regiment of Sindh Horse) . . . carriage cattle will be required for the whole to march up by land,¹ the commissariat supplies being chiefly carried up the river in steamers, to protect which the army would encamp daily as near the river as possible.' Mules and camels were to be procured in any quantity; and *yábús*, or *tattoos*, provided with baggage saddles. Boats, moreover, with stocks of hay should be got in readiness, to meet the anticipated want of forage. He reckoned that at least six weeks would elapse before the fleet conveying the troops could reach Muhamra; but he himself hoped to leave for Bushahr about January 8 or 9, after receipt of the English mail then next expected.

In a letter to Colonel Sykes of January 1, he thus refers to the prospect of peace opened out by Farrukh Khan's offer to withdraw the Persian garrison from Herat, intelligence of which had just reached him from England:—

Did we not know the Persians, and bear in mind how shamefully they shuffled out of their pledges to Mr. McNeil in 1838, under very similar circumstances, the intelligence you communicate in your postscript of Ferukh Khan's promise on the part of the Persian Government to withdraw instantly from Herat, and to give the Heratees indemnity, might encourage me to hope for a speedy arrangement of our differences; but I fear those promises were held out merely to gain time, and so avert the threatened occupation of Bushire. It is well, therefore, I think, that a blow has

¹ Along the banks of the Kárún, towards Shustar.

already been struck there likely to inspire the Shah with a wholesome dread of the consequences of persisting in his hostile course ; for doubtless the troops defeated at Bushire will vastly exaggerate our strength to lessen their own disgrace. And when it is seen by the arrival of reinforcements, and our preparations for a forward movement, that we are bent on more serious measures, I do hope that he will become amenable to reason ; for, no doubt, his Minister had led his Majesty to believe that nothing beyond the occupation of Bushire would be attempted.

It was not until January 15 that Sir James Outram could leave Bombay. He had been detained more than three weeks at the Presidency from unavoidable causes. The chief one was the limitation of his brevet rank to India alone, an error only rectified in the Home Gazette brought in by the mail three days before his departure. The time cannot, however, be said to have been wasted when the work performed is taken into account. To organise a division of an army in the field, select a staff, and provide for the thousand and one contingencies of a campaign in a comparatively strange and physically difficult country are no light matters of consideration, and involve an amount of correspondence which none but the initiated can thoroughly understand. Details such as here contemplated can never be surmounted with perfect ease and smoothness : there must be hitches somewhere ; and hitches, whether small or great, can only be disposed of by unflagging zeal and energy tempered with patience. On January 13, the Governor in Council announced that, under instructions from home, and with the sanction of the Government of India, a force had been organised under the command of Brigadier-General Have-lock, C.B., to form the 2nd division of the Expeditionary Force for service in Persia ; and that the entire force, consisting of two divisions, was combined under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram. General Stalker's troops then at Bushahr would become the 1st division ; and

Brigadier-General John Jacob, C.B., would command the cavalry division.¹ This last-noted appointment had been much pressed by Sir James upon the authorities at home and in India on strong public grounds. Hoping that the rank of Major-General might at the same time be accorded—to admit of Jacob's succession to the chief command with full diplomatic powers in the event of his own illness or death—he had suggested to the President of the Board of Control, as an alternative measure, and to warrant the promotion to Colonel, the possible submission of his name for the distinction of Aide-de-Camp to Her Majesty, on the score of important services publicly acknowledged by Lord Ellenborough. 'Those services,' he added, 'have since been eclipsed by the far more important services—administrative as well as military—which he has rendered to the State, as custodian of the Scinde frontier for fifteen years past.'

¹ The 'personal staff' of the Lieutenant-General was composed of Captain Malcolm Green, Military Secretary and A.D.C., Lieutenant W. H. Sykes, A.D.C., and Captain C. B. W. Harvey, Acting A.D.C., and Captain E. P. Arthur, Persian interpreter. Among the 'head-quarters staff,' of which Colonel (now General the Right Hon. Sir Edward) Lugard was chief, and the Rev. G. P. Badger, the Chaplain, may be mentioned Lieut. Colonels Younghusband and Pope; Majors Boyé, Barr, Hill (Engineers), and Curtis; Captains Wray, Macdonald, Rigby, Finnimore, Taylor and Warden; Lieutenant Pengelley, I.N., and a young Lieutenant of Engineers, Ballard—who had already won for himself the high honour of the Bath, and was appointed Assistant Quartermaster-General and Superintendent of the Intelligence Department. Colonels Wilson, K.H., Honner, Hamilton, and Hale commanded the Infantry; Colonels Trevelyan and Hall, C.B., the Artillery; and Colonels Tapp and Steuart the Cavalry Brigades.

At Bushahr, the 1st division consisted of H.M. 64th Regiment of Foot, 2nd Bombay European Regiment, 4th and 20th Regiments of Native Infantry and 2nd Baluch Battalion, the head-quarters and two squadrons 3rd Regiment Bombay Light Cavalry, and two troops Puna Irregular Horse, a troop of Horse Artillery, two companies of European Foot Artillery and Reserve Artillery, with the head-quarters and two companies of Sappers and Miners. In the 2nd division were H.M. 78th Highlanders, the 23rd and 26th Regiments, and Light Battalion, of Native Infantry; together with the 14th King's Light Dragoons, a troop of Horse Artillery, two field batteries, and the 3rd Regiment of Sind Horse.

The first mention of the names of Outram and Havelock in conjunction is too suggestive of an association which will ever live in the history of our country to require comment here. When Sir James applied for the services of Colonel Havelock to be placed at the head of one of his divisions, he was unaware that his own name had been submitted to General Anson by Havelock himself, then Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, as that of one 'suited above all other men'¹ for command of the whole expedition. The two may have met but seldom, though thrown together at Kandahár and Ghazni in 1839; but from their public services each had learned to gauge the worth of the other.

Before embarkation, Outram addressed Lord Canning—in reply to a request by telegraph that he should 'write fully' and say whether he had 'any change to suggest' in the proposals already submitted and arrangements confirmed. He had no change to suggest; but he had recommended, 'as a precautionary measure,' that two more native regiments be named for service, in case General Stalker should need reinforcements to supply any gaps in his division caused by a demand for support to the movement on Shustar. The 2nd division of the Expeditionary Force had, he reported, been organised, and the first infantry brigade was to be embarked on or about January 19; the second a week after; and the cavalry would follow the last detachment of infantry in about ten days. I myself,' he wrote, 'leave in the "Semiramis" on Thursday the 15th instant, touching at Karáchi 'to communicate with General Jacob, and I expect to reach Bushire about a week or ten days before the first of the reinforcements.' He added:—

¹ Marshman's *Life of Havelock*. We do not know on what evidence the biographer has added that 'it was partly under the influence of this suggestion that the offer was made' to the General 'by the Home Government.' The selection in England appears to have been spontaneous—without reference to India—and carried into effect in the way we have already described.

During this interval, I shall have thoroughly acquainted myself with the relative advantages of the proposed advanced posts of Khisht and Shuster, whether as regards sanitary considerations, or the facilities afforded by either route for future operations in the interior—in order that, should it not be found prudent to occupy both, in consequence of a more formidable opposition being prepared than our previous information had led us to anticipate, I may be enabled to decide which to choose: for, should the power of the enemy be such in either quarter as must cause a battle to be fought ere the desired position is attained, it may be necessary to hold the post in greater strength than would admit of such division of the forces as I had contemplated in the event of meeting the slight or no opposition which was expected on first establishing ourselves.

Should the enemy really be mustering in advance of Bushire in such force as General Stalker is led to believe, it is next to certain their object is to oppose our advance on Shiráz; for they would hardly have the temerity to attack our entrenched position in front of Bushire. In that case, the passes below Khisht would afford positions so naturally strong—and which they would not fail to improve by art—that we may be exposed to severe loss ere we make our footing sure at Khisht. And then it might require our whole means, thus weakened by battle, to maintain our position there; for the neighbouring tribes are not to be depended on—being, I believe, chiefly ‘Sheeahs’, who are more subservient to the Shah’s Government than are the half-Arab ‘Sunni’ tribes who intervene between Shuster and Mohumra.

Our advance from Mohumra to Shuster, on the other hand, though liable to be opposed by the army of the Viceroy of Khuzistan, represented at from three to eight thousand men, has no great physical difficulties to contend against—no passes to surmount: and our army there would possess the advantage of water-carriage for its supplies, and a better provision of land-carriage than can be obtained at Bushire.

The neighbourhood of Shuster, moreover, is described as abounding in forage, fuel, and water; and the population being Sunnis, with strong ties of connection with the Turco-Arabian tribes in their vicinity, are generally, it is said, bitterly inimical to their Sheeah rulers, and would, it may be hoped, readily be induced to favour our cause. Our vicinity to the Turkish frontier

would, besides, facilitate the organisation of the Turco-Arabian levies.

He showed cause for preferring Shustar to Khisht on military, sanitary, and political considerations: and if the menace to Shiráz was a strong argument in favour of the latter position, he recognised a show of impending danger to Ispahan in our maintenance of the former. The concluding paragraphs of his letter illustrate that forethought for his soldiers which evinced itself in the conduct of all his campaigns:—

Shuster, being further from Mohumra than Khisht from Bushire, might be more difficult to support were the intervening tribes hostile, and were it not that we have the river Karoon to aid us, navigable to our armed steamers. But there, not merely are the people likely to be with us, but we shall soon have more ample means for controlling the intermediate country, in our Arab levies, than we ever could have at Khisht, where we should be too far from the Turkish frontier to obtain the services of the tribes we wish to embody. And the increasing strength of our levies would, I hope, prevent the necessity for further reinforcements until the season for active operations in October next.

Should I find, therefore, that it is impracticable to maintain both Khisht and Shuster, I may probably confine our operations to the latter quarter. In which case, it may be advisable to borrow one of General Stalker's European regiments and some of his European artillery, with the double view of adding to our strength on the Karoon and securing a better climate for the Europeans; and General Stalker's attention would be confined for the present to the defence of Bushire, and holding Karak, for which the troops then left to him, would, I think, amply suffice.

Materials for the barracks of one European regiment have been provided, and may, I hope, be furnished for the remainder of his European artillery, but certainly it would be impossible to prepare accommodation for more Europeans at Bushire. The native troops can have nothing but tents, I fear.

Hospitals are preparing at Karak, which place was found remarkably healthy when we held it formerly. These will receive the sick of the 1st, or Bushire, division, as well as such

of the 2nd division as may be sent from time to time from Mohumra, where a transport hospital-ship will be stationed for the reception of the sick of the 2nd division, sent down from the interior.

Of course, there will be no time to prepare much shelter for the Europeans at Shuster; for we can hardly arrive there before the commencement of the hot season, but it is to be hoped we may find means for covering their tents with grass 'chuppers.'

At Karáchi, the rumour of disturbances in Kalát caused Outram to apprehend the detention in Sindh of General Jacob¹ and his frontier horsemen. After leaving that station—where he had only remained six hours—he wrote an earnest request to the Governor of Bombay that he would not sanction a countermand of the reinforcement on which the completeness of his little army so much depended. His correspondence with Lord Elphinstone was of that unconstrained character which invited and elicited free expression of thought and feeling where such could not fail to be advantageous to the public service. On January 27, he informed his lordship of his arrival that afternoon at Bushahr. General Stalker had welcomed him 'most cordially,' meeting him, before he landed, in the boat which had gone off to receive him. Mr. Murray had given him a like cordial greeting on reaching the Envoy's temporary quarters at the Residency.

'The Persians,' he wrote, 'have been busily stockading some time past at Muhamra; and their works, as described to me—earthworks, staked with felled date-trees sloping outward—will not be carried without loss, unless we can enfilade them from our floating batteries.' Such was the intelligence which first met him; and he could not move higher up the Gulf until some, at least, of his transports should appear with detachments of the 2nd division. They could not be expected, at soonest, within a week or ten days; and unfortunately the best steamers would not convey the

¹ Then acting as Commissioner in the absence of Mr. H. B. Frere.

first brigade. Outram resolved, therefore, to break ground in the Karun Expedition, by despatching Captain Jones of the Indian Navy, Resident at Bushahr and an officer of great local experience, in the 'Hugh Lindsay' to Basrah, with the view of securing, if possible, the friendly co-operation of the Arab tribes to whom Muhamra belonged; as also to obtain correct information on the strength of the enemy and the nature of their defensive preparations. The Rev. Dr. Badger was associated with Captain Jones in this service; and by the same opportunity, Captain Malcolm Green, Military Secretary and Aide-de-Camp, was deputed to 'make such military survey of the enemy's works as could be effected from the vessel in passing them on her way up and return;' while Commodore Ethersey and Captain Young, of the Indian Navy, were instructed to proceed to the Shattu-l-Arab—the broad river combining the waters of the Tigris, Euphrates, and minor tributaries—examine its channels, and ascertain its capabilities 'for naval operations in the vicinity of the point of attack.' Lord Clarendon's instructions had assumed that there were independent tribes among those with which the General would come in contact, and, to avoid complications, had restricted him from seeking the aid of others. But whether independent or semi-independent, the sovereignty of the soil on which they lived and moved was a question which could not be disregarded. Of the Arabs at the head of the Gulf some dwelt in Turkish and some in Persian territory: some again migrated periodically from one to the other; and their subjection or quasi-subjection to Sultan or Shah would assuredly be claimed by the power concerned, should necessity arise, or expediency suggest the step. Outram's idea was that we could avail ourselves of the services of these men, provided only that, at the close of the war, an amnesty were proclaimed to all who befriended us while the war lasted. The object would, then, simply be to guarantee them from oppression on

the ground of the past, not to support any tribal claim to future independence. Sir James had from the first entertained the project of raising levies among the nomads to be found on the confines of Western Persia. He found that the Porte advanced some sort of claim to Muhamra, and the question arose whether it should be made over to the Pasha of Baghdad, when captured. But ascertaining that the local tribes would resent Turkish rule, he managed, by the exercise of a little tact, to keep the delicate point in abeyance, and avoided complications which might have arisen from it, as well as from the obstructive presence at Muhamra of a small Turkish war-vessel.

More immediate interests, however, than those involved in the Muhamra expedition soon absorbed his attention. In the interval between the surrender of Bushahr and the arrival of Sir James at that port, General Stalker's advance division had not been wholly unemployed; and the movements of a Persian force, at no considerable distance inland, if not openly aggressive, were indicative of the inclination to provoke active hostilities. It appears that, on the entry into Bushahr of the British troops, the liberated garrison, allowed by the captors to go where they pleased, had taken the road to Shiráz, the far-famed city of Fars and whilom capital of the Persian monarchy, situated in the high country about 150 miles from the coast. There they had been, in the local acceptation of the term, re-organised and re-equipped, and then embodied with a force of some five regiments, or 4,000 men, assembled under the Shuja'u-l-Mulk, who had further called to his aid the Ilkháni, or chief of the Iliát (wandering tribes). Independently of this numerical demonstration, the Persian Government had also collected supplies of flour and ammunition at Barazján and Chahkota, villages in the low country, the former forty-six, the latter twenty miles from Bushahr. In the words of an intelligent writer and

shrewd observer,¹ 'the amount of ammunition would not be considered as indicating a very provident spirit on the part of any other Government than that of Persia; for there were not above one thousand of cannon shot, and some fifteen or twenty tons of gunpowder; but as all this had to be brought on the backs of mules by difficult roads for three hundred miles, it was of considerable value.' General Stalker, by means of his cavalry and two horse-artillery guns, effected the destruction of the Chahkota magazine and stores, on December 24, in a manner both creditable to the officers concerned and little injurious to the inhabitants. But Barazján was too far off to admit of equally easy disposal: and in the beginning of January, the Persian commander came down with his army from Shiráz and took up his position there. When Outram appeared, towards the close of that month, the report of his coming and of the reinforcements that would follow, had been accompanied by directions to get together all available land transport; so that, very soon after despatch of his *avant-couriers* to Turkish Arabia, he felt himself in condition to deal with his threatening neighbours.

At first, he looked upon the gathering at Barazján as intended only to bar the probable advance of the British troops to Shiráz, and proposed to defer any counter-movement on our part; but he was shortly led to change his opinion of the meaning of his foes. 'It became apparent,' he wrote to the Governor-General, 'that the enemy were concentrating a far greater force than it had hitherto been supposed they possibly could accumulate below the passes.' Unless now checked it was evident to him 'they would soon be in a position to attempt the recapture of Bushire.' The Persian commander-in-chief had formed an entrenched camp

¹ Lieutenant Ballard (since Lieutenant-General Ballard, C.B.) of the Bombay Engineers, whose death by sunstroke, at Livadia in Greece, has been quite recently recorded. The article quoted is entitled 'The Persian War of 1856-57,' and is to be found in *Blackwood's Magazine* for September 1861.

at Barazján, 'which he occupied with . . . 8,450 regular infantry and cavalry . . . seventeen guns and one mortar. . . . Reinforcements from Tehran, and elsewhere, were rapidly approaching, to the extent of twelve regiments of regular infantry with thirty-five guns, while preparations were making for raising the tribes, of whom 4,000 would be assembled in twenty-four hours. Parties of horse had been sent forward, and violent denunciations were proclaimed to deter the country-people from furnishing supplies to our camp. Mistrust and apprehension prevailed in the town.' In this state of affairs, it is not to be wondered at if Sir James Outram deemed it 'imperatively necessary to strike a blow' in the threatening quarter 'before extending operations elsewhere.'

The mode of striking is described in the following extracts of a despatch which was addressed to the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay on February 10:—

The 1st brigade, 2nd division, which arrived on the 31st ultimo and 1st instant, was landed immediately; and on the evening of the 3rd, the troops¹ . . . marched from this camp, without tents, or extra clothing of any sort, each man carrying his great coat, blanket, and two days' cooked provisions; the commissariat being provided with three days' in addition; the protection of the camp and town of Bushire being duly provided for by a detachment of troops under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd, reinforced by a party of seamen from all the ships in the harbour, which the senior naval officer was so good as to place at my disposal.

After a march of forty-six miles in forty-one hours, during which the troops were exposed to the worst of weather, cold nights, and deluging storms of rain, they reached the enemy's entrenched

¹ 3rd Cavalry, 243; Púna Horse, 176—total, 419 sabres; 64th Foot, 780; 2nd Europeans, 693; 78th Highlanders, 739—total, 2,212 Europeans. Sappers, 118; 26th N.I., 442; 4th Rifles, 523; 26th N.I., 479; Balúchis, 460—total, 2,022 N.I.; 3rd troop Horse Artillery, 6; 3rd Light Field Battery, 6; 5th ditto, 6—total, 18 guns. Camp:—378 Europeans; 1,466 N.I.; 1 company European artillery; 14 guns.

position on the morning of the 5th, and found it abandoned. The enemy, on hearing of our approach, had evacuated his entrenchments the previous night so precipitately that his tents and camp equipage and ordnance magazines were left behind. The former were being rapidly carried off by village plunderers, operating for some hours before we arrived. I endeavoured to intercept the retreat of some of the Elkhane's horse, who had held the camp during the night and were still in sight, and a little skirmishing took place, but eventually they made off.

‘It had long been my earnest wish to meet the “Bayard of India,” of whom I had heard and read a great deal,’—writes a worthy chronicler¹ who has served a hard apprenticeship in the lower grades of the military profession, and whose reminiscence of one endeared to him as to many old comrades in arms, may appropriately break, while it illustrates, the formal paragraphs of a military despatch. ‘My wish was at last gratified on February 3, 1857, at Bushire, when the division was formed up for the march to “Barasjoon,”² to attack the Persians in their entrenched camp there. Sir James was in undress uniform, and had a cigar in his mouth. After a very disagreeable march, we were halted a few miles from Barasjoon for the night. Shortly after, a terrific thunderstorm broke upon us, and in a short time we were all wet to the skin. It was quite dark and dismal, and we felt anything but comfortable. Sir James appeared amongst us and cheered us up (he was in the same condition as ourselves) by kind words, and then and there ordered the commissariat to issue a dram of arrack to every man in the force. Nothing could possibly have been more welcome under the circumstances. This was the first of innumerable acts of kindness we experienced from him.’ To resume the despatch:—

¹ Captain John Robertson, late of the 78th Highlanders, and afterwards 35th (Royal Sussex) Regiment.

² This is according to local pronunciation, whereby the final *an* becomes *in* or, as here transliterated, *oon*.

The enemy having succeeded in withdrawing their guns to the strong passes, where I did not deem it prudent to follow them, and being satisfied with the moral effect of our occupying their position for two days, I decided upon moving the troops back to Bushire. I accordingly commenced the return march on the night of the 7th, first destroying their magazines, found to contain about 40,000 lbs. of powder, with small-arm ammunition, and a vast quantity of shot and shell; and carrying away large stores of flour, rice, and grain, which the Persian Government had been collecting for a long time past for their army, thereby effectually crippling their future operations. Some of their guns are supposed to have been cast into the wells: as their wheels and axles fell into our hands, it will be impossible they can be used again for the present.

At midnight an attack was made upon the rear-guard by the enemy's horse, and parties threatened the line of march on every side; the troops were halted, and so formed as to protect the baggage, and resist the horsemen in whatever direction they might attempt to charge. Four of the enemy's guns, of heavy metal, opened their fire upon the column, whilst the darkness of the night prevented any steps being taken to capture them.

I should here state that, on abandoning the position, Shoojaool-Moolk with his force had taken the direct road to Shiráz by the 'Mhak Pass,' and the Elkhanees with his horse had retired by the one leading to the 'Huft Moola;' and from information subsequently received, I learned that they had planned a combined attack upon our camp the night we marched. Indeed the explosion of their large magazines gave them the first intimation of our departure, when they hastened after us in the expectation of being able to attack us on the line of march, and possibly create confusion and panic in the dark.

At daybreak the Persian force, amounting to between 6,000 and 7,000 men, with some guns, was discovered on our left rear (north-east of our line of march), in order of battle.

Our artillery and cavalry at once moved rapidly to the attack, supported by two lines of infantry, a third protecting the baggage. The firing of the artillery was most excellent, and did great execution. The cavalry brigade twice charged with great gallantry and success. A standard (of the Kaskhai Regular Infantry Regiment) was captured by the Poona Horse; and the 3rd Light Cavalry charged a square and killed nearly the whole regiment. Indeed,

ascertain whence the disturbance proceeded: his horse fell with, and rolled over its rider, who was stunned with the shock. As expressed in his own despatch, the General recovered only in time to resume his place at the head of the army shortly before the close of the action. 'To Major-General Stalker and Colonel Lugard, chief of the staff,' he wrote, 'is the credit due for successfully guiding our troops to victory on this occasion.' Again, writing to the Governor-General, he expressed his apprehension that he had not done sufficient justice in the despatch to the services of Colonel Lugard, who had been 'invaluable' to him in supplying his own place 'during the two or three hours' he was 'disabled at the most exciting crisis before the break of day. To him,' he continued, 'in aid of General Stalker, we are indebted for preserving our troops in such admirable order while beleaguered in the bivouac, and for placing them in order for the contest so soon as the dawn admitted a view of the enemy's disposition. . . . It was the noise of the commencement of this contest that brought me to my senses.' Much more is added in the same letter, in commendation of his efficient Chief of the Staff.

Our losses were, providentially, small. Lieut. Frankland, Acting Brigade-Major of Cavalry, was killed, Captain Forbes and Lieutenant Greentree were severely wounded, and of the European and native troops engaged, ten were killed and sixty-two wounded.¹ Outram expressed his thanks for services rendered, to the heads as well as to individual officers

¹ The Governor-General in Council thus publicly notified his appreciation of Sir James Outram's despatch, reporting the operations at Barazjān and Khush-āb:—

'It describes a new success of the British army in Persia, achieved, between the 3rd and the 9th of February, against a force much superior in number, and in the face of the difficulties which have made conspicuous the energy and promptitude of the commander and of the officers associated with him, as well as the courage, discipline, and cheerful endurance of the troops.

'The rapid and toilsome night-marches, deliberately planned and accom-

of the several departments, to Major Taylor on political employ, and to his personal staff (including Lord Dunkellin, a volunteer A.D.C.); and the great obligations he was under to the medical officers for their untiring exertions. 'The rapid retreat of the enemy,' he remarked, 'afforded but little opportunity for deeds of special gallantry;' but the 'successful charges made by the 3rd Cavalry and Poona Horse, under Captain Forbes and Lieutenant-Colonel Tapp, and the very efficient service performed by the Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan,' merited special notice; and the Brigadiers commanding the 'infantry brigades—Wilson, Stisted, and Honner—with the several commanding officers

plished with precision; the inclement weather, against which no protection of any kind was available to men or officers; the steady resistance to an attack, in circumstances the most trying to the patience and order of an army; and the utter rout and confusion of the enemy, with a very heavy loss, when the morning light enabled our soldiers to discern their assailants—have marked this operation against the Persian entrenched camp at Barazjún, as one of which the force under Sir James Outram's command may well be proud. In the course of it, officers and men have exhibited all the qualities which make an army invincible.

'To Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, and to his brave companions in arms, the Governor-General in Council desires to offer an early assurance of the warm approbation and thanks which they have so well earned. These are especially due to Major-General Stalker, C.B., and to Colonel Lugard, C.B., chief of the staff, who are described by Sir James Outram as having guided the troops to victory at the time—most happily not of long continuance—during which he was disabled by a severe fall of his horse. But they are due to all of every rank who have taken share in this signally successful exploit, which has called for extraordinary exertions from all, and in which all have borne themselves with gallantry.

'The Governor-General in Council will have the greatest satisfaction in expressing to the Honourable Court of Directors his appreciation of the service rendered, and of the manner in which it was performed.

'The Governor-General in Council has to lament the loss of one gallant young officer—Lieutenant Frankland, of the 2nd European Regiment—who, acting as Brigade-Major of Cavalry, fell dead in the first of the brilliant charges by which our small body of horse on that day distinguished itself. Captain Forbes, commanding the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry, and Lieutenant Greentree, of her Majesty's 64th Regiment, have been severely wounded. But, upon the whole, the casualties on the side of the British force have been few compared with the very heavy loss inflicted upon the enemy, both in men and munitions of war.'

of regiments,' as, 'indeed, every officer and soldier of the force,' had earned his 'warmest approbation.' No less than three officers, among others recommended in the 3rd Bombay Cavalry, afterwards received the Victoria Cross for special gallantry displayed in breaking and riding through the Persian infantry square—said to have been 'perfectly formed' to resist them, on the model of European armies.

We again borrow from Captain Robertson's manuscript, the immediate sequel to the defeat of the Persians on February 8:—

'After the battle of Khush-áb, we halted on the field until five o'clock in the evening, when the march back to Bushire was commenced. At eleven o'clock the next day we reached a mud fort about fifteen or sixteen miles from Bushire, where we halted for about three hours for rest and refreshment, when the march was resumed. Darkness set in when we had completed about half the distance, and the native guides deserting us, we floundered about on the plain, not knowing where we were going, and nearly famished for want of water. Sir James with some of his staff came out, bringing bullock-*bheesties* with water, and conducted us into Bushire. The whole division was in a very deplorable condition. The boots were dragged from the feet by the mud, so that half at least of the 78th returned barefooted. Next day Sir James, in the most generous manner, issued a new pair of boots to every soldier gratis. These boots, with worsted stockings received from the clothing agent, were worn with the kilt and called "Outrams" by the men.'¹

¹ Sir James Outram's report of this circumstance is contained in the following paragraph of his letter to the Governor-General:—'As we were exposed, during the six days occupied in this expedition, to frequent heavy rains, the troops suffered much discomfort in bivouac, and still greater hardship on the march, owing to the heavy, spongy nature of the ground they traversed—all which they bore with admirable cheerfulness and fortitude. The shoes

But that return march from Barazján has become memorable to more than one narrator in whose mind the figure of Outram is pleasantly conspicuous. The darkness of the night which favoured the Persian attack, while it concealed the features of the doer, has not cast into the shade the deed of kindness which is thus related by Colonel Haldane, late of H.M. 64th Regiment:—

‘Soon after it fell dark, I was walking at the side of my regiment when a horseman rode up to me and inquired why I was not riding. I told him that my pony was carrying the blankets &c. of myself and a brother officer, and that I had no second horse. He then began questioning me as to how the men liked marching by night instead of by day, and on similar matters. When leaving me, he turned and said, “There is a spare horse of mine behind: if you like to ride it, you are very welcome.” He then rode off. Seeing he was followed by a number of officers, I began to suspect that it was either the General (whom I had not seen before) or one of the Head Quarter Staff. The next instant Hudson our adjutant came up and asked me if I knew who had been talking to me, and told me then that it really was Outram himself.

‘A few hours later we were attacked by the enemy. The General had a fall from his horse and was stunned; the battle of Khush-áb took place, and it might well have been supposed that Sir James would scarcely remember his good-natured offer to one of the subalterns of his army. Yet one afternoon, about three weeks afterwards, I was walking with Captain Morphy through the camp at Bushire, when we met the General, who stopped to speak to my companion, and of the greater portion of the infantry were literally drawn off their feet in struggling through the mud; and those which remained were rendered so utterly unserviceable, that I have had to issue a new pair from the stores to every European and Native infantry soldier. This I have done gratis, and I trust it will meet with your lordship’s approval.’

presently turned to me, and said—"You never got that horse after all!" This proved that not only did he remember the offer made, but that he had actually taken the pains to find out if I had been able to avail myself of his kindness. It was such traits in his character that endeared him to all who had the honour and pleasure of serving under him.'

Yet an extract from an interesting Memoir in the 'Times of India':—

On the expedition to Barazján we were obliged to march in the lightest possible order, no one from the General downwards having a tent, a bed, or other necessities, save what everyone could carry with him, or on his horse. The only exception was poor General Stalker, who, after much persuasion, was induced to take a small *routee*, as he was in bad health at the time. A share of this *routee*—which barely sufficed to cover the two generals—Stalker insisted that Outram should occupy, on the threat that if he did not, he himself would leave it. The day before we reached our station, we were bivouacked on an open plain, and in the middle of the night it came on to rain violently and continuously. I had thrown my cloak over my head, and was busy trying to get some food for my horse, when I was surprised at meeting the General, without any cover whatever. I said, 'Good heavens, Sir James, what brings you abroad?' His reply was, 'I could not sleep, thinking how the poor Highlanders are faring, and I came out to satisfy myself; will you convey my orders to—— (the Commissariat officer) to give them an extra dram in the morning?'

Again, on our return from this expedition, we made a long and harassing march into our camp before Bushire. For the last part of the march, that across the Mashíla, the General and many of the Staff officers preceded the troops. On arrival in camp the General's first care was to go to the tents of the Highlanders, the 64th and 2nd Europeans, to see personally that orders that he had given to have the floors well covered with dry rice straw, were carried into effect, that the men might have a comfortable place to lie down in, on arrival from their march. While thus occupied we heard that some of the troops coming across the Mashíla had got into some confusion, and in the darkness of the night parties of them had lost their way. Heedless of the exertion he had already

undergone, and although he was still suffering from the effects of a fall he had had the night before, which had rendered him insensible for many hours—Outram no sooner heard the report than, mounting his horse, he proceeded to the Mashila, and riding back almost to Chahkota, did not content himself till he knew that the last man of the force was in camp: not till then did he seek the repose which the exertions of the foregoing forty-eight hours so much needed.¹

Of course the Persians ludicrously falsified the particulars and general results of the battle at Khush-áb. They gave out that, on being attacked, we had blown up our ammunition, and returned towards the coast, pursued by the victorious army of our opponents. The statement continued that, at nine miles from Bushahr, we had been reinforced, but the Persians, with far less numbers than on our side, ‘rushed forward to the slaughter, fought heroically for four hours, and twice broke through the English square’—adding many other mendacious absurdities.

February, for the remainder of its days, was a month of preparation rather than of visible progress in the campaign against Persia. The result of the battle which had marked its commencement, in no way modified the General’s plan of action; and he still believed the most desirable point of new attack would be found up the river at the head of the Gulf. He foresaw exceeding difficulty in attempting to reach the interior by the steep and high passes leading to Shiráz, with the comparatively small force at his disposal, and without transport animals, not obtainable in the neighbourhood of Bushahr; whereas the way to Shustar seemed

¹ There is this also in the Memoir quoted:—‘His thought of and care for the soldiers,’ says one of his staff, ‘was such as is not often felt by Generals for their men. He had during the Persian campaign an orderly bugler, Mackenzie of the 64th. On the line of march I have seen him look down and say: “Mackenzie, you are not smoking.” “No sir,” would be the answer, “I have no tobacco.” The General’s cheroot case was at once at the bugler’s disposal, and he would stop his horse, and from his own cheroot give a light to Mackenzie.’

far more practicable, provided only that Mubamra, where abundant carriage and supplies could be found, were made the base of ulterior operations. Again, he entertained the hope that the capture of the last-named place, which had been strongly fortified, and which the Persians deemed impregnable, might cause the enemy to abandon the conflict altogether.

A passage in a letter to Lord Elphinstone, dated February 15, throws a pleasant light upon his relations with his second in command. 'From General Stalker I receive the most hearty support, and I have indeed every reason to be most grateful to him. Not content with seconding me in command, he insisted on my being his guest and sharing his tent. No brother could be more kind or cordial, and I shall be very sorry to leave him for a time. His position here will be very onerous until reinforced, or until I can return; for, on learning the diminution of the force here, the enemy may be encouraged to come on, though I do not think this immediately likely.' When two Generals are content to live in one tent for weeks, Anglo-Indian officers can hardly be spoken of as luxurious in their requirements! But he was sorely put out by the delay in the arrival of his full reinforcement. He had expected to find at Bushahr, on return from Barazján, the whole of the troops composing his second division, for they were overdue. Disappointment in this expectation was to him a 'source of very serious embarrassment;' and in so expressing himself to the President of the Board of Control, he defined his meaning by very clear and practical reasons. It was only after the first week in March that his letters gave more cheering intelligence. The opening paragraph of one to Lord Canning on the 9th of that month is here reproduced as an admirable example of the attention to essential details which rendered him

so competent a commander of mixed European and native troops :—

To our great delight, on Thursday the 6th instant, three steamers, towing five transports, made their appearance, bringing all the missing infantry (except one company of the Light Battalion), one horse artillery troop, and a troop of the 3rd Cavalry; and assurance, moreover, from Colonel Jacob, that all the Sinde Horse would be embarked and despatched from Kurrachee by the 1st instant. This, Captain Rennie of the 'Feroze,' who brought the communication, assured me, will ensure their being here by to-morrow or next day, judging, as he does, from the winds which have prevailed for some days past, and relying on the capabilities of the steamers which were ready at Kurrachee to tow the horse transports. I rely, therefore, on having all here by the 12th, if not sooner. And as soon as they begin to make their appearance, I shall re-embark the native troops, and proceed with them on Friday morning to Mohumra, picking up at the entrance of the river the transports containing the artillery and portion of European troops which have been despatched there within the last few days, so as to anchor within the bar for the advantage of being abundantly supplied with good water, our great difficulty with the shipping here. To European troops, remaining on ship-board is no consideration; but with natives, who cannot cook on board, detention in the vessels is a great hardship. I therefore keep the sepoy till the last. And the two or three days I am thus able to give the latter on shore—especially the 23rd Regiment, which have been a month at sea—will completely set them up. Supposing they might be almost incapacitated physically, after so long an abstinence from cooked food, from satisfactorily working in active service immediately on landing at Mohumra, I had arranged to substitute an equal strength of native troops from General Stalker's division for the 23rd Regiment. But the men are so eager to go on, and are really so strong, declaring that two days' cooking on shore here will fit them for anything, that I have decided on taking them. The only troops I borrow from General Stalker will, therefore, be seven companies of the 64th Regiment and a troop of horse artillery, leaving him three companies of the 78th.

In another letter, written two days later, he acknowledges

the receipt of a minute from the Governor-General which, in his opinion, 'fairly estimates our requirements for operations in the south of Persia, including Shiráz;' and he gratefully thanks Lord Canning for a further communication explaining the circumstances which had rendered necessary his own transfer from Oudh to Rajputana.¹ As regards the latter point, the following extract, if it disclose the workings of a highly sensitive mind, is redolent of honour and unselfishness:—

I cannot but feel convinced that, for the good of Oude and for the interest of Government, it was most necessary that a *permanent* Commissioner should be appointed. I am satisfied, moreover, that those interests could not be better advanced than by the charge of Oude being placed in the very able hands of Sir Henry Lawrence, and I rejoice that he has been selected for, and has undertaken the duty. Neither could your lordship have sent me to any place or duty more congenial to my tastes than Rajpootana. But, as General Low is aware, I should not myself have sought the change, nor wished it so far as I am personally concerned; for the transfer from so important an office as that of Chief Commissioner of Oude to the less onerous one of Agent in Rajpootana, might be regarded by the public as an evidence that I have been *found wanting*. My present occupation will, however, I trust, preserve me from injurious imputations. But, whether or not, I should be sorry indeed were my personal feelings or interests to be allowed for a moment to stand in the way of an arrangement so obviously calculated for the public good as that which your lordship has found it necessary to make. Even had it been a source of morti-

¹ Haidarabad was open to him had he preferred it. It has already been fully explained by Sir John Kaye, in the first volume of his *Scpoj War*, that the result of the administration of Oudh, as temporarily arranged for by the Governor-General, was such as to render an immediate change necessary. Under the circumstances Lord Canning, who, as we have seen, had considered Sir James Outram's return to that province even of more importance than his appointment to command the Persian Expedition, wisely asked Sir Henry Lawrence to sacrifice his own inclination to the public service, and exchange the congenial leisure of Rajputana for the ungracious labour of restoring Oudh to the prosperous condition in which his brother 'Political' had left it in May. Worn and weary though he was in mind and body, Sir Henry nobly responded to the call of duty—with what grand results history has attested.

fication, I should have considered myself more than compensated by the kindly manner in which you have condescended to announce the arrangement to me.

Were there no other evidence on record to prove the fitness of our Indian rulers for the responsible duties devolving upon them, the non-official letters of Lords Canning and Elphinstone addressed to Sir James Outram in the Persian Gulf, during the early months of 1857, would alone go far towards that end. They would establish as an indisputable fact that there were, at least, two British noblemen holding at one and the same time high position in India, who had the requisite mental power to deal with generalities and details; the instinct to hold personal opinions 'thought out' on the best procurable data; the courage to initiate action, on a large or small scale, if convinced that it was right; the discrimination to read individual character, and profit from the reading; a stock of common-sense, tact, and experience above the average allotted to their fellow-men; and, with a full knowledge of the uses and abuses of condescension, the great wisdom to rely on those whom they had loved to honour by raising into a sphere of responsibilities almost akin to their own. On the other hand, Outram's letters breathed a loyal and worthy response to the confidence with which he was regarded by his more immediate superiors. The range of subjects on which he was expected to reply to questions put—questions spontaneously suggesting lines of policy or lines of strategy to his mind—was a large one; but his keen eye took in all, and left no spot unnoticed. Besides addressing his correspondents at Calcutta and Bombay, and complying with the necessary local demand on his pen, he despatched home interesting letters to Lord Clarendon, the President of the Board of Control, and his warm friend Colonel Sykes, Chairman of the Court of Directors.

Before embarking for Muhamra, Sir James Outram had

exhaustively reviewed his position, and submitted it to authoritative scrutiny, with reference to further movements. Irrespective of interminable details, which the employment and distribution of troops and transports must always necessitate on active and emergent service, the political element was too much blended with the military in the conduct of the Persian campaign to be ignored at any time; and the sound of drum and pipe could not, for an instant, divert the mind of its leader from the many non-professional questions which kept cropping up at every stage of his progress. In his instructive correspondence of those days, Sir James Outram discussed the ways and doings of the Shah, his ministers, governors, and commanders, together with the ways and doings of the Arab tribes bordering on the Persian Gulf; and he described the geographical and general features of those parts of Persia through which it might be desirable to penetrate—dwelling upon their resources, as available to meet military requirements. The views and probable action of France and Russia—more or less factors in Anglo-Oriental politics—and the pertinent topic of our negotiations with Dost Muhammad, were not forgotten;¹ nor was the hypothesis, applicable to the close of the war—that a demand for independence might be made from us by our Arab auxiliaries—deemed a premature consideration.

Both the Governor-General and Lord Elphinstone had been rather disposed to favour an advance on Shiráz than Shustar, but they left the choice in the hands of their commander, well satisfied that he would carefully study all their wishes and suggestions, when determining actual procedure

¹ This one remark in reference to Baluch-Afghan affairs ought not, perhaps, to be passed over:—‘As General Jacob’s plan of permanently holding the Bolan and an advanced post at Quetta cannot be entertained (for which also I must admit my partiality), the arrangement with the Dost is certainly, I think, the most satisfactory our circumstances will admit of.’ It is part of a sentence in a letter to Lord Canning.

private. Military, naval, and political, all worked with a will, and there are no signs of jarring notes. Even where chafing about the non-arrival of his reinforcements and the mischievous consequences, he takes care to add that no blame must be implied to anyone, and that he is certain the Bombay authorities have done their utmost with the means at their disposal.

It was not until March 18 that General Outram himself left Bushahr. From the 4th of that month he had commenced embarking the troops detailed for Muhamra, but the process had been impeded by strong north-westerly gales; and the uncertainty of arrival of long-awaited detachments interfered greatly with the order of the arrangements. For example, the troop of the 3rd Native Cavalry, whose arrival is above mentioned, was added to the onward-going force, in the absence of a large portion of Jacob's horse known to be working up to Bushahr in sailing vessels unaided by steam. Unexpectedly also, a troop of the 14th Dragoons made its appearance, and, being already on ship-board, was in like manner directed to proceed with the expedition. The question arose whether the men of the 3rd might not return to shore, but as cavalry was urgently required for Muhamra, and the missing Sindh horsemen could be retained at Bushahr, the original order was not countermanded. Later reports, however, that the enemy, still hovering about the old quarter, meditated an attack on the latter place, caused Sir James Outram to recall the dragoons and a troop of horse artillery. In accordance with the usual fate of British commanders, his great desideratum—one on which he constantly dwelt—was cavalry. From lack of horsemen his victories were robbed of their results, and his arrangements much embarrassed.¹ General Stalker was to remain in command at Bushahr, with

¹ About 100 sabres of the Southern Maratha Horse embarked for Bushahr in April, under Colonel (now Sir George) Malcolm.

Brigadiers Wilson, Honner, and Tapp, two field-batteries and the mountain-train, the entire cavalry of the 1st division, three companies each from H.M. 64th and Highlanders, the 4th Rifles, 20th Native Infantry, and the Baluch battalion. Sir James would take with him the remainder of his troops—roughly, some four thousand men—those left for the defence of Bushahr counting about three thousand.

But the expedition was destined to start under a mournful cloud. The death of General Stalker occurred four days prior to Outram's departure. Such a calamity was keenly felt by the many friends of the popular and lamented officer, and by none more than their chief, who wrote to Lord Elphinstone on March 15, that they had 'lived together like brothers' in the same tent to the last—during the whole time he had been at Bushahr. His letter concluded with these words:—'I write with a sore heart, under the grievous affliction we are now suffering. The funeral this morning, attended by the entire force, was a most melancholy display. My amiable, kind-hearted comrade was beloved by all.' Consequent upon this casualty, Brigadier-General Jacob, who had landed on the day of its occurrence, was placed in command at Bushahr. Only two days later the Persian Gulf Expedition had to deplore the loss of another officer holding high position in it—Commodore Ethersey, commanding the naval squadron, an able and much-esteemed public servant.

On the evening of March 21, the 'Feroze,' with Sir James Outram on board, reached the anchorage inside the Shatu-l-Arab, having been detained by strong north-westerly winds prevalent at this season, and almost throughout the year in these waters. Some notion of the shallowness of the Gulf in its upper part may be obtained from the fact that between Bushahr and the telegraph station at the entrance of the 'Shat'—a distance of 174 miles—the greatest depth recorded for the submarine cable is twenty-eight fathoms.

Two or three of the vessels which had preceded the 'Feroze' with troops, had grounded on the bar at the mouth of the river, and one with the Sindh Horse was, at the time of its arrival, still in that unpleasant predicament. Reporting this untoward circumstance to Lord Elphinstone, Outram expressed the hope that they would be off in time to move up some forty miles on the day following and attack Muhamra on March 25.¹ It was not, however, until the morning of March 26 that he could actually commence operations; but about mid-day on that date, the Persian army, demoralised by the admirably directed fire of the Indian navy, 'evacuated their entrenched position and camp, leaving behind all their tents standing, with nearly the whole of their property, public and private, all their ammunition, and seventeen guns.' The official account, thus given in the Lieutenant-General's despatch to the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay, is sufficiently graphic to be adopted as our narrative of this brilliant episode in the national annals:—

For some months past, the Persians had been strengthening their position at Mohumra; batteries had been erected of great strength, of solid earth, twenty feet thick and eighteen feet high, with case-mated embrasures, on the northern and southern points of the banks of the Karoon and Shat-ool-Arab, where the two rivers join. These, with other earthworks armed with heavy ordnance, commanded the entire passage of the latter river, and were so skil-

¹ Muhamra, as described by Lieutenant Ballard, 'lies on the north side of the river Karun, close to its junction with the Shatu-l-Arab, here from 600 to 800 yards wide. It is about 30 miles from the sea. There were no defences at the mouth of the river: but for a quarter of a mile, both above and below the junction of the Karun, some excellent earthworks had been thrown up, and were lined with artillery and musketry. To take Muhamra it was necessary to sail up the Shatu-l-Arab past the embouchure of the Karun, and land the troops on the left bank, so that a very heavy fire would be encountered from these defences. The left or east bank of the Shatu-l-Arab, for 60 miles from its mouth, belongs to Persia, the right bank to Turkey, which further up possesses both sides.' . . . 'Had the Persian gunners worked their guns properly, the vessels ought never to have passed the embouchure of the Karun.'

fully and judiciously placed, and so scientifically formed, as to sweep the whole stream to the extent of the range of the guns up and down the river, and across to the opposite shore. Indeed everything that science could suggest, and labour accomplish in the time, appears to have been done by the enemy to effectually prevent any vessel passing up the river above their position. The banks for many miles were covered by dense date-groves, affording the most perfect cover for riflemen, and the opposite shore being neutral territory (Turkish) was not available for the erection of counter-batteries.

The accompanying rough sketch¹ will, I fear, give your Excellency but a faint idea of the great strength of the Persian position, and the difficulty of successfully attacking them in it without very considerable loss. I could have landed my troops on the Island of Abadan, which was strongly occupied by the Persians; and there is no doubt that, after defeating them, the southern battery eventually would have fallen to us; but the several batteries on the northern bank of the Karoon commanded the entire southern bank as well as the stream of the Shat-ool-Arab, and it would have been a serious and an extremely difficult operation to have crossed the rapid current of the Karoon in the face of the enemy, had the means existed of doing so; but until our small steamers and boats could round the southern point and join us, we should have been helpless.

After mature deliberation, I resolved to attack the enemy's batteries with the armed steamers and sloops of war, and, as soon as the fire was nearly silenced, to pass up rapidly with the troops in small steamers towing boats, land the force two miles above the northern point, and immediately advance upon and attack the entrenched camp.

I have now the very great satisfaction of announcing to your Excellency the complete success of the first two operations; the third, to the regret of the army, being frustrated by the precipitate flight of the enemy.

The Persian army, ascertained from credible report to amount to 13,000² men of all arms, with thirty guns, was commanded by the Shahzada, Prince Khanler Meerza, in person. The British

¹ Reproduced and attached.

² Cavalry irregulars, 1,500; 9 regiments regulars, 700 each, 6,300; Arabs and Bakhtiari and Baluchis, 4,600; gunners, 600; total 13,000.

force under my command composed as follows,¹ was the utmost I deemed it prudent to withdraw from Bushire; but with the aid of four armed steamers and two sloops of war, to effect my landing, I felt confident of success, although I anticipated some loss, from what I learnt of the determination expressed by the enemy to oppose our further advance to the utmost of their power, and their extreme confidence of succeeding, as evinced by the fact of their having sent away their baggage cattle.

On the 24th instant, the steamers, with transport ships in tow, moved up the river to within three miles of the southern battery, opposite the Arab village of Hurteh; but as some of the large ships shoaled on the way, and did not reach the rendezvous until after dark, I was obliged to defer the attack for another day. During the night a reconnaissance was made in a boat to ascertain the nature of the soil of an island west of, and immediately opposite, the northern battery, where I wished to erect a mortar battery; but as it was found to be deep mud, I determined to place the mortars upon a raft. This was constructed the following day, under the superintendence of Captain Rennie, I.N., and being armed with two 8-inch and two 5½-inch mortars, with a party of artillery under Captain Worgan, was towed by the steamer 'Comet,' and moored in position close to the island during the night, unobserved by the enemy, who, from our preparations at the rendezvous, and their confidence as to the impossibility of any vessel being able to pass above their batteries, apparently expected that we should land on the southern island (Abadan). The horses and guns of the artillery, a portion of the cavalry, and the infantry were transhipped into boats and small steamers during the day, in readiness for landing the following morning.

At break of day on the 26th, the mortars opened their fire upon both the northern and southern batteries. The range of the 5½-inch proved too short, but the 8-inch shells were very efficient, bursting immediately over and inside the enemy's works; whilst, from the position of the raft, but few of the Persian guns could be brought to bear upon the mortars.

At 7 o'clock the several vessels of war moved up into the posi-

¹ H.M. Light Dragoons, 89; Sind Horse, 303; H.M. 61th Foot, 701; 78th Highlanders, 830; 23rd Regiment N.I., 749; 26th do., 716; Light Battalion, 920; Bombay Sappers and Miners, 109; Madras ditto, 121; 12 guns 3rd troop Horse Artillery, 166; No. 2 Light Field Battery, 176; total, 4,886.

tion allotted them by Commodore Young; and by 9 o'clock the fire of the heavy batteries was so reduced, that the small steamers, with boats in tow, and one large steamer, the 'Pottinger,' towing the transport, 'Golden Era,' were able to pass up and land the troops above the northern battery, without a single casualty amongst the troops, although they had to run the gauntlet of both gun and musket fire. Two or three native followers only were killed, in consequence of their unnecessarily exposing themselves.

By half-past one o'clock the troops were landed and formed, and advanced without delay through the date-groves and across the plain upon the entrenched camp of the enemy, who, without waiting for our approach, fled precipitately, after exploding their largest magazine, leaving, as I have before stated, their tents and baggage, public and private stores, with several magazines of ammunition, and sixteen guns, behind. The want of cavalry prevented my pursuing them as I could have wished; but I despatched a party of Sindh Irregular Horse, under Captain Malcolm Green, to follow them up for some distance. This officer reported that he came upon their rearguard retiring in good order; but that the road in many places was strewn with property and equipments. The loss of the Persians has been estimated at 200 killed, among whom was an officer of rank and estimation, Brigadier Agha Jan Khan, who fell in the northern battery.

I beg to annex a report received from Commodore Young, with copy of a letter I had previously caused to be addressed to that officer, expressing my entire satisfaction with the naval operations. Indeed, it was impossible for my instructions to have been more ably or more successfully carried out; and the Commodore, and every officer and man under his command, have nobly earned my warmest thanks. From Commodore Young, ably seconded by Captain Rennie and the other officers of the fleet and masters of transports, I have throughout received every possible assistance.

With exception of the artillery, with the mortar battery under Captain Worgan, no portion of the military force was actively engaged with the enemy, beyond some European riflemen sent on board the war vessels; but I am not the less indebted to all for their exertions and zeal, and especially for the great order and despatch with which the landing of the troops was effected under Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B. The highest spirit prevailed; and had the large Persian army only awaited our approach out of

the range of the ship's guns, I feel confident that it would have received a lasting lesson.

From recent information I learn that the Persian force, in a very disorganised state, is still in full retreat, and I propose to despatch immediately, up the Karoon to Ahwaz, three small armed steamers, with 100 European infantry in each, for the purpose of making a reconnaissance, and, if practicable, effecting the destruction of the magazines at that place.

I take this opportunity of recommending to your Excellency's notice Colonel Lugard, C.B., the chief, and the several officers of my general and personal staff, the Brigadier-General, the brigadiers and their respective staff, as also the officers commanding the several regiments, batteries, and detachments of cavalry, and heads of departments composing this force, upon whom much responsibility has devolved, and whose zeal and exertions throughout this expedition have been most praiseworthy.

To Captain Kemball, Bombay Artillery, Consul-General at Baghdad, I am much indebted for his very valuable assistance, also to Major Taylor, as well as to Lords Dunkellin, Seymour, and Schomberg Kerr, who volunteered their services on my staff.

Large quantities of flour, grain, dates, and chopped straw for fodder, were found in the abandoned camps, and distributed among the troops and followers. Extensive magazines of flour, wheat, and barley were also discovered within the town of Muhamra, over which guards were placed until their contents could be examined and verified. There fell, moreover, into the victors' hands, much ammunition, in addition to the contents of the exploded magazines; and the captured guns were fine ones. Commodore Young's report of his proceedings was highly creditable to himself, and every officer under him. The following extracts show the number of casualties, and the nature of the work assigned in this operation to the naval squadron:—

So effective was the fire from the ships, that in less than three quarters of an hour from its commencement, the batteries were only able to reply from three or four guns. At this period (7.45 A.M.) of the engagement, the 'Feroze,' flying my pendant, hoisted

the rendezvous flag at the mast-head, which was repeated by the other vessels engaged, the preconcerted signal for the troop-ships to advance.

This movement on the part of the vessels in question not being made with such celerity as could be desired, Commander Rennie, of the 'Feroze,' volunteered to proceed through the fire to accelerate that advance, which was accomplished in admirable order, although at the time the fire from the batteries was far from being silenced.

From between nine and ten o'clock five heavy explosions in different parts of the fortifications indicated the overwhelming nature of the attack, and led me to suppose that the resistance hitherto afforded could not much longer continue. I was, therefore, anxious to have the troops landed as expeditiously as a due regard to their security would allow, so that a combined and simultaneous movement by the naval and military forces might be made with the certainty of a successful issue, and with this view, passed up the river, until close to Jaber's Fort, where the disembarkation was effected easily and without interruption.

After the batteries had ceased firing artillery, a fire of musketry was opened from them, as well as from breastworks in their vicinity, and maintained with great spirit for some time; when storming parties were landed from the 'Semiramis,' 'Clive,' 'Victoria,' and 'Falkland,' who drove before them the last of the enemy, and took possession of their works and guns.

Considering the strength of the fortifications both as regards position and construction, with a numerous garrison, and the large number of guns which could be brought to bear on the ships, in consequence of their closeness to the enemy's defences, which were likewise strengthened by breastworks occupied by large bodies of small-arm men, whose fire was at times annoying, I am thankful to say the casualties sustained by the squadron during the engagement amounted only to five killed and eighteen wounded.

Before concluding, he thus addressed himself more personally to Sir James:—

Allow me to acknowledge the many obligations I owe you for the great assistance you afforded me in maturing and facilitating measures that appeared likely to conduce to the success of the enterprise. My thanks are also due to your staff for the complete-

ness with which every arrangement was made for the immediate landing of the troops in a state fit for active service.

I feel confident that although the victory was a naval one, it would not have been so complete but for the sight of the imposing force with which the enemy felt he must soon come in hopeless contact, unless he made an immediate retreat.

Though the affair at Muhamra was attended with but little loss on our side, a very different result might have been foretold. The captain of a French frigate ('*La Sybille*') who had visited the place some weeks prior to the attack, informed Lord Elphinstone, on arrival at Bombay, that, while believing in our final success, he was of opinion that we should lose two or three ships in carrying out our contemplated operations, so formidable were the batteries which had been raised on the banks of the river. The Governor, when acquainting Outram with the French officer's opinion, implored him not to be too rash; but the note conveying the injunction did not reach its destination until some days after the defeat and flight of the Persian forces.

To Dr. Badger we are indebted for the following interesting particulars:—

'In planning the attack on Mohammerah, Outram had determined to be in the leading ship. Several of his staff ventured to expostulate with him on the subject; pointing out the risk which he would run, and the disastrous effect of his loss to the future conduct of the expedition; but their expostulations were in vain. There was only one chance of turning him from his purpose, and one of his most confidential friends determined to try it. Knowing that to expatiate on the danger attending the step would only confirm Outram in his decision to take it, he wisely forebore all allusion to personal risk, and adroitly appealed to a trait in his character which was always open to impression, his generosity. No sooner was it suggested to him that his presence with the

leading ship might deprive the Commodore and the Indian navy generally of some of the honour which was to be won, than he immediately changed his purpose, and arranged to follow in the "Scindian," after the forts had been battered by the men-of-war.

Outram, however, did not thereby place himself beyond personal danger. As the different vessels moved up the river, they were exposed to the fire of several field-pieces which the Persians had detached to arrest their progress, and to frequent volleys of musketry from behind the mud wall which enclosed the date-groves on its banks. The "Scindian," carrying the old Indian jack, or gridiron, as the sailors call it, was specially marked for these attacks. A round shot from one of their guns struck down Captain (now Sir Henry) Havelock's servant and killed him on the spot, and a musket ball was prevented from wounding Outram's foot by a lucky *hookah* which happened to stand before him. Outram at the time was calmly surveying the movements of the enemy on shore, lowering his glass every now and then to order the men—who belonged to her Majesty's glorious 64th Regiment and who would be peering above the bulwarks—not to expose themselves. He had hardly uttered the words: "Down, men of the 64th," when a shower of balls from the shore rattled over the deck, happily missing the General, whose whole person was exposed to the assailants. "They have put your pipe out," was his only remark, addressing himself to his friend who had been smoking the *hookah*, quite unconscious of the danger which he had escaped.'

It having been ascertained that the Persian troops had retreated to Ahwaz, a town about one hundred miles up the Karun river, where they had magazines and supplies, Sir James Outram resolved upon following up the capture of Muhamra by an immediate move thither. From the share

which Captain Hunt took in this expedition, his published account of it has become all the more attractive. We now subjoin Sir James's official report:—

In my despatch, dated the 27th ultimo, I announced to your Excellency my intention of immediately despatching up the Karoon River, to Ahwaz, an armed flotilla, being the only means I had of effecting a distant reconnaissance, owing to the total want of baggage cattle; but as the steamers had to be coaled, and seven days' provisions for the troops put on board, whilst all were busily engaged disembarking tents and stores from the transports, some little delay occurred, and it was not until the afternoon of the 29th that the party could be despatched.

The flotilla I placed under the immediate command of Captain Rennie, I.N., aided by Captain Kemball, political agent in Turkish Arabia, who zealously undertook the political conduct of the expedition. Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, commanded the military detachment, and Captain Wray, deputy quartermaster-general, and Captain M. Green, my military secretary, accompanied the expedition, for the purpose of reporting upon the country in the vicinity of Ahwaz.

My instructions to Captain Rennie were 'to steam up to Ahwaz, and act with discretion, according to circumstances. Should the Persian army have arrived, and apparently be prepared to make a determined stand, the party was to return after effecting the reconnaissance; but in the event of the enemy having proceeded beyond Ahwaz, or if they continued their flight on seeing our steamers (as I fully expected they would under the impression that the flotilla was the advanced guard of the British army), it was my desire that the party should land and destroy the magazines and stores which the Persians had collected.'

By the annexed reports from Captains Rennie and Wray, which I have the honour to submit, your Excellency will learn how admirably my instructions have been carried out, and the complete success which has attended the energetic and judicious measures adopted by all concerned. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate upon the advantages which must ensue from the successful result of this expedition, in the effect it will have upon the Arab tribes, who, in crowds, witnessed the extraordinary scene of a large army of 7,000 infantry, with five or six guns, and a host of cavalry, pre-

cipitately retreating before a detachment of 300 British infantry, three small steamers, and three gunboats.

I feel that I cannot sufficiently express to your Excellency the great obligation I am under to the several officers and men of the expedition.

Captain Rennie, Indian Navy, whose gallant conduct at the bombardment of Mohumra I so recently recorded, has again earned my highest praise and warmest thanks for the able manner in which he has conducted the expedition.

Captain Kemball on this, as on every occasion of difficulty and danger upon which I have required his services, has rendered me most valuable assistance, and materially contributed to the success of the expedition by his counsel and energy. Great praise is also due to Captain Hunt, 78th Highlanders, who so successfully carried out the military operations; to Captain Wray, deputy quartermaster-general, and Captain M. Green, my military secretary, for the parts they so ably performed; and to all the officers and men employed in the expedition. I have to thank them all, and beg to recommend those specially named to your Excellency's notice.

It is only fair to the officers and men concerned, to add the General's non-official testimony to the gallantry exhibited in, as to the advantages derived from, the above reported exploit, communicated to his friend, Mr. Mangles, who had succeeded Colonel Sykes as Chairman of the Court of Directors:—

A more daring feat is not on record perhaps than that of a party of 300 infantry, backed by three small river boats, following up an army of some 8,000 men, braving it by opening fire, and deliberately landing and destroying the enemy's magazines, and capturing one of his guns, in face of his entire army, and actually compelling that army to fly before them, and then occupying for three whole days the position they had compelled the enemy to vacate! The effect will be to clear Kuzzistan entirely of the Persians; and the entire province, including Shuster and Dizphool, is now at our command. And the Persians will never make head again in the province, for they have neither troops, nor guns, nor stores, nor munitions of war, wherewith to reinforce and supply their troops in this quarter. Whether, therefore, we occupy

Ahwas, on Shuster, the Persians will certainly take the position altogether, in apprehension of an attack from our army. So gallant an enterprise, attended with so magnificent results, merits, you will I think agree with me in this opinion, ranked distinctly as for the principal parties concerned, Captain Baine (second-in-commanding Commodore), Captain Kemball, and Captain Hunt, and also Captain Wray and Malcolm Gordon.

Practically, the war was ended. On the very day the expedition returned from Ahwas, the unexpected news that peace with Persia had been concluded on March 1 reached Sir James Outram by express from Bagdad, and was promulgated as soon as received. In a note to the President of the Board of Control he speaks of this as 'very gratifying, if we have secured all the advantages by treaty which we are now in a position to demand; and adds: 'I had just conducted an elaborate review of the proposed treaties as submitted by Mr. Murray—annotations by Sir Justin Shiel—co-terminator Lord Clarendon, the Board of Trade, &c. &c., from country in had compiled the terms which I myself recommended may be now useless, but I forward my despatches to Ahwas, standing, in case only the preliminaries of peace should be yet been settled, in which event my propositions for the reconsideration, for they have been framed with great proceeding in a just spirit.' But before dismissing from our seeing our events of a campaign which, being but a brief session that between the all-absorbing military dramas of the time, it was my the Indian Mutiny, the English public have almost gazed and we may well allow the victor to review the actual Wray, when the curtain providentially fell. He thus we learn how Murray on April 23:—

The previous official announcement of peace, received the night of the 4th April, of course, tied our hands, full result the Prince's army from unconditional capitulation, with tribes, have followed the advance of this division to Ahwas (Shuster itself); for the inhabitants of Shuster and the army, pre-

would probably have risen against their oppressors at our approach (as, indeed, we received intimation they proposed doing): but, without any such compulsion, their dread of our advance against them would, there can be no doubt, have induced proffers of surrender in their dispirited state, conscious as they are of their inability to stand against us (even had they the pluck), as they are devoid of ammunition and supplies: and they would prefer the alternative of surrender to us to running the gauntlet of the tribes in any endeavour to retire towards Booroojid. They have scarcely any musket ammunition even left wherewith to defend themselves. . . .

Knowing that this division would meet with no opposition, I had arranged to send it up to Ahwaz, under command of Havelock, there to be guided by the information Kemball would obtain regarding the state of the enemy whether or not to push on to Shuster—and the information we have since received makes it certain that the occupation of Shuster (and Dizphool) would have been effected without opposition; consequently, Havelock would certainly have advanced, and the surrender of the Persian army must have ensued. I myself arranged to return to Bushire (sending back the 64th there) to attack the Sirkesheechee Bashee¹; and from the information we now have of the position he has taken up at Naneezuk, there can be little doubt that we could have cut off his retreat by the cavalry dashing round to his rear when attacked by our artillery and infantry from the front. Of the result there can be no doubt—thirty more guns added to our store, and another army captured or destroyed: a very satisfactory termination of our short campaign.

No discretionary power has been left to me to send back any portion of the army to India; and, perhaps, slippery as Persian diplomatists so notoriously are, it is as well to husband all our strength in Southern Persia until the Shah has really ratified the treaty. But I should have preferred all troops, beyond those who can be maintained in Bushire, being located at Kurrachee (whence they could be brought back in time for further operations should they be necessary) to keeping them here. As it is, I am compelled to leave the 2nd division in this neighbourhood, for we cannot accommodate more troops at Bushire.

¹ As now rendered, 'Sar-kashakchi-báshi'—Commander of the Guard. His force had been estimated in February at about 27,000 men, including 31 regiments of regular infantry, and a numerous body of cavalry, with 85 guns. But Sir James knew that many of the guns must be left above the passes.

Notwithstanding the changed aspect of the political horizon and the consequent stop put to all contemplated measures of aggression, an immediate withdrawal of the British troops from Persia would have been dangerous and impolitic. Lord Clarendon's instructions involved their detention until the three months assigned for execution of the ratifications had expired, and effect had been given to the stipulations of the treaty regarding Herat and Afghanistan, and the due reception of the British mission at Teheran. Despatching, therefore, the 64th Regiment and his troop of the 14th Light Dragoons to Bushahr, the General had no option but to find out the healthiest locality in the neighbourhood of Muhamra, and hurry on arrangements for getting the remainder of his force under substantial cover. Muhamra was no place in which to detain Europeans unnecessarily; but after careful examination of other spots, it was found, after all, the best available—access to the higher grounds, or originally contemplated summer quarters, having been cut off by the peace. His letters are at this time full of carefully weighed criticisms of localities and expressions of anxiety for the health and comfort of his men, who continued singularly healthy in spite of the rapidly increasing heat. He explains how he proposes to extemporise quarters for the Europeans, double roofed, and well ventilated, with 'tatties' to temper the fiery air; how efficient huts for the sepoys can be contrived; and how he will roof in some of the transports in order to provide cool barracks for the sickly. Supply of forage for the baggage cattle, and the detention of a fleet of vessels, were very serious considerations. Nor did what some may deem minor matters escape him, even down to mosquito curtains for the men. Last not least, we find: 'In order to foster and maintain the spirit of the troops by useful and healthful recreation, I have also applied for a supply of books and games. And the necessary duties and exercises of the divi-

sion will be carried out so as to entail as little exposure to the sun as possible.' In short, his letters continue full of interesting details, illustrative both of the writer's own characteristics, and of the varied requirements involved in such a campaign. Happily, the efficiency of his expedients had not to be tested.

In the end of April he visited Karak and Bushahr, with the same object in view, of providing healthy shelter for the force. On arrival at the latter place he heard such satisfactory accounts of the progress of negotiations with the Persian authorities that he had almost made up his mind to act upon his own responsibility, and despatch at least two-thirds of his Europeans to Karachi forthwith, when the arrival of opportune letters from Bombay, expressing a desire for the return of all European troops that could be spared, relieved him of further anxiety, and enabled him to carry out his wishes with a clear mind.

He had judged rightly that the crushing blow at Muhamra would be enough for the Shah, and that his Majesty's sole desire would be to ratify and fulfil the favourable terms of the treaty as promptly as possible. Captain Hunt mentions that the Shahzáda, in trepidation as to Sir James's further intentions, sent a messenger to Muhamra to inquire whether he was aware of the satisfactory issue of negotiations; and that the General's 'curt and soldierly reply was that, had he not been aware of it, he should have been at Shuster to beat up his quarters days before.'

After securing General Jacob's consent to remain in command on his own eventual departure to India, he returned to Muhamra; and on May 17, its abandonment having been effected, he proceeded to Baghdad, to arrange, as stated in a despatch to Lord Clarendon, 'the formation of the mission to be deputed to Herat to see the evacuation of that fortress and district carried out by the Persians; and, in con-

junction with Captain Kemball, to take measures for the disposal and discharge of such portions of the animals and establishments of the land transport corps as are not required at Bushire.' On June 9 he left Baghdad for Bushahr, and on June 17 finally bade adieu to Persia, reaching Bombay on June 26.

An instance of the enthusiasm of the troops for Sir James occurred as the 78th Highlanders were leaving Muhamra for India.¹ They had been inspected by him in the morning, as also by Brigadier-General Havelock commanding the division; but the men could not leave without taking a special farewell of their gallant chief. They had intimated their wish through their officers, and Colonel Stisted had arranged with one of Sir James's staff that the General should be detained in his tent to receive them: otherwise, from his known objection to such demonstrations, it was feared he might evade them. Towards evening the sound of the bagpipes announced the approach of that fine regiment, and Sir James was apprised of the fact. After some persuasion he consented to come forth; but no sooner was he seen by the men than they burst out into a cheer such as British soldiers only can give. Outram attempted to address them, but his sentences were interrupted by renewed outbursts which so much affected him that he could scarcely speak. An Italian officer in the service of the Pasha of Baghdad, who was an eye-witness of this scene, remarked to an officer of the force that he should be sorry to command a whole division of Persians against one regiment of Highlanders!

On the threshold of an even more stirring passage of this eventful career, and at the close of a chapter already too long, we must content ourselves with referring the reader to the

¹ Again are we indebted to the Rev. Dr. Badger for this anecdote.

Appendix for a few selections from the complimentary orders and notices incidental to the close of a successful campaign,¹ and only give here Lord Clarendon's final letter intimating the bestowal upon the General of the highest rank of the Bath:—

‘Foreign Office, July 11, 1857.

‘I have great satisfaction in conveying to you, by command of the Queen, her Majesty's entire approval of the zeal, judgment, and ability which you have shown throughout the whole of the operations in the south of Persia in which you have been engaged; and her Majesty is convinced that if the war had not been happily brought to an early conclusion by the treaty of March 4, she could have fully relied on your zeal, and on the courage and devotedness of the army under your command, for the continued prosecution, to a successful issue, of the military operations which might have been found necessary to induce the Government of Persia to agree to a just and honourable peace.

‘Her Majesty has received, with peculiar satisfaction, your reports of the exemplary conduct, on all occasions, of the forces employed under your orders; and it is her desire that you take the proper steps for making known to them her gracious approval of their conduct.

‘I am happy to add that her Majesty has been graciously pleased to signify her intention of conferring upon you the honour of the Grand Cross of the Bath, in testimony of her approbation of your conduct in Persia.’

It need hardly be said that the approval of the Indian authorities was intimated in unqualified terms, while Sir James on his part was deeply sensible of the unvarying confidence and support accorded to him by his superiors both in the East and West. At the same time he freely acknowledged that, in regard to one contemplated measure, L_C

¹ Appendix I.

Canning had been right and he himself wrong, and added a cordial expression of thanks to the Governor-General for his considerate disposal of the matter. A brief quotation from an article in the *Times* of June 12, 1857, adverting to the terms of the Persian treaty then just published, and remarking upon the apathy of the public in regard to such things, may sum up these brief glimpses of a campaign which under other circumstances would have been considered by no means unimportant:—‘Why, then, has it passed unread, or been perused with a listlessness that failed to catch the points? Merely because people look elsewhere for the results of the war. We have struck a blow at Persia; we have invaded her territory; we have evidently frightened her out of her wits, and let her know what we can do, and what we are certain to do, if necessary. The expedition has done its own work—written its own peace; and happily some of its text is much more recent than that of the treaty before us, besides being written in a stronger hand and somewhat brighter colours. Sir James Outram has been the real negotiator, and no one can mistake or forget what he means.’

Providential indeed was the close of the Persian war. The very day Lord Elphinstone heard of the signature of Peace, on April 6, he took steps to recall the Madras Fusiliers who had just sailed for Bushahr, in order, as it turned out, that they might be in time to save Banáras and Allahabad under their own prompt Colonel—Neill. And little did Outram suppose when he last shook hands with Havelock at Muhamra, and when he rejoiced to get the 64th and the 78th away, in good condition, from Persian sun and Gulf fever, that he was sending them all to toil under deadlier influences at Kánhpur—destined to stem the tide of rebellion by victories which their opportune arrival alone rendered possible.

The tempest which had burst upon British India had not taken Outram by surprise, though the vehemence and magnitude of it appalled him like everyone else. The following extracts show what thoughts and what schemes must have occupied his mind as he impatiently steamed past the barren shores of Arabia, hurrying to Bombay, in accordance with Lord Elphinstone's summons and his own conviction 'that every available servant of the State is urgently required in India.'

The 'mutterings of the storm' are noted in a letter to Lord Elphinstone of April 27, 1857:—

The mutinous spirit so extensively displayed in the Bengal army is a very serious matter, and is the consequence of the faulty system of its organisation, so different from that of Bombay, where such insubordination is scarcely possible; for with us, the intermediate tie between the European officers and the men—i.e. the native officers—is a loyal efficient body, selected for their superior ability, and gratefully attached to their officers in consequence. Their superior ability naturally exercises a wholesome influence over the men, among whom no mutinous spirit could be engendered without their knowledge, and the exertion of their influence to counteract it; whereas, the seniority system of the Bengal army supplies neither able nor influential native officers—old imbeciles merely, possessing no control over the men, and owing no gratitude to their officers, or to the Government, for a position which is merely the result of seniority in the service.

I pointed this out to Lord Dalhousie once, who told me he had seriously considered the matter, and had consulted some of the highest officers of the Bengal army, who, one and all, deprecated any attempt to change the system, as a dangerous innovation. Whatever the danger, it should be incurred, the change being gradually introduced; for, as at present constituted, the Bengal army never can be depended on.

In forwarding from Baghdad to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, Mr. Frere's intimation of the outbreak dated May 18 and 20, he concludes, with a full grasp of the situation, 'All

the troops England can furnish will be required to restore our power in India; and I presume the troops destined for China will be required at Madras and Calcutta. . . It will occur to your Lordship how advantageous it would be to send troops through Egypt, which the Sultan and Said Pacha, might permit, perhaps, if without arms. The regiments destined for the next Indian relief might thus be sent. I mention this in the hope you may suggest the measure.'

Addressing Mr. Mangles on the same day, June 8, he adds the personal view of a son, husband, and father:—

I myself am more shocked than surprised; for I have long dreaded something of the sort, and you may recollect I told you of the warning I gave to Lord Canning when I was last in Calcutta, when I suggested that measures should be adopted for the better security of Allahabad. We know not yet what may have happened to the eastward of Delhi, but I shall not be at all surprised if that strong fortress, with all its valuable stores and war munitions, has fallen into the hands of the insurgents. That would indeed be a climax to our misfortunes, more serious even than their seizure of Delhi; for while held by an enemy there can be no communication between Bengal and the Upper Provinces, and a very large army will be required to retake it; while its occupation by an enemy will raise Benares and the whole country against us, and encourage an invasion from the Nepaulese probably.

To add to the anxiety I feel on public grounds, I am tortured by fears for my wife and son. He is stationed at Allyghur, and she was with him when I last heard from her in the middle of May, but expected to leave for Landour in ten days. At that time all was tranquil in that quarter, but ere she could leave most probably the country may have risen, and God only knows what may have been her fate. It is dreadful to contemplate.

I enclose a letter for my mother, which I beg you will kindly forward. Of course to her I do not let it appear that there is any cause of anxiety— but should she become acquainted with their danger, she also may become a victim. At her age (nearly eighty) such anxieties could ill be borne.

Harrassed as I am by my feelings, you will, I am sure, excuse a long letter.

And on the eve of his departure from Bushahr he gives his latest intelligence :

My wife and son had a narrow escape from Allyghur. Her letters, dated only two days before her flight, described everything there as most favourable to all appearance ; but the sepoy's at last broke out in mutiny, and all Europeans were obliged to fly. Our boy Frank placed his mother behind him on a pony, and carried her safely¹ till they overtook a carriage on the Agra road, and they made good their way to Agra ; but all their kit (including her jewels and some of my medals, &c.) was sacrificed, except the clothes on their backs. Her latest letter was dated 26th May, by which time she had recovered from her fatigues, but was in much anxiety about Frank, who forms one of a band of volunteers who scour the country to rescue isolated Europeans. If Allahabad is saved, and Delhi recovered, Agra may be maintained in quiet ; but there is much cause for anxiety, and I shall be on tenter-hooks till I reach Kurrachee to obtain further information.

¹ The pony rebelled against the double burden, and so they had to walk for more than half a mile, through cantonments—the sepoy's looting the bungalows as they passed. Lady Outram's thin shoes fell off, and her feet were much blistered by the hot sand.

CHAPTER II.

1857.

Summons to India.—Arrival at Bombay and Calcutta.—Appointed to command two divisions of the Bengal Army.—Moves up the river to Banáras, Allahabad, and Kánhpur.—Advance upon Lakhnau.—The troops reach the Residency.

‘WRITE to Sir James Outram, that I wish him to return to India immediately, and the same to General Jacob—we want all our best men here.’ Such was the telegram which Lord Canning addressed to Lord Elphinstone, and which the latter nobleman forwarded to the commander of the Persian Expeditionary Force, with a letter dated June 3, 1857. There was meaning in the words; the crisis was urgent; it was no time for empty compliment; plain truths were shorter, too, than conventional circumlocution. Outram received the summons at Bushahr when arriving at that place on or about the 13th of the month, and he lost no time in re-embarking for Karáchi, accompanied by General Lugard and other officers of the staff. This arrangement would not greatly delay his passage to the Presidency, and would enable him to consult with the Commissioner in Sindh as to the necessity for General Jacob’s immediate return to that province. He could not make up his mind to dispense thus suddenly with the services of an officer so valuable in his position at the head of the troops still in Persia, until he had ascertained what would be the further pleasure of the Indian Government, when made aware of his own particular views on the subject. On June 26, his arrival at Bombay was notified by telegraph to the Governor-General; but no reply to his

repeated request for instructions having reached him, he took the steamer leaving for Galle on July 9, intending to avail himself of the first opportunity to continue his voyage to the Húgli. A few days before this, he had arranged a carriage *dák* to Dhúlia in Khandesh, whence he was to make his way to Máo, and so on to his head-quarters as Political Agent in Rajputána; but the spread of the insurrection in Western India had compelled him to change his plans; and as the prevalence of the monsoon was opposed to his passage to Gujrát by sea, he determined to proceed at once to Calcutta. Thence he hoped to reach Agra in a week; and from Agra his further course would be guided by circumstances.¹

While awaiting orders at Bombay, under the Governor's hospitable roof, his attention was naturally engaged in gaining every information on the rebellion, which had already assumed formidable proportions, and in disussing those measures which appeared the more practical for its early suppression. Nor was his action at this time confined to personal consultation with Lord Elphinstone, with whom, as we have already seen, he had been in such constant correspondence during the Persian campaign. His official letter to the Governor, dated July 7, makes the sensible proposition that, instead of increasing the strength of native infantry regiments, as then determined, by 200 men added to the ranks, two supernumerary companies, to be afterwards embodied, should be raised for each. The promotion of native commissioned and non-commissioned officers entailed hereby would be but a just acknowledgment, it was argued, of the loyalty shown by the local troops, and the

¹ After Sir James Outram's departure from Bombay, Lord Elphinstone received a telegram from the Governor-General to the effect that he should be placed in command of the troops in Central India; but a subsequent telegram ruled his despatch to Calcutta. A copy of the former was put into the General's hands at Madras; but, fortunately, no steamer was there available to admit of his return. The 'Nubia' had just left the roads on her way to Suez.

substantial boon conferred would act as an encouragement to continued faithful service. Sir Patrick Grant subsequently expressed his high approval of the suggestion. He had himself proposed a similar modification of the scheme of increase to the Madras army.

Outram reached Calcutta on July 31, and was welcomed on board by Lord Dunkellin, who brought an invitation to Government House, where he took up his quarters. Writing to Lord Elphinstone the second day after disembarkation, he mentioned that events had occurred in Dánapur and elsewhere which called for his 'immediate services in command of the two divisions of the Bengal army,' occupying the country from Calcutta to Kánhpur inclusive. On August 5, his nomination to this double charge appeared in general orders. But this was not all the task allotted to the soldier-administrator. The Chief Commissionership of Oude, resigned by him fifteen months before, and now vacant by the death of Sir Henry Lawrence, was to be joined to the military control.

The whole situation was critical, and we note it as it appeared to Outram himself the day after he had been gazetted to his all-important office. General Havelock, after the victories of Unao and Bashirat-ganj on July 29, had fallen back to within six miles of Kánhpur to await reinforcements. Whence to furnish these with promptitude was a difficult question in the disturbed state of the country below and on all sides. Neill had sent him a company of the 84th and two guns out of Kánhpur, but he could do no more—and yet a rapid advance seemed urgent for the safety of the Lakhnau garrison, hemmed in as it was by a large force which, keeping up an unremitting fire, progressed from day to day to closer quarters, both by advance above ground and by the still more dangerous process of mining below. There were barely enough troops to hold Kánhpur.

The well-equipped and organised Gwáliar contingent hung like a thunder cloud, ready to burst either upon it or upon Agra, which was now completely isolated and contained a garrison only sufficient to hold the overcrowded fort. From Dehli came the same pressing demand for material aid; and though the besieging force was described as in 'excellent heart and health,' it was really besieged itself, and no expectation was held out of attempting an assault on the city until more troops could arrive from the eastward. The Panjáb trembled in the balance, uncertain of the issue, and preserved to us only by the personal qualities of John Lawrence and his lieutenants. In this emergency, the fall of Lakhnau, or failure to maintain our advanced position towards its relief, might lead to incalculable mischief, in addition to the fearful calamity of the sacrifice of Inglis and his precious charge. For, supposing the enemy's legions to be once released from Oudh, there was great probability that Allahabad and Banáras would be beleaguered before competent reinforcements could come up to the rescue; or that the ranks of the insurgent army at Dehli would be so strengthened as to compel General Wilson to raise the siege, and thus, probably, seal the fate of Agra and the Panjáb; in other words, of Northern India.

Such being the state of things above Allahabad, how was it between that all important point and Calcutta? The chain of positions along the river was maintained by small and miscellaneous detachments, scarcely adequate to hold their own in case of attack. Not only so, but at Dánapur—the cantonment which overawed the great city of Patna, the most virulent focus of Muhammadanism in India—the mutinous native regiments had just been permitted to escape with their arms, to muster round Kunwar Singh, and to besiege Wake's gallant little band at Árah. Thus the action of the only body of European troops, sufficiently

numerous to spare a few men for other places, had been paralysed. Nay, more; the catastrophe of Dunbar's costly defeat, in his attempt to relieve Árah on July 29, had just been reported. So Bahár was 'up,' under an enterprising chief, and it seemed difficult to exaggerate the probable effects of such disaster, at the very heart of our road communication with Banáras. We all know now how the providential appearance on the scene of an exceptional soldier, Brevet Major Vincent Eyre, followed by his singularly prompt and skilful action, altered the state of affairs, and saved Bahár just at the critical moment. He relieved Árah on the 3rd, and dispersed Kunwar Singh's forces at Jagdispur on August 11, but at Calcutta only disaster had been heard of as yet, and in a letter written a few hours before he sailed, all Outram could say of 'Captain Eyre' was, that he 'and his bullock battery' were 'somewhere between Dinapore and Benares.'

This very brief and imperfect survey of the aspect of affairs, as viewed from Government House on August 6, will enable us to appreciate the position of the officer who now became responsible for the peace of the country from Calcutta upwards. The reinforcements at his disposal consisted nominally¹ of H.M. 5th and 90th Foot, and Eyre's battery, on their way up the river, and of sundry portions of Havelock's regiments, detained at stations *en route*. These last were to be exchanged for other small detachments, or, as was afterwards remarked in regard to Sir Colin Campbell's measures, 'torn from the reluctant grasp of the civil authorities.' Some companies of the 5th, so appropriated, had to be released. The nature of the emergency rendered it imperative to hurry upwards every available man. As regards

¹ These are spoken of as 'regiments,' but they were not sent up complete, for, on August 25, the Governor-General promised that over 400 of them, then in Calcutta, would be despatched by bullock-train at the rate of eighty a day.

the means of transit, a few might be forwarded by bullock train, and even horse *dâk*, provided Kunwar Singh did not cut off communication by the Grand Trunk road; but for the bulk of the Europeans the river was the only route practicable. Steamers, towing their attendant 'flats,' bore precious freights in those days; there were none too many of them, and such as could be found were made use of to their utmost capacity. Heading the strong stream of the Ganges was slow work at best; halts for coaling were frequent; and unforeseen delays from accident or grounding, chafed the eager passengers almost beyond endurance. Still the water route was more expeditious, and less hurtful to the health of unacclimatised men than a march up the road; and thus it was that the 90th, and 5th, and their comrades were struggling up the stream at the time of which we speak.

Before starting at night on August 6, Outram wrote to Lord Elphinstone: 'It will take me a fortnight, they say, to steam up to Dinapore. . . . I take up a mountain train with me, but no artillerymen are to be had, and I must extemporise a crew for the guns as best I can from among the sailors and soldiers. You will allow my prospects are not very brilliant, but your lordship may rely on my doing my best to uphold my honour as a Bombay officer, and to prove myself worthy of the confidence you have always placed in me.' To add to his anxieties on the public service, he continued to be 'tortured by fears,' as he expressed it, on account of his wife and son now surrounded by rebellion and tragedy at Agra; for Lady Outram's last letter was more than a month old, and informed him that the day before she wrote she had been moved into the fort, with the great crowd of other ladies and non-combatants, in view of an impending attack. Satisfied as to her own security, she expressed uneasiness about her son, who was still out with eleven other volunteers in the Aligarh district, and had just

reported the defeat of a considerable body of malcontents who had issued forth to secure the heads of the party as decorations for the gates of Koel. But we should be doing scant justice to Outram's warm-hearted sympathy and true friendliness of character, did we allow it to be inferred that the burden of his own cares deadened his interest in those of others. We find this characteristic passage in a letter to Mr. Mangles, of the same date—interrupted by the summons to receive Lord Canning's final commands: 'When you see Colonel Sykes, please tell him I have not the heart to write to him on the sad events passing in India. I can little bear to think, much less dilate on them. His sons are happily out of harm's way in the Bombay Presidency. Yours might be in danger if not looked after; it will now be my business to do this, and I hope in my power. Your son, Ross, was in danger the other day, which, as a civilian, he ought not, or at least need not, have incurred. He volunteered to accompany that unfortunate expedition to Arrah, of which you will receive the distressing accounts by this mail, but, thank God, he escaped uninjured¹ . . . it will be my duty to restrain Ross's martial ardour when I join him, as I hope to do in a few days.'

Regarding Sir James Outram's appointment and instructions, a letter from Lord Canning to the Chairman of the Court of Directors may be quoted: 'There is no need of his services in Rajpootana, and I proposed to him to take the command of the two military divisions of Dinapore and Cawnpore, his first duty being to restore order in Bengal and Behar, for which purpose every European soldier not abso-

¹ It may be scarcely necessary to remind the reader of the acts of bravery and devotion performed on this occasion, which eventually won for Mr. Ross Mangles, and Mr. Macdonell of the Civil Service, the honour of the Victoria Cross. But it was only a year after the occurrence referred to in the above extract, that Outram became aware of the real nature of the gallant young civilian's exploit, and brought it to the notice of Lord Canning.

lutely necessary for the peace of Calcutta and Barrackpore, would be at his disposal. He undertook the charge eagerly, and left Calcutta on his passage up the river on the 6th. For the moment everything must give way to the necessity of arresting rebellion or general disorder below Benares.' In another letter he remarked, 'Outram's arrival was a God-send. There was not a man to whom I could with any approach to confidence intrust the command in Bengal and the Central Provinces.'

Thus we see that the restoration of order in Bengal and Bahár was the duty first laid down. But underlying this primary object—of securing the base of all our operations—was the urgent necessity for expediting the progress upwards of every individual soldier who could be made available for the work in Oudh. How Outram carried out these aims consistently, we can afford no space to detail. But his proceedings may be partially illustrated, and, as far as possible, in his own words.

One source of constant embarrassment to the military commanders must be traced, in a general sense, to the alarms, requisitions, and interferences of local authorities. Without implying blame to individuals, it will readily be understood that those who are responsible for local administration in such a crisis can hardly be expected to take in the whole military situation in accurate perspective. No one complained of this state of things more than the Commander-in-Chief;¹ but the General commanding the Dánapur and Kánhpur divisions had his full share of its annoyances. And in fact, just at this time Sir Colin got the credit from

¹ For instance, he thus telegraphed to Sir James on September 13. 'To the regret of the Commander-in-Chief, his Excellency has to inform Sir James Outram that the columns which were marching to his support have in two cases been divided and diverted from their original purpose at the instance of the civil authority . . . His Excellency's efforts are interfered with at every moment by the requisition of the civil authorities.'

the public of much of what his Lieutenant, Outram, had accomplished by firmness and tact, in remedying the palpable evil—credit which, however, he took the earliest opportunity of transferring to the right shoulders in his General Order of September 28, to be referred to later on.

With Sir James Outram, embarked, as his military secretary, and chief of the adjutant-general's department, a soldier, the mention of whose name is sufficient to suggest support to his superior officer such as, perhaps, no other man in the British services could have rendered—Colonel Napier, of the Bengal Engineers¹—then for the first time associated with him. That his advice and assistance proved invaluable in every department, it seems superfluous to state. But James Outram found in Robert Napier not only a staff officer of priceless value, but a true and trusted friend till death.² Mr. J. P. Grant, the ablest member of the Governor-General's council, with Captain Richard Strachey, R.E., as his private secretary, and Mr. Samuells, the newly appointed Commissioner of Patna, were also of the party. Mr. Grant was on his way to Allahabad, to act as Lieutenant-Governor of the Central Provinces, because, as Lord Canning explained to the President of the Board of Control, 'The condition of the country about Allahabad and Benares, where we are recovering our own, but where every man is acting after his own fashion, and under no single authority nearer than Calcutta, has made it necessary to put some one in the temporary position of Lieutenant-Governor, all communication between Agra and those districts being indefinitely cut off.' They steamed up the river, out of

¹ Now Lord Napier of Magdala.

² When asked in 1862 who was the best soldier he had come in contact with, Outram replied without hesitation: 'Robert Napier'—a selection to be afterwards endorsed by the nation. Sir James Outram's staff also included at this time, Lieutenants Sitwell and Chamier, A.D.C., and Mr. W. J. Money, C.S., Private Secretary.

reach of telegrams, and in consequent ignorance of what was going on up country, making Bhágálpur on the 15th, and Dánapur on the 19th. Thence Outram wrote to the Governor-General:—

On the evening of the 15th instant we anchored off Bhaugulpore, where I landed to inspect the defensive preparations of Mr. Yule, the Commissioner, which I found to be everything I could desire—eighty men of H.M.'s 5th Regiment occupying a Mahomedan tomb on an elevated position, impregnable by any enemy not furnished with artillery, and which thoroughly commands and protects the Commissioner's house and public offices. Mr. Yule had kindly given up a portion of his house as an hospital for the Europeans, among whom cholera had broken out. Three had died; others were suffering; but the disease had taken a milder form, and I trust will have entirely ceased by this time. At midnight, Mr. Yule came on board to inform me that the 5th Irregular Cavalry, stationed at Bhaugulpore, had mounted and fled with their arms three hours before, though the circumstance was only just reported to him. It appears that as our steamer and flat exhibited only some twenty soldiers, they imagined that a stronger body was concealed for the purpose of surprising and disarming them during the night; and this caused the panic through which they fled.

Half of their native officers remained; the troopers molested no one, and left all their property behind them. Before our departure, shortly after daybreak . . . Mr. Yule reported having ascertained that the cavalry had taken the direction of Bowsee,¹ 36 miles from Bhaugulpore, where the head-quarters of the 32nd N.I. are situated. Up to this moment we have learnt nothing of their proceedings, or whether they induced the 32nd Regiment to follow their example; but the flight of the sowars having been reported by telegraph to Monghyr and Dinapore, created, as we found on our arrival at these towns, a very unnecessary alarm.

¹ Warned by a message sent by Mr. Yule, at a cost of 100*l.*, Colonel Burney was ready for them at Bausi. He turned out his regiment for ball practice, possibly in order to empty their pouches; and the *sowars*, alarmed by the firing, turned off in another direction, leaving him unmolested. When Mr. Yule came on board at midnight—to report the flight of the cavalry, the despatch of his expensive messenger to Bausi, and his other arrangements—he found Sir James in bed. The General, having entire confidence in Mr. Yule, merely replied, 'Well, you know best what to do; good night!' and turned to sleep again,

— had withdrawn his detachment of Europeans (fifty men of the 5th Fusiliers) into the fort, some three miles in circumference, all the gates of which, except one, he had closed up, and the town was left without any protection.

Fifty European soldiers would be no real protection to so extensive a place; but their mere appearance in the town gave a sense of security to the people; and taking them away to shut them up in the fort had of course the very contrary effect. I therefore wrote to Mr. — remonstrating against the measure (copy enclosed), and caused corresponding instructions to be conveyed officially to the officer commanding. I also directed the officer commanding at Bhaugulpore to send up to Monghyr thirty of his Europeans; the remainder of his detachment being quite sufficient for that place in addition to the hill rangers. Both places have now as much European protection as can possibly be afforded, and quite as much as is needed to give confidence. On arrival near Patna, the night before last, I learnt that the panic had extended to Dinapore, and that the 90th Regiment, which had passed up the river four days before, had been recalled. I immediately despatched an express to prohibit the return of the regiment; but unfortunately it did not reach in time to stop the return vessels, which came back yesterday evening, and, I regret to say, with cholera on board—a doctor had died. This has necessitated landing the men, in order to cleanse and purify the vessels, which cannot be ready for their reception before to-morrow evening.

The delay thus caused in the advance of this regiment, and the disease likely to be engendered by long confinement on board crowded boats during the present extreme heat, are the more provoking as there is in reality not the slightest cause for alarm here. So satisfied am I on this subject (after the precautions I have ordered to be carried out, the mountain train guns being placed at the Opium Godowns in such positions as to effectually protect them, and at the same time overawe the town &c.), that I have ordered a detachment of 100 men of the 90th, which had been kept back, to join the regiment. And I would send away another 100 men of the 5th Fusiliers, who also have been detained here, were they not required for the town duties, which could not safely be entrusted to the . . . Regiment under the . . . exasperated feelings it just now displays towards natives of all classes.

I purpose taking on two guns of the battery here (leaving the mountain train for service in Behar if necessary hereafter, for which I intended it), and also Major Eyre's battery, to Benares, where I propose, if practicable, to organise a column to advance to Lucknow, through Jaunpore, between the Sye and Goomtee rivers;—the only course now left by which we can hope to relieve our garrison in Lucknow; General Havelock having again retired from the attempt, and recrossed the Ganges to Cawnpore, being unable, I imagine, to cross the Sye in the face of the enemy, the Bunnee bridge having been destroyed.¹ In addition to the artillery above mentioned, I can only have the 5th Fusiliers and 90th Regiments, so weakened by detachments as to amount together to less than 1,000 men—some of the Ghoorkhas perhaps, and the Madras Regiment now on its way up the river. But I hope to arrange with General Havelock—after effecting a junction with such troops as he can forward from Cawnpore—to cross the Ganges about Futtehpore, and pass the Sye near Roy Bareilly. I would there prepare rafts (on inflated skins) by which these reinforcements would cross the Sye. We should then be in sufficient strength, I trust, to force our way to Lucknow.

All my arrangements here will be completed by to-morrow, and no time shall be lost in pushing up to Benares, whence I hope to send back most of the steamers and flats now here and above. Aware as I am how urgently those vessels are required at Calcutta, I am very much vexed that such great and unnecessary delays should have interposed, by detentions here, at Dinapore, and other places; and your lordship may rely on my preventing any further delay than can possibly be avoided.

The next day he sent a long letter to Mr. Tucker, the Commissioner of Banáras, containing the following further remarks about the Jánpúr idea: 'I thank you for your suggestions for the relief of the Lucknow garrison. From the reports prevailing here, it would appear scarcely possible they can hold out for the length of time that would be occupied by my advance by either of the routes you recommend; but it is my determination to make the attempt

¹ 'Such,' he says, in another place, 'was our information at that time.'

if their position is still maintained. . . . For reasons which I will explain when we meet, I prefer the land route (through Jaunpore to Lucknow) to that of the Gogra, independent of the consideration of the detention of the steamers which would be caused by the latter operation, they being urgently required to bring troops &c. from Calcutta. . . . As many skins (*mussacks*) as procurable should be got, and bamboos, poles, &c., for preparing rafts. Pray telegraph to Havelock in my name, to keep up every appearance of preparation to recross the Ganges, as if meditating another advance on Lucknow—but in reality to keep the enemy in that direction, who otherwise would move down to oppose our advance from Jaunpore. Better say nothing to Havelock at present of my intention to call for his co-operation (from *below* Cawnpore), lest it might get wind through the telegraph. There will be time enough to arrange this when I join you at Benares. . . . It would be as well for you to let Havelock know that you had recommended me to go up the Gogra, and relieve Lucknow from Fyzabad, without telling him I had decided on taking the other route, thus leading the telegraph people to suppose I am to come that way; and I hope this may ooze out at Cawnpore, and so lead the enemy to expect and prepare for us at Fyzabad.'

On August 20, Outram left Dánapur. His time there had been fully and urgently occupied in solving questions which, whether general or of detail, involved results of immense importance. We have said that he reduced the number of Europeans left behind to a minimum. Yet circumstances had occurred to encourage disturbances in the interior of the districts, which compelled him to provide detachments of European troops for several stations where otherwise they would not have been needed. A month had not elapsed since the mutiny of the native regiments at Dánapur, and the escape of the mutineers had been productive of wide-

spread mischief. The security of Patna, with its Opium Godown, the pacification of Árah, and protection of Gaya, were local considerations seriously affecting the Government revenue, to which the General's attention was earnestly drawn by the newly appointed Patna Commissioner, Mr. Samuells. To this gentleman's memorandum on the protective measures proposed for Bahár, he promptly replied, setting forth the provisions that had been made; but declining to detach more of his troops in view of 'the vital interests at stake higher up the country, to forward which every European soldier not absolutely necessary for the protection of Dinapore and Patna must be sent on.' As an instance of the value of one district, it was represented that Árah alone possessed an opium crop worth to Government 'not less than half a million sterling.' It will be needless to note day by day the passage up the Ganges. That progress was necessarily slow may be judged by the instance of Captain Peel's memorable naval brigade, the head-quarters of which, under the immediate supervision of its distinguished commander, left Calcutta, by river, for Allahabad, on August 20,¹ and was only between Dánapur and Banáras on September 28. Not to want of will or skill could tardiness be attributed. In such an emergency the British sailor would not have brooked a moment's delay, except from causes beyond the reach of mortals. The navigation of Indian rivers—especially up the stream—is subject to much obstruction; nor is a strong opposing current the only adverse influence at work to render impossible a continuous high rate of speed.

¹ This is the date given in the Commander-in-Chief's telegram to Sir James Outram of August 26. On the 30th idem he had heard 'that the vessel Captain Peel was in, grounded at Berhampur.' Beyond which point, it was feared that he had not yet got. On September 28, the chief of the staff informed Outram that Captain Peel was 'still in the river between Dánapur and Banáras,' and that his arrival at Allahabad could 'only be looked forward to as a distant contingency.' The gallant officer arrived there, however, in October,

Meanwhile the new Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, having arrived in Calcutta on August 13, was, before a week had elapsed, in constant communication with Sir James Outram. Neither was a stranger to the other's name and character. One of the first, perhaps the first, of the chief's telegrams, dated the 18th idem, expressed the hope that Eyre's success had so far restored tranquillity in the Dánapur division as to have enabled Sir James to send on the 5th and 90th Regiments to Allahabad, but authorised the detention of the former in Bahár, if necessary. The postscript to this telegram was couched in these pleasant words, 'It is an exceeding satisfaction to me to have your assistance, and to find you in your present position.' On August 22 a further telegram from Sir Colin informed Outram that General Havelock's force, owing to cholera and casualties on service, had been reduced to 700 men in the field; and urged that the 90th Regiment should be at once despatched to his assistance. The day following, a second message was transmitted, showing that two fresh telegrams had been received from Kánhpur, pressing for reinforcements, and adding that, unless these were supplied, that station must be abandoned, and the garrison would have to fall back on Allahabad. On the 24th Sir Colin wrote to Outram as follows:—

'I am extremely happy, and deem myself most fortunate, to find myself associated with you on service, and to have the advantage of your able assistance in carrying on the duty in which we are now engaged. I send you herewith the different telegrams received from General Havelock since my arrival: they will make you fully acquainted with his operations in Oude; his reasons for crossing the Ganges; his subsequent operations in the neighbourhood of Cawnpore, with account of his loss by sickness and casualties in the

field ; his present numbers, and their condition as to health and efficiency. I have been favoured by the Governor-General with a perusal of yours to his lordship : . . . in which you purpose to collect a force of about 1,000 infantry and 8 guns at Benares, with a view to march to the relief of our garrison in Lucknow, by the most direct route from thence, and that the force under General Havelock at Cawnpore should co-operate with you in this movement. . . . Hope of co-operation . . . is not to be entertained. The march from Benares, by the most direct route, to Lucknow is a long one—some 150 miles¹—and the population through which you would have to pass, hostile. Its great recommendation I presume to be that you (by that route) turn, or rather come in rear of, the many nullahs which, I am told, interpose between Cawnpore and Lucknow, and this would be an important advantage. But if the force you propose to collect at Benares were to be moved by the river to Cawnpore, and united with Havelock's reduced numbers, do you think it would be able to force its way over the numerous nullahs, necessarily full of water at this season, which are to be found on the road from the latter place to Lucknow ? By this route all incumbrances, such as sick, &c., would be left at the different stations or posts along the road, and the troops, being conveyed by steam, would suffer less than if obliged to march—and Havelock's anxiety about his post would be removed. In offering these remarks to you, who are acquainted with the country, people, and difficulties attending the movements you propose, it is not with any view to fetter your judgment and perfect freedom of action, but I mention these as they occur to me in writing to you, and I think I may venture to say that the measures you

¹ A glance at the map will show how very much, in point of fact, it was the shortest in actual measurement—the road from Banáras to Lakhnau, via Kánhpur, being about 250 miles.

may deem most advisable to pursue will receive the approval of the Governor-General.¹ At midnight of the day on which this letter was written, the chief supplemented it with a telegram summarising its purport, and adding a telegraphic message from Havelock to himself of the same date, stating: 'I will communicate with Sir James Outram, and have telegraphed to Benares to learn where he is. . . . With the reinforcements promised, I could resume the initiative, and march to Lucknow, if the place should not unfortunately have fallen before the reinforcements arrive.'

Sir James Outram first saw the copy of the message from which we have extracted on August 28, when arriving at Banáras. At the same time he received Sir Colin Campbell's letter of the 24th. Practically, therefore, this was the first intimation made to him that only *men* were wanted to relieve Lakhnau from Kánhpur. It must be borne in mind that while both Lord Canning and the Commander-in-Chief were fully aware of the facts in regard to General Havelock, Outram was not only unacquainted with these facts when he mentioned the idea of adopting the Jánpur route, but he had actually been misled by information which induced him to conclude that the Kánhpur road was physically impracticable to a relieving force; and that consequently the relief of Lakhnau must of necessity be attempted by another. Had he but possessed at Dánapur the information contained in the telegrams of which copies now came into his hands, the Jánpur scheme would not have assumed shape of any kind. When he learnt the true state of affairs higher up the river, he lost no time in despatching a telegram to

¹ The Governor-General communicated his separate views by telegram to Outram on August 25, also received at Banáras. His observations upon the Jánpur road were to the same effect as those expressed by the Commander-in-Chief, with whom he had doubtless held consultation on the matter. Among the points discussed, the abandonment of Kánhpur was authorised should it facilitate the relief of Lakhnau.

General Havelock to the effect that he expected the 90th and 5th Regiments on the morrow, and should at once push on with them to Allahabad, where he hoped to be, in despite of the contrary stream, on September 2nd or 3rd, starting thence for Kánhpur, by forced marches, on the 5th. His force would consist of 1,268 officers and men, besides any chance addition from Mirzapúr and Chuiár. The arrival of the expected naval brigade at Allahabad would release more hands for work in the front from that station. He added:—

‘I shall join you with the reinforcements, but to you shall be left the glory of relieving Lucknow, for which you have already so nobly struggled.¹ I shall accompany you only in my civil capacity as Commissioner, placing my military services at your disposal, should you please to make use of me—serving under you as volunteer. Encourage the Lucknow garrison to hold on. Spare no cost in effecting communication with Colonel Inglis. . . . Proclaim at Cawnpore, and cause it to be made known to the leaders of the enemy’s forces at Lucknow, that for every Christian woman or child maltreated at Lucknow, an Oudh noble shall be hanged. If you could afford a second detachment to hold its ground on the Lucknow bank of the river opposite Cawnpore, it would have a beneficial effect in distracting the enemy’s attention from the Lucknow garrison, besides facilitating the passage of the river when the time arrives.’

But, in point of fact, Outram had given up the Jánpur project before arrival at Banáras; for the chief’s telegram of August 23, so unexpectedly foreshadowing the possible

¹ The notion of superseding General Havelock, before carrying out the great object of his immediate advance from Kánhpur, had been a source of distress and annoyance to Outram on board the steamer. On one occasion he came up to Colonel Napier and said:—‘I know what I will do. I will go in my political capacity.’

abandonment of Kánhpur, which had reached him on the 25th, at Gházipúr—at once decided him to pursue another course; and, three days before the date of his own telegram above quoted, he had written to the Commissioner of Banáras, requesting that officer to inform Havelock, through the wires, of his decision—further, that all available Europeans would now be sent to Kánhpur as speedily as possible. ‘Tell Havelock,’ were his instructions, ‘that of course I have given up the intended advance direct on Lucknow for the present, as available Europeans will be sent to him. Also say, I beg to congratulate him on his brilliant successes against the enemy.’ As the reinforcements, hurried on with the utmost energy, had not reached Banáras, the idea of the Jánpur route could not in the least affect their progress. Had it indeed been adopted, Banáras would still have been the place of debarkation. Unfortunately, Mr. Tucker’s action, when using the telegraph instrument on behalf of his friend, had already resulted in some confusion. In a telegram of August 23, General Havelock had informed Sir Colin Campbell that he had heard through that gentleman of Outram’s intention ‘to ascend the Gogra, and relieve Lucknow by Faizabad.’ Now it must be clearly understood that the idea of taking this route was not Outram’s at all, but that of the Commissioner of Banáras himself. The former (as we have seen) had never approved or entertained the scheme, and only warranted mention of it to General Havelock as a recommendation of Mr. Tucker’s, ventilated for the purpose of misleading and distracting the enemy.

Among other causes of special anxiety to the local authorities at this period, was Gorakhpur, the abandonment of which place Outram considered a ‘sad mistake.’ He thought that it might have been maintained by our allies the Gúrkha troops from Nipál, and felt that the step taken, by throwing the town into the hands of Oudh insurgents, had encouraged

the invasion of the whole district. From Mirzapur he addressed a telegram to the Commander-in-Chief, suggesting means, and submitting detailed proposals for dealing with this emergency; but showing that the special object which he had in view prevented the detachment of any portion of his own force in this direction. In like manner he was debarred from lending immediate aid in the pursuit of the notorious Kunwar Singh, then supposed to be at the head of three or four thousand men in the neighbourhood of Mirzapur. 'I could not,' he wrote to Mr. Hamilton, Opium Agent at Gházipur, 'delay the troops now following up the river. . . . My object is to push them on to Cawnpore without delay, and thence to Lucknow.' Besides, he thought it most likely that such expectation, if carried out, 'would prove but a wild goose chase.'

Outram reached Allahabad late on September 1. The next morning he received letters from Kánhpur, the following passage in one of which, while it indicated the feeling entertained by the officers generally on the subject of the all-important movement which his coming would accelerate, justified his disbelief of the gloomy reports current at Banáras that the straitened garrison was treating for terms of surrender:— 'Lucknow is at present all right and in good spirits. We shall meet opposition on the road; but if we take lots of heavy guns they won't stand long.' His own letters written during the day expressed confidence that he would be in time for the relief of his beleaguered countrymen and their faithful adherents: but he was disappointed that the troops which were to have followed him closely up the river from Banáras, did not make their appearance. Nor had they arrived when he thus wrote to Mr. Mangles, in the early morning of September 3:—

'I have made every disposition the means at my command permitted for the security of the principal stations

. . . but of course I could not provide military means for ridding the districts of the gaol-birds and *bad-máshes* let loose on the country . . . I, however, suggested to the civil authorities to augment their police, and to impress on their *zamindars* &c., that *they* would be held responsible for keeping the peace within their own limits . . . I trust my next will be from Lucknow. . . .¹

On September 3, arrived the steamer and flat conveying Major Eyre's battery and a portion of the 5th Fusiliers: and on the day following the head-quarters of H.M. 90th Regiment in the 'Mirzapur.' Eyre's horses were found to have been despatched from Rániganj by road only a few days before; so he had to be content with his bullocks. September 4 was taken up in landing and putting together the guns; and though the operation was not completed till late at night, the battery was ready to accompany the first detachment which marched towards Kánhpur under Major

¹ To the three Rájahs, Mán Singh of Shahganj, Mádu Singh of Ramnagar, and Rustam Sahá of Dairah, he addressed the following, in token of approbation of the friendly spirit which they had evinced:—

'I have heard of your having, during the late mutiny at Faizabad . . . saved the lives of several British officers, their wives and children. With this conduct on your part I have been much pleased; and I cannot but feel convinced that you will, by your future conduct, continue to prove your fidelity to the British Government. Rest assured that the British Government is ready to reward its faithful subjects, and that I shall have much pleasure in bringing to its notice any act on your part, during the present disturbances, which may tend to prove that you are a sincere well-wisher to the State.

'It cannot be hid from you that the British Government will soon quell this rebellion. Troops, in great numbers, are on their way from Europe, and will shortly arrive, before whose overwhelming power the cowardly rebels will be annihilated. But, although the British Government will punish with the utmost rigour those who have dared to rebel against the State, it will always have pleasure in rewarding those of its subjects who, notwithstanding the evil examples by which they are surrounded, hesitate not to show their staunch fidelity to the British Government—and amongst such I hope to reckon yourself.

'I am now on my way to Cawnpore and Lucknow, and shall be happy to receive any communication from you expressive of your readiness to obey the orders I may think it necessary to send you.'

Simmons at 3 A.M. on the 5th. From Allahabad the distance is reckoned at 127 miles, and this was to be got over in six stages; but as the two first stages were comparatively easy, the remainder would average about twenty-five miles a day. Outram, in writing to Havelock that such were Simmons's orders, shows also that they were subject to an important condition:—'unless he should find his men knocking up (foot-sore), in which case he would report to you, and you would order him to lighten his marches or otherwise as you thought proper, influenced, as you doubtless would be, by the state of the Lucknow garrison.' The strength of the party was 683 men: besides Eyre's artillery and two eight-inch howitzers, it was composed of H.M. 5th Fusiliers, and a few men of the 64th and 34th Regiments. As Outram would follow within twenty-four hours, with the 90th Regiment (678 rank and file), and a company of the 78th (87 rank and file)¹ expected from Banáras, it was reckoned that the whole contingent which his coming would supply, would amount to 1,448 men. To obtain even this moderate figure, it had been necessary to weaken the garrison at Allahabad considerably more than had been intended at Army Head Quarters. But reinforcements of European troops were almost daily looked for from Calcutta: Peel's naval brigade was moving up the river; and while one Madras native regiment had reached Monghyr on August 27, another was well advanced. Moreover, Mr. Chester, the Civil Commissioner, apprehended no danger whatever from too great a reduction of local military strength.²

¹ This came up to Sir James Outram's camp, by bullock-train, at the second stage out.

² That Outram's attention was not wholly engrossed with the proposed relief of Lucknow, to the detriment of other parts of India, may be inferred from his letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, Central Provinces, of September 5, showing his proposed disposition of the Madras troops. 'It appears to me,' he wrote, 'that no operations in the North-West Provinces can be of more importance than restoring order in the districts bordering on Bengal . . . I

True to the time named in his telegram to Havelock, despatched eight days before from Banáras, Outram left Allahabad for Kánhpur on the night of September 5. But the rapid progress he had hoped for proved to be, as he had feared it might, out of the question. After the first march of 14 miles to Mufti Ke Poonwa, it was found that a large proportion of the 90th was quite unequal to the fatigue of double stages. This regiment had for five consecutive months been cooped up on board ship and in river steamers; and it was not strange that the physical power of the men should have become affected by such long confinement. Outram felt it would be folly to persevere in an attempt which, if in one sense successful, must in another prove a failure. So he thus wrote to Havelock on September 6: 'As we have such favourable accounts of the Lucknow garrison (there can be no doubt, I think, of their ability to hold out as long as need be)—and it being of importance you should receive your reinforcements in an efficient state—I propose, unless I hear from you that quicker movement is indispensable, or at least desirable, to pursue the ordinary ten marches to Cawnpore.' On the same day Havelock wrote much in the same strain, and to the same effect, to Outram; ¹ hoping that his letter might reach him before he had left Allahabad. The letters must have crossed.

Instructions were accordingly sent to Major Simmons to modify the programme which had been laid down for his guidance on starting for Kánhpur. But notwithstanding the extraordinary precautions taken to preserve health and strength, two deaths occurred in the advance, and three in

think, therefore, we may best promote the public interests by devoting the whole of the Madras troops to that duty.'

¹ 'I fear it will not, in the present state of the weather, be possible for either column to make the marches you have designated without the certainty of throwing a great number of men into hospital, and rendering inevitable a halt to refresh after arrival. . .

the rear column during the first four or five marches ; while as many as forty men of the 90th Regiment were at one time on the sick list. At Kalogan, his fourth stage, information reached Outram that some Oudh *zamindars*, with 400 men and two guns, had crossed the river where it ran parallel with the line of march, and were plundering in the Do-áb. Such a danger to his flank could not be passed by : so halting Simmons's detachment, he moved up to it at Kurria, on the morning of September 10. On arrival he directed Major Eyre to proceed against the enemy, taking 100 Europeans from the 5th, and 50 from the 64th Regiment, all mounted on elephants, with two guns. They were to be joined at a neighbouring village by a squadron of the 12th Irregulars under Captain Johnson. No time was lost in carrying these orders into effect : and although fresh intelligence reached the General in the course of the day, considerably magnifying the strength on the rebel side, he felt every confidence that the little force he had despatched was equal to the occasion. 'As Major Eyre commands the party,' we read in his letter to Havelock, mentioning what had occurred to change the even tenor of his march, 'he will succeed, if any one can, in discomfiting the scoundrels.' That his confidence was justified, the result fully proved, for the invaders were driven into the river, and all but annihilated. The report of Eyre's success reached Outram at Thariárun, where he arrived on September 11, in time to be notified at foot of a despatch which he had just completed to the Commander-in-Chief. A still later postscript added an item of information corroborative of the importance of this victory. It was to the effect that he had just been visited by the 'Thánádar,' who assured him that the invasion, thus summarily checked at the outset, was to have been followed by an extensive rising in the neighbourhood. Subsequently, he ascertained that this Oudh force had been but an advanced guard, and the intr

tion had been to cut off his communication by a *levée en masse*, and an eruption from Oudh, whenever he advanced from Kánhpur towards Lakhnau. Outram wrote thus from Thariárun on September 11 to Colonel O'Brien at Allahabad:—

‘Simmons’s column went on to Futtehpore this morning, taking on the company of the 78th; and I follow with the Europeans to-morrow. Eyre will overtake us by the time we reach Cawnpore. The 90th will be the better for this halt, their sick amounting to fifty-two. But though the Oude people may now be driven back, they will probably return shortly after this force passes on; or the Dinapore and Rewah rebels may cross the Jumna with a view to plunder the Doab and interrupt our communications. It is absolutely necessary, therefore, that a post be established between Allahabad and Cawnpore, sufficiently strong to detach against any parties of rebels crossing either the Jumna or Ganges. Futtehpore offers the most convenient position, and I beg, therefore, you will cause preparations to be made for passing on to that place all the men of the 90th and 64th (except their sick) now coming up from Benares, either by bullock train or marching, as you think most advisable. But the first detachment (which is to reach Allahabad to-morrow) should be despatched by bullock train *at once*, to take charge of the tents, which I shall leave there, for upwards of 500 Europeans—intended for the accommodation of the Futtehpore force when all are assembled.

‘Even that small detachment, magnified as it will be by rumour, will suffice to keep the Oude rebels dispersed by Eyre, from again venturing to come across the Ganges; and long before they learn the real force of the detachment, it will have been reinforced by further details. This post would, moreover, tranquillise the Futtehpore district (which

is becoming utterly disorganised from the absence of any European supervision) if an experienced civil functionary could be sent to assume charge of it.'

The importance of Fathpúr, from a military point of view, situated as it was midway between Allahabad and Kánhpur, was not the only object Outram contemplated in making this recommendation. He was essentially a just man, and his knowledge of the native character, acted upon by a keen sense of equity, would not suffer him to convict indiscriminately of mutiny and rebellion all those who were set down as in arms against us. He saw that in many instances the retaliating spirit had led to excessive punishment, and that a craving for vengeance had confounded, in the eyes of our soldiers, the innocent with the guilty. The restrictive orders which he issued on the subject though perhaps considered by some critics needlessly severe, will be justified by the decisions of after years—not simply because they were in accordance with Lord Canning's clement policy, but in the light of personal opinions. In a long letter addressed to the Governor-General between Fathpúr and Kánhpur, Outram refers to the former place as being in the most disaffected of districts; but states that he has authorised Colonel O'Brien, its proposed future commandant, to 'organise a small body of certain well-disposed sepoys of the Agra disbanded regiments, who went on leave, duly provided with certificates . . . and have not since, or previously, been implicated in any disloyal act.' He thus continues a remarkable despatch, not the less characteristic because it was written at a time when his mind was unusually on the stretch. He was all anxiety to reach Havelock at Kánhpur, yet earnestly seeking to put Lord Canning in possession of the main facts of the rebellion up to date, and of the most practical means at hand for its quick suppression:—

‘The time has now arrived, I conceive, for your Lordship to decide how the native soldiers, who have committed no overt act of mutiny or rebellion, and are not implicated in any deed of atrocity, should be dealt with. Among such I may mention those who were peaceably disarmed at Agra, and went to their homes on the faith of Mr. Colvin’s proclamation, before the announcement of its withdrawal by Government; those who allowed themselves to be disarmed, and have since remained with their regiments doing duty without arms; and, above all, the very few regiments still staunch to us, who have retained their arms.

‘Unless these men receive an assurance that they will remain in our service, with the present pay and privileges, their minds will naturally be imbued with doubts as to their future fate, rendering them yet liable to seduction; while, in the other case, their fidelity may be assured, and we certainly cannot entirely dispense with the services of these men. The most favourable time for the promulgation of such a determination on your Lordship’s part, would be the announcement of the fall of Dehli and the awful retribution that must then be taken on the mutineers congregated in that city. But if that event, so long delayed, be deferred much longer, the opportunity for taking advantage of the favourable reaction will pass away, and thus no opening for mercy would be available to any of the classes now composing the Bengal native army. Has not the time arrived, my Lord, for a proclamation announcing that, as more than four months have elapsed since the outbreak of the rebellion, the Government is satisfied that those regiments which have so long withstood the menaces and temptations with which their disaffected comrades have assailed them, have thus proved themselves staunch and trustworthy servants of the Government, which, therefore, deems it but just to remove any apprehensions they may entertain as to the future, by

assuring them of its continued favour? They will be retained in the service, with all the privileges and advantages hitherto enjoyed, and be rewarded for their fidelity—especially those regiments which have served under arms through the crisis, by sharing in the extensive promotions to be announced on the reorganisation of the native army. It may also be added that Government has made this announcement at the moment when all India is convinced of the speedy re-establishment of the Government's power, which four months' rebellious conflagration could not shake, and when the legions of England are about to pour into the country.

‘But I humbly conceive the Government should go further: it should express its conviction that thousands of the Sepoys unhappily belonging to the regiments that fell away from their duty, were the unwilling victims of a powerful majority whom they were helpless to oppose, and were no party to the violence or crimes of their comrades; to avoid participation in which, they retired peacefully to their homes, and in many cases proved their devotion by saving the lives of their officers. The Government, acting upon this conviction, and being desirous not to confound the innocent with the guilty, has, therefore, empowered a committee of officers to assemble at——, who will investigate and report upon the cases of those officers and men who appear before them to establish their innocence. After the evidence produced has been considered and recorded, their cases will be submitted for the consideration of Government.’

For holding such a committee Fathpúr was named as a convenient spot, and it was also suggested that Colonel O'Brien would be an officer fully qualified to preside over it. The letter further discussed the question of raising the well-disposed part of the Hindu population in certain stations against the Muhammadan rebels; and the writer forwarded

a correspondence which had passed on the subject between General Neill and himself. He was careful to explain that his object was not to promote an ill-feeling between the two races, but to 'encourage our friends and well-wishers,' by the example of our Hindu subjects fighting with and for us in the cause of order and good government. Towards so desirable an end he thought that a money grant might be fairly sanctioned by the State; and in one instance he authorised an outlay of 50,000 rupees (5,000*l.*) on his own responsibility.

On the morning of September 15 Major Simmons arrived at Kánhpur, and Outram followed at night. The meeting of the two generals was most cordial. Already has it been shown that Havelock had before spoken and written of Outram in no measured terms of praise;¹ moreover, that Outram had applied for Havelock to command one of his divisions in Persia. It was now precisely four months since Havelock had embarked at Muhamrah to return to India, taking the sincere thanks of Sir James Outram for 'the zealous and valuable assistance' he had rendered 'at all times, in command of the second division.' They again met one another much in the same relative positions in respect of actual rank as in Persia, but otherwise under different circumstances. Outram's resolution as to waiving his right of command has been recorded a few pages back. It had been made known to Army Head Quarters before coming into effect, and Sir Colin Campbell had written to Sir James how he had communicated the matter to the Governor-General, and how the Governor-General had 'expressed himself in the warmest terms of admiration' of the 'truly handsome and generous proposal reported.' 'God grant you may succeed!' were the words added, on his own part, by the Com-

¹ See *ante*, p. 111, with reference to previous association, and the command in Persia.

mander-in-Chief. On September 16 appeared the following division orders, well inaugurating an honourable command:—

All Cawnpore Division Reports to be made for the information of Sir James Outram, K.C.B., commanding.

The force, selected by General Havelock, which will march to relieve the garrison at Lucknow will be constituted and composed as follows:—

First Infantry Brigade.—The 5th Fusiliers; 84th Regiment, Detachments 64th Foot and 1st Madras Fusiliers; Brigadier-General Neill commanding, and nominating his own Brigade staff.

Second Infantry Brigade.—H.M. 78th Highlanders; H.M. 90th Light Infantry, and the Sikh Regiment of Ferozepore; Brigadier Hamilton commanding, and nominating his own Brigade staff.

Third (Artillery) Brigade.—Captain Maude's battery. Captain Olpherts's Battery. Brevet-Major Eyre's Battery. Major Cooper to command, and to appoint his own staff.

Cavalry.—Volunteer Cavalry to the left, Irregular Cavalry to the right. Captain Barrow to command.

Engineer Department.—Chief Engineer, Captain Crommelin; Assistant Engineers, Lieutenants Limond and Judge. Major-General H. Havelock, C.B., to command the force.

The important duty of relieving the garrison of Lucknow had been first entrusted to Major-General Havelock, C.B.; and Major-General Outram feels that it is due to this distinguished officer, and the strenuous and noble exertions which he has already made to effect that object, that to him should accrue the honour of the achievement.

Major-General Outram is confident that the great end for which General Havelock and his brave troops have so long and so gloriously fought, will now, under the blessing of Providence, be accomplished.

The Major-General, therefore, in gratitude for, and admiration of, the brilliant deeds of arms achieved by General Havelock and his gallant troops, will cheerfully waive his rank on the occasion, and will accompany the force to Lucknow in his civil capacity—as Chief Commissioner of Oude—tendering his military services to General Havelock as a volunteer.

On the relief of Lucknow, the Major-General will resume his position at the head of the forces.¹

The preceding pages will have been written in vain if this most honourable act requires explanation. It was illus-

¹ On September 28 Sir Colin Campbell thus confirmed Outram's temporary transfer of command:—'Seldom, perhaps never, has it occurred to a Commander-in-chief to publish and confirm such an order as the following one, proceeding from Major-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B.

'With such a reputation as Major-General Sir James Outram has won for himself, he can well afford to share glory and honour with others. But that does not lessen the value of the sacrifice he has made with such disinterested generosity in favour of Brigadier-General Havelock, C.B., commanding the field force in Oude.

'Concurring, as the Commander-in-Chief does, in everything stated in the just eulogy of the latter by Sir James Outram, his Excellency takes this opportunity of publicly testifying to the army his admiration for an act of self-sacrifice and generosity, on a point which, of all others, is dear to a real soldier.

'The confidence of Major-General Sir James Outram in Brigadier-General Havelock is indeed well justified. The energy, perseverance, and constancy of the Brigadier-General have never relaxed throughout a long series of arduous operations, in spite of scanty means, a numerous and trained enemy, and sickness in his camp. Never have troops shown greater or more enduring courage than those under the orders of Brigadier-General Havelock.

'The force and the service at large are under the greatest obligations to Sir James Outram, for the manner in which he has pressed up the reinforcements to join Brigadier-General Havelock, in the face of much difficulty.'

The last paragraph is thus reverted to in a letter from Sir Colin of the same date:—'I took the liberty of attracting attention in orders to the manner in which you supported Havelock by pressing forward the reinforcements, as it had been brought to my notice that the newspapers of Bombay had attacked you on this score, and I thought it best at once to demolish their false statements, in justice to you.'

All we find in Outram's letters regarding such misrepresentation, is the following passage in one to the Military Secretary:—'See how I am denounced for my supposed shortcomings in the accompanying anonymous missive. The Governor-General is aware that I was as much vexed at the detention of the troops as the writer could be.' The newspapers had got hold of the idea that he was responsible for the remand of the 90th to Dánapur, already alluded to as a cause of the greatest vexation to him, and they were naturally disposed to lay the blame of previous detentions on him also, without observing dates. Whatever may have occurred *before* he first appeared on the scene at Bhagalpur on August 15, it is very certain that every action of his was directed towards expediting the passage up of the men already on the river, and pushing on those unnecessarily detained by local alarms. Not a man was kept back by any proceeding of his.

trative of the man himself, and thoroughly in accordance with his particular views of duty, his ordinary abnegation of self, and his repugnance to become a passive instrument of injustice, or even apparent injustice, to a gallant brother officer. To the majority of men such conduct may seem exceptional; to Outram—as more than one episode of his previous career must have already made manifest—it was part of his rule of life. But we are now able to show what actually passed through Outram's mind on this occasion, and it would be injustice did we refrain from doing so. Everyone can appreciate what it must have been for an ambitious soldier to surrender the glory and satisfaction of conducting to a triumphant issue, under the eyes of the whole world, such an enterprise as the rescue of the imperilled garrison of Lakhnau. But this was not all; he believed, on what were at the time good grounds, that the rebellion would virtually collapse after the capture of Dehli and relief of Lakhnau, and that any subsequent operations would be of a desultory character, unlikely to afford any opportunity of distinction to an officer of his rank. In short, he believed that this month's campaign would in all probability bring his military career to a close. He was already a G.C.B., and any additional reward must necessarily assume the form of a permanent title with a pension attached. He therefore believed he was irretrievably surrendering the certainty of a baronetcy and its accompaniment. Further, it was understood that the treasure in the Residency, stated to be from 23 to 32 lakhs of rupees, would, in accordance with precedent, be adjudged prize-money. He elected to receive the insignificant share of a civilian volunteer, instead of the very substantial one of the General in actual command. Thus he deprived himself 'not only of all honours, but' [we quote an allusion to the subject in a private letter of his own] 'of the only means of support for the declining years of a life

the chequered vicissitudes of which have afforded no opportunity of making any provision for the requirements of age.' If, in after years, the matter was mooted in his hearing, he was wont, as his custom was when his own good deeds were spoken of, to turn it off by some self-depreciatory remark, such as, 'People have made too much of it.' 'I had the chance of obtaining the highest object of my ambition, the Victoria Cross,' and so on. But it is only fair to the memory of an unselfish man, now to make public what he only revealed in confidence. The surrender of the command was no mere chivalrous impulse, but a deliberate act of self-sacrifice.

It so happened that the start from Kánhpur could not immediately follow the junction of the forces. The situation of that city on the right bank of the Ganges rendered it necessary that the troops should cross the river before a march could be made in the direction of Lakhnau; and means were yet wanting to effect this object. Outram's telegram of August 28 suggested the despatch, if feasible, of a detachment to the left bank, to distract the enemy's attention from Lakhnau, besides facilitating the passage of the relieving column when the time for that movement should arrive. To this Havelock had replied: 'The reinforcements announced will reduce the relief of Lucknow to a certainty, if the garrison can hold out till their arrival. I have written to Colonel Inglis to defend himself to extremity, and propose, so soon as the first detachment reaches me, to recross to the left bank, and resume my strong position of Mungulwar.' On September 5, Outram had expressed the hope that the crossing arrangements would be ready by the 12th, when he expected to reach Kánhpur; but Havelock's letter of the 8th, while noting that the preparations contemplated would be made, had shown the enemy to be increasing their force in men and guns on

the left bank. Again, on September 9, when the date of his arrival could be more surely calculated, Outram had written: 'If you can have the bridge . . . prepared, and have established your position on the opposite side before we join you on the 15th, no time would be lost, as we should cross at once.' And his further letter, dated the next day, was much to the same effect. On the 11th, Havelock had expressed his regret that he could not find a place well fitted for crossing. A bridge could easily be thrown to certain islands directly opposite, but as these were too swampy for occupation, he suggested for consideration whether it might not be well for Outram to cross before reaching Kánhpur, at a point lower down the river. Though a postscript to Havelock's letter was unfavourable to this suggestion, Outram was for the moment not indisposed to act upon it; but to avoid being attacked in detail, he preferred selecting a point nearer Kánhpur than that proposed. After-information, however, decided him to revert to the original programme, and he had pushed on. The march to a junction at Kánhpur itself was not interrupted.¹ At the

¹ 'Time presses,' wrote Havelock, 'but I regret to say I cannot find a place well fitted for crossing to the opposite bank. The islands directly opposite are too swampy for occupation. I could easily throw a bridge direct to them; but to remain on them, or get out of them, would not be easy, as there are muddy channels between them, fordable perhaps, but not under the fire of a numerous enemy who warily watches the whole bank. Under these circumstances I would suggest for your consideration whether it might not be feasible for you to cross to the left bank lower down—say at Nudjufghur Ghat, below Sirsood: I could send you down the steamer and as many boats as she could tow, and though this might attract the enemy's attention, you might anticipate him, and get your men and a battery across. Then, if it were previously ascertained that there is no impassable obstacle on the route, you might march up and turn the enemy's entrenchments whilst we crossed by the bridge thrown direct over to the islands. You would in this case, however, have to leave on the trunk road, troops sufficient to convoy the stores of various kinds coming up for us. Pass as we will, some risk must be incurred, so the above idea may be worthy of consideration.

'P.S.—Since writing the above, it appears certain that the enemy have troops and guns at each of the several points to which we could cross, excepting

request of the engineers, but contrary to his first intentions, General Havelock now proposed to send detachments across the river to occupy the opposite sandhills, and cover the construction of the bridge. He had already collected boats, on board of which were guns and ammunition, for the transport of his soldiers on the morning of September 16. Outram, fearing the loss that might ensue from exposure of the men in such a position, without tents, during the time requisite for completing a boat-bridge, and ascertaining that available howitzers would range as far as the enemy's position, should they mean to give trouble, was more inclined to utilise at once the means before indicated by Havelock, and, reverting to the latter officer's original plan, recommended that no troops at all be embarked until the connection with the island had been nearly accomplished. Then he thought that a detachment with guns, by occupying the newly acquired position, would effectually protect the workmen who were to make a road of planking and fascines over the muddy creek beyond. To this Havelock agreed, and the construction of the bridge commenced accordingly, without the precaution of covering parties. The whole operation was safely completed in three days, thanks to the zeal and energy of Captain Crommelin and those who worked under his orders.

Meanwhile, Outram had been by no means neglectful of his congenial duties as pacificator. Still anxious to avoid confounding the innocent with the guilty, and desirous of attracting by just leniency those not already hopelessly compromised, his first act on entering his own province of Oudh was the issue of a proclamation, of which the following extract from a letter to the Governor-General, of September 20, on the swampy island directly in our front. So it remains to be considered whether we should avoid the evils of separation of force involved in the plan above suggested—crossing below at Nudjufghur Ghat. Probably the safest plan after all would be to effect the passage to the island.'

sufficiently indicates the tenor: 'I transmit the translation of a proclamation which will be printed to-day in Cawnpore, and extensively circulated in Oude to-morrow. Under any circumstances, such an intimation would, I trust, meet your Lordship's approval, as opening the door to those who are not irretrievably committed beyond the pale of mercy; but it is particularly called for at this juncture, to counteract the effect of the strenuous endeavours now being exerted at Lucknow by the rebel leaders to draw all classes to their cause, by representing that all who have in any way borne arms against the British are equally certain to meet the fate we award to the mutineers who fall into our hands; consequently that nothing is left for them but war to the death against the English.'

We have no space for further allusions to what may be termed his 'civil' correspondence at this time. But the reader must keep in view that the earnest mind of this long-tried friend of the native races of India was actively occupied with schemes of peace and of mercy, no less than with those of war and of stern justice. The 'Chief Commissioner' was not lost in the Volunteer General, and he felt that Oudh had been wronged as well as rebellious.

On September 19, the crossing was effected without casualty, the enemy retiring after a feeble resistance. The heavy guns and baggage were passed over on the 20th. Havelock, writing a despatch from Bashirat-Ganj on the day following, reports: 'This morning I attacked the enemy, turned his right, and drove him from his position, with the loss of four guns, two of which, and the regimental colour of the 1st Bengal N.I., were captured by the volunteer cavalry in a charge headed by Sir James Outram.'

Of this affair at Mangalwâr, Havelock's biographer supplies a graphic account, relating not only that the experienced volunteer, who placed his services at his disposal,

led on his 'little troop of horse with as much ardour as when he started in pursuit of Dost Muhammad, nineteen years before;' but also noting the material aid afforded by the gallant band which he commanded. The weapon he himself wielded on this occasion was no sword, but a stout stick. How Havelock's troops continued their march to the capital of Oudh has been told, and well told, in history. There, also, we read how they were able to cross the Banni bridge over the Sái, and move on, practically unopposed, up to the 'Alam-bágh; how they fired a salute when at about sixteen miles from Lakhnau, in the vain hope that the sound would reach the Residency; how again, in the action at the 'Alam-bágh, Outram, at the head of the volunteer and native cavalry, pursued the flying enemy to the Chhár-bágh bridge. This last day's work is thus narrated by Havelock:

'On the 23rd, I found myself in presence of the enemy, who had taken a strong position, his left resting on the enclosure of the Alum Bagh, and his centre and right drawn up beyond a chain of hillocks. The head of my column at first suffered from the fire of his guns, as it was compelled to pass along the trunk road between morasses, but as soon as my regiments could be deployed along his front, and his right enveloped by my left, victory declared for us, and we captured five guns. Sir J. Outram, with his accustomed gallantry, passed on in advance, close down to the canal. But as the enemy fed his artillery with guns from the city, it was not possible to maintain this, or a less advanced position for a time taken up; but it became necessary to throw our right on the Alum Bagh, and refuse our left, and even then we were incessantly cannonaded throughout the 24th; and the enemy's cavalry, 1,500 strong, crept round through lofty cultivation, and made a sudden irruption upon the baggage massed in our rear. The soldiers of the 90th, forming the baggage-guard, received them with great gal-

lantry, but lost some brave officers and men, shooting down, however, twenty-five of the troopers, and putting the whole body to flight. They were finally driven to a distance by two guns of Captain Olpherts's battery.'

The despatch further sets forth that, as the troops had been 'marching for three days under a perfect deluge of rain, irregularly fed, and badly housed in villages, it was thought necessary to pitch tents, and permit them to halt on the 24th.' Of the occurrences of that day, we know from other evidence that the enemy's guns were constantly firing into the camp, and that a reply on our side was found necessary.¹ And we learn, in like manner, that the enemy's cavalry, as well as his 9-pounders, kept our troops on the alert, and forced them into active opposition.² During the halt, moreover, the superior officers deliberated on a plan of advance for the day following, so as to reach the Residency with the least possible loss and difficulty. Outram had written to Colonel Inglis from Kánhpur reporting progress, and advising caution. 'My only apprehension,' he said, 'is lest your garrison, in its eagerness to aid us by a sortie, should be tempted to go too far from your works, so that too few European troops might be left to guard your defences. In the probability of this occurring, it is not unlikely the enemy may have a strong body concealed near you, ready to make a rush upon your works . . . as their last chance of getting at you. If a small and compact body can with safety be spared to penetrate a short way in the direction in

¹ *Calcutta Review*, March 1859, Article II.

² *Marshman's Memoir*. A *Morning Post* correspondent, writing from the camp at the 'Alam-bágh, a few weeks later, says of that occasion: 'The enemy still sent us round shot in pretty fair numbers, and knocked over a man or bullock occasionally. We replied with our 24-pounders . . . They attacked our baggage, and the men of the 90th, mistaking them for some native cavalry we had with us, allowed them to come close up before they found out their mistake. We lost nine of the rear-guard, and emptied about 35 saddles of the enemy's cavalry.' The 35 should doubtless have been 25.

which we are engaged, it might have a beneficial effect by opening a fusillade towards the rear of our opponents.' He wrote also to the same officer from the 'Alam-bágh, mentioning the proposed advance of the force on the morrow, and adding, 'but it may be late in the day ere it reaches you: don't risk any sally from your post that might expose your position to assault or surprise.'

Truly the heroic defenders of the Residency had been, and still were, in sore straits; and nobly did they maintain the honour of their country throughout the stern ordeal to which they were subjected. Not India alone, but, so to speak, the whole world had become interested in their behaviour. Painfully keen was the attention with which the Governor-General and Government of India regarded their critical situation. As for Outram, Havelock, and the officers and men who accompanied them, their senses were strained in the direction of Lakhnau with an eager anxiety which could not have been greater had the Residency contained none but near relations or personal friends. Some such indeed there were: but no relationship however close, no friendship however sincere, could have proved a stronger incentive to push on to the goal before them than the zeal and patriotism which animated their breasts. Since the death, early in July, of Sir Henry Lawrence, and, later in the same month, of Major Banks, the control of affairs had been vested in Colonel Inglis, between whom and General Havelock letters had constantly passed to and fro during the eleven chequered weeks of victory and disappointment which had preceded Outram's arrival at Kánhpur. The state of the beleaguered garrison was therefore no secret. On August 16, it was notified that by putting the force on half-rations, the provisions would last till September 10; but the enemy had then arrived to within a few yards of the defences, were doing hourly damage with heavy guns, and sedulously strove

princes of Oudh—a large space, with a house, or palace, and outhouses enclosed within high walls. It was on the right of the road in coming from Kānpur to Lakhnau; a little farther on was a prominent building called the Yellow House, and farther still, an enclosure known as the Chhār-bāgh with village adjoining. Beyond these there was a canal which it was necessary to cross before entering the streets of the town, and the crossing in this quarter could only be effected by a bridge, named Chhār-bāgh after the neighbouring enclosure.

From the 'Alam-bāgh there was a choice of three roads. One was a continuation of the so-called high road from Kānpur, across the canal by the said Chhār-bāgh bridge, and thence in a more or less direct line for about a mile and a half to the Baillie Guard gate of the Residency. This was the shortest available; but it was known to be defended, as one writer has expressed it, 'by entrenchment behind entrenchment, and battery upon battery.'¹ It led certainly through the heart of the city, and, independently of the impediments caused by digging or constructing across the street, the houses on either side were loopholed, and filled to the tops of the roofs with musketeers. Progress here could only be attempted as a last resort. The second road involved a *détour* to the right by the Dilkushā palace and park, whence troops might advance by a circuitous route on the right bank of the Gúmṭi or, crossing the Gúmṭi, might march along its left bank to an advantageous site nearly facing the Residency. The latter project had commended itself to General Haveock, not only as a means of avoiding the strong positions taken up by the enemy in the streets and outlying buildings of the city, but also because it seemed to present facilities for withdrawing the occupants of the Residency to the north of the river. But, setting aside discussion on other

¹ *Calcutta Review*, March 1859: Article X.

grounds, the season was unfavourable to this movement. Incessant rain for three days had thoroughly soaked the earth, and its effects would be felt for too long a period to admit of delaying the advance. A reconnaissance made under Sir James Outram on September 24 had resulted in the decision that it was 'absolutely impossible to move even the light field-pieces across the country.'¹ This opinion was adopted, and the proposal consequently abandoned. The third plan was a kind of compromise, and pointed to a middle course between the other two. It was to force a passage across the Chhár-bágh bridge, thence to turn to the right and move along the bank of the canal, for nearly two miles, to the bridge of the Dilkushá, on the road to the palace of that name; from which point a rectangular sweep of about three miles might be made to the Residency through the open ground east of the city. Outram was in favour of the last proposition; it was based upon a route drawn out by the engineer officer at Lakhnau, and, although it threatened a perilous struggle on the near approach to the goal, there was no long line of street to be threaded such as presented on the Kánhpur side.

At 8 A.M. on September 25 the force started. We here borrow the words of an intelligent reviewer, writing with evident personal knowledge of his subject some eighteen months after the events narrated:—'It consisted of the 5th, 78th, 90th, and Madras Fusiliers; portions of the 64th and 84th, and 200 Sikhs; Maude's and Olpherts's batteries, and some heavy guns. . . . The enemy were found strongly posted close to the camping-ground; their position did not admit of attack. A hot fire was therefore kept upon them till the force had passed. At the Chhár-bágh was the first severe opposition. Aware of some commanding ground where the enemy's fire might be kept under, Outram hastened thither

¹ Marshman's *Life of Havelock*.

with a chosen body of rifles, but he was there only in time to see a party of Fusiliers storming the bridge with young Havelock leading on horseback. The enemy's battery was taken, the adjacent houses were stormed and held, and the 78th were directed to occupy them until all the troops and baggage had passed, and then to follow, protecting the rear.

'The main body advanced by the canal; on reaching the Dilkushá bridge, it turned to the left towards the 32nd barracks; thence towards the Secundra-bágh, Shah Najaf, and Moti Mahal. Between the Chhár-bágh and the Moti Mahal the force met with very slight opposition. But at the Moti Mahal and the farther advanced posts, Martin's house, the stables, steam-engine and Hirun Khána, it came under a strong fire from the Khurshid Manzil and the Káisar-bágh. Eyre's guns were brought into position to reply, and they replied successfully. . . .'¹

It was between the Moti Mahal and a building used as the mess-house of the 32nd Regiment that the real contest began; and this was continued with deadly vigour for about three-quarters of a mile, or the whole remaining distance to the Residency. Opposite the Kaisar-bágh, where two guns and a body of mercenary troops were entrenched, a murderous fire of grape and musketry was opened, under which we have Havelock's testimony that 'nothing could live,' yet partially exposed to which our undaunted 'artillery and troops had to pass a bridge.' The shelter afforded by the wall of the Farid Bakhsh palace, and the occupation of the Chattar Manzil, one of the palatial buildings along the line of river, allowed a lull to take place in the busy proceedings of that eventful day. Darkness was coming on; if there was any doubt as to immediate action, the opportunity was favourable to deliberate. Outram proposed a short halt to enable the rear-guard with the heavy guns, baggage, and wounded men

¹ *Calcutta Review*, March 1859.

to come up. The whole force, he reasoned, would by that time have occupied the Chattr Manzil in security, and, from that post, communication with the Residency could be effected through the intervening palaces; less brilliantly, perhaps, but with less exposure of life than by the street. At the same time, if the latter alternative were preferred, he was ready to act as guide, a duty he could conscientiously undertake from previous acquaintance with the locality. Havelock, on the other hand, was desirous of pushing on without delay. The main reasons given for haste were:—the straits to which the inmates of the Residency were reduced; the danger to which they were exposed from mines which might be sprung by the enemy at any moment; the possible desertion of natives under the disappointment occasioned by failure in long-anticipated relief; and the want of power in their enfeebled state to resist a new assault of the insurgents, if attempted as a desperate but not unlikely venture. There was, moreover, the advantage to be gained by following up a success before its first effects could subside. Then again, last not least inducement, ‘not half a mile distant were there anxious hearts, for whose sake he had been struggling and pressing for the last three weary months; the goal was in Havelock’s sight; he determined to win it at once.’ Outram’s consent was not withheld; nay, he would show the way as he had said. Thus onward went the gallant and devoted band—Highlanders and Sikhs, with Havelock and Outram at their head. Neill and the Madras Fusiliers followed—charging through a very tempest of fire. ‘The Baillie Guard was reached: the garrison was saved.’¹ But the cost was heavy. Neill fell like a true soldier, shot through the head; while, of the entire force of about 2,000, one-fourth were killed and wounded. The rear-guard with

¹ These, and the few preceding words in inverted commas, belong to the writer in the *Calcutta Review*.

completion by the enemy of six mines. To the credit of the ever-honoured garrison it should be stated that, however skilfully these were designed, and however cautiously worked out, our vigilant engineers had become aware of their existence in time to render them innocuous by countermining. But there was no question of the risk of delay; and the following extract from the same despatch notices the course pursued in hastening the expected succour:—

To force our way *through* the city would have proved a very desperate operation, if indeed it could have been accomplished. After passing the bridge, therefore, which is at the entrance, General Havelock took his force by a detour to the right, where but little means comparatively of opposition had been prepared, until he approached the front of the 'Kaisar Bagh,' whence a heavy fire was opened upon us; and from that point (through a limited extent of about a quarter of a mile of street which then intervened before reaching the Residency), the troops were much exposed to the fire of the enemy occupying the houses on both sides, as well as to some of the besieging guns which had been turned against us, besides being obstructed by ditches which had been cut across the street—all which obstacles were overcome by the usual gallantry and dash of British troops, but at a heavy cost. The Residency was gained in the evening; and the cheers of our rescued comrades overcame for the time our regrets for the many who had fallen in their cause.

Relief or reinforcement—or whatever name be applied to it—the great feat of arms achieved on this occasion has been commemorated in Brigadier-General Havelock's official report from which we have already quoted. But the details supplied by minor actors in, and independent historians of the Indian Mutiny must be studied and understood if justice is to be done to the glorious march of the 2,000¹ from the 'Alam-bagh to the Lakhnau Residency on September 25, 1857.

¹ The number roughly given in Outram's telegram as having 'forced their way into the city,' 3,179 of all arms, was the estimated force at Havelock's disposal; but from this must be deducted the garrison, and sick and wounded at the 'Alam-bagh.

CHAPTER III.

1857.

Lakhnau, from September 25 to November 22, 1857—Relief and withdrawal of the garrison—Death of Sir H. Havelock.

THE Generals had not needed to speak face to face with the gallant defenders of the Residency, to realise the stubborn fact that the bold stroke which they had accomplished—whatever its moral effect—was no literal or effectual relief. Outward signs had suggested this truth to them before they had crossed the canal south of Lakhnau; and every step of their passage through the occupied part of the town had tended to confirm their belief in the persistent character of the local rising. But it turned out, notwithstanding, that Outram had been right in his anticipation that a decided success at that particular time would have been followed by immediate restoration of British ascendancy in Oudh. It was in fact a crisis with our foes as with us; and if the relieving force had been large enough and mobile enough to follow up its victory, every purpose might then have been accomplished. It is probable that aggression would have ceased and resistance become desultory; while provisions would have been obtainable, together with transport for the withdrawal of the garrison and for further operations. Some of the enemy's positions around the Residency were accidentally found to be empty that night, which confirmed the intelligence, afterwards collated from various sources, to the effect that the same state of things prevailed generally, that

the regular *sipahis*, with the exception of the artillerymen, had in fact fled, and that opposition was confined to the irregulars and *bad-ma'ashes*.¹ The great Zamindárs and their retainers, as yet half-hearted and but partially compromised, were ready to accept the proffered mercy, while the mass of the trading population of the city were eager only for restoration of peace and security. But our true position became manifest in the morning; and the heads of the many soldiers who had fallen into the enemy's hands were despatched in all directions as unquestionable proofs of victory to our assailants and of disaster to ourselves. Then a reaction set in which brought back the fugitives to their abandoned positions, decided all waverers against us, and effected a cohesion among the discordant elements of rebellion such as had not before existed. Under the Bigam and Maulavi the armed hosts of Lakhnau became a fairly coherent army which, well equipped as it was, attracted to itself the scattered remnants of *sipahis* and fanatics dislodged from Delhi and other centres by our advancing armies. Thus it became more formidable week by week, and the worn defenders of the Residency, waking to the bitter reality, found themselves only reinforced after all, and that without being revictualled. True that they would be hard pressed no longer, and the incessant hail of bullets and round shot which they had so long endured was to be modified into an occasional visitation of such missiles. But privations must be increased rather than otherwise, and the long-deferred release indefinitely postponed once more. Nobly did they respond to this severe test, and no less nobly did the brave men who had hazarded all for their rescue take their place beside them, and share their hardships.

Varied then were Outram's emotions as he, almost the

¹ The *bad-ma'ash*, lit., man of 'bad life,' is the Indian vagabond or black-guard.

first to enter the battered entrenchment, received the enthusiastic greetings of many an old and many a new friend on that eventful evening—among them standing safe, though hardly well, a valued brother-in-law, Lieutenant J. C. Anderson, then Commanding Engineer officer. All was rejoicing around him, and he shared in it with the full warmth of his sympathetic nature. But there, in the gloom, stood the shattered ruins of what had been his home, and around its crumbled walls clustered sad memories. There had the noblest of his friends made his last glorious effort ‘to do his duty.’ Of all contemporaries, perhaps, Henry Lawrence had been most akin, in spirit and in career, to James Outram, and though seldom brought into personal contact, each held a very high place in the other’s heart.¹ There it had been the great delight of his own and Lady Outram’s daily life to make all comers welcome to their ‘open house.’ And of these, how many a brave heart, full of life and hope and zeal, had been stilled for ever—how many a bright young form had been bowed to death or bitter widowhood, during the few short months of his absence. Truly, sorrow could not but intrude on joy. And now came a burden of responsibility such as falls to the lot of few men in a century. Never in his life did he experience anxiety such as he passed through during that closing week of September. The strain was great, indeed terrible. Before him loomed the near prospect of utter failure of provisions, and it soon became evident that to withdraw the non-combatants from the garrison and to obtain supplies would be alike impossible. As he brooded over this, one thing he inwardly resolved, that whatever the extremity, the surrender of Kánhpur should not be imitated.

¹ In a letter addressed to Outram in Persia, Henry Lawrence thus alludes to his acceptance of the Oudh appointment offered to him by Lord Canning:—
‘I felt I could hardly refuse. I go, however, with a faint heart, and would *much rather* be your Chief of Staff. Will Lugard change? Ask him, with my love.’

The alternative was a fearful one, but he felt that it must be faced, and that for the present at least, all idea of it must be confined to his own breast.

The following reminiscence, by his private secretary, Mr. Money, tells its own suggestive story:—‘On one occasion—it was while the stay or departure of a portion of our force was yet undetermined—in the still hours of the night I saw him, by the dim light there was in the room, kneeling on the bed with his head on his pillow, deeply engaged in prayer. It was a grand sight to see the brave, stern, fearless soldier, bending in humility before the Great Disposer of all things.’ But whatever the crushing load on his mind, he kept it to himself until the crisis had long passed, and neither word nor manner revealed the inward struggles of the night. It need hardly be added, that his energetic spirit was active as ever in attending to the exigencies of the hour—and they were many.

Sir James and his staff took up their quarters with his good friends Dr. and Mrs. (now Sir Joseph and Lady) Fayrer, and were made heartily welcome to the best the Residency could afford, such as it was. Next morning the General was to be seen, his only coat in his hand, begging that some lady would kindly mend the bullet-holes in the sleeve. His wound caused him no trouble. Indeed he had to give attention to much more serious matters than this. He resumed command on the morning of the 26th, and his first care was to reinforce, and then extricate, the rear-guard under Colonel Campbell, which, with wounded, heavy guns, and ammunition waggons, had not been able to get beyond the Moti Mahal the previous evening. This was effected in a masterly manner by Colonel Napier. During the night of the 26th, the wounded and camels were safely brought in through the Palaces and along the river bank, while the guns and waggons were withdrawn to a secure position.

Meanwhile the space known as the 'Captain Bazaar' had been also on the 26th occupied by H.M. 32nd Regiment under Brigadier Inglis, who effected his purpose, capturing five guns, but with the loss of one officer¹ and two privates killed, and seven privates wounded; and, on the day following, the palaces towards the river, between the Residency and Kaisar Bagh, were taken possession of and utilised for the accommodation of the troops. Outram, in reporting these occurrences, gives the further information that, on the later date, 'at noon, a party consisting of 150 men made a sortie on another of the enemy's positions, and destroyed four guns, at a loss of eight killed and wounded:' also, that 'at daylight on the 28th, three columns, aggregating 700 men, attacked the enemy's works at three different points, destroyed ten guns, and demolished by powder explosions the houses which afforded position to the enemy for musketry fire.'² This,' he continues, 'has effectually destroyed his attacks excepting on one point, where he has still three guns which it is difficult to get at, but it is not likely the enemy will attempt to maintain that isolated position; and as there has been no communication from thence this morning, it is probable he may have abandoned it.'

General Havelock was placed in command of the troops occupying the palaces and outposts; and Brigadier Inglis remained in command of the Residency garrison. As to the detached portions of Sir James's force, it was only on the 1st day after the great struggle, that he could address a message to Major MacIntyre, informing him that it was then practicable to open communications between the Residency and the 'Alam-bagh, on account of the 'band of rebels

¹ Captain Hughes, of the 57th Bengal Native Infantry.

² Major Simmons, commanding H.M. 5th Fusiliers, was killed in this affair, an officer 'most deeply regretted by the whole army.' There were, besides, seven men killed and missing, and one officer and thirty-one men wounded.

swarming' in their rear. Pending the accomplishment of this object, all that he could suggest was to make the best of the means of defence available. 'Should you be assailed, he wrote, 'you will be able to hold your own. The only damage they can do you is by firing long shots into the garden, but I trust the four guns left with you will soon silence such fire.' Four days later, he reported to the Chief that 'the insurgents were too strong to admit of any retirement but that of surplus troops from the Residency. This measure it might, for many reasons, be advisable to attempt carrying out: not that complete withdrawal which had formed so essential a part in the plan of relief. The state of affairs was thus explained:

'The sick, wounded, women and children, amount to upwards of 1,000. The force will retire, therefore, after making arrangements for the safety of the garrison, by strengthening it with all but four of our guns, and leaving 90th Regiment; then destroying all the enemy's works; exploding all the six mines which have been found since our access to the interior, and so disturbing the ground in front of each work as to render future mining a difficulty, and demolishing the houses in the neighbourhood which command the entrenchments. The remainder of our force, reduced by casualties, will make its way back to Cawnpore, and will leave two or three days hence.' He concluded by stating that 'two additional brigades, with powerful field artillery, would be required to withdraw the garrison, or reduce the city;' expressing the hope that these brigades might be 'speedily assembled at Cawnpore.'

On the same date he requested Brigadier Wilson, through Captain Bruce, at Kánhpur, to prepare a detachment to advance to the relief of the retiring column. 'Send rockets,' he added, 'to give us notice of its position when they are

supposed to be in the vicinity. . . . Draw from Futtehpore, Allahabad, and Benares, all men that can be spared to be sent to Cawnpore with all practicable dispatch.

‘Request the authorities at Agra, to make known to the General at Delhi the urgent necessity there is for reinforcements being pushed on to Cawnpore as speedily as possible, without which the Lucknow garrison cannot be withdrawn. . . . it is to be hoped, at least one strong brigade may be spared from there, and another may be completed by the troops from the eastward.’

To the Governor-General the following telegram was transmitted for despatch: ‘My hopes of a reaction in the city are disappointed; the insurgent sepoys have inspired such terror among all classes, and maintain so strict a watch beyond our picquets, that we have not been able to communicate with one single inhabitant of Lucknow since our arrival. Nothing but a strong demonstration of our power will be of any avail.’

By reference to Outram’s later official report, we learn that, after the 30th September, ‘the first work required was to open a roadway through the palaces for the heavy train, which had been brought into one of the gardens on September 27, and by October 1 was safely parked within the entrenchment.’ He then states that, contrary to expectations, ‘the enemy, relying on the strong position of their remaining battery (the one known as “Phillips’ Battery,”) continued to annoy the garrison by its fire, and to maintain there a strong force. Its capture, therefore, became necessary, and this was effected on October 2, with the comparatively trifling loss of two killed and eleven wounded; a result which was due to the careful and scientific dispositions of Colonel Napier, under whose personal guidance the operation was

conducted. Three guns were taken and burst; their carriages destroyed; and a large house in the garden, which had been the enemy's stronghold, was blown up.'

On October 6, Outram's correspondence shows that he had been compelled to abandon for the time the intention¹ of withdrawing *any* portion of his force; and his hopes for support to the 'Alam-bágh detachment became centred in Kánhpur. His instructions of the next day to Major MacIntyre regarding one 'Bhowanee Deen,' a friendly pensioner who was to procure him supplies, are unique of their kind:— '*Arrange with him,*' he writes, underlining certain words to emphasise their meaning, 'to introduce what he gets in such way as to make it appear that *you looted his carts* in passing near your post. Otherwise you would get no second supply. He might be instructed to bring his carts into the vicinity of 'Alam-bágh, when you would creep out and rush upon him with a cheer, and pretend to plunder, taking him and the banians with him (to whom the grain belongs) prisoners, and, when out of observation, paying them most liberally, in hard cash, from the public treasury, five rupees for every rupee's worth of supplies, and sending them off again with the carts *after dark*, with instructions to repeat the experiment. It is obviously necessary to arrange it so that our friends must appear victims.'

Within Lakhnau matters had grown daily worse. Nevertheless Outram's mind had been relieved of its most pressing burden, and he could await succour with equanimity, if not with patience, after securing his position by external action so far as due regard for the lives of his men would permit. The strict scrutiny of the commissariat stores which he had

¹ The draft of a Farewell Order written at this period, to be issued after his departure, is given in Appendix N. Expressing his disappointment at not carrying out the relief originally purposed, it explains the arrangement he had proposed to make to meet the urgency of the case, had a partial withdrawal of troops been practicable.

ordered revealed the joyful fact that they had somehow been under-estimated. Immediate danger of actual starvation was therefore averted, although reduced rations must be still further reduced to not very far above starvation limit. It is remarkable that so much difficulty was experienced in calculating the grain heaps. The Generals were of course dependent upon the reports of the Commissariat officers; but as Inglis had been, so Outram was to be, more than once, misled by these, notwithstanding the careful surveys made under his strictest orders. We are told that the hurried manner in which the stores had been deposited, in all sorts of apartments and receptacles, rendered accuracy of measurement impracticable. Well indeed might the inmates of the Residency bless the foresight of Sir Henry Lawrence, when it was found, time after time, that his accumulations had been even larger than imagined; and they *did* revere the memory of him to whom, under Providence, they owed their preservation. On October 7, Outram told Captain Bruce: 'Our force is now besieged by the enemy, who have increased in number and audacity, which leads me to think the Delhi mutineers must now be here. Our position is more untenable than that of the previous garrison, because we are obliged to occupy the neighbouring palaces outside the entrenchment to accommodate the Europeans, which positions the enemy are able to mine from cover of neighbouring buildings. Still no communication with the town, and little prospect of procuring provisions: the neighbouring streets, into which we have made sorties at much cost of life, containing nothing. We have grain and gun-bullocks, and horses, on which we may subsist a month, I hope, but nothing else. No hospital stores, and but little medicine.'

About the day on which this was written, a party of some 270 Europeans, with two guns, conveying Commissariat

stores, reached the 'Alam-bágh from Kánhpur under command of Major Bingham, H.M. 64th Regiment; but, owing to some strange mischance, it brought no supplies for natives. The convoy was welcomed and with heartiness, but it did not fulfil all requirements, and the despatch of fresh stores was urgent. Brigadier Wilson, commanding at Kánhpur, himself a gallant soldier—while he considered that a strong detachment with guns might proceed safely along the Lakhnau road as far as the 'Alam-bágh—laid much stress on the risk incurred in sending small detachments, a measure to which he was strongly opposed. It was evident to his mind that the revolt in Oudh was no mere mutiny of *sipahis* in British pay; and in his judgment nothing less than '1,500 European bayonets and six guns' should be despatched to the vicinity of the rebellious city, so as to co-operate with the beleaguered garrison in any combined movement; and these, only provided that a second detachment of equal strength could follow in ten days. The bridges, however, between the Residency and 'Alam-bágh having been destroyed, and communication otherwise cut off, the necessity so strongly impressed upon him by Outram, of numerically strengthening and provisioning the latter post, was self-evident. Accordingly, on October 18, the Brigadier moved out with 600 infantry and six guns to Shivrájpur, there to attack a body of rebels of whose approach he had received intelligence, and with whom it was understood that the Nānā was in immediate communication. An easy victory having been obtained and the road cleared, a new convoy left for the 'Alam-bágh on October 22, composed of 500 infantry, fifty cavalry, and two guns. Outram's instructions to Major MacIntyre regarding this detachment, authorised retention from its ranks of any additional men required to hold their position. But news had been received of a more important reinforcement coming from another quarter. Colonel Greathead's column,

expected at Agra from Dehli, had been ordered to move at once to Kánhpur for service in Oudh, and it was now but a few marches from its destination under command of Sir Hope Grant. The Commander-in-Chief, moreover, was about to appear in person in the same field. His telegram to this effect to Captain Bruce, dated the day that the later and larger convoy of stores left Kánhpur for the 'Alam-bágh, commenced with a request that his 'best regards, by *cossid*'¹ be sent to General Outram, who was to be informed that he (the Chief) had never ceased from his exertions 'to press every available soldier up to his support.'

History has told us how Sir Colin Campbell left Calcutta on October 27, and travelled day and night by horse *dák* to the seat of war; also that Sir Hope Grant's column was, during the first week in November, awaiting the Chief's arrival between the Banni bridge and 'Alam-bágh. We have from the same source full particulars of the second advance into Lakhnau up to the meeting of the commanders. Without again going over this ground, we have yet something to say on Outram's more than seven troublous weeks of command, passed in maintaining the position taken up both within and outside the walls of the continuously besieged Residency. Not that history has omitted to record this chapter of the Indian Mutiny; but that a summary of its contents is essential to the work we have undertaken.

We have spoken of his care for strengthening and supplying the detachment at the 'Alam-bágh. But the question, as it appeared to his mind, was not one of mere men and rations. Commanding the forces, near, as well as within the rebellious city, he felt it a duty to attend to the security of his whole charge and the well-being of his soldiers in the most comprehensive sense. The letters which he sent to Major MacIntyre or Captain Sibley refer to minutiae of

¹ *Cossid*, strictly *kásid*, a messenger or courier.

interior defence—to the strength and equipment of escorts—to sanitary arrangements—to foraging—to working parties—to the administration of punishments—to the *narakh*, or authorised charge for bazaar supplies to Europeans and natives—to the better mode of carrying on intercommunication by signals, and other matters, inclusive of the disposal of particular exigencies. Examples may be readily found under each of the heads. The officer addressed is told, at one time :—

Occupy the mosque in front of your gate by a small picket of Rifles, night and day; for if seized by the enemy they might harass you much thence. Burn all huts and cover within-gunshot of your post. *If you can spare time and followers to work, erect an earthen banquette inside your wall—at least at the most exposed spots, if not all round—and some flanking defences round your towers, or in front of your curtains.*

At another, while enjoined not to relax in strengthening his position till the arrival of the Dehli column, he is thus instructed :—

In addition to the ramp inside the wall, loopholes and a redoubt outside each corner curtain, you should make a ditch outside all round, commencing with the most exposed places, of course. A traverse should also be constructed, connecting the mosque with four squares. . . . Surround your corner towers with a rampart of sandbags.

In reply to his report that the convoy under Major Bingham's orders had reached the 'Alam-bágh, Outram thus writes :—

It is now most necessary to send back the elephants and camels, which, if the road is clear, might, unladen, make their way to Cawnpore in one forced march, if started off after dark under guidance of an intelligent officer who knows the fords of the Bunnee River. They should keep a sharp look-out in passing Bunnee and Busseerutgunge, making a *détour* should there be any appearance of opposition; which, however, could hardly be pre-

part if they moved rapidly on, and strict precautions are taken to prevent traitor in your post sounding notice of your intention, by preventing a soldier putting outside your walls from the moment your preparations begin. But they must be well guarded, for the capture of our elephants would be an irreparable loss to us. One hundred riflemen, at least, should escort them, half of whom might be entrusted on the elephants—the animals to be kept well together—many Europeans can be spared, who understand the native language, teachers, interpreters, &c., to be sent with the party, to prevent misunderstanding between the soldier and the captive elephant driver, and to guard against the latter taking their animals off them, on any pretext, but they should walk off with them to the camp.

That the health of the detachment is also a primary consideration, he exemplified in the following brief but essential warnings:—‘Should elephants or camels die in the enclosure, the carcasses should be given to bullocks and taken out sufficiently far to prevent them tainting the air.’

‘Be careful in not attempting forays beyond reach of your guns’ is one of his practical monitions. ‘It is most dangerous to weaken your position for ever so short a time; and you might fall into an ambushade.’ And again:—‘If you cannot seize cattle in the field without exposing your men to risk of being cut off by cavalry, kill your cart-bullocks and sheep if you have them for their subsistence, and supply something from your European stores to those natives whose caste will not allow them to eat meat.’

Working parties he wished to be paid at the rate allowed in his own immediate range of defence. ‘European and native soldiers and camp-followers’ were to receive ‘for ordinary work in the trenches, one rupee for four hours’ work, or more or less in proportion to the time of work.’ Field engineers’ allowances were to be awarded to ‘officers commanding working parties, not on staff pay.’

Referred to in respect of punishments to be awarded in

certain cases, he says of one offence, that of a 'sentry sleeping on his post,' no more than 'Consult the articles of war, and act accordingly.' On others he is more explicit, and replies:—

(1) The Provost Marshal will inflict fifty lashes on any man caught in the act of plundering our own stores. If not caught in the act, but convicted, he will receive fifty lashes under sentence of court-martial.

(2) The troops should be warned that the commanding officer has received my orders to direct the Provost Marshal to hang on the spot the next man found thus offending, and that the order will be carried out without fail. The *jemadar* and *mahout* found communicating with the enemy should be tried by court-martial for rebellion, and if found guilty, hanged.

His sympathy for the poorer section of his force is testified in the following brief extracts:—

A camp-follower who has made his way from Alum Bagh informs me that you charge the poor followers one rupee a seer for atta!¹ I directed that the Mahomedan and meat-eating castes should be furnished with meat, by slaughtering the cart-bullocks necessary to supply them, and that the castes who cannot eat meat should be furnished from the European supplies until bazaar supplies arrived from Cawnpore; but this did not warrant your charging famine prices for the articles so supplied, or charging one fraction beyond the price they cost at Cawnpore; so I trust I am misinformed.

The price you put on meat and biscuit is much too high for poor camp-followers. An anna a seer is the utmost that should be charged; but the allowance, of course, to be limited in accordance with your means.

As regards the signalling, we select passages from letters written at the time of near approach of the Dehli column:—

The flag at the top of your house proclaims, I presume, that you received my despatches concealed in a bamboo stick, which I sent off during the night. . . .

¹ The *str* is two pounds avoirdupois—more or less, according to locality. *Afā* = flour.

&c. concealed in bundles of grass.' Another precaution adopted in this clandestine correspondence was the use of the Greek character. In the rebel ranks might naturally be many readers of English; but it was unlikely that there were many, if any, who could decipher English words when expressed in Greek letters. Though himself often put out of patience by this foreign, and to him unfamiliar alphabet, the General was particular in enjoining its use. He thus admonishes one officer:—'You ask me to write in the English character—so would the enemy wish me to do. As the only security against their understanding what we write in case our letters fall into their hands, the Greek character *must* be used.'

One bold attempt was made to open communication with the 'Alam-bágh by the direct Kánhpur road leading to the bridge of the Chhár-bágh. But as the strong position taken up by the enemy in this particular quarter had been the cause of the circuitous passage of our troops on September 25, it was no easy matter to dislodge the possessors of the bridges and holders of the various defences which intervened. To effect the desired end, Major Haliburton, of H.M. 78th Highlanders, commenced on October 3 'to work from house to house with the crow-bar and pickaxe.' The sequel is thus narrated:—

On the 4th, this gallant officer was mortally wounded; and his successor, Major Stephenson, of the Madras Fusiliers, disabled. Concerning the whole of the 5th, these proceedings were continued;

As ^{the} 6th they were relinquished, it being found that a large ^{regt.} ngly occupied by the enemy, required more extensive written at the ^{the} capture than were expedient; therefore, after

The flag at the top principal houses on the Cawnpore road, from you received my despatch^d been annoyed by musketry, the recon- sent off during the night. Withdrew to the post in front of Phillips'

¹ The *sir* is two pounds avoirdupois. been retained as a permanent outpost, ^{modation} to H.M. 78th Highlanders, *Afá* = flour.

and protecting a considerable portion of the entrenchment from molestation, besides connecting it with the palaces occupied by General Havelock.

It was during these operations that the enemy, 'recovering from their surprise,' began to threaten the British position 'in the palaces and outposts, by mining and assaults.' From this point Sir James's official report of November 26 will best tell its own tale :—

As there were only a few miners in the garrison, and none with the field force, the enemy could not be prevented from exploding three mines, causing us a loss of several men ; and on the 6th they actually penetrated into the palaces in considerable numbers.

But they paid dearly for their temerity, being intercepted and slain at all points. Their loss on that day was reported in the city to have been 450 men.

A company of miners, formed of volunteers from the several corps, was placed at the disposal of the Chief Engineer, which soon gave him the ascendancy over the enemy, who were foiled at all points, with the loss of their galleries and mines, and the destruction of their miners in repeated instances.

The Sikhs of the Ferozepore regiment have zealously laboured at their own mines, and though separated only by a narrow passage (16 feet wide) from the enemy, have, under the guidance and direction of the Engineer department, defended and protected their position.

The outpost of her Majesty's 78th Highlanders, under Captain Lockhart, has also been vigorously assailed by the enemy's miners. Its proximity to the entrenchment made it convenient to place it under the charge of the officiating garrison engineer, Lieutenant Hutchinson, under whose skilful directions the enemy have been completely out-mined by the soldiers of her Majesty's 78th Regiment.

I am aware of no parallel to our series of mines in modern war : twenty-one shafts, aggregating 200 feet in depth, and 3,291 feet of gallery, have been executed. The enemy advanced twenty mines against the palaces and outposts ; of these they exploded three which caused us loss of life, and two which did no injury ; seven have been blown in ; and out of seven others the enemy have been driven, and their galleries taken possession of by our miners—

results of which the Engineer department may well be proud. The reports and plans forwarded by Sir Henry Havelock, K.C.B., and now submitted to his Excellency, will explain how a line of gardens, courts, and dwelling-houses, without fortified *enceinte*, without flanking defences, and closely connected with the buildings of a city, has been maintained for eight weeks in a certain degree of security, and notwithstanding the close and constant musketry fire from loopholed walls and windows, often within thirty yards, and from every lofty building within rifle range, and notwithstanding a frequent though desultory fire of round shot and grape from guns posted at various distances, from 70 to 500 yards! This result has been obtained by the skill and courage of the Engineer and Quartermaster-General's departments, zealously aided by the brave officers and soldiers, who have displayed the same cool determination and cheerful alacrity in the toils of the trench, and amidst the concealed dangers of the mine, that they had previously exhibited when forcing their way into Lucknow at the point of the bayonet, and amidst a most murderous fire.

But skilful and courageous as have been the engineering operations, and glorious the behaviour of the troops, their success has been in no small degree promoted by the incessant and self-denying devotion of Colonel Napier—who has never been many hours absent by day or night from any one of the points of operation—whose valuable advice has ever been readily tendered and gratefully accepted by the executive officers—whose earnestness and kindly cordiality have stimulated and encouraged all ranks and grades, amidst their harassing difficulties and dangerous labours.

I now lay before his Excellency, Brigadier Inglis' report of the proceedings in the garrison, since its relief by the force under my command, since the capture of the enemy's batteries, and the occupation of the palaces and posts.

The position occupied by the Oude Field Force relieved the garrison of the entrenchment from all molestation on one half of its *enceinte*—that is, from the Cawnpore road to the commencement of the river front; and the garrison, reinforced by detachments of the 78th and Madras Fusiliers, was enabled to hold as outposts three strong positions commanding the road leading to the Iron Bridge, which have proved of great advantage, causing much annoyance to the enemy, and keeping their musketry fire at a distance from the body of the place.

The defences, which had been barely tenable, were thoroughly repaired, and new batteries were constructed to mount thirteen additional guns.

The enemy, after the capture of the batteries, adopted a new system of tactics. Their guns were withdrawn to a greater distance, and disposed so as to act, not against the defences, but against the interior of the entrenchment.

The moment they were searched out and silenced by our guns, their position was changed, so that their shot ranged through the entrenchment; and but for the desultory nature of their fire, might have been very destructive. . . .

I cannot conclude this report without expressing to His Excellency my intense admiration of the noble spirit displayed by all ranks and grades of the force since we entered Lucknow. Themselves placed in a state of siege,—suddenly reduced to scanty and unsavoury rations,—denied all the little luxuries (such as tea, sugar, rum, and tobacco,) which by constant use had become to them almost necessities of life,—smitten in many cases by the same scorbutic affections and other evidences of debility which prevailed amongst the original garrison,—compelled to engage in laborious operations,—exposed to constant danger, and kept ever on the alert,—their spirits and cheerfulness, and zeal and discipline, seemed to rise with the occasion. Never could there have been a force more free from grumblers, more cheerful, more willing, or more earnest.

Amongst the sick and wounded this glorious spirit was, if possible, still more conspicuous than amongst those fit for duty.

It was a painful sight to see so many noble fellows maimed and suffering, and denied those comforts of which they stood so much in need.

But it was truly delightful, and made one proud of his countrymen, to observe the heroic fortitude and hearty cheerfulness with which all was borne.

The many paragraphs in the original despatch, recognising the services of individuals, are necessarily parts of a permanent national record; and to repeat them in these pages would in no way enhance their value. But acts of heroism were frequent in those Lakhnau days, as readers well

know who have traced the succession of events from the reinforcement to the relief of the beleaguered British garrison. Colonel Napier's movement to rescue Colonel Campbell and men of the 90th, with their wounded comrades, from the walled passage in front of the Moti Mahál; and the bold sorties on September 26, were but the first of a series of soldiers' opportunities, which gave an undying reputation to those in whose way they fell. For some days there was little suspension of active hostility, at one time exhibited in hand-to-hand fighting, at another in musketry or artillery practice. At length there was a partial lull, and the action of the rebels relapsed into a more desultory and less continuous warfare. The list of killed and wounded between September 26 and the date of Sir Colin Campbell's arrival affords sad proof of the severity of the struggle while it lasted.

The conscientious precision which characterised Outram's ordinary official correspondence finds remarkable illustration in his letters to Captain Bruce throughout the trying period of which we write. This officer had become, as head of the Intelligence Department, the medium of communication between the Lakhnau Residency and the outer world; and though he would have preferred more active service in the field, were such offered, the agency which he fulfilled at Kánhpur had too special value to be dispensed with or lightly regarded. We commence our extracts from the days when the approach of a relieving force had raised expectation to its highest. The following, of October 21, is business-like and illustrative:—

Your messenger tells me that a force was prepared to cross the river, with convoy, for Alum Bâgh, on the morning he left; but that, during the night, information having arrived that a large body of rebels (including Gwalior mutineers) was approaching Cawnpore, the troops had suddenly been sent off in their direction,

instead of crossing the river. As my letter to you prior to this of the 17th was dated the 11th, I knew nothing of this intended movement, of which intermediate letters, not received, may have been intended to inform me. I sent (in a separate quill) a despatch from General Havelock, which please telegraph to Calcutta, with this copy of one from myself to the Commander-in-Chief, which oblige me by copying and expressing.

Your letter of the 8th was brought by Canojee Lall on the 10th. I have received nothing else from you before this of the 17th, which I now acknowledge, and only one from Wilson of the 11th.

As Canojee Lall took mine of the 13th to you, I presume you have received it, though you do not say so. I have sent the following despatches to you or Wilson; let me know which of them have been received: 26th, 29th, September 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th. I am particularly anxious to know whether those of the 14th and 15th were received. The former, sent through Alum Bâgh, and addressed to the officer commanding the Delhi column, I intended to await his arrival at Alum Bâgh; but . . . stupidly sent it on to Cawnpore by one of your men. The latter, directed to Brigadier Wilson, was sent direct. They contained plans of the ground between Alum Bâgh and this place, with suggestions as to mode of co-operation; and I should not wish the enemy to have got hold of them, though written in the Greek character.

P.S.—I send duplicate of my letter to Wilson of the 16th. Our food, *upon a very reduced allowance indeed*, may possibly last till 20th November, but we should have no bullocks left to move the guns.

A week later, on October 28, he wrote to Captain Bruce in terms which disprove one of the few accusations circulated against him, viz. that of having unnecessarily hurried Sir Colin Campbell's advance from Kánhpur, thereby preventing the previous dispersion of the Gwáliar contingent. It will be observed that Sir James distinctly and urgently recommends that the Gwáliar force should first be disposed of, and promises to hold out till near the end of November if need be.¹

¹ The dates show that there would have been ample time to have attracted the Gwáliar troops and accomplished the advance on Lakhnau (which.

I received last night, by the hands of Canojee Lall, your letters of the 24th and 25th, with duplicate of that of 16th (neither original nor Bussarut have come).

Canojee has certainly proved himself most zealous and able, has richly earned reward, and shall assuredly obtain it. Having such faith in him, I purpose sending a plan and further instructions to the officer commanding the relieving force by him to-night, if ready in time.

If not ready to send by him, I hope it may safely reach Alum Bâgh by other means, there to await the arrival of Colonel Grant, or whoever may be in command of the force. I shall not detain Canojee beyond to-night, being anxious to prevent the force being hurried from Cawnpore to Alum Bâgh. The latter post, having now been amply supplied with food, and sufficiently strengthened to defy attack, is no longer a source of anxiety; and however desirable it may be to support me here, I cannot but feel that *it is still more important that the Gwalior rebels (said to be preparing to cross into the Doab) should be first disposed of.* I would therefore urge on Brigadier Wilson, to whom I beg you would communicate this as if addressed to himself, that I consider that the Delhi column, strengthened to the utmost by all other troops that can be spared from Cawnpore, should in the first instance be employed against the Gwalior rebels, should they attempt to cross into the Doab, or be tangible to assault elsewhere within reasonable distance. We can manage to screw on, if absolutely necessary, till near the end of November on further reduced rations. Only the longer we remain the less physical strength we shall have to aid our friends when they do advance, and the fewer guns shall we be able to move out in co-operation.

But, it is so obviously to the advantage of the State that the Gwalior rebels should be first effectually destroyed, that our relief should be a secondary consideration. I trust, therefore, that Brigadier Wilson will furnish Colonel Grant with every possible aid to effect that object before sending here. Pray tell the Brigadier

(dispersion must have facilitated) between the receipt of this letter of Outram's and the end of November. Sir Colin was at the 'Alam-bâgh by November 12, and back again at Kânnpur by the 28th, with the Lakhnau garrison in charge, in spite of a day or two's delay at the Dilkusha. Outram's last gun bullock was killed on the 17th, the very day he first shook hands with Sir Colin Campbell.

that it is suspected the enemy obtain supplies of shot and shell from the Cawnpore magazine—stolen thence, and sold by blackguards who have access to where they are lying outside without any guard over them. So I am told. Ask him from me, with my salaam, to take such measures as will render pilfering ordnance stores impossible.

It is hard that your good service at Cawnpore should debar you from military duty with your regiment. Still, you are too zealous a servant of Government to grudge the sacrifice, if your presence there is indispensably necessary.¹

A copy of the letter from which we have just extracted was forwarded to Major MacIntyre, together with another enclosure, to the address of the Officer commanding the relieving force, the importance of which must account for its reproduction here *in extenso*. The pencil draft of it, in his own bold handwriting, remains among his papers:—

My communication of the 14th instant informed you I consider your first operation should be the occupation of the 'Dil Khoosha' house and park, by a direct movement to that place from the Alum Bâgh. The Fort of Jellalabad, which is situated a mile or a mile and a half to the right of that route, is said to be occupied by the enemy, with two guns; but it is too distant to interrupt that line of communication, and it is not likely to be maintained after the Dil Khoosha, in addition to Alum Bâgh, has been occupied in its rear. I think it hardly worth while, therefore, to waste time against that place, which at the commencement of the outbreak was little capable of defence, and is not likely since to have been repaired or stored sufficiently to admit of its retention. The guns now there appear to have been sent merely to interrupt the forage parties from Alum Bâgh. . . . Yet it will be prudent, in afterwards communicating with Alum Bâgh, to afford

¹ With the above letter Sir James Outram forwarded a plan of the ground intervening between the 'Alam-bâgh and Residency, together with minute descriptions of every position and building capable of being held by the enemy. It was based upon the only surveys that had then been made of Lakhnau—those of the late Captain Moorsom before the outbreak. [See plan at the end of volume. This note and those following, to p. 265, are in substance taken from Outram's Despatches &c. printed for private circulation.]

strong escort until it is known whether or not Jellalabad is evacuated.

The direct advance from Alum Bâgh *vid* Char Bâgh, and the main street marked (1) (1) (1) on the plan, should *not* be attempted, very formidable opposition being prepared on the other side of the Char Bâgh bridge, the bridge itself being destroyed, and the passage strongly fortified; besides which there are two miles of street to pass through, in which every means of obstruction have been prepared, the houses loopholed, and guns in position at various points, with ditches, mines, and other obstacles. For the same reason I would deprecate any attempt to force the street which runs from the junction of the Dil Khoosha and Martinière roads to the Kaiser Bâgh, marked (2) (2) (2).

At Dil Khoosha, it is stated, there are at present only some Rajwarra matchlockmen, with cavalry at Beebeapore village perhaps, and at the Martinière; but these are almost certain to decamp when you approach, and may perhaps suffer considerably ere they get across the canal, if followed up sharply by cavalry and horse artillery. Two guns were said to be at Dil Khoosha some days ago, probably those now at Jellalabad. If still there, they would have to be abandoned ere they could be crossed over the canal, if followed up.

It is possible that some of the so-called Regular Infantry may be sent over to the Dil Khoosha when they hear of your approach. If so, they will but add to their own confusion and panic flight when you attack, for never by any chance do they stand in the open. Two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, sent out to oppose Major Barston's convoy, fled at his approach without firing a shot; and on every occasion where whole hosts of them were opposed to ourselves it was just the same. The Dil Khoosha palace cannot be maintained under fire of our artillery, having large windows on every side. If any force of the enemy is assembled there, they must suffer awfully from your guns in escaping across the canal. Or should they fly to the Martinière, they will be in a similar predicament when you follow them up.

On seeing the Dil Khoosha occupied by your troops, the enemy would most probably evacuate the Martinière. After lodging your baggage in the garden to the rear of, and commanded by, the Dil Khoosha house (and surrounded by walls without houses, something like Alum Bâgh, and easily defensible), you would proceed against

the Martinière through the road marked (3) (3) (3). But it would be well, ere getting within musket range of the building, to throw a few shells and round shot into it, in case it should be occupied by the enemy, whose fire from the terraced roof might cause much loss ere you get near enough to rush up and blow open doors for entry. It would be well for you to have some one with you well acquainted with the Martinière building. And it may be a matter for your consideration whether it would not be better, if the place appears strongly fortified, to mask it by encamping your troops between the road (3) (3) and the canal, contenting yourself by bombarding the Martinière during the day and night, which will almost ensure its evacuation before morning. The mound marked (4)¹ would be a favourable site for a 24-pounder battery, which would command the opposite bank of the canal, where you purpose effecting your passage to protect the sappers in making a road for your guns.

It is possible the bridge leading to the Martinière may not be destroyed, and that you may prefer advancing over it. But, on reconnoitring, you will, I believe, find places where the canal may be crossed without much difficulty farther down, towards (6), which would enable you to turn any defensive works the enemy may prepare on the main road (2) (2) (2). If you cross the bridge, therefore, I would recommend your turning to the right after passing it, and making your way through the mud huts (indicated by the brown colour on the plan) until you get into the road running from (6) to (W) (W) (W)—W denotes some deserted and destroyed infantry lines,—leaving the houses marked D D D on your left, and thus making your way into the road (7) (7), which passes the open front of the enclosure in which the barracks are situated. Should the barrack buildings be occupied (they were precipitately abandoned when we advanced from the same quarter), it may be prudent to throw a few shot and shell ere the infantry advances to the attack. Having large doors, open on both sides, as is customary in European barracks in India, I anticipate little difficulty in your effecting an entry. Staircases lead to the terrace roof from the interior of the centre room. The terrace is consider-

¹ Sir James Outram afterwards availed himself of this mound to plant a 24-pounder battery of the Shannon brigade, which effectually kept down the enemy's fire opened on the rear division under his command, when he finally retired to the 'Alam-bagh.

ably raised above, and therefore commands the houses of the Huzrutgunge, and a few rifles placed there could keep down any musketry fire from thence (Huzrutgunge), which alone could disturb the party left in occupation of the barracks when you advance farther. But it would be necessary to throw up a parapet of sand-bags, or screens of shutters, to protect the riflemen on the roof, as it has no parapet. The south wall of the enclosure is, however, sufficiently high to afford some protection against direct fire.

Should you cross by the bridge, your whole force would, I presume, come that way. And your next operation, after leaving an adequate guard for the barracks (say 300 or 400 infantry, some cavalry, and a couple of guns; or, probably, you might secure a gun, or two guns, which the enemy are said to have there), would be to proceed by the road (7) (7) to the Secundra Bâgh (G), which, if held, could easily be breached by 24- or 18-pounders—the wall being only about $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet thick—*vide* enclosed description.¹ It is said to be occupied by Maun Sing, with some 200 or 300 Rajwarrahs and two guns; the former are pretty sure to bolt when your guns open upon the place, and two or three shells are thrown into it.

If you cross the canal at (6), the main body of your force should proceed by the road from (6) to (W). A regiment and portion of artillery might, perhaps, make their way by the road which leads direct to the Secundra Bâgh (8) (8); but as it is not well defined, it may be more prudent to keep all together till you occupy the barracks.²

Should you have met with opposition, or been delayed much in crossing the canal, the day will be pretty far advanced ere you have occupied the barracks and Secundra Bâgh. These might be

¹ The Commander-in-Chief's force met with serious opposition at the Sikandra Bâgh, owing to their having approached it by a cross-road from the rear, whence their breaching guns could not be brought up until the troops had been exposed for some time to a heavy fire. Had they come by the broad *pucka* road leading from the barracks, as suggested, their heavy guns could have opened upon the place while the infantry remained out of musketry fire. A practicable breach would then have been made, or the shelling would have driven the enemy out. As it was, however, the occupants, greatly more numerous than reported, had no means of egress, and were *destroyed to a man*; but our own troops also suffered severely in taking the place.

² Neither the roads (7) (7) or (8) (8) were followed by Sir Colin Campbell's force, which was taken by a more circuitous and intricate road than either, and suffered greatly before its guns could be brought to the front.

the limit of your operation that day—encamping your force between, and a little in advance of, those two points, with its right rear on Secundra Bâgh, and the barracks on its left rear—thus obtaining a tolerably open plain to encamp on, with almost clear space in front, from which your guns would play upon the buildings which still intervene between your camp and our position, namely, the Shah Nujif (H), Motee Mahal (K), Mess-house (M), and Tara Kottee (N), which, if held, might be bombarded from both our positions prior to commencing combined operations next morning. You would then decide on the garrisons to occupy the barracks and Secundra Bâgh, to maintain communication with Dil Khoosha, where your baggage would, I trust, be secure in the garden, protected by 200 men occupying the house, and a couple of guns. About the same strength (with convalescents) would suffice for Alum Bâgh, aided by the enemy's guns we have there. And, perhaps, two of our own guns, supported by 100 riflemen, would hold the Martinière, with a small body of cavalry to command the plain down to the canal. A strong picquet also should be placed in the nearest huts to the road by which you cross the canal. You would, perhaps, occupy the houses D D also, as further security for your communications.¹ Another point to which you should turn your attention while delayed in breaching the Secundra Bâgh is the destruction of the bridge of boats some few hundred yards thence.² If a troop of horse artillery and cavalry are sent off rapidly to any point commanding the boats, many men would be destroyed with the boats that would be sunk by your guns; and the destruction of the boats will prevent the enemy's force on the other side of the Goomtee coming over to molest you at night.

The signal that you are crossing the canal will be my notice to spring certain mines, and storm the posts now held by the enemy in my immediate front (9) (9); and once in possession of these, I shall open my guns on the buildings above mentioned, and endeavour, also, to silence the fire of the Kaiser Bâgh, which commands the open space between us, to favour our junction next

¹ All this was carried out, with the exception that the barracks and the houses D D were refused in the *advance* to the Sikandra Bâgh, and had, therefore, to be taken afterwards, and (it is believed) at a greater loss than had they been assailed in the first instance.

² The enemy's leaders themselves caused the bridge to be broken up to prevent the flight of their followers.

morning¹ when our united batteries could be turned upon the Kaiser Bâgh. And they would, I hope, in a day or two, effect its capture, which is necessary to ensure the entire submission of the city.

It only remains to suggest a code of signals by which we may understand your movements.

(1) A salvo of four or more guns, fired three times at five minutes' interval, at 2 P.M. on the day you reach Alum Bâgh, to let us know you have arrived there. (2) A similar signal to be fired at 2 P.M., on the day before you advance to the Dil Khoosha house. (3) On occupying the Dil Khoosha, display a regimental colour from the roof. (4) Also the same on obtaining the Martinière, which we will answer by a colour on the top of the Chutter Munzil (10).

As it may occupy a longer time than I anticipate to make your arrangements at Dil Khoosha, and to cut your road for guns to cross the canal, &c., on the evening before you cross the canal, hoist two colours on the top of the Dil Khoosha, one above the other, that we may be prepared to spring our mines when you advance next morning.

You will, I suppose, leave all heavy baggage at Alum Bâgh, bringing only light carts, elephants, camels, and pony or bullock carriages, to the Dil Khoosha. But I beg you will bring the kits of the European troops here; for the cold weather is coming on, and they have neither great coats nor bedding.

When you advance from the Dil Khoosha, I hope you will be able to bring on with you a few days' supply of rum, tobacco, and tea, for the Europeans (who have been so long without these luxuries), and *gram for our horses*. Other supplies, which are less pressing, we can obtain when an escort can go back to the Dil Khoosha for more. Those which I have specified could come with you on elephants or camels, to be pushed on to the garrison the moment we effect a junction. We cannot rely on the resources of the city being opened to us until we secure the Kaiser

¹ This was done. Sir James Outram's troops stormed and took the buildings (9) (9) on the day Sir Colin took the Sikandra Bâgh. Sir James then opened his batteries on the Mess-house, Kaisar Bâgh, &c., exactly as here proposed, until the junction was effected; and the Kaisar Bâgh could have soon after been taken, had it not been determined to withdraw our forces for a time. —(See the Despatches of General Havelock, Brigadier Eyre, Colonel Napier, &c., in reference to these operations.)

Bâgh, which may occupy some days. Until then, we must rely on sharing your supplies.

I think it most probable the enemy will abandon his positions between the Dil Khoosha and this place when you cross the canal, in dread of being caught between two fires.¹

In that case our junction will be effected on the same day you cross the canal; but it will be equally necessary to occupy the intermediate positions I have indicated, in order to secure our communication with the Dil Khoosa. The enemy's bridge of boats must be destroyed to prevent their getting to your rear.

So far as we learn, the enemy have, between the Dil Khoosha and this place, one gun in a 'morecha,' at the junction of the Dil Khoosha and Martinière roads, two guns at the barracks, and two guns at the Secundra Bâgh, which are all that could be brought within a day or two to oppose your passage across the canal. Other guns are directed against this position from the Kaiser Bâgh, and at (9) (9), but they are not likely to be withdrawn for other work; and there are four or five heavy guns on the other side of the Goomtee which it would take some time to get over; and they are not likely to be removed, as they play upon our position: these will be cut off when you destroy the bridge of boats.

If you delay crossing the canal more than a day after occupying the Dil Khoosha, two or three other guns may perhaps be brought, which now guard the main street leading from the Char Bâgh; but they have great difficulty in moving their guns, as they are so badly mounted.

I would recommend your bringing on the 24-pounders and 8-inch howitzers from Alum Bâgh, and at least two of the 9-pounders now there. (If the enemy's captured guns will suffice for the defence of that post, bring all ours.) Also plenty of ammunition, for the big guns especially; powder for explosive purposes; and mining-tools. I send descriptions of all the buildings that may be occupied by the enemy between us and the Dil Khoosha.

This further letter to Major MacIntyre—again alluding to the necessity of clearing off any threatened attack on

¹ This they probably would have done, had not their egress from Sikandra Bâgh been cut off by approaching it from the rear.

Kánhpur before advance on Lakhnau—was written on October 31:—

The flag at the top of your house proclaims, I presume, that you received my despatches concealed in a bamboo stick, which I sent off during the night.

I hope you found the plan as well as the despatches, by splitting up the whole of the bamboo. But it is now reported that there are *two* flags shown by you—one above the other—which I can only interpret as indicating that the relieving force has already reached you. This is just possible, as the Delhi column was expected at Cawnpore on the 26th (my last communication from that place was dated the 25th.) If so, it is sooner than I expected, supposing as I did that it would be detained to oppose the Gwalior rebels; and sooner than I now wish; for certain mines that I am preparing cannot be ready for a week or ten days; and I require to explode these ere I can move out to co-operate with the relieving column.

The delay is desirable, also, to increase the strength of the column as much as possible by the additional European troops closing daily up to Cawnpore.

The stronger the column is the better able it will be to afford garrisons for Alum Bâgh, Dil Khoosha, and Martinière, ere it reaches the canal; and to furnish the various detachments afterwards required to maintain the positions necessary to secure our communications with the Dil Khoosha after its junction with us. At the lowest computation these drafts will diminish the strength of the column by at least 1,200 infantry, besides cavalry and guns; and could more men be spared, it might be prudent perhaps to garrison the Dil Khoosha (having to protect the baggage and stores, &c.) by more than the 200 men and two guns, and cavalry, as I have suggested.

If, therefore, the column has arrived at Alum Bâgh, I would beg the commanding officer to wait there till further orders, and more troops join him from Cawnpore; where you should send copy of this express to Brigadier Wilson, with my request that he pushes on to Alum Bâgh all further troops as they arrive, or such detachments as can conveniently be spared beyond the 350 required for his own garrison, *if he is not seriously threatened from any quarter*. As the column would be detained so long at

Alum Bâgh, it might be advantageously occupied in driving the enemy from Jellalabad, which I should think might be done by the mere appearance of a strong detachment before the place, and throwing a few shells into it. And I trust no tedious siege operations would, under any circumstances, be required.

The column, when it does advance, should be well supplied with ammunition, especially for the large guns, and shot and shell; for we may have a good deal of bombardment work after our junction; also abundance of powder for explosive purposes. All food supplies should be brought on to the Dil Khoosha—except what may be required for the Alum Bâgh garrison—to save us from the necessity of detaching escorts.

We cannot calculate on obtaining anything from the city for some days after the column joins, as perhaps the place I indicated in my yesterday's letter may have to be got hold of first.¹ But your *heavy* carts had perhaps better be left at Alum Bâgh, as there is no made road to the Dil Khoosha.

If there is a long string of baggage, the rear-guard should be strong, even though the enemy are not likely to venture an attack in the open country between Alum Bâgh and Dil Khoosha.

Please send our private carriage, kit, and servants with the column.

Should the column not have arrived, oblige me by forwarding copy of this to Brigadier Wilson, with a request that he will consider it addressed to himself, i.e. so far as Cawnpore arrangements are concerned.

The Commander-in-Chief left Kânhpur for Lakhnau on November 9, joining the head-quarters of his small army² under Sir Hope Grant beyond Banni. Here he was met by

¹ The Kaisar Bâgh.

² 'The whole force, of all arms, under the Commander-in-chief, was not above 4,200 men, and with these he had to rescue Outram from the grasp of 60,000, occupying a position of immense strength, before November 18, and save Windham, whose entrenched camp at Cawnpore, covering the boat-bridge over the Ganges, was our sole line of retreat, from the attack of the Calpee forces . . . Divided nominally into three brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, with artillery, sailors, and engineers, it hardly numbered one strong brigade—not more than 4,200 sabres and bayonets—and, small as it was, it was unequal in its composition.'—'Lord Clyde's Campaign in India': *Blackwood's Magazine* for October, 1858.

Mr. Kavanagh, who, in the disguise of a native, quitting the Residency and boldly passing through the enemy's lines, brought with him Outram's plans of the city and suggestions as to the route to be adopted by the relieving force. On the 12th he had encamped behind the 'Alam-bágh; his advanced guard having smartly repulsed the enemy during the day, taking two field-pieces. On the 13th there was a halt; tents were packed within the fortified enclosure, and the Fort of Jalálabad was destroyed. On the 14th the march was made to the Dilkusha, which position was occupied agreeably to Outram's suggested 'first operation.' The enemy having been driven to and beyond the Martinière, that building also was taken possession of and held by our men, and became the Chief's head-quarters on November 15. On the 16th the force advanced 'along the river bank for about a mile, and then by a narrow and tortuous lane, through thickly wooded enclosures, and between low mud houses, upon the Secundra-bágh.'¹ This movement involved a *détour* to the right further than either of the two roads named by Outram; and was attended with the serious disadvantage that the breaching guns were not brought to bear upon the enemy's position until the troops had been for some time exposed to a heavy fire. Had the advance been made by the broad road leading from the barracks (that one, in fact, followed by Outram and Havelock in September), the heavy guns, it was believed, could have opened upon the place at once, the infantry remaining out of reach of shot. As it was, the capture of the Sikandra-bágh was a brilliant feat of arms; nor was the storming of the Shah Najaf, which followed, a less striking achievement. On the next day, the building known as the 'Mess-House' was gallantly taken: and the rebels were driven from the Tára Kothi and Moti Mahál, in the precincts of which latter structure they made

¹ See also the article above quoted.

their final stand. Here it was that the three generals met; and by virtue of this meeting Sir Colin could report to the Governor-General that 'the relief of the besieged garrison had been accomplished.'

But it is more to our immediate purpose to see what had been done by those awaiting relief. Sir James Outram eagerly watched for signals from the approaching column. At about 11 A.M. on the 16th the movement upon the Sikandra-bāgh was certified, and he directed that his proposed response should have immediate effect. This was, to blow in the outer wall of the advance garden belonging to the palace of Farid Bakhsh, and open our batteries upon the insurgent defences in front, following up the operation by the storm of the 'Hirn-khāna' and steam-engine house under which three mines had been driven. The initiative explosion was, in the words of General Havelock, to whom had been entrusted the conduct of these operations, 'comparatively feeble, so the batteries had the double task of completing the demolition of the wall and prostrating and breaching the works and the buildings beyond it.' We read in the same despatch:—

'Brigadier Eyre commanded in the left battery; Captain Olpherts in the right; Captain Maude shelled from six mortars in a more retired quadrangle of the palace. The troops were formed in the square of the Chuttur Munzil, and brought up in succession through the approaches, which in every direction intersected the advance garden. At a quarter-past three two of the mines at the Hern Khana exploded with good effect. At half-past three the advance sounded. It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm with which this signal was received by the troops. Pent up in inaction for upwards of six weeks, and subjected to constant attacks, they felt that the hour of retribution and glorious exertion had returned.

‘Their cheers echoed through the courts of the palace, responsive to the bugle sound, and on they rushed to assured victory. The enemy could nowhere withstand them. In a few minutes the whole of the buildings were in our possession, and have since been armed with cannon, and held against all attack.’¹

From the point now occupied, however, to the Moti Mahál, the most advanced position held by Sir Colin’s troops, about half a mile intervened; and the way from one place to the other was exposed to the enemy within easy musket-shot. According to a recent writer,² ‘the risk did not prevent the two gallant generals and their staff from crossing the space to meet the Commander-in-Chief. They started—eight officers and one civilian. They were Outram, Havelock, Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdala), Vincent Eyre, young Havelock (now Sir Henry Havelock), Dodgson, the Deputy-Adjutant-General, the aide-de-camp Sitwell, the engineer Russell, and the gallant Kavanagh. They had not gone many paces before they were seen by the enemy, and the musketry fire from the Kaisarbágh redoubled. Napier was struck down, young Havelock was struck down, Sitwell and Russell were struck down. Outram, Havelock, Eyre, Dodgson, and Kavanagh, alone reached the Moti Mahal uninjured.’ The cordial greeting which ensued may be better imagined than described. On the Chief’s part it has been publicly recorded as a cause of ‘inexpressible satisfaction.’

More work, however, remained to be done—work both hazardous and delicate. The generals had come out to welcome their leader; but, as the despatch puts it, this was ‘before the action was at an end’—in other words, rebellion was rampant around. Immediate steps must be taken to

¹ We regret much having to omit the Reports of officers engaged.

² Colonel Malleon: *History of the Indian Mutiny*, vol. ii.

drive back the more forward of our opponents; and the garrison had to be withdrawn—not merely a number of able-bodied men, fighting men, but sick and wounded, together with women and children. There were, moreover, ordnance stores and indispensable impedimenta of all kinds to be conveyed away with the living occupants of the Residency and adjoining defences.¹ The conference at the Mess-house by the Moti Mahál was not long, however much to the purpose; and, running the gauntlet a second time, Outram and Havelock retraversed the space which separated the more advanced of the two British positions.

But to remove women and children, with the sick and wounded, from a hotbed of active sedition such as Lakhnau then was, without risk and exposure to the fire of numerous foemen, was no simple process. Nor could the task be speedily accomplished. It was a matter of six days, and busy days too. We learn from his despatch how the Chief secured the left rear of his position by the seizure of Banks's house on the night of November 17, afterwards completing a chain of posts in that direction in the face of a vigorous opposition from the rebels, who kept up an incessant fire upon the barrack and houses occupied by our troops; also how admirably the Bengal Horse Artillery lent their aid in effecting this object. We then read:—

During the next three days I continued to hold the whole of the country from the Dilkoosha to the gates of the Residency; the left flank having been secured in the manner above mentioned, with a view to extricating the garrison, without exposing it to the chance of even a stray musket-shot.

From the first all the arrangements have been conducted to—

¹ That articles of personal use or comfort could not have formed a large item, we may infer from the circumstance that the members of Outram's and Havelock's reinforcement had their baggage and servants at the Alam-lugh, coming into Lakhnau with only the clothes on their backs, which few had put off for forty days. (See Havelock's letters to his family in *Marshman's Biography*.)

wards this end. The whole of the force under my immediate command being one outlying picquet, every man remained on duty, and was constantly subject to annoyance from the enemy's fire; but such was the vigilance and intelligence of the force, and so heartily did all ranks co-operate to support me, that I was enabled to conduct this affair to a happy issue, exactly in the manner originally proposed.

Upon the 20th, fire was opened on the Kaiserbagh, which gradually increased in importance till it assumed the character of regular breaching and bombardment.

The Kaiserbagh was breached in three places by Captain Peel, R.N., and I have been told that the enemy suffered much loss within its precincts. Having thus led the enemy to believe that immediate assault was contemplated, orders were issued for the retreat of the garrison through the lines of our picquets, at midnight on the 22nd.

The ladies and families, the wounded, the treasure, the guns—which it seemed worth while to keep—the ordnance store, the grain still possessed by the commissariat of the garrison, and the State prisoners, had all been previously removed.

Sir James Outram had received orders to burst the guns which it was thought undesirable to take away, and he was finally directed silently to evacuate the Residency of Lucknow at the hour indicated.

The dispositions to cover their retreat and to resist the enemy, should he pursue, were ably carried out by Brigadier Hon. Adrian Hope; but I am happy to say the enemy was completely deceived, and he did not attempt to follow. On the contrary, he began firing on our old positions many hours after we had left them. The movement of retreat was admirably executed, and was a perfect lesson in such combination.

Each exterior line came gradually retiring through its supports, till at length nothing remained but the last line of infantry and guns with which I was myself to crush the enemy if he had dared to follow up the picquets.

The only line of retreat lay through a long and tortuous lane, and all these precautions were absolutely necessary, to insure the safety of the force.

The extreme posts on the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Hale, of H.M.'s 82nd Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, of H.M.'s

23rd Foot, and Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart, of H.M.'s 93rd Highlanders, made their way by a road which had been explored for them after I considered the time had arrived, with due regard to the security of the whole, that their posts should be evacuated.

It was my endeavour that nothing should be left to chance; and the conduct of the officers in exactly carrying out their instructions was beyond all praise.

It will be seen in the foregoing extract that to Sir James Outram had been entrusted the arrangements for the evacuation of the Residency. The memorandum supplied for his guidance by the Chief of the Staff, though expressing that the emigration would take place at night, referred mainly to the ordnance and stores to be removed. That his responsible duty would be ably and effectively fulfilled could not be doubted. This charge must have been assigned to him at the outset: for the day after the Chief's arrival, in the hope that *dâk* communications had been effected with Kánhpur, he wrote a few hurried lines to Lady Outram, thus alluding to the circumstance:—‘I have enough to do just now in arranging the difficult and delicate operation of the withdrawal of our troops with the vast number of women, sick and wounded (about 1500 souls).’ He adds in the same letter, with his thoughtfulness for others:—‘Tell the good Bishop the Catholic priests are well, with the exception of the usual gout. My wound is entirely healed, and was nothing to signify, not having laid me up for a single day.’ Four days later he again addressed Lady Outram from the Residency, stating his expectation of moving out the garrison in Havelock's division to the Chief's camp, that night. ‘Our further plans,’ he continued, ‘will then be arranged. . . . General Havelock being ill, and several of my staff being wounded, I have much thrown on my hands and have not a moment to spare for writing. I cannot answer one of the hundred letters which were brought to me

yesterday—the first mail we have received for two months—for the Chief's army did not bring our mails with them.'

The delicate operation of evacuation was effected by night, along the bank of the Gúm-ti, and under cover of the palaces which had been bravely held by Havelock's division during the siege. So quietly was it accomplished that the enemy were completely outwitted and kept up for hours a heavy fire on the tenantless position. An eye-witness, Mr. Money, supplies us with a glimpse of the final scene. 'I had passed out of the entrance gate of the Bailey Guard at Outram's request, and I saw that he held back. The thought struck me at once that he wished to be the last man to quit the garrison—but it was not to be. Brigadier Inglis had observed the move, and at once said, "You will allow me, Sir James, to be the last, and to shut the gates of my old garrison." Outram at once yielded, and Inglis closed the gates.'—But it happened that neither was the last man to leave. That honour was reserved for an officer then peacefully slumbering within. He had overslept himself and awaked to find himself the sole occupant of the garrison, but fortunately, in time to overtake the retiring force unscathed. So ended the 'Defence of Lakhnau.'

Sir James assigned to the 78th the post of honour—the rear of his retiring force, enjoining them not to keep step, lest the regular tramp should be heard by the enemy. More noteworthy still, he particularly desired Major Lockhart to inform them that as they had been the first in, so should they be the last out. The whole force reached Dilkúsha on the afternoon of the 23rd. From this post the enemy had been driven off by our cavalry on the previous day. On the way, at the Martinière, Sir Colin issued the following general order :—

The Commander-in-Chief has reason to be thankful to the force he conducted for the relief of the garrison of Lucknow.

Hastily assembled, fatigued by forced marches, but animated by a common feeling of determination to accomplish the duty before them, all ranks of this force have compensated for their small number, in the execution of a most difficult duty, by unceasing exertions.

From the morning of the 16th, till last night, the whole force has been one outlying picquet never out of fire, and covering an immense extent of ground, to permit the garrison to retire scathless and in safety, covered by the whole of the relieving force.

That ground was won by fighting as hard as it ever fell to the lot of the Commander-in-Chief to witness, it being necessary to bring up the same men over and over again to fresh attacks; and it is with the greatest gratification his Excellency declares that he never saw men behave better.

The storming of Secundra Bâgh and Shah Nujeef has never been surpassed in daring, and the success of it was most brilliant and complete.

The movement of retreat of last night, by which the final rescue of the garrison was effected, was a model of discipline and exactness. The consequence was, that the enemy was completely deceived, and the force retired by a narrow tortuous lane, the only line of retreat open, in the face of 50,000 enemies, without molestation.

The Commander-in-Chief offers his sincere thanks to Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., for the happy manner in which he planned and carried out his arrangements for the evacuation of the Residency of Lucknow.

The withdrawal of the Lakhnau garrison was truly one of those *perfect* military combinations of which a nation may be proud, and which afford peculiar satisfaction to the General actually responsible. Sir James Outram was distressed to find the credit assigned to him when due to the Commander-in-Chief. The following passage in his official acknowledgment of the vote of the freedom of the city of London, though written in 1859, may not unappropriately find a place here:—

‘Sir James Outram feels most gratefully the generous warmth with which one honourable speaker eulogised his services; but he is in honour bound to disclaim much of the

credit ascribed to him, which is due alone to his great commander—Lord Clyde. The withdrawal of the Lucknow garrison, the credit of which is assigned to Sir James, was planned by Lord Clyde, and effected under the protection of the troops immediately under his Lordship's command, Sir James Outram merely carrying out his chief's orders. In like manner were the operations which resulted in the capture of that city entirely planned by Lord Clyde, Sir James Outram merely carrying out such portions of the subordinate operations as were entrusted to him. Neither can Sir James Outram claim the credit attributed to him of having "headed the storming party," "made the breach," or being "the first to scale the heights;" and most earnestly does he disavow any title to be regarded as, on that occasion, "though second, everywhere the first."

A difference of opinion had arisen between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner, regarding the course to be pursued after the withdrawal of the Residency garrison, which we shall allow the former to explain in his own words. We have no record of Sir James' arguments in favour of an immediate attack upon the Kaisar Bagh, with the force then available, as the first step towards ejecting the rebels from Lakhnau and regaining possession of the city; but we are told that General Havelock agreed with him.¹ Sir Colin referred the question for the decision of the Governor-General in the following telegram, dated November 20:—

The garrison of Lucknow has been removed, and I am now engaged in carrying the women and wounded to the rear. I propose to move the whole force to an open position outside the town, without further loss of life. Sir James Outram, on the contrary, desires that an attack on the Kaiser Bagh should be made, and then

¹ 'Sir James Outram and Havelock were anxious that an attack should be made on the palace, which they felt would be successful, and that we should then continue to hold the town, for which they considered that two battalions of 600 men would be sufficient.'—*Marshman's Biography*.

to continue to hold the position in the town. He thinks that two strong brigades of 600 men would suffice to hold the town after the Kaiser Bagh had fallen. But I am of opinion that at least the same force would be necessary to preserve the communication now mentioned by me to the Alum Bagh, and constantly under the fire of the enemy—that is to say, four strong brigades would be required, unless it is wished that the garrison should be again besieged.

I have always been of opinion that the position taken up by the lamented Sir Henry Lawrence was a false one; and after becoming acquainted with the ground, and worked my troops upon it to relieve the garrison, that opinion is confirmed. I therefore submit, that to commit another garrison in this immense city is to repeat a military error, and I cannot consent to it.

I conceive that a strong moveable division outside the town, with field and heavy artillery in a good military position, is the real manner of holding the city of Lucknow in check, according to our practice with the other great city (*sic*) of India. Such a division would aid in subduing the country hereafter, and its position would be quite sufficient evidence of our intention not to abandon the province of Oude.

Such are the general grounds for my opinion. The more special ones are—the want of means, particularly infantry; field and musket ammunition for prolonged operations, owing to circumstances beyond my control; and the state of our communications in the North-West Provinces. The first of these is, of course, unanswerable; the second appears to me an insuperable objection to the leaving of more troops in Oude than such a division as I have mentioned, as evidence of the intentions of Government.

In the meantime I await the instructions of your Lordship in the position I have taken up.

Owing to the expression of opinion by the political authority in the country, I have delayed further movement till I shall receive your Lordship's reply.

Lord Canning replied on the 21st:—‘The one step to be avoided is, a total withdrawal of the British forces from Oude. Your proposal to leave a strong moveable division, with heavy artillery, outside the city, and so to hold the city in check, will answer every purpose of policy.’


On November 24, Sir Colin proceeded with General Grant's division to the 'Alam-bágh; leaving Outram in position at Dilkusha, to prevent molestation of the women and wounded who were moving onward towards Kánhpur. In the forenoon of the Saturday, that honoured Christian soldier, Henry Havelock, worn out by toil, privation, and sickness, breathed his last. Outram contributed to Mr. Marshman's Biography a long and interesting letter, giving, among other details, the particulars of an affecting interview he had with his dying comrade on the eve of his death. The writer was deeply moved and admits he could not restrain his tears. 'On the evening of the 23rd,' he says, 'I had a most affecting interview with him. . . . His tenderness was that of a brother. He told me he was dying, and spoke from the fulness of his honest heart of the feelings which he bore towards me, and of the satisfaction with which he looked back to our past intercourse and service together, which had never been on a single occasion marred by a disagreement of any kind, nor embittered by an angry word. . . . How truly I mourned his loss is known to God and my own heart. . . . I myself was denied the melancholy satisfaction of attending his honoured remains to the grave, by being left at Dilkusha to bring up the rear division. . . .'

On the 25th the remains of the deceased general were conveyed to the 'Alam-bágh, where they were interred on the day following in presence of the Commander-in-Chief and many officers and men. To provide against future contingencies, Outram caused the grave to be smoothed over so as to escape detection. At the same time he directed such minute measurements to be taken as to lead to the recognition, when required, of the precise site. Moreover, to obviate all accidents, a memorandum of these measurements was forwarded to Calcutta for preservation among the archives of Government.

Majr Genl Sir J. Outram's Position

from 23rd Novr 1857 to 6th March 1858.

ON THE PLAIN OF THE 'ALAM BAGH.



CHAPTER IV.

1857-1858.

Outram at the 'Alam-bágh.¹

THE Commander-in-Chief left 'Alam-bágh on November 27. Sir James Outram's instructions were to remain there until circumstances should admit of the recapture of Lakhnau; and 'hold the city in check,' in accordance with the desire of the Governor-General. Full justice has only recently been done to the manner in which he and his division carried out the duty thus imposed upon them—owing to a misconception of what that duty was. The prevalent idea appears to have been that it merely involved a continuance of the defence of the fortified enclosure hitherto so well held by Major MacIntyre; but that the manner in which it had been fulfilled nevertheless reflected much credit on the general and his troops, who had repelled several heavy attacks with very little loss to themselves. Colonel Malleson's graphic chapter devoted to the defence of the 'Alam-bágh, has, however, effectually removed all excuse for such an impression, and his eloquent narrative leaves nothing to be desired. For the general details of this, as of previous and subsequent phases of the war, in which Sir James Outram bore so prominent a part, the reader is once again referred to the 'History of the Indian Mutinies' and other military memoirs. We shall continue, as far as possible, to allow the General himself to

¹ With reference to his statement in the Preface regarding assistance derived in the present volume, the biographer would explain that he has rather 'edited' than 'written' this chapter on the 'Alam-bágh.'

narrate events and explain his views. His reports are so full, so candid, and so suggestive of the man himself, that a freer use of official wording seems admissible in his case, than might be in that of more laconic, perhaps more terse, writers of despatches.

When Sir James Outram, after covering the retirement of the army and non-combatants from the Dilkushá, took up the position appointed him—subsequently known as that of the 'Alam-bágh—he found the enclosure of that name, fortified in accordance with his instructions from the Residency, available for the defence of his right front, but capable of accommodating only a small garrison; while his right flank might be protected by another detachment thrown into the dilapidated old native Fort of Jalálabad, exactly two and a half miles distant. His main force must encamp on the open plain, across the Kánhpur road, and be protected by extemporised field works which necessitated a circuit of very nearly eleven miles. These detached works, added to as occasion required and time permitted, were not connected by continuous trenches. Such was really the position in which, for three months, Outram's division held in check 120,000 organised troops, with more than 130 guns, besides the crowd of armed fanatics which a Mohammedan population supplies in profusion. It must be borne in mind also, that across the front of the camp stretched for miles the out-kirts of Lakhnau, affording advantageous cover, within easy range, for the rebel pickets and batteries. Outram's orders were to act on the defensive; but even if unfettered to attack such advance posts, unless preparatory to a assault upon the city itself, would have been to throw away his men's lives to no purpose. A heavy gun or two might have been taken, a few of the enemy killed, but with no permanent result. So his part was to watch, to ward, and to strike only when he got an open chance. The con-

around, though level, abounded in villages which covered the approach of an attacking force, and facilitated its retreat when worsted. Sir James thus explains the whole situation clearly, in the retrospective despatch of February 28 :—

‘ . . . Circumstances demanded that, on the relief of Lucknow, his Excellency should withdraw his army to other districts, certainly for months, possibly for the greater part of a year. But it was deemed of paramount importance that a military footing should be retained in Oude during his Excellency’s absence, however protracted that might prove ; and to the division which it has been my honour and good fortune to command, was allotted the task of maintaining for an indefinite period, the honour of the British arms, and of representing the authority of the British Government in this province.

‘ It was considered advisable, both on political and strategic grounds, that we should remain in close proximity to the capital. The position assigned us was within a mile and a half of the suburbs of Lucknow. Our advanced posts were within gunshot range of the outworks of a vast city, swarming with hosts of mutinous sepoys, with Nujeebs, the undisciplined but well-armed soldiers of the rebel government, with many thousand city “budmashes,” the armed and turbulent scum of a population of 700,000 souls, and with numerous bands of those feudal retainers of the chieftains and great zemindars of Oude, whose normal state for the last fifty years has been one of warfare.¹

¹ ‘ MEMORANDUM.

‘ *Strength of the Enemy on January 26, 1858, as ascertained by Captain Alexander Orr, of the Intelligence Department.*

| | | |
|-------|---|--------|
| 37 | Regiments of Sepoys, including Oude Force | 27,550 |
| 14 | “ new Levies | 5,400 |
| 106 | “ Nujeebs | 55,150 |
| 26 | “ Regular and Irregular Cavalry | 7,100 |
| | Camel Corps. | 300 |
| Total | | 95,500 |

‘The enemy thus ranged against us, and certain to receive large accessions from the Sepoys dispersed in other parts by the victorious forces of his Excellency, had the resources of the entire province at their disposal: while our supplies had to be derived periodically from Cawnpore, a distance of forty-five miles: they were known to be well furnished in artillery, and to be strong in cavalry, an arm in which we were ourselves lamentably deficient:—and they were animated by every motive of hostility and vengeance that could be supplied to men conscious of having irretrievably committed themselves, by the inflammatory exhortations of Hindoo and Mahomedan fanatics of reputed sanctity, and by the scornful taunts to which they were subjected by the spirited mother of the boy-king.

‘Such was the position assigned to the 1st Division on the 27th of November last; and to enable it to perform the duties that must devolve on it, his Excellency increased its strength to 4,442 men of all arms, Europeans and natives. But his Excellency is aware that, of this nominal force, a detachment 540 strong (subsequently reinforced by 100 Europeans) was ordered to be kept at Bunnee, 12 miles off, where, though of service in keeping open our rear, and preserving the bridge over which the army had to return when advancing to the reduction of Lucknow, they were obviously of little use to

‘Artillery.—Guns of all sorts and calibres, not including wall pieces, and the guns brought from Futtehpoore, 131. Number of artillerymen not known.

‘The above is exclusive of the armed followers of the Talookdars and Zemindars still at Lucknow on January 26, amounting, at the lowest calculation, to 20,000 men, exclusive of the armed budmashes of the city, and exclusive also of four or five regiments that fled to Lucknow from Futtehghur with three to five guns, amounting to certainly not less than 3,000.’ The total aggregate of hostile forces at Lucknow on January 26, not less than 120,000 of all arms. Since that date several of the Zemindaree troops have left; but their place has been much more than supplied by the regiments ordered in from the district.’

and 1,200 yards.¹ And on our small force there devolved the duty not only of defending this large and incompact position against a foe who could have brought large bodies of troops to bear against us simultaneously at several distant points, but of supplying foraging parties, and of being prepared to move out beyond our limits to meet the enemy, whenever, by his attempts to cut off our communications, to menace Bunnee or Cawnpore, or by other hostile demonstrations, he might render such an operation necessary.'

While cheerfully undertaking the military duty imposed upon him, Sir James Outram did not altogether approve of his position. His objections were, however, based solely on the assumption that it had been decided upon to defer the capture of Lakhnau, contrary to his expressed views, until next cold season. If it were so—and all the information he had received led him to suppose it—he considered it his duty—not as a General of Division, but as Chief Commissioner of Oudh,—to recommend a withdrawal of his force to some point near Kánhpur, such as Mangalwar. He judged that the political effect would be more satisfactory, while military risks and difficulties would be reduced to a minimum. He gave full reasons for his conviction that, until Lakhnau had been reduced, it would be unwise to attempt to move troops about in Oudh for the re-establishment of our government or the collection of revenue. To do so would be unfair to those

¹ 'MEMORANDUM.

'Length of Lines from Picquet to Picquet, enclosing the Position defended by 1st Division.

| | |
|---|--------------|
| Jellalabad to Alumbagh | 4,400 yards. |
| Alumbagh to left front village | 3,600 „ |
| Left front to left rear village | 3,900 „ |
| Left rear village to rear picquet | 2,400 „ |
| Rear picquet to Jellalabad | 5,500 „ |
| Total | 18,800 |
| Or a total of 10 miles and 1,200 yards. | |

W. R. MOORSOM, *Lieutenant, Deputy Quartermaster-General.*

who might welcome us, and dangerous for our detachments. 'Meanwhile,' he argued, 'it is immaterial what particular spot in Oude is held as a proof that we have not deserted it, so long as a footing is retained in the province: for no civil government can be exercised so long as we are not in possession of the capital itself.' To continue to hold a position in the immediate neighbourhood of Lakhnau 'would render necessary the employment of a much larger body of troops, to maintain their post and keep up their communications with Cawnpore; and also, remaining in the vicinity of the city, without making any effort to take it, would be a declaration of weakness which, under the present circumstances, is in every way to be deprecated.' But he took care to wind up by begging his Lordship distinctly to understand 'that he only advocates the withdrawal of this force from its present position, in the event of the reconquest of the capital and of Oude during the present season being definitively abandoned. If, on the other hand, it be contemplated to undertake these operations, he is of opinion that political considerations imperatively demand that our present position be maintained at any cost.' It *was* maintained, but at *little* cost, and right glad was the General when it was at length intimated to him that Lakhnau was, after all, to be disposed of at once, as he was fully convinced it easily might be.

The Division was composed of the remnants of Havelock's noble force; the regiments Outram had brought up with him from Allahabad; and what the siege of Dehli had left of the gallant 75th. Weak in numbers were these battalions, but every man of them was a veteran to be relied upon. One, the 78th, had learned to love James Outram—no other word would express the truth—in Persia. The military train, as worthy comrades of the volunteer cavalry, and some good Madras troops, must not be forgotten in making up the total. Sir James had lost Colonel Napier, called away on other duty,

but Colonel Berkeley proved an excellent Chief of the Staff. Colonels Hamilton and Stisted well led his two infantry brigades; while Vincent Eyre handled the cavalry and artillery to perfection, seconded by one whose dash had become proverbial even among Horse Artillerymen—Major William Olpherts. The result bore testimony to the efficiency of the Engineer department under Captain Hutchinson. His right hand in administrative matters continued to be Mr. (now Sir George) Couper, who had filled the office of secretary to the Oudh Commission ever since the annexation. This very able member of the Bengal Civil Service had earned not only a C.B.ship, but much needed furlough to Europe by his devoted service throughout the siege, when he had acted as A.D.C. in addition to other duties. But he remained to help his old chief at the 'Alam-bágh. A still older friend, Dr. Ogilvie, also resolved to share Sir James's toils, although much shattered in health by garrison trials.

Matters soon settled down into the routine of a watchful camp life; and for some time the enemy gave little trouble, not yet having recovered from the pounding the Commander-in-Chief had so liberally administered. The protection of salient points was attended to. Efforts were made to attract supplies, but without success, in spite of offers of most liberal payments. So efficient, indeed, had been the blockade since September, that Sir James spoke of it to the Governor-General as 'perhaps the most remarkable circumstance that has hitherto occurred in the course of the rebellion.' The villages within reach were deserted, and the peasantry seemed forcibly prevented from communicating with his officers. It became evident that supplies must be obtained from Kánhpur, and to furnish adequate escorts for the fortnightly convoys, in addition to the permanent post at Banni, was a serious drain upon the 'Alam-bágh Division.

Sir Colin Campbell hoped that the defeat of the Gwáliar

contingent at Kánhpur would have such an effect in Oudh as to make a favourable opportunity for improving communication with the 'Alam-bágh and settling the adjacent country. His Chief of the Staff, accordingly, directed Sir James Outram, on December 7, to detach for that purpose, under his best officer, 400 European and 200 Madras infantry, Olpherts' battery, half his cavalry, and all his camels. To this large demand upon his resources he felt bound to demur, and respectfully, but very strongly, represented his view of the case, and that reinforcement, rather than diminution, of his numbers was called for. In the memorandum by General Mansfield, to which he felt compelled to take serious exception, it was moreover suggested that if a battery threatened him, it should be destroyed before it became the source of annoyance. and that on the occasion of a force going out, the front of his camp should be contracted. To this he replied: 'It would be entirely out of my power to destroy the batteries alluded to—that is to say, I could not take the guns, for my spies inform me that the horses are always kept harnessed in readiness for immediate flight. All that I could do, therefore, would be to destroy the work itself, which would involve loss of men to no purpose, from the enemy's musketry in the neighbouring cover, as the insurgents have unlimited command of labour, and in the course of a very few days would erect another battery in the same, or in an adjacent position. Neither could I contract my front in proportion to the diminution of my force. I cannot retire from either flank position without abandoning strong posts which the enemy would immediately occupy, and thus acquire the power of doing us much mischief; nor could they be dislodged without more loss than I should care to have to report for your Excellency's information.'

The convoy arrangements appear, after this, to have been left to Sir James's discretion. He calculated the strength of the

escort according to the exigencies of the time in each case, and not one was ever molested, far less imperilled. Regarding the effect of what had happened at Kánbpur, he was sorry to have to report to the Governor-General, on December 15, that the net result was unfavourable rather than otherwise; for the impression made by the earlier successes of the rebels seemed to have more than counterbalanced that produced by their final defeat. Many items of intelligence from Lakhnau tended to confirm this inference, in addition to the growing insolence and frequency of the demonstrations on his front and flanks. The enemy were perfectly aware of his inability to pursue them beyond the suburbs, and fully capable of availing themselves of the advantages of their position. The difference between the Maulavi and the Queen Mother had been patched up, the ranks of their army had been largely increased by fugitives from the Gwáliar contingent; and all had conduced to sustain their spirits and to confirm the wavering inhabitants in disaffection. He took the opportunity of again urging the recapture of Lakhnau that season. Meanwhile the great object was, he conceived, to promote the concentration of all rebel forces in that city, preparatory to a sweeping and final blow to be delivered there. To this end, he advised that his 'army of observation' should be steadily augmented from time to time, by 'reinforcements however small.' This would not only enable him to guard effectually against the attacks of an increasing enemy, either on his position or on his communications; but it would serve to keep them in constant dread of an assault on the city, and would prevent their detaching forces in different directions, for the plunder of British districts and for other other mischief. All these points were entered into with his usual care and precision, together with other details of general interest. But we cannot dwell upon them.

Although effectually cut off from supplies, Sir James

could not be balked of intelligence; his reports show its fulness, and events always proved its accuracy. A large amount of his success in war has been attributed 'to his determination to obtain the best information of the enemy's strength and plans before acting. He was cautious in this, but when once on the field, he was all dash. At the Alam Bâgh, his Intelligence Department was amazingly good. Again and again were his spies sent back, before he would move from camp.' For some time before December 22, he had reported a storm brewing, and on that day he effectually dispersed it. During the previous fortnight, the enemy had been busy erecting batteries in his front, and had made frequent demonstrations in the plain. They took very good care, however, not to expose themselves to being cut off from their cover. He ascertained that now an attempt was to be made upon his rear, and awaited the opportunity which such a movement would give, for turning the tables upon the Maulavi. It came, and he promptly availed himself of it. But his slippery foes made off too quickly to admit of his intercepting their retreat to the Dilkúshá as he wished. In forwarding to Government his report of the action, the Commander-in-Chief 'considered the whole affair to have been extremely well conducted and to reflect much credit on the troops engaged.' The following is an extract from Sir James's despatch:—

I had been informed two days previously, by my spies, that the enemy contemplated surrounding my position, in order to cut off supplies, stop all foraging expeditions, and to intercept my communication with Bunnee. With this object they despatched a force to Guilee, which took up a position between that village and Budroop, which places are about a mile distant from each other.

On the evening of the 21st instant, I learnt that the rebels had been reinforced, and that their strength amounted to about 4,000 infantry, 400 cavalry, and 8 field guns.¹

¹ Since ascertained to have been only four: all of which were captured.

Having ascertained that a space of about half a mile intervened between their position and the gardens skirting the canal and the Dilkhoosha, I moved out at 5 A.M., in the hope of surprising them at day-break, and intercepting their retreat to the city. . . .

The main body of the enemy being on the march considerably in advance, retreated to the city by a detour to the left, out of our reach, and concealed by intervening tops of trees, on hearing the attack on their rear; but the loss of four horse artillery guns, much ammunition, besides elephants and baggage, and some fifty or sixty men slain, will, I think, deter the enemy from again venturing beyond their defensive works, or at any rate from attempting, for some time to come, to carry out their plan of surrounding this camp within a too limited circumference. . . .

A division order to the troops contained further details—

. . . The right column, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Purnell, her Majesty's 90th Regiment, consisting of detachments of the 78th and 90th Regiments, and of the Ferozepore Regiment of Sikhs, excited admiration by the gallant way in which, with a cheer, they dashed at a strong position held by the enemy, and from which they were met by a heavy fire. Regardless of the overwhelming numbers and six guns reported to be posted there, the suddenness of the attack, and the spirited way in which it was executed, resulted in the immediate flight of the enemy, with hardly a casualty on our side.

Colonel Guy, in command of the left column consisting of 400 men of her Majesty's 5th Fusiliers, under the guidance of Lieutenant Moorsom, deputy-assistant quartermaster-general, was equally successful in his simultaneous attack on the adjacent village of Guilee, in which, and the adjoining tope, two guns were captured.

The enemy were now rapidly followed up across the plain by the Volunteer Cavalry, under Captain Barrow, until they found refuge in a village, from which they opened a fire of grape and musketry. They were, however, speedily dislodged by the assistance of two of Captain 'Olpherts' guns, under the command of Lieutenant Smithett, and changing their line of retreat, they endeavoured to reach the city by the way of the Dilkhoosha.

The Military Train, under Major Robertson, having been, however, despatched to make a flank movement, followed them up

so rapidly that they dispersed their cavalry, and drove their guns into a ravine, where they were captured, the leading horses, of which the traces were cut, only escaping.

The Major-General was particularly pleased with the very cool and soldier-like behaviour of the Military Train. Far ahead of the infantry, and unable to remove the guns which were captured, they were menaced in their front by a large body of fresh troops from the city, and attacked on their right flank by the main body of the enemy, consisting of about 2,000 infantry, who had commenced their march previously to our attack, and who, on hearing their rear assailed, also changed their route to one in the direction of the city, but on seeing their guns in possession of so small a force as that under Major Robertson, made demonstrations of an attempt to regain them; but by the bold front shown by the Military Train, and the gallant advance of their skirmishers, they were held at bay; until the arrival of a party of the 5th Fusiliers and two 9-pounder guns, under Captain Olpherts, completely secured the capture of the guns, and enabled a working party of the Madras Sappers, under the command of Lieutenant Ogilvie, to extricate them from the ravine into which they had been driven. Captain Hutchinson, chief engineer, on this, as on several other occasions during the day, afforded much valuable assistance. . . .

Sir James Outram has also to express his acknowledgments to Brigadiers Hamilton and Eyre, who were left in charge of the camp, and with the small force at their disposal checked the dispositions for an attack which the enemy was commencing with their skirmishers on the left flank, until the return of the force to camp caused them to abandon their intention. . . .

He adds his warm acknowledgments to Brigadier Stisted, commanding the force which moved out, and other officers, not omitting Staff-Sergeant Roddy, who commanded two guns.

This sharp lesson so discouraged the enemy that they allowed Christmas and the New Year to pass quietly. But it was evident that they would not let Outram alone much longer; and even while they abstained from decided movements, they were constantly dropping cannon-shot into the outposts. These were harmless as a rule, but on January 8

one of them caused the death of a promising young artillery officer, Lieutenant Gordon, in the 'Alam-bágh enclosure. The Commander-in-Chief had been able to send reinforcements to the number of 340 by December 22, and nearly as many more before Sir James was again seriously menaced. But the enemy were largely on the increase. Lakhnau had become the focus whither congregated the more determined of the mutineers and rebels whom Sir Colin was routing out of Fathgarh, whom Franks afterwards drove before him from Jánpur, and whom the Ghurkas dislodged from Gorakhpur. In fact, every success elsewhere added to the numbers opposed to Outram's division; and thus infantry, artillery, and cavalry were constantly swelling the ranks of the Maulavi, perhaps the most capable leader whom the rebellion produced. In reviewing the situation, we must not lose sight of this very important feature.

Though Sir James had wisely set his face against desultory and spasmodic attempts to re-establish government in Oudh, until he could date his orders from its conquered capital, he caused Captain Carnegie to commence at once the organisation of a body of police at Banni, and to utilise them for the maintenance of order and of communication along the road to Kánhpur. It was one of his principles, that if a man is to be trusted, he ought to have as much discretion allowed him as possible. Especially did he hold to this in the matter of prompt rewards. We accordingly find Captain Carnegie vested with large powers in this respect. When reporting these proceedings to Lord Canning, the Chief Commissioner forcibly stated his views on the general and most important question of the recruitment of police and other levies—in fact, the organisation of a new Bengal army. He is alarmed at the prejudice against high-caste men which he sees prevail—though but a natural reaction from the opposite error of former days. He considers

‘that it would be in the highest degree injudicious to raise these new levies entirely from the sweeper, or lowest castes, which he has reason to believe has already been done in some instances. He can conceive no measure more calculated to arouse the bitter detestation of all the higher classes of the Indian community—whether Hindoo or Mahomedan : and even the passive opposition of these enormous masses of men, if combined, will make the tranquillisation of the Empire indeed an arduous undertaking. Moreover, it is only readopting our ancient policy in a new phase. Formerly we would entertain none but high-caste men, and they have betrayed us. What, the Chief Commissioner would ask, is to prevent an army entirely composed of low-caste men from playing the same game ? Until recently, high caste was the only passport into the ranks of the army. It is now proposed to make it an absolute disqualification for service. Both extremes, the Chief Commissioner respectfully submits, are alike injudicious. In the new levies no low-caste man should be refused because of his caste. The test should be entirely irrespective of caste. The recruit should be informed that there is no such thing in the army, and, that to plead it as an excuse for evading, or refusing to perform, any order passed by an officer, will subject the offender to the severest military penalties, in addition to immediate dismissal. The annals of the armies of the sister Presidencies show that the highest caste men are not in reality polluted in their estimation by standing shoulder to shoulder with men of inferior degrees. It is in the Bengal army alone, where this groundless and arrogant pretension has been tolerated. Abolish it, —throw open the ranks of the army to all comers, without regard to their caste, and it is the Chief Commissioner’s belief that, in a very short time, there will be no lack of Brahmin recruits, notwithstanding that they may find they have to salute a native officer of the caste of a sweeper.

Whereas, by accepting the services of low-caste men *only*, the popular idea, already sufficiently strong, that our aim is the utter subversion of all caste, and the compulsory introduction of Christianity, will become universal.'

Sir James at the same time advised systematic disarming of the entire population, whenever order had been restored, 'so complete that the next generation should be unacquainted with the ingredients necessary for the manufacture of gunpowder, and all unskilled in the use of arms.' As usual, he detailed at length both his reasons and the methods he would employ, pointing out wherein the process would differ from that so beneficially carried out in the Punjab in 1850. About this time he submitted what Lord Canning characterised as an 'able and elaborate' memorandum on the system of civil administration to be adopted for Oudh after Lakhnau should have been subjugated. In it were discussed many important points, from the oft-debated question of 'Ta'aluk-dâri' versus 'Ra'iyat-wâri' settlement, onwards.

In the end of December, he was glad to report signs of wavering among some of the leaders in Lakhnau, and even advances towards negotiation on the part of the Queen Mother. But the accessions to the rebel army continued, and increased the confidence of the soldiery, whatever misgivings were becoming apparent in the minds of those who had much to lose and were in a better position to discern the signs of the times. One thing he spoke of as 'the first aim and object never out of his thoughts,' namely, the release of the captive ladies, Mrs. Orr and Miss Jackson. Now he not only offered a free pardon to the powerful Mân Singh, if he would bring them in, but, with Lord Canning's sanction, authorised the expenditure of a lakh of rupees (10,000*l.*) to secure their liberation. Sir James failed to 'effect the object which every Englishman in India has so much at heart,' before the capture of the city in March, when

it was accomplished by the British officers with Jang Bahadur's force; but his ceaseless endeavours had meanwhile been the means of alleviating their imprisonment and paving the way for their release.

The next effort made by the enemy to sweep from the face of the earth the obnoxious foe encamped so calmly under their very eyes, was a formidable one, well-timed and planned with considerable judgment. In addition to the encouragement inspired by their own increased numbers and the diminished force opposed to them, they had been warned by a great Pandit that between January 12 and 20 was the most propitious time for the attack, and indeed the only chance of success the Fates would vouchsafe. Accordingly they advanced on the 12th in immense masses, not unskillfully handled, and with a determination which only failed them when it came to the point of pressing home their assaults. Outram awaited quietly the development of their attack, and when the right time came, made use of the 1,500-men he could move out against them, with results he thus narrated in his despatch of the same day. In forwarding it to Government, the Commander-in-Chief commended the forethought displayed :—

In consequence of reports that Mansoob Allie was collecting men and receiving reinforcements from Lucknow to intercept my communications, I sent a stronger escort than usual with my convoy now on its way from Cawnpore, consisting of 450 infantry, 4 guns, and 80 cavalry.

The rebels were encouraged by this reduction of my force to meditate an attack, of which I received information for several days, and yesterday evening more definite accounts led me to expect them at sunrise this morning. I therefore made such dispositions of my force and outposts as were necessary, and the troops breakfasted at daybreak, and were all in readiness.

About sunrise this morning, large masses of the enemy were seen on my left front, and they gradually spread round the whole

front and flanks of my position, extending from opposite to our left rear outpost to near Jellalabad on our right, a distance of at least six miles, and they amounted, at the lowest estimation, to 30,000 men.

As soon as their movements were decidedly in advance, the brigades—the right mustering 713 and the left 733 Europeans, and 100 men of the regiment of Ferozepore—were formed in front of their lines.

The enemy first advanced upon my left front and flank, covered by a large body of skirmishers, on which I detached two regiments of the left brigade to support the outposts, and extended in skirmishing order on their flanks, whilst the third regiment was held in reserve; at the same time Major Olpherts, with four horse battery guns supported by a detachment of the Military Train, was directed to check the enemy on my left rear, where their cavalry showed in the greatest strength. The volunteer and native cavalry were drawn up to protect the rear of the camp, which at this time appeared to be threatened.

The right brigade remained on its ground.

As soon as the enemy were fairly within range, they were exposed to a severe fire of artillery from Alumbagh, and from the advanced batteries of my outposts on the left front and centre, and fled with the utmost precipitation without having come within musket range except at the left centre outpost commanded by Captain Down, 1st Madras Fusiliers, where a considerable number entered a grove of trees usually occupied by our outlying picquets, from which they were driven in a few minutes by the skirmishers of the outpost.

On the left rear, Major Olpherts moved out his guns at a gallop, and advancing well to his front, completely drove off and dispersed a very large body of infantry and cavalry which was endeavouring to penetrate to our rear, turning them back towards the city, and doing much execution by the fire of his guns, on their masses at 500 yards.

At this time I received a report that Alumbagh and my right advanced outposts of Jellalabad were threatened; and on proceeding to the right I found that the enemy had brought three horse artillery guns, supported by an immense mass of infantry, against the picquet which connects my right with Jellalabad, and which had been strengthened to 100 men with two guns. I moved the

regiment of Ferozepore and the 5th Fusiliers, with two guns of Moir's Bullock Battery, from the right brigade to the front, taking the enemy in flank and driving them back. They were then exposed to the fire of Maude's guns from Alumbagh, which played upon them with great effect.

About this time the enemy again advanced on the left front and flank, their cavalry on this occasion being more to the front than before. A party of the latter galloped up to the rifle-pits in front of the left advanced outpost; but Alexander's and Clarke's guns opened on them and drove them back in confusion.

About the same time, the enemy on the right, again advancing from the heavy cover of groves and villages into which they had retreated, re-opened their guns on the Jellalabad picquet, but were finally silenced and driven off by the fire of Moir's two guns, which had been sent to the picquet to reinforce it, and to replace the two guns originally there, which had been withdrawn to Jellalabad.

Simultaneously with the attack above described, the enemy advanced upon Alumbagh, and established themselves in the nearest cover, notwithstanding that they were seen to suffer severely from the artillery and rifle fire. About noon they also advanced into the open ground, and were immediately dispersed and driven back by the fire of Maude's guns and the riflemen from Alumbagh.

By four o'clock P.M. the whole of the enemy had disappeared, and retired to the city or to their original positions in the gardens and villages in our front. . . .

The steadiness of the troops, and the promptitude with which my orders were carried out by my officers, gives me every assurance that the enemy's attack, if it had been as formidable as their forces were numerous, would have been as signally defeated.

The enemy's loss was heavy. His own casualties amounted to six wounded!

The unhappy insurgents now tried one of those oddly timed rushes to which Orientals are unaccountably prone. The convoy had arrived unharmed on the morning of the 16th, when suddenly, at the unlikely hour of breakfast, the most determined attack yet delivered was made upon the picket

between 'Alam-bágh and Jalálabad. It was accounted for by religious fanaticism, the leader being a Brahmin dressed up as Hanuman, the monkey-god, tail and all, who came on bravely, till wounded and taken prisoner. A brisk cannonade and advances of skirmishes throughout the day were followed by a night attack in great strength on the battery at the extreme left. This was repulsed with consummate coolness by Major Gordon, who commanded at that point; while Olpherts again sharply routed the enemy's cavalry in their advance upon the left rear, which had been entrusted to his vigilant charge. The rebels lost many men that day, while Sir James had only to report one bombardier killed and eight men wounded—one of them by an accident.

With the fresh experience gained by these bold attempts on his position, Outram felt it his duty once more to urge the expediency of providing him with additional troops. 'The sole object of this powerful host,' he told General Mansfield, 'would be the extinction of his division, the only obstacle to their supreme rule, and to the collection of the revenues of Oude; and the only hope, moreover, left them of recovering their lately lost prestige.' Sir Colin wrote in reply that he had ordered the 34th Regiment to join the 'Alam-bágh force, and that four 24-pounder siege guns would be sent in compliance with his requisition, as soon as cattle could be collected.

But the enemy were thoroughly disheartened, and contented themselves for a whole month with harmless though provoking demonstrations and false alarms; continuing also their accustomed desultory cannonade. In one of Sir James's letters he speaks of 100 to 150 cannon-balls per day as the allowance, but we never hear of anybody being the worse for it. The fact is, these were not joyous weeks within Lakhnau. The rebels saw that the end was

opening upon them, in spite of reinforcements still being driven in their direction; and again they took to fighting among themselves. On the other hand, all went on uneventfully, not to say monotonously, in the camp they vainly strove to alarm. The attack on the city was determined on, much to the satisfaction of every one, and signs of its approach began to be cheerfully manifest, in the arrival of men and stores, and in reports of the splendid army collecting at Káhnpur. Still it must not be supposed that idleness was the order of the day. Picket and convoy duties were heavy, and the enemy's demonstrations demanded constant alertness.

would never have allowed it had he been aware of any such proceeding, and that he was ineligible as being the General under whom they served. They respectfully but firmly declined to alter their decision, and to this day James Outram stands the elected representative of that illustrious little band. Some months afterwards it happened to be ruled at the Horse Guards that a General officer was not to be debarred by his rank from reception of the Cross, and in consequence Sir James's case was again officially discussed. It was finally decided that his peculiar position, as responsible for General Havelock's force although not in command of it, excluded him from the honour; and the upshot of the whole matter was that both the Volunteer cavalry and Sir James Outram remained undecorated. Many a regret has been expressed that an exceptional opportunity for a graceful act—in conferring upon an old soldier a distinction he could never again hope to win, and of thereby gratifying the whole army—was thus set aside.

On February 7, Sir James wrote to Lady Outram that 'we are now enjoying perfect quiet;' but a week later he had a different tale to tell. Men and stores were almost daily passing to and fro from Bānni, and what with convoy duties and the enemy's movements, now constant and imposing, his troops were 'excessively harassed.' Reinforcements had been joining him from time to time, and the Commander-in-Chief's army was rapidly forming. Nevertheless the rebels began to show unwonted courage and perseverance. On the 15th a strong body of horse, supported by infantry, endeavoured to cut off a convoy, under cover of a dust storm. It was a bold stroke, worthy of the energetic leader who conducted it, the Maulavi himself. Outram, however, not to be easily caught napping, frustrated the attempt by a sudden attack. The Maulavi's force was incontinently dispersed, he himself being severely wounded and almost taken prisoner.

On this occasion, as usual, Major Olpherts' prompt and effective dash was conspicuous.

The next day the enemy filled their trenches and assembled in vast numbers on the front, and also threatened the left flank with cavalry. Repeatedly they began advances during the morning, and as often their courage failed them. At last they seemed to have made up their minds, clouds of skirmishers suddenly issued forth, and they advanced in great force upon the left and centre. But the fire of Colonel Smith's picket of the 90th proved too much for them, and they retired again, leaving a good many dead. At dusk they began a heavy fire of musketry on the 'Alam-bāgh. This, too, ceased at about half-past eight, and they gave it up for the night. Our loss on these two days amounted to but one killed and three wounded. On the 17th, right, left, and rear were seriously threatened. In short, things were warming up; and it appeared that the insurgents were being spurred on by sheer despair to attempt to wear out, and then overwhelm the 'Alam-bāgh division, as their only chance of averting the impending blow. Intelligence was brought that it was their design to harass by continual annoyances of the kind just commenced with so much spirit, and that attacks were to be made daily from all quarters. It was well they had not adopted these tactics before. It was now too late. But they were determined to die hard, and made two final efforts—the most resolute of all—to rid themselves of their tenacious warder. The first came off on Sunday, February 21, when they hoped to find the regiments at church-parade. It ended, as Sir James expressed it, 'with the usual result,' which he described as follows. Heavy though the loss of the enemy was, his own did not exceed nine wounded:—

movement round about our flanks, at the same time threatening the whole length of our position, and attacking the north-east corner of the Alumbagh, and also the picquet and fort of Jellalabad, against which they brought four guns.

I, immediately on perceiving their intention, reinforced the posts of Alumbagh and Jellalabad, which easily repulsed the attacks made on them, and inflicted much loss on the assailants, who had advanced under cover of long grass and underwood, within grape-shot range of both these posts.

I detached about 250 cavalry and two field guns to the rear of the fort of Jellalabad, under command of Captain Barrow, Volunteer cavalry, where they suddenly came on about 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry. Our guns immediately opened on them, killing several, which caused them to withdraw to the immediate vicinity of the infantry attacking the fort, in number about 5,000; they remained there until the attack was abandoned, when they all withdrew towards the city.

The attack on our left flank was made by about from 8,000 to 10,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, to oppose whom I sent out the remaining 4 field guns available, supported by the military train (120 in number) under command of Major Robertson, keeping the 2nd Infantry Brigade in reserve. The cavalry and guns soon drove back the enemy's cavalry, and their infantry then halted, and on the guns being turned on them soon commenced to retreat also, being followed up by us until within range of their batteries.

A large convoy was on the road at the time, the escort required for which materially crippled our small cavalry force, and prevented anything more being effected than frustrating their attempts to gain our rear and molest our convoy. . . .

One more desperate attempt to retrieve their lost fortunes on the part of the Lakhnau army—and the 'Defence of the 'Alam-bāgh' was to be at an end. On February 25, under the eyes of the Bigam and her Prime Minister, who came out in state to witness the anticipated victory, the rebels fought better and with more perseverance than on any previous occasion. But Outram had by this time so fine a force of cavalry and horse artillery, that he was able both to strike harder and to make better use of victory, and the issue

was never for a moment doubtful. Again, for the last time, we leave him to tell the story:—

The principal attack was on our right, against which twenty-four regiments of regular infantry, six Nujeeb corps, 1,000 cavalry, and eight guns moved out from the enemy's trenches; of this number, about one-half, with two guns, advanced towards our right rear, and having occupied the 'topes' immediately to the east of Jellalabad, commenced shelling that post heavily, evidently in the hope of igniting the large quantity of combustible stores at present collected there, while the remainder were held in support in the villages and 'topes' directly in front of the enemy's outworks.

Large bodies of infantry and cavalry, with three guns, simultaneously menaced our left, and the trenches in front of our position were occupied in force.

Soon after ten A.M. I moved out with detachments of artillery, cavalry, and infantry, as per accompanying return, to intercept the column which had opened its guns on Jellalabad, having previously sent Barrow's Volunteers and Wale's Horse round, *vid* Nowrunga-bad, to co-operate in their rear.

As we advanced, a portion of the enemy's reserve made a demonstration against our left; but were speedily driven back, and afterwards held in check by the four guns of Remington's troop, supported by a squadron of the 7th Hussars, under Colonel Hagart, and by Brasyer's Sikhs.

The column then moved forward, flanked on the left by Brigadier Campbell, with the native cavalry, which pushed on in advance to intercept the enemy's retreat, which, owing to their having heard the fire of Remington's guns, proved more sudden than we had anticipated. The manœuvre was completely successful, and speedily converted their retreat into a rout, Brigadier Campbell's detachment assailing them on one side, while Barrow's and Wale's Horse appeared on the opposite quarter, and the Military Train, under Captain Robertson, dashed into the middle of the flying enemy and captured their two guns. The rapidity of their flight prevented the infantry from taking a prominent part in the action. At one P.M., when we finally left the field, the foe had vanished.

In the meantime the hostile forces on the left of my position had retired before the very effective fire of Moir's guns, not liki-

the look of the arrangements which had been prepared by Brigadier Franklyn, who had been left in command of the camp, for their reception.

Judging from the corpses which strewed the field where the cavalry had charged, and from the dense masses upon which our guns repeatedly opened, the enemy's casualties must have been heavy. Our loss consisted of four men killed, five officers and twenty-five men wounded.

My cordial acknowledgments are due to all the officers and men who conducted and took part in these operations, but especially to the Military Train, whose brilliant charge excited the enthusiasm of all who witnessed it.

Colonel Berkeley, my able and zealous military secretary, whose knowledge of the ground was of great service to Brigadier Campbell in cutting off the enemy's retreat, was wounded while gallantly charging at the head of Hodson's Horse, as was Lieutenant Moorsom while rendering to Barrow and Wale assistance similar to that which Colonel Berkeley afforded the Brigadier.

About four p.m. the enemy again moved out against us. On this occasion they directed their principal efforts against our left, and evinced more spirit and determination than they had hitherto done. Repeatedly they advanced within grape and musket range, and as they ever met with a warm reception from our guns and Enfields, especially from those of the left front picquet, commanded by Major Master, of the 5th Fusiliers, they must have suffered severely.¹ They renewed their fire from time to time during the night; but solely, I believe, with the object of covering the parties engaged in moving their dead. Our loss in this subsequent operation amounted to one man killed and fourteen wounded. In all five men killed and thirty-five officers and men wounded.

The enemy had done their worst and had hopelessly failed. The constant arrival at the 'Alam-bâgh of fresh troops and *matériel* showed them that any further attempts to molest the force there, or arrest the concentration of the Commander-in-Chief's army, would be futile; and they devoted all energies now to preparations for defence of the city.

¹ Information since received showed the enemy's loss throughout the day to have been between 400 and 500.

To Sir James Outram a part was to be assigned in the coming operations which would sever his connection with the 1st Division. In a closing despatch, from which we have already extracted the descriptive portion, he summed up his obligations to the force he considered it a proud privilege to have commanded. After attributing to their gallant demeanour the fact of their having been 'comparatively unmolested,' he adds, 'it is almost superfluous to say, that where men have behaved so well in the field as the troops of the 1st Division, they must have been in a high state of discipline. Such has, indeed, been the case; and their admirable conduct must be held all the more praiseworthy, when we consider the extreme exposure and discomfort the whole of them have had to endure from the loss of their warm clothing and our deficiency of tentage, and that most of them had already sustained much privation during the seven weeks they were besieged in Lucknow.' His next paragraph is particularly suggestive:—'This gratifying state of matters, as his Excellency will readily imagine, has been in no small degree due to the kindness, care, and attention which the officers of all arms and ranks have bestowed on their men, and to the earnest anxiety with which they have endeavoured at all times to promote their comfort and provide for their amusement.' Expressing his warm acknowledgments to the staff and all in prominent positions, he singles out Colonel Berkeley for special praise. It need hardly be added that both the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor-General fully endorsed these commendations, and also complimented the General himself in high terms.

Although we have quoted fully from Sir James's reports, in order that he might be as far as practicable the narrator of events, *quorum magnā pars fuit*—we have been unable to insert one class of paragraphs usually conspicuous in his despatches, viz., those in which he commends by name officers,

and even private soldiers. To make selections from these would be invidious,—to give all, impossible. Some considered him too lavish of praise. It may be so, but there is no doubt that in every such allusion he did but sincerely express the feelings of his own heart; and his anxiety to do justice, or more than justice, to every corps and individual under his command was not confined to the moment. He was always ready, it might be said eager, to rectify omissions or misconstructions, however brought to his notice; and he did not scruple to assail the powers above with any number of supplementary recommendations. A great deal of his time in Calcutta was taken up in attending to these claims. Indeed, to satisfy them was one of his main objects in causing to be printed for presentation to the officers concerned, two goodly octavo volumes of his despatches and correspondence in connection with the Persian and Lakhnau campaigns—a most expensive as well as troublesome business. The names of those distinguished officers who were most prominent as his lieutenants during his Lakhnau commands are already familiar to the reader as household words—for example, Napier, Inglis, Eyre, Olpherts—not to speak of him whose resting place hallowed the 'Alam-bāgh, Henry Havelock. But many others, who shared with Sir James the perils of these six months, and who were constantly being brought to notice, performed services not less remarkable in their sphere—such as Barrow, the stedfast commander of the Volunteer cavalry; Dodgson, Assistant Adjutant-General; Orr, of the Intelligence Department; and Moorsom, whose topographical knowledge and talents were literally invaluable. An address to the 78th Regiment is given in the Appendix to this volume¹ as a specimen of Sir James's hearty words of appreciative gratitude to those who won his battles for him. How touchingly that noble regiment showed their estimation of their old General

¹ Appendix N.

-- 'Company's officer' though he was---there will be occasion to relate further on.

Lord Canning's very cordial concurrence in the Commander-in-Chief's satisfaction at the manner in which Sir James Outram 'had fulfilled the expectations which led to his being selected to maintain the position at the Alam Bâgh,' applied to the military office. But it may well have had a more comprehensive meaning in regard to one, much of whose time and thought had been expended on the laborious problem of bringing back order to Oudh in a purely administrative sense. Though the Chief Commissioner saw fit to postpone overt attempts of this nature, except the organisation of police, all his proceedings and recommendations had that aim in view, and tended to facilitate it when the time arrived. We can but allude to this in passing. The value of his suggestions for present or future guidance can only be appreciated by perusal of his continuous correspondence with the high officers of State and private friends, among them Lords Dalhousie and Elphinstone, and members of the Court of Directors. The same remark applies to the detailed and careful manner in which he ascertained and laid before Government the movements, combinations, and dissensions among the rebels; and to the effect of his negotiations with Mân Singh and others.

Before passing to the capture of Lakhman, we may complete our review of life in the Residency and on the plain of 'Alam-bâgh, by a few reminiscences of a personal rather than a public character.

Sir James's existence in the Residency soon became one of routine. His active mind always found employment of some kind, but after the first terrible week had passed, it was not overburdened. In 'Fayrer's Garrison' the utterly destitute General was made as comfortable as circumstances would allow; but he would not submit to be treated better

than his comrades. We are told that he was no less particular in his attendance at family prayers than in his daily round of the defences, visits to the hospitals, and other military duties. Stray cannon-balls and bullets were, to one of his temperament, a welcome variety in these accustomed peregrinations. When his busy pen failed to occupy his time indoors—and for two months he enjoyed the luxury of being out of reach of the post—he could fall back upon another unfailing resource—miscellaneous reading. If food for the body was scarce, food for the mind was abundantly supplied by the good libraries destined to be left for the edification of Lakhnau *badma'ashes*. He had numerous calls to make upon his old friends—too many of them, alas ! visits of condolence—a social duty he was always scrupulous to fulfil. Once he nearly made a sad mistake when on an errand of this kind. His Private Secretary fortunately encountered him on his way to pay his respects to the Judicial Commissioner's widow, clad in a garment of peculiar pattern, which Mr. Money had just bought for him, at great cost, at the sale of the deceased gentleman's effects. To have been detected in this would very likely have been more of a shock to him than if the widow of Muhammad Hussain Khan, the Wazir of Kalat, had recognised *her* husband's apparel¹ when she breathed her woes in his ear on the way to Sonmiani, twenty years before.

Sir Joseph Fayrer thus recalls incidents of those days :—

‘ You may fancy our delight on seeing him at the first relief of the Residency, when he fought his way in to our rescue. He had been exposed to every conceivable danger and had not escaped scathless, for his arm was tied up when he came in, and he had lost his hat. I dressed the wound ; the ball had passed through the arm, and narrowly missed the main artery, but he did not seem to mind it in the

¹ Selected by Outram for disguise, from the Prize Agents' Stock. See vol. i. p. 202.

least, and it was with the greatest difficulty that I could persuade him to let me attend to it. We had nothing to give him in my garrison but flour cakes (*chapâtis*) and gun bullock beef (very little of either) and water, but he was perfectly satisfied, and only seemed anxious that others should be cared for. His gentle, courteous treatment of all the poor ladies and children, and his solicitude for them, was most touching. He lay down at night on a sofa in the long room in my house, where the most part of my garrison generally assembled, and insisted that no particular attention should be paid to him. Some time in the following morning he showed me his coat, and asked if my wife could mend the holes in the sleeve; and when she took it to him mended, and expressed regret for his wound, he said it was nothing, and he would willingly have lost a leg or an arm to have relieved them. A private soldier, one of my garrison, came into the room where he was lying down, and, not in the least knowing who he was, began to talk to him about the relief. He was most kind to the man, and answered all his questions without any remarks. The next morning, finding he was talking to some one of importance, passed on. He was courteous to all, rough in some ways perhaps at times, but it was only manner, for he was kindness and goodness itself at heart. I heard some one lament that we had nothing better to give him, and he said he neither wanted nor would have anything but what the garrison had. He seemed absolutely indifferent to danger of any kind. Shot were constantly striking the house, and when one knocked down part of the verandah where he was sitting he just quietly moved his place a little, but was very anxious that my wife—who was carrying our boy Bob (who had been wounded and sick, and was very weak and wanted air) about in the garden in front of the verandah—should not go beyond a certain point where she would come within

reach of the bullets. He told me all his plans, what he thought of doing, and how he thought we were to get out of the Residency. At one time it was seriously contemplated that we should try and fight our way out to join the force outside, and he sent for me and told me. Of course it would have been attended with great loss and frightful risk to the women and children. He said, you know I mean Mrs. F. to have my horse—he had ridden in on an English horse: I said, “And what are you going to do?” “Oh! I shall go on foot!” Happily this was not attempted: we did not move, and it was well we did not, for few would have survived the attempt.’¹

Outram’s genial and kindly spirit was perhaps never more strongly evinced than when detained amidst actively hostile thousands at Lakhnau, or during the three long months of alert watchfulness and intermittent action passed at the ‘Alam-bágh. His care for the soldiers, consideration for brother-officers, and abnegation of self were then, as throughout his career, proverbial; and anecdotes no doubt abound in illustration of these prominent features in his character at this period. At the Residency, we are told that, on one occasion, when the scarcity of provisions for the mere sustenance of life necessitated a strict frugality on the part of all ranks, his indignation was aroused at the unex-

¹ ‘One day,’ writes Sir Joseph, ‘I went over to the Residency (in 1856) to see him on some business. I was writing for him at that time a *précis* of the news reports that used to come in daily, and I had gone over to ask some question. I had with me a young bear that I was bringing up as a pet—quite young and not bigger than a small dog: it followed me into his room, and sat down at his feet. He caressed it, and said, “Why don’t you teach it to smoke the hubble-bubble?” I thought he was joking; but he assured me he had done so with a bear, and that it enjoyed it immensely. Accordingly, I made the man who had charge of it and other animals undertake that branch of its education, which it very quickly acquired; and it would take the cocoa-nut hubble-bubble out of the hands of the servants, put it to its mouth, suck in the smoke with intense delight, and roll over shrieking with pleasure, apparently half intoxicated. He was greatly amused when he saw it smoking some time after.’

proffered offer of an exceptionally luxurious meal. The soldier-butcher had begged his acceptance of the heart and liver, or other delicate portions of the internal economy of a bullock, in addition to the ration of meat for the day. Now such a proposal was, in his opinion, simply outrageous: the idea that *he*, of all others in the camp, should be selected as the recipient of a kind of modified *Khatpat*, was too horrible to contemplate: nothing would satisfy him but to place the culprit under arrest! But a little after-inquiry into the matter elicited the fact that the proffered dainties were the legitimate perquisites of the well-inclined butcher, who was at liberty to dispose of them as he liked, and had as much right to offer them to the General Commanding as to the junior subaltern among his officers. The poor man was therefore released with a kindly apology.

Another time, an officer of the old garrison, who had hoarded a bottle of precious pickles, was seized with the unhappy notion of presenting his treasure to the General Commanding. Great was Outram's anger when solicited to accept a luxury of the kind. He considered that everything should have been given up for general use at a time of common scarcity and trial, especially such articles as might be fitly consumed in hospital. An occasional present of wine, sent by Mr. Gubbins, was invariably made over to the hospital five minutes after receipt.

The medical officer on General Havelock's staff, writing of the straits to which the defenders of our position in Lakhman were put, prior to Sir Colin Campbell's advance, says:—'Cigars were sold for six shillings each in the garrison, and General Outram used often to say he wished I was a smoker, for then he should have the pleasure of giving me one.'

Captain Chamier, who was, in those memorable days, A.D.C. to Sir James, relates that in the Baillie Guard on

one occasion, when his chief was taking his usual walk round the defences, he remarked to a batch of men who were discussing their scanty breakfast: 'I am very sorry, my men, to be obliged to reduce your rations.' The reply from one of the number was, 'I should not mind it at all, General, if my appetite was not so uncommonly good!' To solicitude for others and disregard of personal comfort were joined compassion for the weak and helpless, and a withering scorn of bravado or meanness—instances of which, in the ordinary occurrences of daily life, were treasured up in the memory of comrades, who have repeated them in after years with sympathetic delight. The following are reminiscences by one of them, of Outram at the 'Alam-bâgh:—

A remark was made in his hearing, at dinner, on the necessity of administering severe and indiscriminate punishment to mutinous *sipahis*, wherever caught, and under whatever circumstances. Outram turned suddenly to the speaker and said: 'I have always observed that those who are the most bloodthirsty in talk are the least remarkable for personal courage.' Again. He was out with a portion of the force, endeavouring to cut off a body of mutineers, and had sat down on the ground to rest with some of his officers. A young armed rebel was brought in, whose demeanour clearly indicated—and possibly that of his custodians led him to believe—that his end was at hand. His captor, after reporting the case to the General, seemed to suggest and expect that the trembling youth should be instantly hung upon one of the neighbouring trees. 'Never shall I forget,' are the words of the notedly gallant soldier who has retailed this incident, 'the look of intense disgust and scorn in Outram's face,'—a response to the implied demand very different from what had been awaited. The unfortunate individual who had spoken, immediately withdrew, abashed and disconcerted.

The same comrade, not by any means the least distinguished of his officers, once accompanied him to the rear of the camp, to inspect a detachment of native cavalry that had lately joined. The native officer in command, after paying his respects to Outram (who, as usual, treated him with the most kindly courtesy), said he would like to produce some letters which he possessed from English officers under whom he had served. His request was readily granted, and, retiring to his small tent, he presently returned with the much-prized testimonials. The first paper put into the General's hands at once aroused his interest. 'I was standing,' says our informant, 'close behind Outram, and heard him speaking to himself as he read the letter. Thus he soliloquised: "Ah, poor Charley: *he* could appreciate a good soldier!" The manner in which these few words were spoken sufficed to convince the hearer that he who uttered them had the warmest feeling towards the subject of his contemplation. It was indeed a worthy tribute *in memoriam*, for the writer of the native officer's certificate was no other than Sir Charles Napier.

Major W. T. Johnson, to whom reference has already been made in the preceding chapter, relates that, when a subaltern with the army in Oudh, he was lying dangerously ill with fever at the 'Alam-bágh. Outram constantly came and visited him, sending him any delicacy he could obtain. Finding that he had only a thin *vauti* (native tent), which protected him insufficiently from the heat of the sun, the General had an extra covering put on. 'By this means I believe he saved my life,' is the narrator's grateful testimony in later years to the good deed performed.

Captain Robertson has added a few reminiscences of service with the 78th in Oudh to those already contributed for the Persian campaign. Noting the pleasure with which the men again met their General—who, for the few days he

was at Kánhpur, got up sports for their amusement, awarding prizes to the successful competitors—and pronouncing his unselfish and generous relinquishment of command to be characteristic of the man, he continues :—‘ During the time we were shut up in the Residency, Sir James was untiring in his exertions to do everything in his power for us. He daily visited the sick and wounded, speaking words of kindness when he could do nothing better. His genial face and kind-hearted words did more for me ¹ than all the skill of doctors. . . . At the ‘Alam-bágh, he never harassed the soldiers by calling them out a moment before wanted to repel the repeated attacks of the rebels, and he dismissed them as soon as he could dispense with their services, generally ordering a dram or half a dram of rum to be issued if he had it to give. The result of this was that when an alarm was given the men were on the ground at once.’ Captain Robertson also notices Sir James’s habit of communicating news to the men, instancing that of the fall of Dehli which reached him on the eve of the advance from ‘Alambágh to Lakhnau. ‘He at once ordered the 78th to be fallen in, and read the letter to us, calling upon the regiment to give three cheers for Brigadier Wilson and the soldiers at Dehli, and three cheers more for *ourselves*, who were going to advance on the Residency.’

A General Officer thus illustrates this latter trait :—‘ Nothing could exceed the courtesy and kindness of Sir James to all under his command, of whatever rank. Whilst in camp at Alum Bágh, when we visited the outlying pickets, who do not turn out to pay compliments, the men would all come forward to meet the General and salute him. They would come up and pat his charger, and ask him if he had any news. On one occasion a *cossid* had brought him some

¹ He had been severely wounded in the head by a bullet.

welcome intelligence: he said to me, "I will tell you shortly—" and we galloped off. When surrounded by the men he pulled the letter out of his pocket and read out to us all the report of one of Sir Colin's victories over the rebels. He then turned to me and said, "I wanted to be the first to let these fine fellows have the good news." His kindness and attention to the sick and wounded were very great.'

CHAPTER V.

1858.

Final capture of Lakhnau under Sir Colin Campbell—'The Oudh Proclamation.'

WHILE Sir James Outram watched over Lakhnau at the 'Alam-bágh, measures were being carried out with more or less success for the suppression of the mutiny and rebellion elsewhere. Sir Colin Campbell, after his hard-won and memorable victory of December 6 at Kánhpur, was delayed by want of transport in prosecuting further active operations for more than a fortnight; for the safe conveyance to Allahabad of the families rescued from Lakhnau necessitated a large supply of carts which could ill be spared from strictly military objects. On December 24, however, the Commander-in-Chief's camp was again in movement, his plan being to march by the right bank of the Ganges upon Fathgarh, to which point the rebels would be forcibly driven by a column from Dehli on the one side, and a brigade of rifles with cavalry and artillery detached from his own force, on the other. A long halt at Fathgarh followed the propitious entry into that devastated cantonment and recovery of the Do-áb; and here it was that the Chief, abandoning for the time all other considerations, and confining his immediate operations to the scour of the surrounding country, and reduction of insurgent villages, applied himself to give effect to the Governor-General's resolution to bring back, at the earliest possible date, the capital of Oudh into British possession. Having made his dispositions accordingly, and

satisfied himself of the departure of a siege-train from Agra, he left Fathgarh for Kánhpur again on February 1, reaching the latter station in four days. The whole month was busily occupied in preparing for the new advance upon Lakhnau. From day to day came some accession of strength to a force which already promised to surmount *all* opposition. Among other occurrences of the day, an anxiously expected convoy of ladies (one of whom was Lady Outram), on its downward way to Calcutta, came in from Agra with the siege-train. Sir Colin availed himself of the Governor-General's presence at Allahabad to run down to that city and confer personally with his lordship.

On February 28¹ the Commander-in-Chief took his departure from Kánhpur, and coming up with, and assuming the command of, the army which had, a few days before, left its encamping-ground between Unao and Banni, was in conference with Outram at the 'Alam-bágh on March 1. They had already been in communication on the subject of the contemplated attack. As the 'Calcutta Reviewer,' before quoted, expresses it, 'very perfect information had been received by Sir James Outram of the designs and defensive work of the enemy;' and Sir Colin had invited his suggestions regarding the line of operations to be adopted. But when first replying to the Chief on February 17, Sir James

¹ At this time, in the words of a clear and very able writer: 'The whole of the siege-train had come up; the long files of hackeries, laden with ammunition, had passed on. The engineer park, the artillery park, the commissariat supplies, the legions of camp-followers, the dense battalions, the glittering squadrons, the well-horsed batteries, had traversed the bridges, and disappeared across the muddy waters of the Ganges amidst the sandy plains of Oude. Such a force India had never seen. Under the Commander-in-Chief, 17 battalions of infantry, 15 of which were British; 28 squadrons of cavalry, including four English regiments; 54 light and 80 heavy guns and mortars, were arrayed; while from the south, right across the country of Oude, Franks, with 3 European and 6 Gourka battalions, with 20 guns, was pressing; and from the south-east, Jung Bahadoor, with 9,000 men and 24 guns, was marching, all to rendezvous together beneath the stately palaces of Lucknow.'

had been misinformed regarding the force which would be available ; so he afterwards, on the 29th, submitted amended proposals adapted to what, he had gathered from officers then in his camp (but still not on official authority), would be the real strength of Sir Colin's army. In both of these letters, operations on the left (or northern) bank of the Gúmti formed a main feature, thereby securing the continuous enfilading fire of our artillery upon the enemy's positions along the right bank. While advocating certain movements from the Dilkushá side, the writer was in favour of delivering the principal attack exactly in the opposite direction, viz. from the Musa-bágh, or western quarter of the city. The enemy, after the manner of Orientals, expecting a repetition of the old operations against them, had partially completed three strong lines of defence to frustrate attack from the Dilkushá and Chhár-bágh, and in so doing had neglected both their left flank, exposed from the further bank of the Gúmti, and the hitherto unmolested western quarters in their rear. Sir James understood, however, that it was contemplated first to turn attention to the capture of the Kaiser-bágh, and thence to complete the reduction of the rest of the city. Accordingly he remarked:—

‘It is my belief that the capture of the Kaiser Bagh once effected, the city will be evacuated by the rebels, the quarter towards Moosa Bagh being free for their egress ; and in that case we shall not inflict so heavy a blow, as if the main attack was from the Moosa Bagh side, hemmed in as the enemy would be on this side and on the other side by the Goomtee. The mere capture of the Kaiser Bagh can be most easily effected from this side, I have little doubt. Not, however, by the route you formerly followed, for every obstruction in their power has been prepared on the river front of the Kaiser Bagh ; but by forcing the canal about

half a mile or so above Banks' house (between it and the Char Bagh bridge) where there is a considerable extent of open ground on the other side of the canal, and a tolerably wide street penetrates into the city from thence to the Kaiser Bagh; by operating in which direction we should turn the defensive works which the enemy have prepared on the direct approach from Dilkoosha, as well as those on the main street leading from the Char Bagh bridge to the Residency; and I do not anticipate much difficulty in penetrating from house to house, and holding all that intervenes between the said open ground (where batteries might be erected, the play of which would expel the enemy from the intermediate houses) and the south-western angle of the Kaiser Bagh, which possesses no defences in that quarter, that I can hear of. If there are guns at all in that direction, as reported, they must be outside, in the houses and streets leading to the Kaiser Bagh. No works in the Kaiser Bagh itself have been there prepared for artillery, I believe.' This movement would be facilitated by the fire of the heavy artillery from the opposite bank of the Gúm-ti. 'But,' he went on to remark, after giving further details, 'the Kaiser Bagh does not command the city, and the moral effect of its occupation does not cause the evacuation of the city, which we may reasonably expect it would do, egress towards Moosa Bagh being open to the rebels. Then we should have to prosecute the capture of the rest of the city by degrees, whereas I believe, that once in possession of the Emaumbara, Shushmahal, Doulet-Khana, and Muchee Bawn, from the Moosa Bagh side, the entire city would be at your mercy; but if the Kaiser Bagh still held out, its capture could as easily be effected afterwards from that side, as from this quarter above mentioned.'

After the Commander-in-Chief's arrival, Sir James

Outram did not remain long at the 'Alam-bâgh. His division had now become part of the magnificent army which, composed of 20,000 men and strengthened with 180 guns, was about to reassert British supremacy in Oudh, by the re-possession of its rebellious capital. He himself had been called upon to fill a higher command—that to which his position as next in military rank to the Commander-in-Chief only entitled him, but which nevertheless his modesty led him to regard as a most gratifying mark of confidence. A letter to Lady Outram of March 4, dated from Bibiapur just below Dilkushâ—on the way to cross the Gûmti at the point where a temporary bridge had been prepared for his use—refers to the fact. 'The Chief,' he wrote, 'has done me the high honour of placing me in command of a large force, which is to occupy a position on the other side of the Goomtee to-morrow. . . . I anticipate little or no opposition, so do not be alarmed should this reach you before you learn the result. . . . A higher honour could not have been conferred on me than this command.'

Well might he express satisfaction with the force placed at his disposal, a powerful *corps d'armée*, according to the scale of our Indian armaments—complete in all arms, and composed of first-rate troops. Moreover, he acquired an admirable second in command and leader of his cavalry, in Brigadier-General Sir James Hope Grant; an association which enabled him, as usual, to add one more to the long list of his trusted friends.

As with the other great events of the Indian Mutiny, the story of the re-capture of Lakhnau by Sir Colin Campbell and the fine body of troops under his command, and the re-establishment of British supremacy in Oudh, has already been told in detail. Any pretence at a description of this brilliant passage of history is now disavowed. Outram's share in the first of the two achievements is officially set

forth in the Memorandum accompanying the Commander-in-Chief's despatch to Government of March 22. But no account of his own, official or non-official, could render justice to the service performed by him on that occasion. Before reproducing his narrative, therefore, we shall say a few words on the nature and importance of the duty entrusted to his hands.

It had been already proved that the defences of Lakhnau were of no common kind, and that the defenders, whatever dissensions might arise from time to time in their counsels, could act with courage and determination on an emergency. The lines of works set up, and the preparations generally made in September 1857 to resist the British advance, were such that it was found impossible to remove with safety the families then besieged in the Residency. The intended relief thus became involuntarily a reinforcement. Again, in the following November, while the relief or withdrawal was actually effected by a fresh body of troops, it was considered unadvisable to reconquer or to occupy the city. The only assertion of sovereignty that could be made was the maintenance of a watching force at the 'Alam-bâgh; and that force was fortunately in such good hands that its existence was a cause of weakness and humiliation to the neighbouring enemy. It dimmed the prestige which the rebels would have acquired by undisturbed possession of Oudh; and it humbled their pride by defeating their attempts to harass its movements or dislodge it from its chosen position. Now that a sufficient army had been brought to the spot, and that Lakhnau was again to be entered with every prospect of successful occupation, it was prudently resolved to move upon the city in two directions; that is to say, by the further side of the Gúm-ti, as well as by the Dilkushá and Martinière and across the dry bed of the canal. Outram's progress with his division would guide the

remainder of the force; for until he had succeeded in turning the first or canal line of the enemy's works, no forward movement could be made from the Dilkushá. He did his part ably: crossing the river on March 6, to pitch his camp near the Faizabad road; driving off the enemy who attacked him on the following day; and on March 9, seizing upon the Chatarwala Kothi, called by the Commander-in-Chief the key of the enemy's position in that quarter. On March 10, Outram employed himself in strengthening his position, repelling the attack of the enemy, and directing the fire of his batteries upon the Kaisar-bágh and main street. The programme prescribed for his guidance was 'all carried out' by him 'with the most marked success.' On the night of the 12th he was reinforced with heavy guns and mortars, and directed to increase his fire on the Kaisar-bágh. This building and its surroundings fell on the morning of the 14th, to the assault of the main force under Sir Colin, which, vigorously fighting its onward way, had successfully stormed the more difficult and stoutly defended positions. On the 16th Outram, having recrossed the Gúmti, 'advanced according to order, through the Chattar Manzil, to take the Residency.' A movement of the enemy in retreat across a bridge becoming at this juncture apparent, 'he was able, almost without opposition,' to seize upon positions which secured the full repossession of the city. Three days later, aided by Sir Hope Grant, he drove the enemy from their 'last position . . . on the line of the Goomtee.'

Sir Colin Campbell's interesting report of the whole proceedings also contains the following paragraph in reference to Sir James Outram:—'It was matter of real gratification to me to be able to entrust the Trans-Goomtee operation to this very distinguished officer, and after that had been conducted to my perfect satisfaction, to bring him forward again to put the finishing stroke on the enemy, while the extended

position in the town was of necessity held by the troops who had won it. My thanks are eminently due to him, and I trust he will receive them as heartily as they are offered.'

We reproduce the memorandum by Sir James to which reference has been made.¹ It shows that he had carried out his instructions to the letter from day to day, calmly, cautiously, and yet with promptitude and daring when occasion called for the exercise of these qualities:—

1. On the morning of the 6th instant, shortly before daybreak, I proceeded with the force named in the margin,² to cross the Goomtee River, over the two temporary bridges which had been constructed by the order of his Excellency, the whole of the cavalry being under the command of Brigadier-General Sir James Hope Grant, K.C.B.; the infantry under that of Brigadier Walpole; the field artillery under Brigadier D. Wood, C.B.; the siege artillery, which subsequently joined me, under Lieut.-Colonel Riddell, R.A. After proceeding a short distance in a northerly direction, the enemy became visible on our left flank, and on being approached by the cavalry, they were discovered to be in considerable force, chiefly sowars. The 2nd Punjaub Cavalry then attacked on the right, while Major Smith, of the Queen's Bays, with

¹ Inverted commas show extracts from the Commander-in-Chief's official despatch. The plan at the end of the volume will enable the reader to follow the course of the several troops employed on the first occasion, and help, moreover, to elucidate the operations of September and November. Some notice of the extent of ground traversed will be gathered from the circumstance that Outram's first position on the Fuzabad road east of the city is at a distance of seven or eight miles from the 'Musa Bâgh' on the west of the plan. But his camp at the latter place was pitched three miles further still.

² Lieutenant-Colonel D'Aguilar's Troop, R.H.A.; Major Remington's and Captain McKinnon's Troops; Bengal H.A. under Lieutenant-Colonel P. Turner; Capts. Gibbon and Middleton's Light Field Batteries, Royal Artillery, and Head Quarters Field Artillery Brigade; Head Quarters Cavalry Division and of 1st Cavalry Brigade; H.M.'s 2nd D. G. [Bays]; H.M.'s 9th Lancers; 2nd Punjab Cavalry. Detachments 1st and 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Capts. Watson and Stanford; 3rd Infantry Division under Brigadier-General R. Walpole:—

5th Brigade, Brigadier Douglas, { H.M.'s 23rd Fusiliers, H.M.'s 79th
C.B. { Highlanders, 1st Bengal Fusiliers.

6th Brigade, Brigadier Horsford, { 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 3rd Bat-
C.B. { talion, ditto, 2nd Punjab Infantry.

two squadrons of his own regiment, one squadron of the 9th Lancers, and Lieut.-Colonel D'Aguilar's troop of Horse Artillery, advanced from our left. The enemy were immediately driven back, and pursued to the banks of the river, many being cut up; but I regret to state that in this charge the gallant Major Smith was killed. Our camp was then formed on the Fyzabad road, about half a mile in advance of the village of Chintah, on the Lucknow side. Early on the following morning, March 7, the enemy made a smart attack on our advanced picquets, and brought out several guns under cover of ravines and clumps of trees in our front. They were, however, speedily withdrawn, on our skirmishers and horse artillery and Captain Middleton's field battery, protected by the cavalry, coming to the front and opening their fire. The artillery practice on this occasion, as on the preceding day, was admirable.

2. The following day, the 8th instant, under the instructions of his Excellency, Colonel D'Aguilar's troop of Horse Artillery and the 9th Lancers re-crossed the river to the head-quarters camp, and the siege guns named in the margin¹ joined me. Having decided upon an attack on the enemy's position, on the next morning, the 9th instant, I caused an entrenchment for eight 24-pounder guns and three 8-inch howitzers, to be constructed during the night. The battery was armed, and commenced its fire at daybreak with excellent effect, after which the right column of infantry, accompanied by Captain Gibbon's field battery, under Brigadier-General Walpole, covered by a cloud of skirmishers, commanded by Brigadier Horsford, C.B., and supported by the 5th Brigade under Brigadier Douglas, drove the enemy through the jungles, walls, and villages, which afforded them an excellent cover, and bringing the right shoulders forward, occupied the Fyzabad road. In the meantime, the left column of attack, composed of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, supported by two companies of the 79th Highlanders, which had been held in readiness on the left of the battery, together with the horse artillery under Brigadier Wood, which had been formed in rear of the bridge across the Kokral, advanced, and in concert with the right column, carried the Chuker Kothee (or Yellow-house), the key of the rebel position, in gallant style, and thereby turned the strong line of entrench-

¹ 24-pounder guns, 8; 8-inch howitzers, 4; 8-inch mortars, 10. Total, 22.

ment which had been constructed by the enemy on the right bank of the Goomtee. Of this success the skirmishers on the other side of the river were subsequently apprised by Lieutenant Butler, of the Bengal Fusiliers, who swam across the Goomtee, and climbing the parapet, remained in that position for a considerable time, under heavy fire of musketry, until the work was occupied.¹ After the occupation of the Chuker Kothee, we drove the enemy rapidly through the old irregular cavalry lines, and suburbs, to the Badshah Bagh. The fortified gates of this strong-walled enclosure were blown open, and the garden occupied, where two guns were found by our troops. Three guns and a howitzer were then placed in position to enfilade the works in rear of the Martinière. A battery of two 24-pounder guns and two 8-inch howitzers was placed near the river to keep down the fire from the town. A battery for five mortars was constructed during the night, and in the morning commenced playing on the Kaiser Bagh. Four heavy guns were also placed in a work thrown up by the enemy at the east entrance into the Badshah Bagh.

3. On the 10th, we were occupied in strengthening our position, the enemy being in force in the suburbs in our front, from which they made an attack in considerable numbers on a picquet held by the 79th Highlanders, but were repulsed with heavy loss. General Sir James Hope Grant occupied himself the while in patrolling the vicinity, during which operation a most valuable young officer, Major Sandford, of the 5th Punjaub Irregular Cavalry, was unfortunately killed; but the enemy suffered severely.

4. During this night, another battery was constructed at the Badshah Bagh for four 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, and five 8-inch mortars, which kept up a vertical and direct fire on the defences in the interior of the Kaiser Bagh. Two more 24-pounders were also brought to bear on the Mess-house, and on the Kaiser Bagh, in compliance with the instructions of his Excellency. I made arrangements to attack the suburbs in the vicinity of the iron and stone bridges, and shortly after daylight, on the 11th instant, the right column, as per margin,² formed on the Fyzabad road under the immediate command of Brigadier

¹ For this singularly gallant action Lieutenant Butler received the Victoria Cross.

² 79th Highlanders; 2nd and 3rd battalion, Rifle Brigade; 1st Bengal Fusiliers; Captain Gibbon's Light Field Battery, and two 24-pounders.

General Walpole, and worked its way, covered by its skirmishers, through the town, until it reached the mosque on the old cantonment road which commands the approach to the iron bridge.

5. The left column, as per margin,¹ proceeded along the lower road, towards the iron bridge. These two columns were connected by a strong chain of skirmishers, which, as well as the left column, met with considerable opposition, as the enemy opened three guns on them from the opposite side of the river, and also held the ground in great strength in front of the rifle skirmishers, commanded by Brevet-Major Warren, Captains Wilmot and Thynne, and Lieutenant Grey, who all behaved most gallantly; Captain Thynne, a most promising officer, I regret to say, being mortally wounded. This column occupied the houses down to the river's bank, and the head of the iron bridge, to the right of which the two 24-pounder guns were placed in battery. The spirit and dash of the men during this critical operation were most remarkable, and merit my highest commendation. Lieutenant Moorsom, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, who had been deputed by me to guide the column, was killed on the spot while reconnoitring on the opposite side of the road. I deplore sincerely the loss of this most gallant and promising young officer, whose soldier-like zeal and acquirements rendered him an ornament to his profession.

6. Having left the Bengal Fusiliers posted in the mosque on the cantonment road, I proceeded with the remainder of the right column in that direction, and shortly afterwards met Sir J. H. Grant's Cavalry and Horse Artillery, which in the meantime had been operating on the extreme right. Turning now towards the stone bridge, we surprised the camp of the rebel 15th Irregular Horse, whose standards and two guns were captured by the Rifles, the enemy flying in all directions over the plain, many being cut up by our cavalry.

7. I then penetrated to the head of the stone bridge, through the strong and dense suburbs, without encountering any material opposition. The enemy, however, were able to command it with guns, as well as with musketry from the tops of several high and strong stone houses on the opposite side of the river, and the position was, moreover, too distant, and approaches too intricate, to

¹ Two 24-pounder guns; three field battery guns, Royal Artillery; 23rd R. W. Fusiliers; 2nd Punjaub Infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt.

warrant my holding it permanently with the force at my disposal. I therefore withdrew to the mosque at the cross road, already occupied by the Bengal Fusiliers, our route being through suburbs in which we destroyed a quantity of munitions of war, and finally we retired to camp, when the arrangements for the occupation of the iron bridge had been completed.

8. During the nights of the 12th and 13th, having been reinforced by four 18-pounder guns, two 10-inch howitzers, five 10-inch mortars, and four 5½-inch mortars, three batteries were erected, from which five 10-inch mortars, ten 8-inch mortars, four 24-pounder guns were brought to bear upon the Kaiser Bagh, on the fall of which, on the morning of the 14th, the guns and mortars were turned on the Residency, and the buildings to the right of the bridge. During this operation, Lieutenant Cuthbert, of the Royal Artillery, brought himself prominently to notice by extinguishing a fire in a small building in front of his battery, in a very dangerous and exposed position. The operations connected with a breastwork across the iron bridge were conducted by Lieutenant Wynne, R.E., and Sergeant Paul, who displayed great coolness and resolution in the face of a heavy and continual fire.

9. Having been ordered to join his Excellency's camp, my operations on the north side of the Goomtee were here brought to a close.

10. Our casualties during these proceedings amounted to five officers killed and nine wounded, and the loss in men, including sergeants, was twenty-one killed and one hundred and four wounded; total, twenty-six killed and one hundred and thirteen wounded. With the exception of the officers, the above statement of casualties does not include the cavalry division. General Sir J. H. Grant having been ordered off into the districts, neither his casualty list, nor his notice of his officers, has been received. From the peculiar nature of the fighting, the actual loss of the enemy is difficult to ascertain. But I cannot estimate it at less than two thousand throughout the whole operations.

11. On the 16th instant, under instructions from his Excellency, I proceeded to the Kaiser Bagh, where I found the 5th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Douglas, C.B., comprising the 23rd Fusiliers, the 79th Highlanders, and the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, to which his Excellency had added her Majesty's 20th Regiment and the Ferozepore Regiment of Sikhs.

12. Vast numbers of the enemy having been seen crossing the

stone bridge from the city, apparently with the design of attacking Brigadier-General Walpole's camp, on the north of the Goomtee, his Excellency ordered me to press our movement. I immediately ordered the advance, and took possession of the Residency with little opposition, the 23rd Fusiliers charging through the gateway, and driving the enemy before them at the point of the bayonet, the remainder of the brigade following them in reserve.

13. The enemy having been dislodged from the Residency, two companies of the 23rd, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bell, accompanied by Captain Gould Weston, who pointed out the road, pressed rapidly forward, and captured the brass gun, which was in position to sweep the iron bridge, after some opposition. In the meanwhile the Residency height was crowned by a field battery of Madras Artillery, under the command of Major Cotter, which kept up a heavy fire on the Muchhee Bhowun. This battery was subsequently withdrawn, and replaced by two 68-pounder guns of the Naval Brigade. On their arrival, the Bengal Fusiliers moved to the iron bridge, and shortly afterwards advanced together with the Regiment of Ferozepore, and took Muchhee Bhowun and the Emmambara, the enemy precipitately retiring, and abandoning six guns. One company of the Fusiliers, under Captain Salisbury, was pushed on to the Roomidurwaza Gate, where another gun was captured. The 79th were then brought up to occupy the Emmambara, and the remainder of the Bengal Fusiliers were placed in the Muchhee Bhowun.

14. On the morning of the 17th, Brigadier Douglas caused the Hosinabad mosque and the Dowlutkhana, in which two guns and a small mortar were found, to be occupied by a company of the 79th Highlanders. About one P.M., with the force named in the margin,¹ I moved towards the block of buildings known as Shurfoodowlah's house, having previously occupied the entrance to the Chowk with three companies of the 79th Highlanders. On arriving at the Juma Musjid, nine cartloads of powder were found in a court-yard in the rear, which impeded our progress. I therefore directed it to be destroyed, under the supervision of the Engineers. I regret, however, to have to state that, from some accidental cause, the powder ignited.

¹ Captain Middleton's Field Battery; two 8-inch howitzers; one company, Native Sappers; one wing, H.M.'s 20th Foot; one wing, H.M.'s 23rd Foot; one wing, H.M.'s 79th Foot; Brasyer's Sikhs.

15. Captain Clarke, R.E., and Lieutenant Brownlow, B.E., who had greatly distinguished themselves, have since died from the effects of the explosion, in whose melancholy death the service has sustained a heavy loss, which I sincerely deplore. About thirty men shared their fate, and the rest of the working party were more or less injured.

16. I then sent two companies of the 79th Highlanders, with one 8-inch howitzer, to take possession of Shurfoodowlah's house, which was occupied without any casualty, the enemy precipitately retreating, although they had made every preparation for a vigorous defence. An iron gun and a brass gun, with an ammunition waggon, together with several small guns, all in position, were captured.

17. I then reinforced the three companies of the 79th in the Chowk, with five companies of the 20th Regiment, and completed the chain of communication.

18. On the 18th, Brigadier Douglas ordered Lieutenant Gordon, commanding a picquet of the 20th, to clear the houses in his front, which he effected, much to the Brigadier's satisfaction, killing twenty-three of the enemy.

19. The stone bridge was found to be undermined, and the circumstance reported to his Excellency.

20. On the morning of the 19th, under instructions from his Excellency, I proceeded to attack the Moosa Bagh, the force named in the margin¹ being assembled for that purpose.

21. At about half-past six A.M., I proceeded to Gao Ghât, and found Ali Nuki Khan's house occupied by the enemy, who opened a sharp fire of musketry on the head of the column. Two companies of the 79th, led by Lieutenant Evereth, being ordered to advance, soon drove the enemy out, and took possession of it. Considerable delay here took place in consequence of having to break through a thick wall, during which time I ordered up a wing of the Bengal Fusiliers to occupy the house.

22. The troops then advanced through the suburbs without opposition towards Moosa Bagh, which position the enemy was

¹ Two squadrons, 9th Lancers; one company, R.E.; one company, Native Sappers; one field battery (Captain Middleton's); two 18-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, four 8-inch mortars, under Captain Carleton, B.A.; three companies, 20th Regiment; seven companies, 23rd Regiment; 79th Highlanders; 2nd Punjab Infantry.

reported to occupy with thirteen guns and five or six thousand men.

23. On arriving on the open ground, two guns were opened on the column, and the enemy appeared in great strength on the road. I immediately ordered out skirmishers from the 79th and 23rd, and Captain Middleton's battery to the front, whose fire soon silenced that of the enemy, during which time the Lancers made a flank movement to the enemy's left, and on our advance their whole force took to flight, abandoning their guns; on finding which I sent to order back the heavy guns under escort of the three companies of the 20th Regiment, as being no longer required.

24. The two squadrons of the 9th Lancers followed up the pursuit for about four miles, when they overtook the enemy, captured six guns, and killed about a hundred of them, the rest dispersing over the country and escaping by the aid of the nullahs and broken feature of the country. The conduct of the officers and men of the 9th was most gallant, as they undauntedly charged masses of the enemy.

25. The field artillery and infantry followed in support as rapidly as possible, and captured four more guns, making in all twelve, which I believe to be the total possessed by the enemy, no trace of the reported thirteenth gun being observable.

26. I then occupied the Moosa Bagh, with the 2nd Punjaub Infantry under Major Green, and withdrew the rest of the troops to their quarters in the city.

27. Throughout the course of these operations, which were very laborious, the cheerfulness and zeal of both officers and men were most conspicuous, and merit my warmest thanks.¹

The list of casualties in Outram's force (exclusive of Grant's cavalry division) from March 6 to March 19, shows 8 officers and 63 men killed; 13 officers and 154 men wounded. Total, 238 of all ranks.

That Outram desired to cross the iron bridge on the 14th, in order to complete the effect of the Commander-in-Chief's capture of the Kaisar-bagh by a crushing rear attack, was stated

¹ The remainder of this despatch, containing commendations of officers engaged, will be found in Appendix P.

at the time by Dr. Russell, the 'Times' correspondent,¹ who pointed out the important results which might have been looked for from such a movement if it had been permitted. The matter has been fully discussed in history, and we are content to leave it in the historian's hands for disposal. The same may be said of the failure on the part of the cavalry and horse artillery brigade from 'Alam-bâgh to fill the position assigned to it on the west of the city during the final operations of the 19th—a *contretemps* whereby was completely frustrated Lord Clyde's very perfect plan for cutting off the escape of the rebels whom Outram swept out of the city by his advance on the Musa-bâgh. Sir James made the best possible use of his handful of cavalry—only two squadrons of lancers—but the absence of the splendid force which should have effectually closed the outlet, rendered of little avail both these efforts and the ably conducted operations of Sir Hope Grant on the other side of the Gúmti.

Thus the final and sweeping blow which Sir James had so long anticipated, and of which he had from first to last done his best to ensure the completeness, became little more than a crushing defeat to a slippery enemy. Instead of its securing the virtual pacification of Oudh at one stroke, as he had hoped it would have done, it left the Province swarming

¹ *My Diary in India*, vol. i. p. 335. One of Sir James's staff recollects Sir Colin's parting words that morning: 'Take care of yourself, Outram—remember you're no chicken'—a friendly piece of advice which might well have been reciprocated. It may have been on this day that Sir James met with an adventure which we shall allow him to relate in his own words—so far as the memory of our informant can be relied upon—premising that, for obvious reasons, he may not have been in the best of tempers. 'I was on the way back from head-quarters,' he said, 'and found some of Peel's guns blocking my way. I desired the sailors to make way for me; when I heard a squeaky voice below me call out (with an expletive I may not repeat), "Who are you that dares to interfere with my command?" Looking down, I beheld a very small midshipman, and made my humble apologies to him, explaining that I was in a hurry to get to my command across the river.' He found out afterwards that the irate naval officer was a juvenile lord.

with armed rebels still capable of resistance. The very contingency he wished to prevent had occurred. What trouble came of it is too well known to call for further allusion here. Sir James Outram had not desired a holocaust of individual mutineers and rebels—far otherwise; but he did expect the annihilation of the enemy as an armed and organised body, with the surrender or death of their leaders. Read by the light of these events and their consequences, the remarks already quoted from his suggestions for the assault, in reference to attack from the Musa-bágh quarter and the necessity of guarding against escape from that side, acquire a force which need not be demonstrated.

The burden of care which this disappointing mishap entailed on the Chief Commissioner of Oudh was not, however, to rest upon Sir James's shoulders. He had already succeeded to the highest appointment in the gift of Government—a seat in the Governor-General's Council as military member—and had expressed his anxiety to enter upon it before the hot weather advanced and the reorganisation of the Province was commenced. He was now delighted to hear that a successor to him as Chief Commissioner had been appointed; and that the person selected was not only, as he had recommended, an experienced civilian, but one upon whose judgment and clemency he could thoroughly rely—Mr. (now Sir Robert) Montgomery, the well-known coadjutor of Sir John Lawrence in the Panjáb. The desire to be relieved of his office had been increased by a proceeding of Lord Canning's in which he could by no means concur—which had indeed astounded and distressed him beyond measure, and which betokened a line of policy towards Oudh that he could not carry out with satisfaction, being in his opinion unjustly severe and calculated to drive every noble to desperation. The Governor-General sent up for issue a proclamation which simply confiscated all lands in the Province with the excep-

This may be said to have been his closing administrative act in Oudh. That his last days at Banks' House, where he had taken up his quarters, were busy ones, may well be understood, but all he could do was to attend to the current calls of the hour and prepare the way as far as possible for his successor. We have a touching incident recorded in Dr. Russell's 'Diary' which shows the General in his old part,—kindly reassuring an unfortunate Oudh noble who had hospitably entertained our officers in the days when peace and conviviality reigned at Lakhnau. He had been much maltreated by the rebels, yet sought humbly, and amid the rebuffs of subordinates, to clear himself from suspicion in our sight. The poor old man did not long survive the anxieties and hardships of the time.

One or two other reminiscences of the 'Bayard of India' may be gathered from the same graphic source of contemporaneous information. Dr. Russell's first impressions of him are too characteristic of Sir James to be overlooked: 'His forehead is broad, massive, sagacious, but open; his eye, which is covered by a shaggy brow, is dark, full of penetration, quick, and expressive; his manner natural and gracious; his speech is marked by a slight hesitation when choosing a word, but it is singularly correct and forcible; and his smile is very genial and sympathetic. He is of the middle size; is very stoutly built, and has a slight roundness of the shoulder, as if from study or application at the desk.' Again he speaks of him at Banks' House as 'sitting like a guest at his own table, which is crowded by the various officers whom his hospitality pours in on his perplexed A.D.Cs.'

His views on the annexation are thus adverted to: 'The General expresses the most liberal views about the settlement of Oude, and is, as I gathered from one or two expressions, shaken in his belief that his advice for the annexation of the Province was quite sound, seeing what the

results have been. General Outram is one of those men who are great enough to admit they may have been mistaken; he is of that true courage which fears no moral danger from the avowal of an error; and if he really thinks he was wrong in respect to Oude, I am certain he will confess as much.' And once more we get a glimpse of the stern soldier—versus the civilian—as the warm advocate of clemency. 'General Outram and he' (the new Financial Commissioner of Oude) 'did not at all agree in the policy which should be adopted towards the rebellious native chiefs and others. The former is for a large and generous and general amnesty, except in the case of actual murderers; the latter is for most vigorous prosecution and punishment.'

On another occasion Dr. Russell was struck by the manner in which he dealt with an abstract strategical question:—'Sir James combated that view with ability and at much length; and in doing so evinced a remarkable knowledge of famous military operations.'

Mr. Montgomery arrived on April 3, and Sir James Outram took his departure on the following day. It need hardly be observed that the farewell greetings he received were of more than ordinary warmth. Few men have left more sincerely attached comrades behind than he did at each stage of his career. He declined an escort for himself and the members of his staff who accompanied him, relying on his stout stick for his own protection; and so he quietly took his final leave of Lakhnau. He had, as he foretold, served his last campaign. But he had not foreseen its magnitude and how different were to be its results to himself from those which he had contemplated when riding, a volunteer with Havelock's force, along the familiar road he now retraversed, for the last time, in peace!

CHAPTER VI.

1858-1863.

Council of the Governor-General—Minutes and Opinions on Questions of the day—Calcutta Address—Departure for England—Tour to Continent, and Egypt—Statues and Shield—London Address and Presentation of Plate—Lord Canning's Funeral—Honorary Degree of D.C.L. conferred at Oxford—Return to Continent—Last Illness and Death.

LORD CANNING was at Allahabad when Outram arrived there, *en route* to take his seat as military member of the Supreme Government of India. Although a feeling of unpleasantness may have been occasioned on both sides owing to the correspondence, and divergence of opinion, on the Proclamation to the people of Oudh, the Governor General welcomed his new colleague with all outward cordiality, inviting him to be his guest. He had just despatched Lord Mark Kerr to relieve Azamgarh, then threatened by Kunwar Singh, who had achieved some kind of success in his latest encounter with British troops; and there was otherwise much to keep him anxious and engage his attention. The earliest evidence of Outram's presence at Calcutta is contained in a letter to Captain Eastwick, dated May 2, detailing circumstances of the deepest personal interest connected with the Mutiny, and—in spite of the writer's assurance that he is '*crushed* with work, principally the drudgery of demi-official correspondence,' resulting from his Persian and Indian commands—discoursing wisely on matters of political import. Of Oudh he has heard good accounts, and he '*hopes and*

believes' that his successor in the administration of that province will render it 'the most prosperous division of our Indian Empire.' The passages immediately following are deserving of extract :—

'By the aid of its existing landed aristocracy this may easily be done. And I think that even the most fanatically keen admirers of the North-West Province and Punjab systems are now inclined to admit that it is worth trying whether the universal laws of social progress do not hold, as regards India—whether the revenue of the State may not be maintained, and the happiness of the masses promoted, as satisfactorily under a system which recognises the legitimacy and advantages of capital and of baronial landlordism, as under a system which tends to reduce the entire population to the dreary and ever-sinking level of a demi-pauperised peasant proprietary. But even with the adoption of correct principles, and with a Montgomery to apply them, I fear that Oude will never flourish—as it easily might be made, and indubitably ought to be made to flourish—until half the foolscap work now imposed on our officials be abolished ; till we trust to the honour and qualifications of our officers, instead of to the mechanical checks and counter-checks which have rendered independent action nearly impossible, and degraded administrators into little better than petty clerks ; till we reduce the records of our criminal courts to a few brief notes of the leading facts elicited on trial ; vastly circumscribe the right of appeal ; greatly extend the summary criminal jurisdiction of our officers of police ; and thus release our highly educated and highly paid civil officers from the clerkly drudgery which leaves them no time for the performance of their higher duties, and from that soul-crushing system of references, official criticisms, and snubbings, &c., which makes them dread to do good, or move one step

beyond the "Regulations." These sentiments, however, are rank blasphemy in the estimation of the "governing classes," and I dare not give open expression to them.'

The observant reader will doubtless take account, with us, of a certain literary power exhibited in the above extract, which can hardly be attributed to mere practice and a long course of official experience. It is to be found in many of his original papers, especially those of later years. The long sentences are retained as of old, but they are clear and full of meaning; and there is a terseness in them which belongs to the school of frequent periods. Contrary to original intention, but constrained by limited space, we shall now bid farewell to Oudh—a province in the welfare of which Outram continued, up to the close of his Indian career, to take the liveliest interest, as the letters addressed to him, when in Council, by Majors Barrow, Hutchinson, and other officers employed there, would abundantly testify. The few years which remain to be chronicled in completion of these volumes, if of comparative repose from out-door excitement, were not devoid of brain-work. To the nature of this, in India, let us then glance, before renewing the thread of narration at a point where it is nearly expended.

As a Councillor, Sir James Outram's Minutes and Memoranda were numerous and of a varied and important kind. According to his own statement, he 'never appeared prominently in debate;' but if the tongue was sometimes tied, the pen was ever ready and active. Like his despatches in the field and political correspondence, justice could only be done to his writings in the Council chamber by separate publication. A volume might well be assigned to the materials available under each head. Our only course at present is to select advisedly from the more generally interesting topics. Nearly one hundred different themes

are registered in the rough manuscript records placed at our disposal ; and these are called only ' Selections.' Out of the number we take a few specimens which appear to merit especial notice:—

First and foremost comes the question of Army Reorganisation. Under the control of civilised governments, the natural consequence of a mutiny, like that which grew into rebellion in India—as in the case of a sudden and widely-spread visitation of famine or pestilence—is the appointment of a Commission of Enquiry ; and so it was with ourselves in 1857. On the very day that Outram, in completion of the abandonment of Lakhnáu, rejoined Sir Colin Campbell at 'Alam-bagh, falling back from the Dilkusha, the Court of Directors placed on record a suggestion that, so soon as circumstances would admit, the proper organisation of the army in India should form the subject of investigation by competent men. After some six months of official interchange of authoritative opinion, the matter was put into the hands of an officer selected by Lord Canning, to collect all the necessary data on which he himself could, with the aid of his council, form a conclusion to be submitted to the governing powers at home. In a Minute dated May 28, 1858, Sir James Outram expressed regret, and explained his reasons for regretting, that the Commission originally proposed had not been assembled ; and, about a fortnight later, showed further cause for adopting this view. At the same time, he stated his hearty concurrence in a recommendation which had been made in strong terms by the President, that immediate measures should be instituted to obtain additional European troops, adding :—

' Only the fear of exceeding my legitimate functions, and of appearing to interfere with those of the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, has hitherto prevented my pressing this subject on the attention of Government. I am not wont to take

gloomy views of public affairs, but I freely confess that I regard with uneasiness our present condition and prospects, even apart from the contingency of a European war. Every week's delay in the restoration of order adjourns consummation for months, weakens our moral influence, and proportionately augments the amount of physical force which will be necessary for the effectual maintenance of our authority in India, while the events of the last twelve months remain fresh in the memories of the discontented, the ambitious, and the warlike. The truest economy will be found in the maintenance, for some time to come, of such a strong European force as shall not only enable us to crush the bands now in arms against us, but confirm our numerous native levies in their allegiance. It will be so, should the peace of Europe remain unbroken. How much more so, should that peace be disturbed !'

On October 16, he thus reviewed some of the more important points discussed in a memorandum by Lord Canning, which had been sent for his perusal :—

I would not re-establish regular native infantry for Bengal, and would retain on the regular footing only the regiments which remained faithful, and those composed of the loyal remnants of other regiments ; these, I think, should have higher pay than the rest of the native army comprised of irregular and police corps, (who will generally, I understand, have nearly, if not quite the same rates of pay as the line formerly received) and every reasonable distinction should be conferred on these regiments as a reward for their fidelity.

As for the Bombay and Madras armies, he would proclaim to them—

How highly her Majesty appreciates the loyalty they have evinced throughout the late trying crisis, in consideration of which they are assured that no alteration whatever shall be made in their organisation, and that their constitution and privileges will be maintained so long as they continue loyal—pointing to the utter extinction of the Bengal army as the consequence of disloyalty. Some such assurance is, I think, necessary, and should

not long be delayed, for our native troops throughout India cannot otherwise than feel anxiety lest the misconduct of the sepoy^s of Bengal may cause us to discard from our service all of their caste and creed in other parts of India, so soon as we can conveniently do so.

Regarding Staff and Civil employ he entirely agreed with the views of the Governor-General:—

I think with his Lordship that the advantages secured to the State by the system of supplying officers from the army for civil duties, and to officer the regular and police corps, greatly counter-balance the disadvantages to the army of having a portion of its officers withdrawn from regimental employ. It would be well if the demand could be more limited, but I would not deprive the Government of the advantages of such a field of selection; and I would not close the door to such a wholesome incentive to mental exertion as the prospect of civil employment, and to the exercise of physical powers as the hope of employment with irregular corps supplies to young officers. Without this the idle life of mere garrison duty in time of peace under the relaxing climate of India, would cause all not naturally of strong or superior minds to deteriorate both mentally and bodily, and of course the morale and discipline of the Indian army would suffer in proportion to the inefficiency of its officers.

The disadvantage resulting from too largely depending on officers of officers may, however, be greatly remedied by introducing, as proposed by his Lordship, the system of *rotation* followed in the Royal Army, so far as in the case of officers returned for civil employment, not army duty. This would be an advantageous and encouraging to regimental officers, as a Staff Corps, and far less costly to the State.

The actual amalgamation of the Royal and Indian armies he was opposed to: he deemed it "impossible without injury to the interests of the latter, especially of its officers." "But," he continued,

it is probable to effect the amalgamation with perfect justice to it and to them, I consider that the measure would be most

impolitic. In the first place, to assimilate the two armies the system of purchase must be introduced into the Indian army, which would be detrimental to its morale. But more particularly would it be injurious to the Indian army, as creating a spirit of restlessness among young men (the officers) naturally desirous of change, and a feeling of instability in their position in India, which would deprive officers of heart in the service—and it would destroy that *esprit de corps* which now animates our Indian army. The officers composing that army should regard India as their home—the only sphere in which they can acquire, or hope for, promotion and distinction—and to reconcile them to that home, care should be taken not to lower the Indian army in respect of dignity, privileges, and advantages, not merely below, but even to an equality (in those respects) with the British army. Both the Indian local army (I mean its officers) and the portion of the British army serving in India, should enjoy superior advantages to what the British army possess in Europe, to reconcile them to service in India. And, as being permanently fixed in India, the Indian officers should have guaranteed to them a larger share of staff employment than what would be secured to them by their mere numerical proportion to the officers of the British troops serving in India. For all staff appointments beyond the general staff of the army, the local experience of Indian officers ought to render them more eligible than officers of the British army whose sojourn in India is uncertain and more limited.

With a view to training officers *for India*, and leading their thoughts and wishes from early youth *to India*, I would retain on an enlarged scale the Addiscombe Institution as the Military College for India; where it should be incumbent on all candidates for the Indian army to undergo a course of education adapted to the career before them, for at least two years.

Although I would deprecate any change which would admit of officers of the Indian exchanging into the Royal Army, at any rate under the rank of a field officer, I concur with his Lordship in thinking that ‘senior officers,’ whose services and ability may render them ‘fit for such marks of her Majesty’s confidence, shall be permitted to serve her Majesty out of India as well as in this country,’ and that ‘divisional and brigade commands should be distributed between the two armies in fair proportion.’

Above the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, exchanges might, perhaps, be allowed without disadvantage.

One great advantage of thus employing a portion of the officers of the Indian army in civil and other State service, is, that for those occupying civil offices in India, a military training may often prove of great advantage, as on occasions of sudden outbreak, when every Briton becomes a soldier. Another, that in times of war it enables Government at once to strengthen regiments with officers.

He considered that 'a close and intimate association of natives with the European soldiery, except in the field, should be avoided as much as possible; the closer the association with the lower class of our countrymen, the less respect is inspired by the latter; the closer the association with officers and educated Englishmen, on the contrary, the greater is the respect secured.'

He would abolish 'all the native artillery of the Bengal Army, with the exception of the few guns required at certain frontier posts, in positions where Europeans could not live.' But he would rather, for reasons stated, 'retain the native artillery of Madras and Bombay,' or, if it must be got rid of, make the transition to European artillery very gradual.

He 'would turn no trained artillery men loose upon the country.' As regards cadets, he wrote:—

I am disposed to doubt the policy of attaching young officers for the first six months to European corps, which has been ordered. After a cadet has been well grounded in his military education at Addiscombe, I think that the sooner he is sent to do duty with a native corps, under a good commander, the better. He will the sooner acquire a knowledge of the native languages, and can only there obtain an intimate acquaintance with the native soldier which will enable him to distinguish and appreciate his better qualities, and to discourage and counteract his evil tendencies.

Now I maintain that early association with European troops is of all things that most calculated to prevent the officer acquiring the understanding, and appreciation, of the Asiatic character which

is so essential to his personal influence over the native soldier. By sending young officers on their entry into the service to European regiments, they naturally imbibe the feelings and prejudices of those with whom they are associated, and it is an undoubted fact that, even in former times—before the late lamentable events had impressed the European mind, and especially the European soldier, with a contempt and hatred for the native character—it was seldom an officer could be found, whose early training had been in European regiments, who had not imbibed a *distaste* to the native which no length of after-service with a native regiment could remove. What, then, could now be expected from a young man, whose first years or months in India are restricted to European association alone? Would he not be more disposed to foster than to ameliorate the bitter feelings which now unhappily have arisen between the governing and the subject races, until which are obliterated we cannot hope that our rule in this country will be satisfactory or profitable, either to England or India.

His remarks on the extent of the amnesty to be granted to the rebels, will form the second and last subject for quotation from Outram's Minutes of 1858. Questions of Railway and Police, the Military Protection of Bengal, Rewards to Native Chiefs, and individual grievances were among the many that came before him during that year, and on which he recorded his opinion. Perhaps no papers were more heartily welcomed than those which acquainted him with the final settlement of the grants proposed by the Bombay Government for the maintenance of the Talpur Amirs of Sind. He fully concurred in the liberal views expressed hereon by his colleague, Mr. Ricketts, and joined that gentleman in advocating that confirmation be accorded to the arrangements submitted.¹ The following is his Minute on the question of amnesty:—

¹ The circumstances were these. Colonel (now Major-General Sir) Le Grand Jacob was commissioned to proceed to Sind in 1852, to investigate charges made against Mir Ali Murad, substantiation of which caused the loss to that chief of the 'Crown' or 'Turban' lands we had allowed to pass into

Unless the exclusion from the amnesty is limited to the murderers of Europeans, I apprehend that it will fail of the desired effect in a great measure; for since the fall of Lucknow thousands of the rebels, who heretofore had not been implicated in the atrocities perpetrated on Europeans, have been drawn into similar crimes as respects natives (European victims being no longer available), by those who, knowing that they themselves were debarred from mercy by such acts, were interested in bringing others into the same desperate position. Hundreds of our native subjects have subsequently been murdered or mutilated in consequence, and many thousands of the rebels have now been more or less directly or indirectly implicated, who till then were free from participation in murder—so many in fact that a general pacification of the country cannot be looked for while such large bodies of men remain virtually condemned to death. Certainly it is to be deplored that any class of murderers should escape with impunity: but this is a question of *policy* as well as of justice. The object of the amnesty is to restore peace and prosperity; and if the more limited class of murderers of Europeans alone are to be excluded from pardon—all of whom are well known to the rest of the rebels, such atrocities having been perpetrated in public—that object we may reasonably hope soon to attain. But, if the exclusion extends to all implicated in murders and mutilations generally, few of the rebels could think themselves safe from future denunciation; and many thousands would, in desperation, continue in arms who otherwise would have been glad to return to their homes and pursue peaceful occupations for the future. Is it not better to leave those among them who may have been guilty of shedding the blood of their countrymen, and most of whom we never may be able to bring to justice, to the

his possession. The reader will bear in mind that the intrigues of this very man were the main cause of the downfall of old Mir Rustam and the other Amirs, and the loss of their country—villany which Outram saw through and denounced, but to no purpose. In the course of the enquiry, the destitute state of Mir Rustam's widow and other members of the late reigning Talpur dynasty in Upper Sind, was brought prominently to notice. Under instructions from Bombay, measures were taken to ascertain and improve the condition of the sufferers. Eventually a long report from Colonel Steuart, collector of Shikárpur, and subsequent reports in the local 'Jágir' department, enabled Government to come to a permanent settlement in favour of no less than twenty-two separate families of the Khairpur House, as well as of their many relatives of Haidarabad and Mirpur.

punishment of their crimes in the next world than, by proscribing them all now, compel a continuation of rapine and murder, whereby the lives of hundreds more of our innocent subjects will hereafter be sacrificed, and the distraction under which this country has so long suffered will be indefinitely prolonged?¹

In 1859 there were discussions on a Calcutta Muhammadan College, Royal Medical Warrants, Missionaries in Jails, Military Finance Commissioners, Places of Refuge for Europeans, Barracks for Native Troops, 'Ináms' in Bombay, and over a vast range of topics. The force organising for China was another important question which engaged the attention of the Calcutta Council, and more especially its military member.

Outram did not consider it sufficient to uphold the existing and create an additional native aristocracy, he wished to see a more comprehensive system of Honorary Rewards, available to all ranks. No Order of Honour, however, would, he argued, be so valuable in the esteem of the natives, as one which Europeans too should seek with ambition. It should not be exclusively native. He not only wished for the elevation to the Peerage, Knightage, and Baronetage of many native gentlemen, but he would like to see established by her Majesty a new 'Order of Victoria,' for which

¹ The Act by which India was transferred to the Crown, and which quietly ended the career, and extinguished the separate existence of the most marvellous 'Company' that the civilised world has known, no sooner found its way to Calcutta, than its purport was signified throughout the land by Proclamation. This was read to listening multitudes on November 1, 1858, and set forth in frank and unambiguous language the intention of Her Most Gracious Majesty to maintain all existing treaties and engagements with native princes, and respect their rights, dignity, and honour—also to regard the millions of India in the light of British subjects elsewhere. They would be free to exercise the observances of their religion, and would be admitted to share in State appointments. An amnesty was extended to all offenders not convicted of direct participation in the murder of British subjects, who returned to their homes and peaceful pursuits by the first day of the New Year.

natives and Europeans, whether in her Majesty's service or not, should be eligible. Admission to this would, in his opinion, compensate in many cases for non-advancement to more lucrative offices; it would entice a higher class of men to compete for civil service appointments; and it would create a fraternity between its native and European members. The following short paragraph of a long and comprehensive minute,¹ treating the matter in every necessary detail, will explain the writer's aim in the projected institution.

I feel assured that, by the judicious distribution of honours, both personal and hereditary, we have it in our power vastly to increase the attachment of the more influential natives of India to the British Crown, and to elicit from them much active aid in the internal government of the country—in amending its institutions, in developing its resources, and in furtherance of those philanthropic objects for the achievement of which we must necessarily be in a great measure dependent on their liberality and personal exertions.

The Medical Service was ever a subject of interest to Sir James, whose minutes on the rank and promotion of its officers, show a due appreciation of their position and requirements. The relative army rank offered was a boon in its way; but he contended that to make that the only privilege specially applicable to India, and allow the holders to be worse off than their brethren at home in respect of pension, pay, and furlough allowances, was to lay down an unwise and unjust distinction. No comment is required on the following extracts from the preamble to a recommendation of reward to certain civil and military officers of the

¹ Dated June 28, 1859. Not two years later, the 'Star of India' was instituted, which included Sir James Outram among its first Knights Grand Cross. How far this particular paper, or other minutes submitted at the time by the Viceroy, led to the establishment of the order, we are not in a position to state.

Bombay Presidency, for distinguished conduct during the mutinies¹ :—

On my return to Bombay from Persia in July 1857, in the height of the panic which then terrified all ranks and classes of the community, I was very forcibly struck with the calm and confident demeanour of Lord Elphinstone at that most exciting time, when his every look was watched with anxiety by the people of Bombay. And I verily believe that the noble confidence his lordship then displayed in depriving Bombay itself of all its European soldiers (except 300) to forward troops to his frontier and into the districts where disturbance threatened, did more to restore confidence in the public mind, and to preserve tranquillity throughout the Bombay Presidency, than all the individual exertions of the able, zealous, and active officers—civil and military—to whom his lordship has expressed his obligations. . . .

And yet I well knew what deep ground of anxiety Lord Elphinstone at *that time* had for the preservation of his own charge, as well as that which he felt regarding what was then passing in Bengal—while fully sensible that in denuding the Bombay Presidency so largely of troops to aid the Government of India elsewhere, he was incurring a fearful responsibility, in opposition to the advice and remonstrances of the military authorities of Bombay.

The intense admiration with which I regarded Lord Elphinstone's bold demeanour and noble self-abnegation under such trying circumstances, when I parted from his lordship in July 1857, was only equalled, for it could not be surpassed even by that with which, on my arrival a fortnight afterwards in Calcutta, I was then inspired by the calm dignity, confidence, and determination with which the Governor-General himself was braving the storm, which by that time was raging in its utmost fury.

For myself I now gratefully acknowledge that the assurance I then acquired of the ability, determination, and self-reliance of our rulers, encouraged me to pass on to fulfil my own humble share of the stern task before us, with a hopeful confidence in the result, instead of that feeling of almost desperation with which I otherwise should have entered on that duty. I am, of course, well

¹ Dated September 18, 1859.

aware that the expression of such feelings is not customary in a formal official document; but, when considering the claims of subordinate functionaries to rewards for extraordinary services, their merits can be fairly estimated only by considering, at the same time, the extraordinary influences under which those services were rendered.

In 1859 two valuable minutes, contributed by Sir James Outram, bearing upon the Memoir on Egypt prepared some ten years before, were written and circulated. They were supplemented by further minutes from the Governor-General, and Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Bombay, who treated the question raised as one of vital importance. We may say no more of these papers than that they were written with a jealous regard to our interests in Egypt, the Red Sea and Persian Gulf: and advocated strong measures of precaution, so that we might be able and ready to hold our own in the event of particular contingencies suggested by the aspect of the political horizon.

Some will perhaps maintain that Outram was needlessly suspicious of aggressive intent in the minds of foreign Powers, and that there was an exuberance of ingenuity on his part in giving colour and substance to such ideal designs, or in devising *ruses de guerre* to counteract them. Undoubtedly there were paradoxes in his transparent character. One who knew him well has drawn attention to the combination in it of great ambition and great humility. Another points out the union of vigorous individuality with accessibility to advice, noticing also the generous care that the credit of suggestions should accrue to the originator and not to himself. This suspiciousness of foreign intriguers was no doubt fostered by his own unpleasant experience in unravelling native plots, but it is in remarkable contrast to the natural guilelessness and straightforwardness of the man.

The most remarkable recommendation of the year,

however, by the Military Member of the Governor-General's Council, was in favour of the official extinction of himself and colleagues. In a letter to his principal correspondent at the India Office, Captain Eastwick, dated July 17, he writes:—

I rejoice to learn from you that it is in contemplation to abolish the Councils, and substitute the Heads of Departments as the direct aids to, and cabinets of the Governor-General and Governors. . . . I had supposed that the more important Imperial duties of the Government of India might render a Council with the Governor-General indispensable. Since I have been behind the curtain, however, I have come to the conviction that the Council is as useless a drag here as in the subordinate Presidencies, and really as little efficacious for good as a check against evil. For instance, in those political missions the propriety of which have of late been most questioned, *i.e.* the Oude proclamation, the negotiations with Nepaul, and the first dealing with the European soldier's disaffection, the Council had no voice whatever. . . . As Lord Canning purposes, I believe, separating from his Council again next cold season . . . the Council will again become a mere transmitting machine, performing, at a vast cost, what could be equally well and more rapidly done by the heads of departments. Now, as I should be President of this useless Council, I feel the more anxious to be saved from so unsatisfactory and anomalous a position, and should be glad, on personal as well as on public grounds, to see the Councils abolished at once, a great saving being thereby secured at no injury to State interests. Of this I feel so conscious that I have some scruples to draw my large salary. And certainly I should not feel aggrieved, or think I had any cause to complain, were my appointment at once abolished (without providing for me elsewhere—you know my sentiments on *that* subject), even if my salary were to cease from that moment. Were any small portion of that salary to be continued to me during the period I should otherwise have been entitled to stay in Council, I should consider such indulgence most generous treatment.

We now come to the consideration of State papers of immense value and importance. That our notice of them is brief and wholly incommensurate with their deserving, is

an unfortunate but necessary result of the principle adopted in preparation of these volumes, intended to illustrate the active career of a most remarkable Anglo-Indian officer, rather than his labours at the desk. His writings have been freely quoted and advisedly; but the merits of those questions respectively treated in them have been, as it were, subsidiary to the personal portraiture. Outram, essentially the man of action, could not stand still, while we laid open before the reader the blue-books he had mainly contributed to fill, and the contents of which would need exposition as well as analysis. Allusion is now made to three minutes on Army Amalgamation written in 1860.

The first, dated January 2, is avowedly a solemn protest against the fusion of her Majesty's forces with the Indian army—a measure which Sir James had reason to apprehend had been already decided on, and which he believed would 'inflict grievous injustice on the servants of the East India Company.' Seeing how public opinion had been influenced in seeking abolition of the local European force, by the so-called 'mutiny' on the part of soldiers who had enlisted for the Company's service, and objected to their sudden transfer to that of the Crown, he stated his impression that the accounts rendered of the affair had been greatly exaggerated; he showed that allowances should be made for conduct brought about by official inconsistencies; and he argued with logic that, 'were circumstances to arise calculated to excite disaffection amongst the European soldiers of India,' the evil could best be remedied by the presence in the country of '*two forces . . . differing so far from each other in conditions of service and traditions, as to give each a distinctive esprit de corps.*' Any inferiority in the interior economy of the local as compared with the line regiments, he attributed 'to other causes than to the fact of the force being a local one,' causes which might easily be removed without amalga-

mation; and he laid stress upon the unquestioned excellence of the Company's engineers and artillery. Owing to the system of selection in force, he believed the staff of the Indian army to contain as great a proportion of highly competent and qualified officers as any army in Europe; for, as he truly said, 'a man can and does create interest for himself, and superior fitness for staff employ always does create it for him. Such is not the case in England.' The argument that a 'local force would occupy a social position inferior to that held by the line troops,' was designated as 'utterly undeserving of attention,' and the alleged desirableness of giving to her Majesty's regiments a better acquaintance 'with the field experience only, or that mainly to be acquired in India,' he interpreted as an admission that Indian regiments were 'in better marching and fighting order than regiments serving at home or in the other colonies.' He gave careful estimates to prove that, among other prejudicial effects of amalgamation, would be increased financial embarrassment to India; and dwelt upon the gross injustice of measures calculated to improve the royal army of England at the expense of the Indian tax-payer.

Two very able appendices, attached to this Minute, detail the system he would recommend for perfecting the local force, and might even now be studied with advantage. In the first he deals with the *private* soldier, and gives the elaborate outline of a scheme of continuous instruction, commencing on board ship, and tending to induce steady men to qualify themselves, not only for the non-commissioned ranks, but for the eventual attainment of unattached commissions, entitling them to employment in the various administrative posts now held by 'clerks,' 'deputy commissaries,' 'conductors' and the like. By opening up such a career, it was conceived that an intelligent and steady class of recruits would be attracted. The second appendix

contains, in no less than eighty-six clauses, a still more detailed scheme of instruction for the *officer*, in order to qualify him for successive regimental grades, and the staff, both military and medical. He takes care to point out that, formidable as the scheme may look, it would cost the State nothing except the establishment of station instructorships, libraries and museums. His remarks regarding competitive examinations are of more general interest. Commenting upon his stipulation that proficiency in swimming, riding, fencing, and field-sketching should be a *sine quâ non*, he goes on to say:—

Far from being opposed to competition, the suggestions I have offered show that I wish to make an officer's whole career one continuous competitive struggle. But the advocates of competition have themselves introduced a practical fallacy into the question, which has justified to some extent the opposition their views meet with. Obtaining our assent to the proposition that the most highly qualified should be preferred for each appointment, they proceed as if our proposition had been that the most erudite should be so preferred. Whereas 'cleverness' and the talent for scholarship and mathematics,—though eminently desirable in all officers, and essential in the more scientific arms and in our departmental staff—are not the only qualifications we require. We desire boys of vigorous frames and high animal spirits, courageous, fond of adventure, ready-witted, self-possessed, full of expedients, having a taste for field sports and manly exercises—the captains and heroes of the playground. These will very often be found amongst the prizemen of their schools; but prizemen will not always be found amongst them. And of the latter—of quiet, good, timid boys, who win prizes, but rarely are found where rough play is going on and juvenile accidents abound—we desire as few as may be. The army is not the place for such, and such are out of place in the army. And to tempt such men into it by competitive trials of a purely intellectual character, is unjust to the army and cruel to them. Let it therefore be known that what an able and witty writer in the *Times* calls 'muscular Christianity' is *one* essential qualification for a soldier. Either attach a certain number of

marks to manly exercises and accomplishments, or require of all candidates the most satisfactory evidence that they possess these accomplishments.

The second paper, dated February 11, explains its objects in these few words:—‘As it is possible that the state of my health during the approaching hot season may compel me to vacate my seat in Council—temporarily at least—before the receipt in this country of the Report of the Commission appointed to investigate the sanitary condition of the Indian army, and therefore before I can ascertain how far their recommendations meet what have long appeared to me the requirements of our Indian European forces, I deem it right to place my own views on record.’

The uninitiated reader may take in, at a glance, that the improvement of the sanitary and moral condition, and professional efficiency of the soldier, whether on board ship or in barracks, form the subject of consideration in this so-called ‘Supplementary Minute;’ but he must not infer that the dry, stereotyped language of an official red-tapeist has been used to express the writer’s ideas. He passes under review the equipment, instruction, discipline, and amusement of soldiers on their way to India, laying stress upon the selection of good officers to command the detachments, and on the permanent influence for good or evil of ‘board ship’ experiences. Then come observations about treatment on landing, the provision of libraries, reading rooms, shooting galleries, gymnasia, swimming baths, and other hitherto neglected addenda to barrack accommodation. Careful proposals for education and the encouragement of athletic accomplishments occupy much space. So do industrial occupations, gardens, canteens, theatricals, picnics, regattas, printing presses, electric telegraphy. Last, not least, the soldier’s wife and her position are dwelt upon, one may say lovingly. We select three or four passages of a truly

admirable and most comprehensive paper. One, on Divine service to be performed daily on board ship:—

I trust I shall not be deemed unreasonable if I express a very decided opinion that, daily (before breakfast), the troops should be assembled for the public worship of God. I do not ask for a long service. On the contrary I think that all our services are too long for a military congregation; and the week-day services I would make very short. But a service of some sort there should be, were it to embrace no more than the singing of the morning or some other hymn—the reading of a few verses of the Bible, and the recitation of one or two collects—or the Litany on those days on which the Church prescribes that the Litany shall be used.¹

One, as illustrative of the way in which the mind may be occupied in leisure hours out of school:—

On the same principle that I propose placing in the canteen the very highest of our cheap but wholesome light literature in order to catch those who do not habitually visit the library, in the hope that they may by such means be won over to prefer the library to the canteen, I would endeavour to supply stimuli to mental culture, and to furnish its means, to those whom the Regimental School, and the prizes it holds out, fail to attract thither. And I look, in the event of the arrangement above recommended being adopted, to the officers of our military stations supplementing the efforts of Government by the delivery of lectures to the men on many interesting subjects.

To this let us add the following:—

I believe there are few unprejudiced officers of experience who do not admit the great value of theatricals,² as a means of

¹ In Major Malan's 'A Soldier's Experience of God's Love,' the author relates that the above order was handed to him on board ship for guidance by the Brigade Major of Calcutta, when he was about to proceed to sea, and was much perplexed on the very point to which the extract refers. He adds: 'How I thanked God for putting it into Sir James Outram's heart to write these instructions. I never pass the statue of that good soldier, on the Thames Embankment, without praising God on his behalf.'

² It is but right to add a qualification of these remarks contained in the preceding sentence:—'Our Indian theatricals have none of the vicious accessories which I presume (and not the intrinsic fact of their being dramatic) render dramatic performances objectionable to Englishmen of serious minds,

affording amusement to soldiers. In every regiment there are several men of mercurial temperament, and often of considerable intellectual ability and good education, for whom it is very difficult to find any innocent amusement—often among the best and most useful men in an emergency, they are troublesome and sometimes even dangerous in quiet quarters. The rough out-door amusements of their coarser comrades have few charms for them, and they are but too apt to degenerate into hard drinkers, or to find a most mischievous vent for their mental activity as soldier lawyers.' It is for men of this stamp that the intellectual excitement of getting up a play is peculiarly valuable, and they contribute greatly to the innocent amusement of their comrades, while absorbed in a perfectly harmless occupation of their own time and energies.

One, which is irresistible, and highly characteristic:—

It is not enough that their officers should invariably be kind to the women and children of their men—few are otherwise. But they should be *methodically* so. The women should feel, and their husbands and husbands' comrades should see, that the most trifling matters affecting their comfort and happiness engaged their officers' constant and solicitous attention. They should be addressed as if it were assumed that every woman was, in feelings, a lady, and in moral tone all that her best friends could wish. One little incident that occurred under my own command serves well to illustrate the appreciation which soldiers have of respectful conduct on the part of officers to their female relatives. An officer, who, like the rest of his comrades, had to leave all his property behind on the evacuation of Lucknow, was, on his arrival at the Allumbagh, accosted by a sergeant and two privates of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, who brought him several silver articles which he had left in his room on the occasion of his starting for the Dilkoosha in charge of ladies and children of the garrison, twenty-four hours before the troops finally moved out of the entrenchment. 'It was a small thing, sir,' said the honest sergeant in reply to the earnest thanks of my

Save at the Presidency towns we have no professional "actors;" our "actresses" are of the male sex; we have neither "slips" nor "saloons;" the performances in our theatres are such only as comport with the tastes of the wives of our leading civil and military officers, who are the patrons and efficient supporters of station theatricals; and from the theatre we repair, not to oyster rooms, or taverns, but to our quiet (perhaps often too quiet) homes.'

astonished friend, 'to do for you and your good lady, who made us tea with her own hands, yes, and brought it to us every day we were on duty near your quarters—and this, sir,' he added, pointing to one of the men—'is an old friend, sir—he knew you at Warley—here, Jack, speak up for yourself to the gentleman'—and Jack promptly answered the summons. 'Yes, sir,' he said, 'there's much come and gone since then, but I knowed you the moment I seed you, and I told them all about you, sir. It's not every officer, sir, as brings presents to our babies, and lifts his hat to our wives, *and calls them ma'am*. She's gone, sir, she's gone,' added the honest fellow, brushing a tear from his manly eyes, 'but she minded you to the last, and the time the colonel and you stopped your carriage to give her a lift, poor lass, from the railway on that wet afternoon.' We may depend upon it that kindly presents given to soldier's babies are crumbs thrown on the water that after many days will return with interest, if not to the donors at least to the service; but more valuable still is that respectful deference shown to soldier's wives symbolised in the act of *calling them ma'am*.

After advocating the formation of Ladies' Associations at each station, to promote the remunerative employment and general well-being of soldiers' wives, he winds up his proposals thus:—

The ladies' efforts in behalf of their humbler sisters would react beneficially on themselves. And it is to be hoped that, besides being the means of saving the immortal souls of some of our own countrywomen, these associations might tend to the spread of the Gospel in this land, prompting the heathen to moderate the rancour and contempt they bear our Holy Faith, as, watching the efforts and results of our ladies, they were compelled to say: 'Behold these Christians, how they love one another.' Whether at present we exert ourselves in behalf of our soldiers' wives as be- seems those who realise the truth of the creed they profess, and feel in their hearts what they so glibly utter in their prayers, each man must answer to his own conscience. Mine, I confess, refuses a comforting response.

I abstain from giving further bulkiness to this minute, which has already swollen into monster dimensions, by entering on the subject of the spiritual instruction of our soldiers and their families,

further than to express a fervent hope that the day is not far distant when each corps will have its own regimental chaplain, whose entire energies shall be exclusively devoted to the spiritual guidance and moral development of its members; when daily shall our soldiers be invited (not compelled) to meet together for the public worship of their God; and when, in filling vacancies in the Indian episcopate, attention shall be paid to the claims and especial suitability to the office of some of our best and most earnest military chaplains. It is a small matter, but of greater moment to our soldiers than a superficial observer might think, that our Protestant churches in every military station should be habitually open, as the places of worship of our Roman Catholic brethren (to their honour be it said) are always, whether there be service or not. The mere power of sitting down in quiet, and of reading or praying or meditating, undisturbed by noisy companions, is a privilege much valued by soldiers, and may often assist to keep up good habits amid the many distractions of a barrack life.

The third paper, on 'Miscellaneous questions affecting the organisation and efficiency of the Indian Army,' relates to the more intelligent professional training of the soldier, camps of exercise, the assimilation and abridgment of forms and regulations, military hygiene, medical topography, and the employment of medical officers. Sir Bartle Frere, thus referring to it, explains its purport:—'Nothing, it seems to me, can be more profoundly true than what he says of the necessity for developing to a greater degree the "individualism" of the soldier—in other words, training him to think and judge and act for himself, in place of training him to consider himself merely as a small portion of a great machine, prohibited from all independent action.'

Two paragraphs from this Memorandum must complete our quotations:—¹

¹ Further extracts are given in the Appendix at the close of volume i. The general reader, as well as the military student, may find much of interest, perhaps of value, in them, notwithstanding the happy change effected in the condition of the British soldier in India during the last twenty years by Lord Napier and other men of like stamp to Henry Lawrence and James Outram, in the line of their recommendations. There is no doubt that the very great

All depends, in the various gradations of military control, on the spirit in which the controlling power is exercised, and on the tact of him who exercises it. Be kind, considerate, and conciliatory; scrupulously regard the feelings of those under you; avoid aught that can weaken their legitimate authority, or diminish the respect of *their* inferiors; treat not a blunder as a crime; assume that what is evidently unknown is simply something forgotten; and, if you have to do with well-conditioned men, they will regard your constant interest in their proceedings as a compliment, not as an offence. I speak from the experience of more than forty years, both in civil and military life.

I can only plead my profound conviction that the British soldier, even of the roughest stamp, is, if wisely and kindly treated, susceptible of a culture—physical, intellectual, moral, and professional—far in excess of that which is generally supposed to be attainable by him; that just as you approximate a private, intellectually, morally, and professionally, to the standard of his officers, do you increase his *commercial* value as a soldier; and that the interests of India (politically, financially, and morally considered) demand that the very highest possible culture of all kinds should be bestowed on the members of her European garrison, and the highest possible development given to their capacities, both individual and corporate.

A Minute, on the Regulations for Sick Officers, dated March 10, might be cited to show the interest he always felt in the welfare of his cloth. Though himself a member of Government and guardian of administrative orthodoxy, not free to follow all impulses of his own generous heart, he was ready to burst his red-tape bonds if they restrained him from good and just acts. Such power was not, however, abused. There are those now living who could bear high testimony to its exercise in a spirit of usefulness to the State and the individual. To Sir Bartle Frere's concurrence in his colleague's recommendations on behalf of sick officers,

labour of collecting and arranging the data in these minutes had much to do with the final break-down in Sir James's health. They were his last legacy of effort on behalf of the army he loved so well.

Mr. James Wilson, the Finance Minister, added his own. 'I concur in much, and admire all, that his zeal and interest in the army has prompted the President in Council to write,' are his well-considered words.

The remaining Minutes recorded by Outram during the first four months of 1860, embraced the usual variety of subjects—*inter alia*, the Naval Defences of India, Revenue Survey, Articles of War, Ventilation of Transports, and Incapable Senior Officers. One special characteristic of his, which has been authoritatively pronounced to be an essential element in military genius—viz., an 'infinite capacity for detail'—may be noted before we close the consideration of his writings. Prompt and vigorous as he was in action—impatient some might say—and remarkably prolific as his busy brain was in comprehensive ideas, he yet never neglected details, and he spared no labour to fathom them to the uttermost. While with a singularly rapid pen he unbosomed himself of views on the prominent questions of the day, he supported them laboriously by well-digested facts and figures. All this was done with an evident power which could result only from daily habits of unremitting attention to the smallest matters. No one who reads his voluminous correspondence can fail to be struck with this trait, illustrations of which are everywhere abundant. We find in an eminent degree the combination of rapidity of thought and action with that patient attention to minutiae which is essential to military success; and this is as apparent throughout his political career as it became when he was called upon to lead armies in the field.

He gave much time and trouble to the due equipment of the force embarking for China. In this instance, the shrewdness and management of the good commissariat officer were better elements of success than the skill of the military tactician, or wisdom of the statesman and legislator. But

his mastery of detail in the many forms familiar to his experienced mind greatly facilitated the discharge of a duty which his high official position, as President of the Council in Lord Canning's absence, might well have restricted within the limits of sedentary supervision. Especially busy with these practical matters in the first few months of 1860, it is an agreeable change to find him, in March of that year, present at a dinner given by the Engineers to Colonel Napier, who had been appointed to command a division of the Expeditionary Army under Sir Hope Grant. In a letter written by the late Major-General Greathead, R.E., to a friend, from the steamer 'Lancefield,' on her voyage to China, we are there told of his doings on that occasion. Paying a most distinguished tribute to the services of the guest of the evening, he 'went so far as to say that, when under the difficult circumstances in which they were placed his heart sometimes failed him, he invariably found Napier prepared with a means of getting over the difficulty, and he always left him reassured and established. Most chivalrous was Outram in his mention of Sir Charles Napier—of the respect and esteem he had always entertained for him from first to last; how convinced he was that the differences which had arisen arose solely from the indiscretion of partisans who came between.¹ Napier (Sir Robert) acknowledged his obligations to Outram's example and Outram's teaching. Referring to the successes which Outram had imputed to him, he said that he would have been dull indeed if he had derived no profit from his intimate relations with such a distinguished soldier.'

Outram's career, as a member of the Supreme Government, extended from May 1858 till July 1860. In Calcutta

¹ In his Minute on 'Titles' dated June, 1859, Outram wrote in reference to a remark of Sir Charles Napier quoted from memory, 'if these be not the exact words of the great warrior-statesman whose authority I cite, they differ from his only in being, perhaps, less forcible.'

he led the usual life of the European dignitary, with its many hours of steamy work, and such relaxation as was afforded by a constant succession of dinner parties. These were in his case, though frequent, mostly at home; for he did not care to go out at night. He and Lady Outram shared a good house at Garden Reach with his old friend Mr. Le Geyt, of the Bombay Civil Service, and they generally had guests living under their roof, after the approved Indian custom—none being more welcome to Sir James than small middies. In June 1858, acting under medical advice, he took a sea trip to Galle, returning within a month; but so little renovated did he appear to be by the change that, when back in Calcutta, he lost no time in suggesting the immediate appointment of a provisional military member of Council, to be ready to supply his place in case of necessity. He was enabled, however, to keep on at his work with little intermission, and, besides the trip to sea, a month at Chandanagor, and one visit to Barakpur (both in 1858), he was seldom absent from his post. On the best of terms with his colleagues and, after a time, with Lord Canning, his Council days passed happily enough, though he may have missed something of the excitement in which he had rejoiced for so many months preceding.

Conscientious attention to the disposal of individual grievances was to be expected from one who had experienced in his own case unmerited slight and injustice. Outram, in Calcutta, was overwhelmed by references on every conceivable subject from his old subordinates and others, and gave to each its due amount of consideration, or a good deal more. Sturdily interfering where it seemed just to do so, there were instances of course in which to take action would have been absurd and unwarrantable. But none, it is believed, could say that a reference to him was ever ‘neglected,’ whether effectual or not. In order to satisfy the many who had served in his campaigns, that he had noticed all who had

claims to notice, he printed and privately distributed his Persian and Indian despatches. He was remarkably courteous and particular in replying to letters, whether on private or on demi-official matters. The warmth of appreciation which he could express to comrades who had won his regard, was never more happily illustrated than in the touching, if quaint lines written when he was leaving Oudh. Lest we should detract from its force, we reproduce one letter in its entirety, as a specimen of the farewell notes he was wont to address to those who had assisted him :—

From Sir J. Outram, G.C.B., Member of the Supreme Council of India, to Major Olpherts, Bengal Artillery. Dated Lucknow, March 28, 1858.

My dear Olpherts,—The old 1st Division is about to be broken up. An entirely new distribution of the army is about to take place, and I shall not have the opportunity of expressing in my farewell order, which must be of a general nature, the admiration with which I regard both you and your noble fellows in particular, and the regard which I entertain towards yourself personally. Such sentiments I could not embody in a despatch while we were together in the field, without laying myself open to the charge of using extra-official language.

Believe me, my dear *heroic* Olpherts, that you occupy a very high place in my affection and regard; and that I shall ever remember with pride, pleasure, and gratitude to yourself the six months we have been companions in arms, and especially the three months we stood together in the plain of Alum Bagh.

'Bravery' is a poor and insufficient epithet to apply to a valour such as yours; and Olphert's 'zeal' and 'energy' are terms of too common application to convey my sense of your entire and successful devotion to the service. But words are at best the symbols of ideas and feelings, and I trust that *you* require no symbols to satisfy you as to what I think of you and feel towards you. Should you be spared, there is a bright and glorious career before you, and not one of your friends will watch it with deeper interest than, my dear Olpherts,

Yours affectionately,

(Signed) J. OUTRAM.

None who knew Sir James Outram will suppose that his concern for the British soldier was confined to writing Minutes about him, when in Calcutta. He delighted to take the lead in entertainments to his humble comrades, such as those given to the Madras Fusiliers and the Shannon Naval Brigade, and to seize any opportunity that offered to cheer or benefit them. Nor was he one to shake off his interest in the regiments he had led to victory, when they passed from under his command. What one of the speakers at the Testimonial meeting revealed we may repeat, viz., that he expended more than 1,000*l.* in providing *readable* books (300 per corps), newspapers, and games for the use of those who had shared his Oudh campaigns. The 5th, 64th, 75th, 78th, 84th, 90th, and 1st Madras Fusiliers received regularly, some of them for two years, a dozen or more of daily and weekly journals. And when he left Calcutta he made over the suitable books of his own library, about 500, to the Soldiers' Library at Fort William. But among the few he reserved for his own home were his 'Froissart,' and 'Life of Bayard.'

A more permanent record of his practical interest was the Soldiers' Institute at Dum Dum, which he established and equipped (one of the earliest, if not the earliest in India) at his own expense, in order to counteract the temptations to which he was distressed to find the men at that station particularly exposed. It was enthusiastically opened soon after his departure. Dr. Duff's biographer also reminds us of the older memorial, which his 'Sindh prize-money' enabled the far-seeing missionary to erect on the banks of the Hugli—the mission school at Bansberia.

These glimpses into James Outram's stewardship of his moderate resources must suffice, in writing of one who liked not that people should talk of such matters. His papers supply touching instances of the way he proved the friend in

need to many a one, and never was he better pleased than when the timely succour—sometimes of very considerable amount—reached its destination without the discovery of the donor. But we must let them remain what he wished them to be—*private* papers; and pass rapidly over the outward closing scenes of what was essentially a *public* life.¹

Late in April 1860, the General's health gave way so seriously that he once again was compelled to take a two months' trip to sea, going as far as Singapur; but he returned little benefited, and, as he had anticipated, there was no remedy for his case save a return home. His right to repose had been indeed fully earned after forty-two years of almost unbroken service; and he might well have been satisfied to rest upon his laurels, of which he had won not a few. But the three years, 1858, 1859, and 1860, had even more substantial tributes to offer him than titles, and the promotion to Lieutenant-General which was gazetted after the capture of Lakhnau. Let us revert to some of these, if not all.

On February 8, 1858, the thanks of the House of Commons were unanimously given to

His Excellency General Sir Colin Campbell, G.C.B., Commander-in-Chief in India, Major-General Sir James Outram, G.C.B., Major-General Sir Archdale Wilson, Baronet, K.C.B., and Major-General John Eardley Wilmot Inglis, K.C.B., for the eminent skill, courage, and perseverance displayed by them in the achievement of so many and such important triumphs over numerous bodies of the mutineers.

Similar acknowledgments were made on February 10 by the

¹ The year 1858 brought him one proof of grateful appreciation of his leadership, which gratified him not a little. Colonel Guy and the officers of the 90th Regiment begged him to accept a handsome piece of plate, which they had ordered as a token of their grateful remembrance of their service under him. He explained that the regulations of the Indian army precluded his acceptance of it, and requested that it might be retained in the mess as a memento of him.

Court of Directors, and on February 17 by a general Court of the East India Company. A second vote of both Houses of Parliament marked the close of the campaign in Oudh.

On June 10 of the same year at Bombay, a meeting was held for the purpose of raising a subscription to present Sir James Outram with a suitable testimonial of affectionate esteem and admiration. This, it should be mentioned, was a movement confined to his European friends, and though undertaken on public grounds, was rather of a personal than general character. Messrs. Hunt and Roskell were instructed to prepare a silver shield for the subscribers.

At one of the last Courts of Proprietors, held in the East India House on June 23, Sir Frederic Currie, chairman of the Court of Directors, who presided, intimating that 'Her Majesty had been pleased to confer the dignity of a baronetcy on Sir James Outram' and, proposing to enhance the value of the distinction with an annuity of 1,000*l.*,¹ added the gratifying statement that the social elevation had been 'the last act of Lord Ellenborough before he left the Board.' Captain Eastwick, seconder of the resolution for the money grant, thus wound up an eloquent speech, in which he reviewed Outram's entire career: 'It is right and fitting that their country should reward such men: no institutions, no political contrivances, can supply their place in the administration of its affairs.'

On October 7, 1858, a Resolution was passed at the Guildhall to present Outram with the freedom of the City of London, and a sword of the value of a hundred guineas; and on January 27, 1859, the Master and Wardens of the Merchant Taylors' Company conferred upon him the freedom

¹ The annuity was to be continued to his immediate successor. But it may be as well to correct a misapprehension more than once assumed to be a fact by public writers. None was voted to Lady Outram in addition. The only pension she receives is that to which she is entitled as the widow of a Lieutenant-Colonel—the *regimental* rank of Sir James Outram at his death.

their ancient corporation. In the following April a banquet was given by the people of Bombay to the 78th, at which the health of Outram, and the mention of his name, were received by the brave Highlanders with ringing cheers, that will be reckoned an equivalent, at any time, for a toast in high places. Six months afterwards the demonstration was repeated by the same regiment, in like circumstances, only on Scottish soil; their Colonel's proposal to add an additional cheer for 'honest James Outram,' being received with enthusiastic applause.

In April 1860, another banquet was given to the 78th in Edinburgh, at which Mrs. Outram, Sir James's mother, was present. The following short extract, from the reported speech of Dr. Douglas MacLagan, will need no comment on its part, to describe the feeling then exhibited:—'*With a hush the name of Outram is inseparably connected with cheers, particularly from the regiment*'. Aye, let me ring out that cheer (*renewed cheering*)—there is a good reason for it: we are delighted and honoured to have among the spectators this evening the mother that bore him (*at cheering from the soldiers, who rose almost en masse*). And that never fell music softer or sweeter on the ear of a British matron than that loud acclaim falls on her ear, from the voices of the soldiers he commanded, in testimony to the worth of her heroic son (*renewed cheers*).'

In July 1860 was held an exceptional public meeting in Calcutta, to consider the propriety of offering to Sir James Outram, 'previous to his leaving for England, some suitable token of the respect and regard universally entertained for him throughout India.' Four resolutions were read and carried.

One of them embodied an address to be presented to the General; from which the following paragraphs are extracted:—

To your energy, zeal, and ability, and to the confidence with

which you have ever inspired all men, civilised or uncivilised, who came within your influence, is due the preservation of our communications with General Nott's force at Candahar, and, but for you, the heroism and conduct of that General and his army could have scarcely availed to hold their position, and to effect their triumphant return to India by Cabool, thus occupied for the second time by a British force.

A succession of brilliant services, military and diplomatic, in Sind, in the Southern Mahratta country, at the Courts of Sattara and Baroda, and in Oude, raised you high in the favour of your Sovereign and the Government of India, but undermined your health and obliged you to seek rest in your native country.

Before time had been allowed for even a brief respite from labour, and with your health still imperfectly re-established, you again responded to the call of duty—took command of the Persian expedition, and in one brief and vigorous campaign convinced the Persian Court of the necessity of making peace as the only means of arresting your victorious progress.

On your services in the dark and troubled period in Indian history, which so immediately followed the conclusion of the Persian war, it is unnecessary for us to dilate. The impression of the great events of that crisis can never be effaced from the memory of the present generation, and throughout that period of public peril and private anguish there was no name which inspired stronger feelings of admiration, hope, and confidence than that of Outram. We will not recall facts which live deep in the memory of each of us. Your Sovereign and your country have recorded, by repeated expressions of gratitude and admiration, their sense of services which will live in all history, and you have established a name which will be embalmed among the heroes who have won and upheld our empire in India.

But, Sir, it is not as the successful general, nor as the trusted statesman, that you will be best remembered by us, who have mixed with the companions of your toils and triumphs, and who, some of us, have had the honour to serve with and under you.

It is as a man whom no success could harden or render selfish; who could surrender to an heroic comrade the honour of success which fortune had placed within his own grasp; who in the excitement of battle and in the midst of triumph never forgot the claims and wants of the humblest of his followers: who loved his

fellow-soldiers better than his own fame and aggrandisement, and has devoted himself with his whole heart to improve the soldiers' moral and intellectual as well as physical condition ; it is as one who would not only sacrifice life and fortune to duty, but who never allowed either fear or favour to weigh for a moment against what his heart told him was right and true ; it is as our noble, disinterested fellow-countryman, who has preserved all his chivalry of feeling, unchilled through the wear and tear of a laborious life, and who will ever be remembered as emphatically ' the soldier's friend,' that we would wish to testify our admiration and affectionate respect, and to preserve the memory of your career, as an example to ourselves, and to those who come after us.

Another resolution, of which a copy accompanied the address, referred to the presentation of a testimonial in the form most agreeable to the recipient. These passages are good specimens of the reply in both cases :—

It is exceedingly gratifying to me to learn that the meeting at which the address and the accompanying resolutions were voted, was attended by members of all classes of the large community of Calcutta, and that the utmost unanimity of feeling prevailed. To have thus secured the united goodwill, and I hope I may add the affection of all classes whose many interests are necessarily so conflicting, must ever be a source of the greatest satisfaction and pride to me. It has been my earnest endeavour during the whole of the time that I have been in the country, so far as lay in my power, to promote union and good fellowship between the various classes of her Majesty's subjects in India, in the full assurance that the associations which would arise therefrom, and the mutual interests which would be created thereby, would prove a source of strength to the Government, and would contribute more than anything else to the prosperity and happiness of its subjects of every race and country ; and I hope that the community of feeling which you, Sir, inform me, was exhibited towards myself at the meeting of Saturday last, will not be confined to the humble object of that meeting, but that it will spread largely and widely, and that it will penetrate throughout the whole of this vast country in all that concerns its numerous and various inhabitants.

I can assure you, in all truth, that I am quite unconscious of

having done anything to deserve the distinguished honour which the Calcutta community have combined to pay me. I am not sensible of having done more than my duty in the various public situations which I have had the honour to hold. To few, perhaps, have the opportunities been accorded which I have had the good fortune to enjoy, and if I have been able to improve those opportunities, and to obtain some measure of success, I owe it, under Providence, to a great extent, to the assistance and co-operation of the many able and gallant comrades with whom I have had the happiness of being associated in the discharge of my public duties; and it is very gratifying to me to think that the honours bestowed upon me will be reflected upon them.

With regard to the testimonial which the meeting did me the honour to vote me, understanding it to be the wish of the subscribers that I should indicate the nature of the testimonial which I should prefer, I will only say that my earnest desire is, that only a small portion of the funds that may be contributed should be expended on any object of a personal character, such for instance as a bust,¹ and that the greater part of the money should be devoted to establishing an institution, at any place that the committee appointed at the meeting may think proper to select, whereby the army in which my lot in life has been cast may benefit.

Such was the close of Outram's Indian career. The subscription list to the Calcutta testimonial amounted in one day to no less than 10,000 rupees (1,000*l.*). On July 20, two days after he had replied to the address, he embarked for England. The 'Friend of India' wrote on the eve of his departure, 'To-morrow the Indian army will lose its brightest ornament, and every soldier in India his best friend. Worn out by the almost continuous service of forty years, having stuck to his post just one hot season too many, Sir James Outram leaves India, nominally for six months, but we believe for ever.'

He had intended, on leaving Calcutta, to go home *viâ*

¹ Mr. Foley, R.A., was accordingly instructed to model a bust of Sir James as soon as possible after his arrival in England. But the subscribers resolved that the memorial should assume the form of an equestrian statue for Calcutta.

Constantinople, Odessa, and Sebastopol. The incidents of the Russian war had not passed from his mind. But he could not carry out his intention. In Egypt, the heat injuriously affected his then weak health, and unfitted him for exertion. 'It would be madness,' he wrote from Alexandria on August 18, 'to attempt the Constantinople route; so I have resolved on going by Marseilles. But as I am very easily fatigued, I shall take it leisurely through France, and shall stop three or four days in Paris.' He would have no one come to meet him on arrival in London, where he purposed remaining but a sufficient time to transact any urgent business, proceeding to join his family in Scotland with as little delay as practicable. On August 29 a letter, dated from the Oriental Club, announced that he had crossed that day in the Calais steamer. He had not delayed at Lyons as proposed; the Emperor was there, and he concluded that the hotels were full; and twenty hours at a stretch in the railway carriage had tired him out. He added, as though unable to realize that his active days were over, 'Again this trip from Paris has occupied me ten hours, and I am a little fatigued, so shall not go to the India House to-day, or transact any other business.' It happened that Sir Charles Wood and certain members of the Indian Council were in town, notwithstanding the lateness of the season; but Parliament was about to be prorogued, and it was unlikely they would prolong their stay into September. 'Our Indian readers,' we find in one newspaper, 'must not suppose that we are indifferent to the exploits of such a man as Sir James Outram, because at this season of the year there is really no one at home to do him honour.' Another announces, 'There is a great man who has landed on the shores of England so gently that the land has not been conscious of the presence of one of her most distinguished soldiers and statesmen.' But the great man was, in this instance, an invalid, and it

was well he could be kept in repose. The doctors would not allow of the trip to Scotland ; so Sir James again took up his quarters in Brighton. There he was at once joined by Lady Outram, who had been compelled to return home very unwillingly in the end of 1859. She was much shocked by the change the nine months had wrought, for when he had bade farewell to her at the mouth of the Hugli, he was looking remarkably well, and now she found him utterly broken down, and in a most critical state of health. She had wished to meet him in Egypt, but with his usual unselfishness, he would not hear of such an arrangement. In October they returned to London.

His attendance at Guildhall on December 26 to receive the freedom of the City and sword voted to him in October 1858 after the suppression of the Indian Mutiny, was an exertion for which he was unfitted, and caused his family much anxiety. He was, however, bent on going, and so every effort was made to render the ceremony as little fatiguing as possible. The Lord Mayor, in consideration of his feeble health, begged him to remain seated when he would have risen ; and the feeling evinced by the crowded assemblage was more than cordial towards him. He was quite incapacitated from attending the evening banquet given in honour of Lord Clyde and himself at the Mansion House : and had also been compelled to decline one to which he had been invited a day or two previously at Merchant Taylors' Hall, in celebration of his chief's and his own admission to the freedom of that corporation ; nor could he venture to name a day for public admission to the guild of the Grocers' Company. The Lord Mayor, expressing deep regret at his absence from the Guildhall banquet, read out a letter in which he had set forth 'some of the sentiments he would have given utterance to had he been present.' It contained nothing of himself or his doings ; it was a generous and glow-

ing eulogium of Lord Canning and the policy he had pursued. So also the few words he had been able to utter at the day's presentations had been mainly expressive of Lord Clyde's merits—'for whom,' as he said, 'he felt all the affectionate devotion of a Highland clansman for his chief.'

We have shown that one public meeting to do Outram honour had been held in Bombay, and another in Calcutta. A third, more influential still, was held in London in March 1861. The result of this movement was to pass a resolution to obtain funds for three objects:—1st, the erection of a statue in the Metropolis; 2nd, the erection of a duplicate statue in India; and, thirdly, the presentation of a service of plate, or other heirloom accompanied by an address bearing the names of all those who had promoted the Testimonial. In the absence of the Duke of Argyll, prevented by severe family affliction from taking the chair as intended, Lord Lyveden presided; and he was supported by noblemen and gentlemen bearing well-known and distinguished names. The chairman, Lord Keane, Sir James Fergusson (now Governor of Bombay), the Hon. Arthur (now Lord) Kinnaird, Mr. Crawford (member for the City of London), Sir Henry Rawlinson, Lord Shaftesbury, Sir Robert Hamilton, Colonel Sykes and Dr. Burnes took part in the proceedings, and advocated more or less eloquently the object which had brought them together.

The Calcutta and London committees working in co-operation, carried out their projects fully. The equestrian statue by Foley, of which the autotype at the commencement of this volume will remind many readers, now stands on a commanding site on the *Maidān* (the Hyde-Park) of Calcutta, the inscription upon it being a modification of that proposed by Colonel Yule, presently to be given in its original wording. Noble's statue on the Thames Embankment, close to Charing Cross, with the story of a life implied in the

single word 'OUTRAM' upon the pedestal, is too easily accessible to the multitude to need pourtrayal here.

'In October, 1861,' writes Dr. Badger,' 'Outram went to Egypt for the benefit of his health; but, unfortunately, health was the thing which he least attended to, and, after spending the winter there, returned to England *viâ* Corfu and Vienna—somewhat improved, perhaps, but still very weak. Egypt had always attractions for him in a political and military point of view, and this country may some day derive important information from the elaborate reports which he has drawn up regarding it. While at Cairo he was cheered by seeing many of his old friends going to or returning from India; and it always afforded him the highest gratification to recognise among the passengers, some he had known in former years. Twice also did his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales descend from the donkey which he unostentatiously rode about Cairo, to speak with Sir James in the front of Shepherd's Hotel. There stood the broken veteran and the Hope of England, and hearty was the pleasure which the royal condescension afforded to the bystanders. At Alexandria he met Lord Canning on his way home, and little was it then expected that he would survive the Viceroy. Now they lie side by side, the noble statesman and the noble warrior! England and India mourn for them, for they were of one heart while living, and in death they are not divided.' Within six short months the remains of Lord Canning were interred in Westminster Abbey. Conspicuous amid the array of illustrious men who took part in the funeral ceremony 'walked Lord Clyde, supporting on his arm the bowed form of the gallant Outram.'¹

'In June, 1862,'—we still quote the same friend—'the degree of D.C.L. was conferred on Sir James by the Uni-

¹ *Times*, June 23, 1862.

versity of Oxford. A like honour had been proposed to him some time previously by the sister University of Cambridge, but Outram was too ill to attend. The enthusiasm with which he was welcomed at Oxford was immense, and its expression was thoroughly appreciated by the object of it. Equally gratified was he with the attentions of Lord Palmerston, who received a similar degree on the occasion. Outram had been requested to come wearing all his decorations; but seeing the Premier without any, he remarked: 'My Lord, the contrast makes me look like a brass captain.' 'You have *won* yours,' replied Lord Palmerston,—a remark which gratified Outram exceedingly, and which he frequently repeated in token of the Premier's kindliness.'

In July, Sir James's own dining-room was the scene of a touching ceremonial, when a deputation of subscribers, men of mark and old personal friends, headed by the Duke of Argyll, presented to the invalid the illuminated address of the London Testimonial, together with a very artistic series of silver centre-pieces supported upon beautifully modelled figures emblematic of his own career. To the address were appended the signatures of 127 of the more noted subscribers, among them the veteran Premier, Lord Palmerston, and a nominal roll of all contributors, which filled a case as large as a 24-lb. carronade. Although the names of many retired Anglo-Indians were to be observed upon this lengthy appendage, it was an essentially *British* appreciation of an Indian career. His comrades had already combined so remarkably to honour his honest efforts, both in Calcutta and Bombay, that it may be truly said that his cup of satisfaction was now full to overflowing. 'The names enrolled,' remarked the Duke, 'are those of men of different classes and different countries, many of whom, knowing you only by the achievements which you have bequeathed to history, admire your heroism and

address. The 'Outram Shield' is recognised as a national work of art—the *chef d'œuvre* of Mr. Armstead in silver-work. Scenes from Outram's eventful life surround a spirited equestrian relief, representing his surrender of command to Havelock. First we see the subjugation of the Bhils; then the power of kindness upon them illustrated by the death of 'Khandu.' Then follow the interview with the dying Mir Nur Muhammad; the defence of the Haidarabad Residency; Colonel Forbes and his Bombay cavalry breaking the Persian square at Khushab; and lastly, the volunteer cavalry at Mangalwar, headed by their general, cudgel in hand. Medallion portraits of some of his most intimate associates in war and peace, Generals Stalker, Jacob, Lugard, Napier, Inglis, and Neill, Dr. Badger, and Sir G. Couper, are introduced also. The whole is of oxydised silver and damascened steel. The committee added a most considerate contribution to Lady Outram's household furnishings in the shape of a complete set of silver plate for ordinary use, tea service, &c.

One more official recognition pleased him, though it necessarily came to nothing. It was contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General in Bombay to the Adjutant-General in Calcutta and ran thus:—'Sir William Mansfield desires me to say that Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram is incomparably the most distinguished general officer on the rolls of the Bombay Army. His Excellency, however, is not aware whether the fact of his not having yet succeeded to a regimental colonelcy should be considered a bar to his selection. If it is not so considered, Sir James Outram should be nominated to one of the regiments (106th).' But that unfortunate fact was an insuperable bar, and 'the most distinguished general officer on the rolls of the Bombay Army' was destined to be laid in Westminster Abbey a regimental lieutenant-colonel.

Let us now add a brief reminiscence supplied by a near relative:—

‘The last two years were but a prolonged struggle with suffering. He purchased a house in Queen’s Gate Gardens to be the home of his declining years; but his asthma kept him so much on the move that he enjoyed little more than a few weeks of occasional residence in it. The stimulus of a congenial friend or of cheery young people would, however, now and then revive him a little, when something of his former self would pleasantly flash out. Youngsters had always been favourites with him, and he was never seen to more advantage than when entering thoroughly into their interests, telling them of his hunting days, or indulging in the good-humoured badinage to which he was prone. His quaint humour, his keen sense of the ludicrous, his merry glance added to the effect of his well-told and well-timed anecdotes; and he had a peculiar way of looking-up and laughing with his eyes which gave irresistible point to his shrewd comments or sly remarks.

‘His taste was good, indeed apt to be fastidious, and he greatly appreciated music of a touching character. Sacred music, always his preference, was an especial solace to him now. Books were still a means of whiling away an hour or two, but reading was no longer the resource it had been. Imperial politics—home, foreign, or Anglo-Indian—continued to occupy his thoughts to the last. Of party intrigues he had seen more than enough, and preferred to judge men and measures from his own point of view. Brag, bluster, or insincerity in any shape were an abomination to him, and he was most averse to persons professing infidel views. But he was tolerant of divergent opinions generally, if only he were convinced of the sincerity of those who advanced them. No one more readily appreciated sterling worth in any sphere of life.

‘The irritability induced by illness and the “trouble” he gave as an invalid, much distressed him. He bought a repeater on purpose not to disturb his servant by asking the time during the weary hours of his long night, and whenever he heard of any sight or amusement within reach he was anxious to send his attendants, no matter at what inconvenience to himself. One of these was a gentle Indo-Portuguese, whom he might well esteem highly. Another was a poor band-boy who had been found chained up a prisoner in Lucknow. Though the son of European parents, his sallow complexion and his usefulness to the rebels as a translator of English saved him from death; and except as regarded close confinement, short commons, jeers and scoffs, he did not complain much of his treatment by them.

‘Sir James was chivalrously loyal, and the inability to attend any levée, in consequence of his infirm state of health, grieved him, lest his absence should be misconstrued. Honours crowded upon him, and he was gratified by the genuine respect and considerate attention he met with wherever he went. But what most pleased him were the kindnesses proffered by strangers of all ranks in recognition of what he had done for some loved one. He felt such attentions particularly, when they were the expressions of the gratitude of aged parents in recollection of some dear boy who had fought and died under his command. Few men had enjoyed so many opportunities of befriending others, and it may perhaps be added that few had availed themselves of such opportunities more constantly. Of this his invalid days reaped the comforting fruit.’

The last passage of a noble life is drawing near. But a few words remain to close a narrative in which if there be lack of interest the fault is that of the narrator. On August 29 Outram wrote to his mother from Brighton on the necessity

which existed for his wintering abroad. 'But,' he added, 'I fondly hope you may, through God's mercy, be spared yet long after my return, when I trust to be sufficiently restored to visit you in Edinburgh. . . I feel that Scotland would be too much for me at present.' The few broken sentences uttered at the Mansion House on receiving the Sword and Freedom of the City of London; the physical failure to represent the 'Dux Fortissimus' he was so aptly styled at the University, and the 'wasted countenance, attenuated-frame, and pain-stricken expression of features, in every line of which might be read the sure progress of disease, and a resolute will battling with it to the last,' noticed on the occasion of the presentation of plate, were significant of the approaching end. Alleviation, not cure, was to be hoped for in a milder climate: so he and Lady Outram again crossed the Channel, and passed on, by way of Paris, where they remained some weeks, to Nice. Here, notwithstanding his shattered health, he employed himself in earnest endeavours to advance the claims of such of his friends as he felt were worthy of his help, and might soon miss his powerful advocacy. The draft of a letter written in December, on behalf of one of them, shows how anxiously and carefully he could, even, in the midst of bodily suffering, perform this loving office. Though not in his own handwriting, none who knew him would suppose that the contents were not of his own dictation. On Christmas morning he was able to attend at the early Communion service, but it was to be the last time. He lost rather than gained strength, and when the *mistral* winds set in he was ordered to Pau. In spite of every precaution the journey proved a trying one, and he only survived it about ten days.

A medical officer of rank in the Madras Army, who happened to be on the spot, supplied the 'Lancet' with these interesting particulars of his brief association with the honoured



invalid:—‘Entertaining a high esteem for this brave and single-minded man, and grateful to him for all he had done and tried to do for army medical officers, I placed my services at his disposal; they were gratefully accepted, and I remained in close attendance on him to the last. My gallant patient was in a hopeless state when he reached Pau. The cold winds of Nice had excited a fresh attack of bronchitis; and during the last eight days of his life he was unable to lie down even for a few minutes. . . . Weak as he was, he spoke often of the depressed position of army medical officers, regretting that so little success had attended his efforts to obtain a due recognition of their services; adding, with emphasis, “The day *must* come when your services will be recognised. Another great war will end this long controversy in your favour.” Such were the dying words of this good and gallant soldier.’—Thus to the last he never moved out of the old unselfish groove of his choice. On March 11,—while all England was rejoicing over the marriage festivities of her Prince, the loyal heart ceased to beat; struggles—controversies—triumphs—all were over; the spirit had passed beyond the range of earthly things. A little past one o’clock on the morning of that day he died, sitting in his arm-chair, without a struggle—his face unmoved—his hands resting as if in sleep. His face had lost much of the suffering look of his later years: his head was slightly bent forward and looked very noble. Lady Outram and his son were at his side; the latter had arrived on the previous afternoon, having but just returned from attendance upon the last weeks of the venerable Mrs. Outram. Her long life had been brought to a close by a brief and unexpected illness,—the break-up of age—which mercifully spared her the blow impending over those who loved James Outram.

But the memory of the man remained, and his reputa-

CHAPTER VII. AND LAST.

Funeral in Westminster Abbey—'In Memoriam' sketches from the pens of old friends: Sir Bartle Frere—Sir Vincent Eyre—Sir Joseph Fayer—Sir George Clerk, and others—Conclusion.

'A RESTING-PLACE in the sanctuary which is the most ancient, venerable, and most honoured in the land—a gathering of men illustrious by rank, station, and service, around his grave—the spontaneous assemblage of a great and sympathetic crowd in the cathedral and its precincts, proved yesterday how much of respect and admiration James Outram had won in distant climes from his countrymen.' In these words did our leading journal open a sympathetic and graphic account of the funeral of a hero, to whose remains no man could grudge the honour awarded by this national ceremony. It was fit that the seal of public approval should have thus been openly set upon the last page of an exceptionally noble record, one which needed not the aid of conventional biography to extract its moral, or expound its meaning, so patent that he 'who runs may read.' We will not here repeat the detailed particulars of an occasion which was ably chronicled and commented on in the columns of the daily and weekly press; the illustrations of skilful draughtsmen being in some instances added to the word-painting of descriptive writers. Those only who have assisted at similar ceremonies in that grand and truly English Abbey—the brightest architectural jewel of the nation—can fully realise the effect produced within its majestic walls on March 25, 1863, by a combination of so many of the elements



IN THE BRIGADIER GEN. LIEUT. GEN. BIR JAMES OUTRAN BART BAKER IS
 A MEMBER OF THE LAST "WALL CHANGING" WAS ONE OF THE FIRST TO BE
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that raise emotion. We are told, and can readily understand, that the reading of the service was impressive, the music exquisitely performed, and that the assemblage of spectators represented the aristocracy of birth, of valour, and of worth ;¹ but such were not the causes which stirred brave hearts to their depths that day. There lay all that was left to them of as true and loyal a nature as they had ever known—there lay not only a statesman, a warrior, a nation's loss, but a comrade, a leader, above all, a friend. 'There were in the train following his coffin some who haply remembered the day when, in the heat and fire of Lucknow, he dis-mounted from his horse to protect a poor native lad whose parents had been slain, and who sat weeping by the roadside.' Haply it was the memory of a personal kindness which, at the words 'earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust,' made a 'stout Highlander, who had doubtless faced death for many a weary night in the Alam Bigh,' wipe with his cuff the tears that flowed down his cheek.'

The Highlanders at Outram's funeral were volunteers. Four officers—Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart, Captain Thomson, Lieutenant Brown, and Quartermaster Irvine—with Sergeant-Major P. and nineteen other non-commissioned officers—came up from Stirling to pay on behalf of their regiment, the last honours to one by whom it was their

privilege to have been led to battle and to conquest.' Sir John Kaye who, had he lived, would himself have painted Outram's entire career with all his literary experience and practised skill, tells these particulars regarding the presence in the Abbey of the kilted soldiers:—

'The 78th Highlanders knew Outram well. There were some men still in the regiment who, twenty years before, had served in the dreary furnace of Scinde; but it was on the great battle-field of Oude that they had learnt to love and to honour a leader who was ever as mindful of their interests as he was regardless of his own: who was as tender towards, and as careful of, his men as though they were his children; who never sacrificed a life except to the stern necessity of the fight. On the morning of March 25, these gallant fellows stood at the door of the mansion which held the remains of their beloved general, and earnestly sought to be allowed to carry the body to its last resting-place. Most reluctantly was the request refused;¹ but they marched beside the hearse, and filed through the Abbey beside the coffin, and were beside it when it was lowered into the grave. And as they stood there, their thoughts went back to the Alam Bâgh, with tender memories and sorrowful regrets that such a chief was lost to them for ever. Not merely of the more stirring events of the memorable campaign thought they in that solemn hour; not merely of his forwardness in action, of the enthusiasm which sent him ever where danger was the thickest, and of the glories to which he had led them. They thought also of his kindness, of the love which he had shown them, of his unceasing efforts to administer to their comforts, and to mitigate the rigours of war. They remembered the much he had done, the more he had striven

¹ The extreme weight of the leaden coffin, and the distances to be traversed, rendered the arrangement impossible without risk of retarding the arrival of the funeral procession at the Abbey.

to do for them ; how he had gone about from the camp at the Alam Bāgh into the surrounding villages, endeavouring to obtain milk and other little luxuries for his men ; how anxiously he had watched the progress of the sick and the wounded, doing all that he could to lighten their sufferings, and grieving that he could do no more ; and how, when the grim business of actual battle was slack, he had found healthy amusement for his followers, and instituted races and games, and all kinds of ‘ rural sports ’ in the camp, just as though it were a season of high holiday in the palmiest days of peace. Doubtless there rose up before those noble fellows, their hearts swelling beneath their tartans, the image of their dear general, as he stood watching their amusements, the never-failing cheroot between his lips, a bland smile on his face, and a twinkle of delight in his eyes ; and as they sorrowed most of all that they should see that face no more, they threw their wreath upon his bier.’

The grave is near the centre of the nave, marked by a marble slab bearing the pregnant epitaph suggested by Dean Stanley :—

‘ THE BAYARD OF INDIA.’

Within a few yards lie Clyde, Pollock, Dundonald, and one who in a widely different sphere developed sterling British qualities of a like type to those of the single-minded Anglo-Indian, ‘ sans peur et sans reproche ’—David Livingstone. Latest of all, ‘ rests from his labours ’ the administrator with a soldier’s heart, whose honoured family name must ever be closely linked with that of this soldier-statesman—John, first Lord Lawrence. Over the doorway of exit from the aisle to the Jerusalem chamber is the monument erected by the Secretary of State for India in Council, of which a necessarily imperfect photograph is reproduced in this volume. A Bhil and a Sind Baluch are the mourners. The relief represents the

meeting of Campbell, Outram, and Havelock at Lakhnau, and the inscription is from the sympathetic pen of Sir John Kaye. Over the entrance of the western transept are windows to the memory of gallant officers of Sir James Outram's division who fell in Oudh, as recorded on the pavement below; and in 'Poet's Corner' the monument of his far-off kinsman meets the eye. So it happens that there is something at hand to suggest the name of James Outram to the visitor, from whatever side he may enter the Abbey.

At this last stage of our work, we can, perhaps, render no better tribute to the memory of the distinguished officer whose career we have attempted, however feebly, to portray, nor can we more fitly study the reader's advantage, than by selecting from reminiscences illustrative of Outram's character, with which we have been favoured by willing contributors. The writers will be recognised as men whom high position and honourable name, combined with antecedent vocation, have constituted competent authorities on the subject.

Sir Bartle Frere, before commencing to relate the experiences of a personal acquaintance antedating to 1836 or 1837, reverts to the time when Outram was 'the great pacificator and civiliser of Khandesh.'¹ Referring to the treatment which the Bhils had been used to under preceding

¹ The services to the State of Sir Bartle Frere, both in and out of India, are too well known to need allusion. In the fact that amid so many pressing and important duties His Excellency has found time voluntarily to string together these valuable reminiscences of an old friend and fellow-councillor, we have fresh evidence of the affectionate regard entertained towards Outram by those who have had exceptional opportunities of testing his value. Unfortunately for the biographer and the public, the papers arrived too late for the good purpose to which they might have been applied in the preparation of the present biography. All the chapters of vol. i. having been struck off, and a great part of vol. ii. being in type when they came to hand, it has become necessary, to avoid repetition of already printed narrative, to omit, under permission considerably given in anticipation, certain portions of the contribution and change the order of the paragraphs.

Governments, and which rendered it so difficult for our officers to obtain their confidence, and bring them in as recruits to their standard, he says :—

‘After being induced to remain all day in camp the Bhils would slip away as the shades of evening approached, fearful of treachery during the night. One night, when Outram had persuaded a number to join him, and when he thought he had entirely gained their confidence, they all disappeared in a manner no one could account for; till it was remembered that a large box from Bombay had been brought that day in a cart, and opened in the presence of the Bhils, who had crowded round to gaze at the wonders it disclosed. Amongst the contents was a uniform coat, and one of the servants, in reply to the Bhils’ questions as to what it was, said, “Oh, it’s a pattern of the coats all you Bhils are to be dressed in. Then you will be put into great boxes like this, and sent over sea to London.” The Bhils said nothing at the time; but were observed sitting together whispering; and when night came they all decamped, scrupulously leaving behind them in their huts everything they had received from the “Sahib.”

‘He afterwards learned that, for months after he first tried to enlist men for his Bhil corps, Bhil opinion as to his object was divided. It was generally supposed that the Bhil recruits were wanted to be made into sepoys, and sent across the great “black water” to England. Others believed that Outram required them to fatten for the cannibal Rajah whose servant he was. The liberal supply of food given to all in his camp favoured this idea. The Sahibs cared as little as the Bhils themselves for what was hallowed or unhallowed in the way of food, and the Hindu and Mahomedan servants would frequently terrify the Bhils by telling them “that people who eat beef and pork were not likely to stick at cannibalism.”

the spear to any competitor, unless he happened to be some youngster upon a pony, with but little chance of the first spear, in which case Outram was always ready to give way, and let the youngster have a chance.

‘Outram was then political agent in the wild districts between Guzerat and Rajpootana, and soon after accompanied Lord Keane, then Sir John Keane, with the Bombay column of the army of the Indus, which was destined to take part in the first Afghan war, by marching through Scinde and up the Bolan Pass to Candahar. Scinde was then very imperfectly known to us through the reports of Sir Henry Pottinger’s, Burnes’s, and other missions, which had been sent to open the way to closer intercourse with the Ameers. The policy of the Ameers had been one of almost Japanese exclusion of all representatives of foreign powers, and the observations made by the envoys were watched with the utmost jealousy. The Ameers had consented to grant a passage through their territory to the Upper Indus, but consent had been very unwillingly given, and when Sir John Keane landed his force at the mouth of the Indus, he found that what little assistance the Ameers could have given to enable him to pass through the unhealthy part of the delta, and to reach the less deadly portions of Lower Scinde, was withheld, and there was every prospect of his force being decimated by malarious fever before they could move. In this extremity, Outram was deputed to Kurrachee, at that time little better than a large fishing village, with a few houses of Hindoo traders, living in apparent poverty, and carrying on with difficulty the small export trade of the country, which did not at that time exceed 30,000*l.* per annum in total value. Here Outram obtained the aid of Sheth Nao Mull, whose history would in itself have furnished the materials for an Oriental romance.

‘Nao Mull’s father had been a compulsory convert to

Mahomedanism, and the son had long wished for an opportunity to assist the English, to whom he looked for the chance of avenging the wrongs of the Hindoos upon their Mahomedan oppressors. He obtained the aid of the semi-independent Jokiya tribe, great breeders of camels, in the almost desert country bordering on the Kelat territory of Las-baila. The carriage required to move Sir John Keane's force was thus obtained, and Sir John Keane marched on through Scinde, and up the Bolan pass, accompanied by Outram, whose share in that campaign is very fully described in the various histories of the Afghan war. Outram returned with the column under General Sir Thomas Wilshire, who was charged to bring to account the Khan of Kelat for his supposed unfriendly conduct to Sir John Keane's army during its advance.

‘Into the history of Outram's career in Scinde and his difference with Sir Charles Napier, it is unnecessary that I should now enter. His heroic defence of the Hyderabad Residency will live among the striking episodes of that brilliant campaign. Perhaps few people have had better opportunities than I have, of estimating the character and great ability of both parties to these unhappy differences, and I need only say, as the net result of all I have seen and heard and read on the subject, that it was one of those differences certain to arise where two men of high spirit, and impatient of control, are required to work together with ill-defined relative responsibilities, and holding conflicting views of what justice and sound policy required. Outram believed most sincerely that he could have, by personal influence, induced the Ameers to do all that the Government of India could reasonably require of them. Sir Charles Napier, on the other hand, felt assured that the knot was one which could only be cut by the sword, and that the constitution of the Ameer's authority was such as to make it impossible for a barbarian

power to exist alongside the advancing influence of the British Government.

'When I returned to India in 1846, Outram was resident at the then quiet little Maratha court of Satara, greatly beloved and respected by the Raja and all belonging to him, but very much out of place in a position which afforded no scope for his fiery energies. I succeeded him in this post, and had often occasion to witness the scrupulous care with which he attended to the rights of the poorest and meanest, even when they afforded little room for the action of that energetic nature, which could never rest without some great task to employ it. During many subsequent years, when I was in Scinde, and he was Resident at Baroda, when he took the command of the British forces in the Persian war, and went thence to take part in the struggle of the mutiny of 1857, we were in constant correspondence, but I did not meet him again till I joined him as a member of Lord Canning's Council at Calcutta in 1860. He was then suffering visibly from overwork and incessant strain on his physical powers, during years of such excitement and labour; but he had always abundant energy for any subject which related to the welfare of the soldier or to the rights of native princes or people, and the favourite work of his latter days in Calcutta was the provision of means for exercise and recreation for the English soldiers to whom Calcutta and the neighbouring cantonment of Dum-dum had so frequently afforded nothing but the road to a premature grave. After he returned home, he continued to take his old interest in the military position in Egypt, and there he was found by Lord Canning, who was returning himself to England. He had, as Lord Canning expressed it, "death on his face," but his interest in his old pursuits was undiminished.

'It may be hoped that the class of political officers to which Outram naturally belonged will never die out in our

Eastern empire ; but every year must lessen the field in which his extraordinary energy and self-reliance developed itself. Of his military capacity, others can speak with more professional weight, but he was in every respect a born soldier, and whether in the field or in the cabinet, he was the soldier's friend.'

Just as received, we now add a 'Souvenir' by Sir Vincent Eyre, an eminent comrade whose well-known name forms its best introduction. It is dated Rome, January 2, 1880.

'In the political and military history of our vast Eastern empire, during recent times, the figure of "OUTRAM, THE BAYARD OF INDIA," stands forth in the open foreground, like a grand heroic statue, which needs no extrinsic aid of polishing or gilding, "to give the world assurance of a MAN."

'Recalling him to mind through the vista of bygone years, since first it was my valued privilege to serve under his command, my memory prefers to conjure up his image, in its own simple unadorned grandeur of outline, rather than in any such minuteness of detail as would, doubtless, better suit the purpose of his biographer.

'Yet I can readily believe that the lives of few men of his celebrity and varied career have so abounded in rich materials of exciting adventure wherewith to fill an attractive and instructive volume. But it was not amid scenes and events quite in harmony with such ideas that I found my lot cast, for a time, with his.

'Our first chance meeting was as entire strangers, in a waiting-room of the old India House, in the autumn of 1856, when he had just received a sudden order to proceed to Persia, to assume the chief command of an expedition then assembling for a campaign in that country. In mutual ignorance of each other's identity, we plunged into what proved an interesting discourse on Indian affairs, during

which it took me not long to discover that I was listening to "a Master in Israel." On being summoned away by a messenger, he inquired my name, and at once most generously volunteered to further my views with the high official he was about to interview. On the spur of the moment I had nothing to suggest; so he cordially pressed my hand, with an emphatic hope that we might "soon meet again on Indian soil." He sailed next day for the Persian Gulf, and on the 24th of the following August, in the memorable year 1857, his wish was fulfilled; for we met at Buxar, on the river Ganges, on board the steamer which was conveying himself and his chief Staff Officer, Colonel (now Lord) Napier, to Allahabad, to assume command of the forces destined for the relief of Lucknow. [*Quorum pars fui.*]

'He had, during that brief interval, brought the Persian war to a triumphant conclusion, somewhat after the fashion of Cæsar's "Veni, vidi, vici." General Havelock, who had been one of his chief co-operators in gaining that signal success, had preceded him to Calcutta, and was now making heroic efforts to suppress the great mutinous and insurrectionary movement which threatened the very existence of British rule, amid the battlefields of Cawnpore and Oudh, in the face of appalling difficulties and overwhelming odds. There was, at that particular juncture, *an ominous pause in the struggle*; and the crisis seemed to have reached its height, when Outram landed in Calcutta in the beginning of August, and was at once hailed, by the universal voice of his countrymen, as "the right man" required to face and appease the spreading storm.

'Havelock's operations having been brought to a temporary standstill for lack of reinforcements, Outram, his personal friend and late chief in the Persian war, was appointed to a high command of special character, for the rescue of Oudh and the adjacent provinces. But, the idea of

“superseding” his brave and useful comrade in arms, by virtue of his superior rank, was utterly foreign to his chivalrous nature; and he lost no time in assuring Havelock that “*to him alone should be the glory of relieving Lucknow.*”

‘That act of self-negation has probably no parallel in military annals. I refer to it now, because, after the first relief of Lucknow had been happily accomplished, it fell to my own lot, as “Brigadier of Cavalry and Artillery,” to forward to the Commander-in-Chief *a certain document.*

‘It is well known that General Outram carried out his generous intentions towards Havelock, during the march of our forces from Cawnpore to Lucknow, by temporarily sinking his military rank, and serving as a volunteer with Captain Barrow’s troop of “Volunteer Horse,” and a small detachment of Native Irregular Cavalry attached thereto, the troopers of which latter had remained “faithful to their salt.” In two engagements with the enemy, in the course of that march, Outram placed himself at the head of a little band of those troopers, and wielding in his grasp only a stout cudgel, daringly charged into the thick of the foe in most dashing style; and with such a signal exhibition of personal skill and prowess, as amply to justify his familiar soubriquet of the “Indian Bayard.”

‘When the relief of the Lucknow garrison had been fairly accomplished, Havelock, before surrendering his military authority to Outram, issued an order that the officers and men of each particular corps of the relieving force should elect one of their own body, whether officer or private, who should be deemed by general consent to have most fairly earned the distinction of the “Victoria Cross.” The unanimous choice of the “Cavalry” fell on Sir James Outram, and it formed part of my own official duty, as Brigadier of that arm (in conjunction with the Artillery) to forward the formal document to head-quarters. Happily, it was in my

power to do this through the intervention of Colonel Berkeley, the Chief of the Staff, without the knowledge of Outram himself, who might otherwise have felt himself placed in an embarrassing position.

'The Commander-in-Chief, unfortunately, did not consider an officer of such exalted rank would be an appropriate recipient of the Victoria Cross; which envied decoration could, in his opinion, be only conferred as a rule on those below the rank of Field Officer. When the matter eventually became known to Outram himself, he acknowledged to me that *he would have counted and prized the "Victoria Cross" more than any other military distinction that could be conferred; "not even excepting the G.C.B."* This feeling was quite in harmony with his whole character and antecedents, and I feel assured that it would have gratified the whole Indian army to have seen so appropriate and well-earned a decoration on the breast of their favourite hero.

'As a Commander in the field, the generous chivalry of his nature was constantly manifesting itself, not only in the utter disregard of personal danger, but in the prominence he was ever ready to give; when opportunity offered, to the humblest services of those under him, and in his anxiety that the full meed of merit should be rendered to even the lowest in rank, when fairly due. Such just and genial attributes could not fail to secure for him a degree of personal attachment and devotion such as has fallen to the lot of few leaders of men since the days of Cæsar and his favourite legions.

'In those military operations wherein he bore the chief command, and which came under my own observation, he seemed to combine two excellent yet quite opposite attributes; each valuable in its own particular way, but rarely found united in one person, viz., *a most vigilant "caution,"*

with an irresistible "dash." The union of these two qualities proved of inestimable value to the small force (mustering less than 4,000 men), which, under his masterly guiding mind, was left behind (on the departure of the Commander-in-Chief from Lucknow on November 26, 1857), *to maintain a defensive position* on the open plain of Alumbagh, on the south side of the city, for a period of nearly four months, during which it had to ward off repeated attacks from the mutinous forces that occupied Lucknow itself; whose numbers were being constantly reinforced from the adjoining province of Rohilcund, whence they were being gradually dislodged and dispersed by the Commander-in-Chief's effective tactics, and driven, as a last refuge, to concentrate within the walls of Lucknow, to make there a final united stand against the British power which they had so recklessly defied.

‘Thus, towards the end of January 1858, the Alumbagh force under Outram found itself in face of a vast hostile army, consisting chiefly of trained soldiers, whose numbers had by that time increased to upwards of 100,000; and whose position, behind the fortified strongholds of Lucknow, enabled them to dispose of large bodies for field operations against the Alumbagh force, and perhaps to cut off its communications with Cawnpore, and intercept all needful supplies. Seldom has a General been placed for so long a period in a position so full of anxious responsibility.

‘Outram, in view of the daily increasing danger, was possessed with an ardent and impatient longing to attack his foe by a *coup-de-main*, but his hands had been tied by strict orders from head-quarters to *act solely on the defensive*, until the Commander-in-Chief himself should return to the scene, for a final onslaught. So the lion-hearted Outram did his utmost to strengthen the weak points of his extensive position, with the aid of trenches, batteries, and abattis; so that when the enemy took courage, with their accumulated

numbers, to make a series of formidable attacks, in bodies of 30,000 trained soldiers at a time, in front, flank, and rear, Outram was always prepared to give them a warm reception at every point assailed, and even to follow up each victory to the very walls of their city of refuge. Also, through his timely precautions, he invariably gained reliable notice beforehand, through his own trusty spies, of each intended attack ; and thus it came to pass that his intimate knowledge of the native character, joined to his own peculiar power of influencing it to advantage, operated marvellously in our favour.

'It was a bold idea of Sir Colin Campbell to leave a small British force, under 4,000 strong, during so long a period, in such an exposed position ; but the result proved that he was justified, *by his knowledge of the remarkable man* whom he entrusted with the heavy responsibility of maintaining it at all hazards ! Heretofore, perhaps the defence of "the Alumbagh lines" at Lucknow by Outram has been insufficiently understood, and therefore too faintly appreciated by his countrymen at large ; but it may fairly take rank, though on a more limited scale, with the far-famed defence of the "lines of Torres Vedras" by Wellington in 1810.

'I would venture now to offer my humble tribute of admiration to the character of Outram in his civil and social capacity. During his residence in Calcutta, as member of the Supreme Council of India, it was my good fortune to be a frequent guest in his house, and to enjoy a considerable share of his confidence. His active mind seemed to be perpetually occupied with the practical problem of how he could best serve the interests of his country, and benefit those classes, whether European or native, who fell within the legitimate range of his influence. Above all, the welfare of the "British soldier" in India was ever uppermost in his thoughts. To this end, among many other benevolent acts,

he expended large sums in the purchase of books for distribution to various regimental libraries; and he did all in his power to introduce a system of healthy recreations and useful occupations in barracks, during those periods of unavoidable idleness when the soldier is most liable to fall into evil habits, from sheer lack of proper objects to engage his attention. These efforts culminated in the establishment, at the cantonment of DumDum, of what became known as "The Outram Institute," and was the first "soldiers' club," on a durable basis, introduced into India. Its success may be said to have given the first impetus to a general adoption of the system throughout the service, with well-known *beneficial results*. In this, as well as in more ways than I need here particularise, but which will doubtless find a place in the forthcoming biography, Outram may be said to have established an unquestionable claim to special distinction as "The Soldier's Friend."

'It is well known that he was strongly opposed to the abolition of the old "local European regiments" in India, and that he drew up, for submission to the Home Government of that day, an able and exhaustive state paper on the "amalgamation" question. The subsequent experience gained during the past twenty years has tended to justify his opinions, inasmuch as the re-establishment of a local European force is understood to be at present a matter of consideration with our home authorities.

'In connection with this important subject, I may perhaps be pardoned for mentioning that a "memorandum" drawn up by myself, at the invitation of Lord Canning, was honoured with the approval of his Lordship and of Outram, although it was foreseen by them that, as the scheme suggested therein did not harmonise with the "purchase system" then in force, it was not likely to be adopted by the Home Government. But, as that objection no longer stands in the

way, it may be as well to state briefly that my proposal was simply as follows: viz. That a given number of European "local battalions," *for permanent service in India*, should be linked, regimentally, with an equal number of "home battalions" in Great Britain and Ireland; and that *there should be a free interchange of officers and men between the two*. It was agreed that such a system would create a reciprocity of interests, whereby both countries would benefit. India would thereby gain a constant influx of young soldiers, ready disciplined, and prepared to rough it in the climate of the East; while England would get back from time to time, as circumstances might render desirable, a corresponding supply of home-sick, yet still efficient and valuable veterans, experienced in war, and probably with medals on their breasts, to stimulate their younger comrades at home, and "show how fields are won." Thus, in a few words, the "Home battalions" might become the nurseries of the "Indian battalions," and would be "arks of refuge" for our returned veteran soldiers, after a sufficient period of exposure and buffeting in India. *One list of names, for purposes of promotion, might combine the officers of both battalions*. I may add that the late Sir Howard Douglas, in his last published essay on "The Defence of England," in 1859, made favourable allusion to this scheme as "deserving of consideration." The present system of "linked regiments" does not appear to satisfy the requirements of the service, especially as regards India, and will probably undergo some modification. It might be fairly expected that the prospect of a prolonged "local service" in India would once more attract a valuable class of recruits, who now stand aloof, especially as there would be always an open door for their return under advantageous conditions to the "Home battalion" should their health so require.

'In conclusion, it may be said of Outram that through-out his whole public career he was actuated by the chi'

spirit of a true "knight errant," as a redresser of wrongs and an upholder of the weak against the strong, whenever his keen sense of duty impelled him to battle in behalf of the oppressed. In so doing he was ever, even to rashness, regardless of self and of his own personal interests; neither was he dismayed by the frowns of any "Jupiter hostis" in high position, who might take dire offence at his proceedings and shake the terrific sceptre of office over his head. In all such cases Outram, more than any public man previously known in our Indian history, acted unflinchingly and persistently on the principle of "*Fiat justitia, ruat cælum.*" It is well that the life of a man so truly noble should be duly commemorated, as an instructive and encouraging example for the imitation of those who follow in his wake as labourers, like him, in the vast and ever-extending field of our Indian empire. To every such worthy son of Britain, in whose breast the fire of a laudable ambition is kindling into flame, I would say:—

Macte novâ virtute, puer; sic itur ad astra!¹

To Sir Joseph Fayrer² we are indebted for the following interesting notes:—

'I first made Sir James Outram's acquaintance when he came to be Resident at Lucknow in 1854. I was then Residency surgeon and extra assistant Resident. In both capacities I had much to say to him, and got to know him very intimately, and to love and honour him as much as one man can love and honour another. He was so generous, straightforward, brave, true, wise, and sagacious; so far-seeing and large-hearted, so considerate for others, so uncon-

¹ 'Go ahead, my boy! in thy new path of virtue and valour, which leads to glory!'

² Surgeon-General Sir Joseph Fayrer, K.C.S.I. Mention has before been made of this distinguished medical officer, and his reminiscences of life within the Lakhnau Residency will be found at p. 240 of the present volume.

scious of self, and so child-like in his simple-heartedness, that it was impossible not to feel for him as I and so many others did who knew him well. The simple inscription on his tomb in Westminster Abbey, "The Bayard of India," is a very fitting one, for to no man in our day, I believe, could that name be more truly given.

'I was with him until he went home from Lucknow on account of his health, which was a good deal broken by climate, although he had then no organic disease. He had had much worry and strain in arranging the affairs of Oude after the annexation. There was much indeed that was distasteful to him in that duty, and he was glad to get away. He had suffered much from neuralgia and muscular pains from the result of imperfect assimilation. The return to Europe no doubt did him much good. I next saw him (though I had frequently corresponded with him) when he came to our relief in the Residency. He came into my house then, and remained there until we evacuated the place in November 1857, and I remember I thought that, despite fatigue and a wound in the arm, he looked wonderfully well. I took leave of him at the Dilkhoosha, when we made that forced march to Cawnpore to Wyndham's relief, and being then sent home on account of illness resulting from the siege of the Residency, I did not see him again until I returned to Calcutta in April 1859, when he became President of the Council, on the Governor-General going away up country. Again I saw him frequently, as did Dr. Macpherson, under whose care I found him, and experienced the same continued and affectionate kindness from him until he finally returned to Europe. I never saw him after that, and when I heard of his death I felt I had lost one of my best friends. I do not know the precise cause of death. He had suffered much from chronic bronchitis and a weak heart, and I imagine some visceral change, probably increasing cardiac debility and

dilatation, must have developed after he left India. A portrait of him, that he allowed a friend of mine in Paris to paint for me very shortly before his death, has a worn, emaciated, and anxious look, that is suggestive of serious illness.

‘He had originally a powerful and vigorous frame, but it had been much tried by climate and work in India for so many years—and such work too!—few men could have sustained the continuous mental and physical strain so long and so well as he did. He was abstemious, simple, and regular in his mode of life (though rather inclined to eat indigestible things) during my knowledge of him, with one exception, and that was smoking. I think I never knew any man smoke more than he did. I have no doubt it did him harm, for it interfered with his digestion, and must have affected, though it may have been slightly, his nervous system. It was the only point on which we did not agree, and I often spoke to him about it. One of the most touching and beautiful, as well as kind, letters I ever had from him—I wish I had it now, but it was lost with many other valuable things at Lucknow—was in reply to an earnest written remonstrance with him on the subject: the purport of it was that no doubt I was right, but he *could* not do what I advised. He never felt or thought that it did him harm, and so he continued it to the last. You ask me for any anecdotes illustrative of his character. I remember none but that show how everything he did was the outcome of a loyal, brave, and true heart and an unselfish nature; no one who knew him, and associated with him as I did, could have failed to receive abundant proof of it. . . . He was, as you know, a great sportsman, and was fond of animals of all kinds; he used to tell me of his adventures in former years with wild ones, and once showed me the scars made by a panther which he had attacked on foot. . . .

‘I did not see him again till I returned to Calcutta in

1859. He was then a member of Council, and as the Governor-General was away in the north-west, he had just become President of the Council. He then asked me to become his private secretary. He was entitled to a staff as President. I pointed out that, though nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be with him again, I thought the duty would hardly consist well with those of my professorship at the college, and that I was sure if he made such an appointment it would be looked on with dislike by the other services. He said that was his affair, he had a right to choose whom he pleased, and he wished for me, if I could undertake the office. However, at my request he postponed it for a short time, and spoke of the matter to others. On the pretext that it was expedient not to incur expense, he was advised not to appoint any private secretary, but an aide-de-camp, who was a son of the Lieutenant-Governor.

'I saw much of him in Calcutta, until he finally left for Europe, whence I and others heard from him. He never seemed to tire of doing kind and thoughtful things for his friends. He wrote several letters to my father, and ever continued to take an interest in my welfare. I know how great a proof it was of his regard for me when he consented to sit several times to Mr. A. Buxton for his portrait. I may just add one other incident illustrative of the humble view he took of his own great powers. In Calcutta he showed me a letter offering him a high appointment in one of the other Presidencies, and his reply to it, saying that he did not consider himself fit for it. He was a better judge of others than of himself. Of the many great men that the India of former days has produced, none ever exceeded him in the mental power of grasping all the prominent points of any great subject, and none ever gave effect to the method of dealing with it with greater force or vigour.

'One of the last minutes he wrote in Calcutta had refer-

ence to the provision of hospital accommodation and comforts for sick officers coming to the Presidency, and like all he did, it was full of thought and care for those who so much needed it. I may add, he was one of the best friends the medical service ever had, and he was always anxious to do justice to their claims and to advance their interests.

‘These are, after all, but a few trifling illustrations of his character; but it was in the general tenor of his noble and unselfish life, and in the constantly recurring evidences of it, that he lives in the affection and memory of those who were with him and served under him.’

Among the eminent men who filled the office of Governor-General during the period of which we have been writing, Lords Auckland, Dalhousie, and Canning, are those with whom Outram was in most frequent correspondence; and the confidential and important nature of that correspondence is of itself sufficient to demonstrate the high degree of merit which he must have attained to become thus distinguished among his fellows. If Lord Auckland discerned in Outram’s early manhood the same qualities of soldier-statesmanship that Lord Canning recognised in his later years, Lord Dalhousie added to this same appreciation a warmth of personal regard, again exhibited on his retirement from public life. When an invalid at Malvern, receiving the sad instalments of news of the revolt then spreading rapidly over Northern India, he wrote to Mrs. Outram that it was to her son ‘and such as he, that the country must look at this time.’ He had before ‘heartily and sincerely’ congratulated her on the ‘accumulated honours which had accrued to her son from the Persian campaign,’ so well won and so fully approved by the whole public.

Dr. Bisset, under whose tuition Outram’s early boyhood was passed at the Udney School near Aberdeen, when ‘Modera-

tor' of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, met his successor, the late Earl of Dalhousie, and had occasion to ask from him a note of introduction for a friend, to the nobleman then ruling in Calcutta. 'I think your strongest claim on the Indian Government,' wrote the then Secretary for War, 'is having trained such a general and statesman as Outram for the public service, and this I have mentioned to Lord Elgin.'

Lord Hardinge, though not led into that frequent and confidential communication with Outram, which the particular employment of the latter had brought about in the other instances mentioned, was not insensible to, or forgetful of his merits. We have seen that his lordship highly approved of his conduct of the Southern Maratha campaign: and we further know that, in expressing annoyance that an Outram and Napier controversy had ever arisen, he characterised the litigants as 'two of the best officers in either service.'

Among the Governors of Bombay, we have cited the well-known names of Mountstuart Elphinstone and Malcolm, as of statesmen who took note of Outram's promising youth. Later on, Sir James Carnac, Sir George Arthur, Sir George Clerk, and Lord Elphinstone all bore testimony to the fruit-bearing vigour of his manhood. Indeed, such abundant evidence of their sentiments in this respect has been already supplied in the preceding pages, that we will but add to the record a brief extract from a late letter addressed to the present biographer by one, and not the least eminent, of the number. Sir George Clerk, writing from Bournemouth, on March 12, 1880, thus incidentally reverts to his own acquaintance with Outram:—

'I never knew one who combined with thorough sterling character and soldierly qualities, so much of single-mindedness and modesty; and heaps of experience have come in my way too, during a long and busy public life.'

We now add the testimony of a gentleman not belonging to the official world, or enrolled in the covenanted or uncovenanted service of India. Mr. J. H. Fergusson, an esteemed and upright representative of the mercantile community of Calcutta, and the original honorary secretary of the Testimonial Committees, has contributed the following personal recollections and impressions:—

‘Those features in Sir James Outram’s character which I was able principally to observe were, I think, his grand simplicity and self-abnegation, his generosity, his contempt of all pecuniary advantage to himself, and his geniality and power of sympathy with all ranks and classes of men. He was ever accustomed in honour to prefer others to himself in genuine unconsciousness of his own superiority. He was, without guile and without *arrière pensée*, a true knight under all circumstances, and in every relation of life. Self was nowhere with him. The world heard of some of his more striking acts of self-effacement. But the world could scarcely know that these actions were the simple outcome of the principles by which he was habitually actuated. He was always ready to sacrifice himself for the advantage of others. He would always take without ostentation the post of danger and trial, or of labour and difficulty, and would so order things of his own intention, that others should, if possible, receive the honour and the reward.

‘From my intimacy with him in regard to the management of his affairs, I had special knowledge of the delicate generosity of his character, and of his thoughtfulness for others—for none more than for the soldier, in small things as well as in great. The men of one of the regiments to which he had sent supplies of books, periodicals, and games, through me, after the Mutiny, asked their Colonel to send word to Sir James Outram that they were ready at any time to g

through fire and water for him. They knew him to be a thorough soldier, and not less to be their thorough-going friend. And just as his sympathy abounded towards them, and towards all who worked with him, high and low, so it would overflow towards a little child in the form of both arms full of toys—brought round by himself, on Christmas-day, when a Member of the Government in Calcutta.

‘By sympathising appreciation of good work done, added to sympathising encouragement, he brought out all the best qualities of the doers, and made them, so to speak, all that they afterwards became. Besides that, he was their fast friend through life, and never forgot their interests, however unmindful of his own. Advantage to himself was what he never thought of, and money was literally the dirt under his feet, except only when he could make it helpful to others.

‘There never was a man more entirely simple and free from all self-consciousness. There was about him the highest ideal of dignity, because there was the absence both of all assumption and of all affected disclaimers of dignity.’

The above tributes ‘in memoriam’ are, as it were, original and unpublished contributions to the biography—wreaths laid by sorrowing yet discriminating friends upon the tomb. Miscellaneous and incidental vouchers of the extraordinary repute he had attained among his brother-officers might be produced in any number. Here is a short but significant extract of a letter from Colonel C. W. Grant, written to Outram himself in 1853:—

‘Did I once tell you that in 1849 we went to Dharangāon, and put up for a few days at your old house, a most comfortable one by the bye. I went to the Bhil Lines—saw the regiment on parade with their band playing “Love not”

or some civilised air, and then went to the schoolroom, where I saw at least fifty children of these *wild* (!) Bhils busy reading and writing. I do not know when I had been so interested in anything; and if, my dear Outram, the reclaiming these poor wild creatures had been the one sole act of your life, it would have been sufficient to ensure you a pleasant retrospect as long as you live—had not your subsequent career been one long act of singleness of purpose and devotedness to your country, through disappointments and vexations enough to have tried the firmest resolve. This Bhil episode must, I am sure, still form one of the most agreeable and satisfactory retrospects of your active and honourable career.'

Major C. Giberne, late of the Bombay Army, after relating how Outram had gained the confidence and attachment of the Bhils by treating them with the greatest personal kindness—at first allowing them to come into his tent, and examine anything they fancied—adds: 'He was about six years my senior, and I well remember the kind of romantic deference with which the younger officers all regarded him. Even as a young man he was possessed of that rare combination of sound judgment, quick decision, unflinching determination, calmness both in counsel and in action, and fearless personal intrepidity which so pre-eminently distinguished him in after years, and which, while he himself invariably led the way on every occasion of doubt, difficulty, or danger, seemed instinctively to command the sympathy and support of everyone, whether European or native, who followed his leadership or acted under his orders.'

But although many such extracts are at hand and available, our space has been well-nigh exhausted. Nor may we venture to extract, however sparingly, from more than two or three of the many published sketches of Outram's

career and character which the intelligence of his death called into print.

Dr. Montagu Butler, the learned and eloquent head-master of Harrow, spoke thus of Outram in the school chapel, about the time of the funeral:—‘During the course of last week a great man was borne to his rest in that famous Abbey where so much that has made England great appeals to the gratitude and the admiration of posterity. The act by which he will probably best be known to future times—because it is identified with a great crisis in our national history—was a signal act of chivalrous magnanimity. Many of you will remember how, when after the long and terrible suspense succours were at last to be thrown into Lucknow, Outram, though the senior officer present, refused to associate his name with the chief glory of the coming exploit, but persisted in making it over to Havelock, who had borne the burden and heat of the day. In that one day he resigned the command, and entered Lucknow as a volunteer. The fame of that chivalrous deed spread far and wide: but its true nobleness is founded in this fact, that it was not an isolated deed, but a deed felt to be of a piece with the whole character of the man. The more his life is studied in its details, the more it will be found how habitually he made a practice of esteeming others better than himself, of looking less at his own things, and more at the things of others.’

The late Sir John William Kaye, too, whom we have before quoted, the historian who has shown how even the dry bones of Indian annals can become things animate and of vital interest, has left us a faithful and bright word-picture, of which the following are no weak specimens:—‘There were men of higher rank than James Outram; men who had commanded greater armies, and who had governed more extensive territories. There was no one great event, changing the destinies of empires, to which he could point as pecu-

liarly his own. His career was without a Waterloo. But a life of sustained devotion to the public service, a life made beautiful by repeated acts of heroism and chivalry, a life of stainless truth and unsullied honour, made England echo back the praises which pealed across the Eastern seas. . . . That he was ambitious is not to be denied; but his ambition had but little of the common element of selfishness. He would never consent to rise at the expense of others, nor would he benefit himself to the injury of the State. No man was ever more liberal in the bestowal of praise on others, more willing to acknowledge the assistance he had derived from his comrades, or more eager to obtain for them the recognition of the Crown. Indeed, it may be said that he almost wearied the Government by importuning them to obtain honours and rewards for the officers and men who had served under him. . . . It was, indeed, always with some reference to the good of others, or to the honour of the great service to which he was so proud of belonging, that he coveted distinction; but even for this he would have taken no high office, the duties of which he did not know that he was capable of adequately discharging. If he thought that any man was capable of doing the work better than himself, he was always willing to give place to him.' . . . Again, 'It was in the largeness and the overflow' of his sympathies, in the 'rich loving kindness redundantly kind,' which he felt for men of all races and all classes, that Outram differed from and excelled all his contemporaries, with the sole exception, perhaps, of Henry Lawrence. His compassion, indeed, was boundless.

He could afford to suffer
With those whom he saw suffer.

It was this compassion, this faculty of seeing with other men's eyes, of thinking with other men's hearts—a faculty, the absence of which from our chief rulers brought us to our

sorest straits in India—which made Outram so strenuous an opponent of injustice in all its forms.’¹

Across the Channel, the story told was much to the same effect; for the nationality of the true hero is, after all, but a conventional consideration. The more universal his acceptance in the world, the more honour does he confer on the country to which, by birth, he belongs.

M. de Valbezen, a popular writer on England, whose name should be pleasantly familiar to the readers of the ‘*Revue des deux Mondes*,’ and who has narrated with ability and intelligence certain chapters of the Indian mutinies, was Sir James Outram’s guest² at Lakhnau in March 1855. Retracing his career some years after the funeral in the Abbey, and when monuments had arisen here and there to the memory of the soldier-statesman, he says:—

‘In one of the public gardens near those fine quays which have metamorphosed the aspect of the Thames, rises the bronze statue of the *preux chevalier* worthy to have inspired Macaulay when his pen traced these noble expressions:—“He was among those who, proud of an honourable poverty, after having made and dethroned kings, find their reward in the thought that their name is not only placed high on the list of warriors, but on a yet better list in the golden book of those who have acted and suffered for the good of humanity.”’

¹ *Cornhill Magazine*: May 1863. Article ‘Westminster Abbey, March 25, 1863.’

² ‘The first time I had the honour of sitting at his table,’ writes M. de Valbezen, ‘with a half-serious half-comic air he put me the question, “Well, would you have any objection to be poisoned?” “Undoubtedly I would, Sir James,” I replied, rather taken aback. “Then mind what you are at here, for they have tried it already on me more than once.” The water, in fact, was padlocked in a tin case. This visible precaution made me understand that the General’s words were not random ones, and, in spite of the abundance and delicacy of the food, I will not venture to say that I gave full rein to my appetite.’

Twenty years ago, M. de Montalembert, of the French Academy, described him, in one of the most eloquent of his writings, as ‘ celui-là des généraux anglais qui avait opéré sous Lord Dalhousie la réunion de l’Oude. . . . et qui, dans la dernière campagne, s’était attiré l’admiration universelle en consentant, comme notre Boufflers à Malplaquet et lord Hardinge dans l’Inde,¹ à rester comme volontaire sous les ordres de son subordonné, parce que ce subordonné était Havelock, et qu’il ne voulait pas lui dérober la gloire d’une victoire à moitié gagnée.’²

But eulogistic notices of Sir James Outram, called forth by his lamented death, and arising incidentally out of circumstances which have occurred since that period, are far too numerous to be adverted to one by one. We might find them scattered broadcast over the continent of Europe in the recognised organs of public opinion, and expressed by the native newspapers throughout the length and breadth of British India. Only we are warned that it is time to drop the curtain, and bring our labours to a close.

The biographer has little to add to the above-recorded testimony of those who have been connected with James Outram by ties of intimate friendship³ or association in professional work—whether in the field or at the desk. But he pleads that acquaintance with his subject which enables him to accept or reject the judgment of others upon it; and he has no hesitation in endorsing, as genuine and trustworthy, the sketches of character which form the staple of the present and concluding chapter of his book. In this belief, it will be no matter for surprise that he sees in the man whose career he has traced from childhood to the grave, an example to the rising generation of the day—as also to all who have gone

¹ In the London copy, ‘Afghanistan’—a manifest error.

² Débat sur l’Inde au Parlement Anglais; par M. le Comte de Montalembert. (London, Jeffs, 1858.)

forth to take their part in the battle of life, or who may still be striving to maintain a conflict long since begun. There is no pretence of perfection in the standard exhibited ; nor do we profess to have brought forward a model without a flaw. But in a character such as Outram's it may well prove a harder task to indicate the particular defects to be avoided, than to proclaim the virtues it behoves us to imitate. Wherefore, we must be excused for preferring the last to the first as a standing-point.

Who can say that any modifications in Nature's handiwork, suggested by human Criticism, might not have impaired those parts of the original fabric which even the more astute of human critics would have sought to preserve intact ? In any case, the result would not have been recognised in the familiar figure so welcomed by the mass. The foibles as well as the virtues went to the composition of that 'James Outram' whom Anglo-Indians knew and admired for thirty years.

On the other hand, were we asked what particular feature in Outram's character is the more worthy of imitation, we should have little difficulty in giving a reply. All may not possess his sound judgment and discrimination, his tact and foresight, his nerve and physical power. Special gifts of Providence, such as these—however subject to growth and development, and strengthened by practice—are not to be confounded with the acquisitions of Study and Perseverance. But all may imitate him in his honesty, his love of truth, his courage, his zeal, his sympathetic kindness, his abnegation of self—qualities which, exercised in a good cause, are essentially Christian ; for they necessarily co-exist with abhorrence of deceit and falsehood, and of mean-spiritedness, indifference, pride, and selfishness.

His character and career cannot, perhaps, be summarised in more accurate and expressive terms than are supplied by the well-weighed sentences which were prepared by Colonel

Yule to be engraved on the granite pedestal of Foley's Statue
on the Calcutta Esplanade:—

HIS LIFE WAS GIVEN TO INDIA :

IN EARLY MANHOOD HE RECLAIMED WILD RACES BY WINNING THEIR HEARTS :

GHAZNI, KELAT, THE INDIAN CAUCASUS, WITNESSED THE DARING DEEDS OF HIS PRIME :
PERSIA BROUGHT TO SUE FOR PEACE,—LUCKNOW RELIEVED, DEFENDED AND RECOVERED,—
WERE FIELDS OF HIS LATER GLORIES.

MANY WISE RULERS, MANY VALIANT CAPTAINS, HATH HIS COUNTRY SENT HITHER ;
BUT NEVER ANY LOVED AS THIS MAN WAS, BY THOSE WHOM THEY GOVERNED OR LED TO BATTLE
FAITHFUL SERVANT OF ENGLAND :

LARGE-MINDED AND KINDLY RULER OF HER SUBJECTS :

DOING NOUGHT THROUGH VAINGLORY, BUT 'EVER ESTEEMING OTHERS BETTER THAN HIMSELF ;'

VALIANT, INCORRUPT, SELF-DENYING, MAGNANIMOUS,

IN ALL THE TRUE KNIGHT !

IF AN OPPONENT ONCE STYLED HIM

THE BAYARD OF INDIA,

THEY WHO SET UP THIS MEMORIAL

MAY WELL LACK WORDS

TO UTTER ALL THEIR LOVING ADMIRATION !

APPENDICES.

APPENDICES.

APPENDIX I.

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM ANDERSON, page 27.

THE circumstances of the murder, in 1848, at Multan, by the soldiers of Mulraj, of two British officers, Mr. P. A. Vans Agnew, of the Bengal Civil Service, and Lieutenant Anderson, of the 1st Bombay Fusiliers, will be found recorded in modern histories of India. Of the character of the latter officer some interesting particulars are given by those who were associated with him shortly before his death.

Mr. Cocks, Assistant Resident, Lahor, sent the following letter to Colonel Outram in the year of the sad occurrence :—

‘I wrote to you a few days ago about poor Anderson. You will not be surprised to receive a new letter from me. I wish I could make the task a pleasant one, but alas ! it is one of the saddest I have ever undertaken. The first attack upon our friends would have been of slight consequence, but the torch once lit, the fire of insubordination spread ; and on the 21st a regular attack was made on the Eedgah, where the wounded officers lay. Moolraj is at the bottom of the whole. The crowd collected and increased from hundreds to thousands. The fight went on, however, bravely until the Sikh force, which had accompanied them down to Mooltan, went over to the enemy. The end is easily imagined. Suffice it to say that both my friends behaved like noble and gallant British officers, endeavouring to save the lives of the few servants who remained, and then making a good defence of their own persons—their death was not lingering.

‘Agnew was a friend of many years’ standing. I mourn him as

‘ During a service of about ten years, he had held appointments of trust in India and Scinde. In 1843 he was compelled by sickness to visit Europe, where he remained until the Punjaub war started him from Germany *en route* to India. Hearing at Malta of the cessation of hostilities, he turned his steps to Constantinople, and pursued his way, unattended, leisurely and inquiringly, through Persia to Bombay. No man of his standing was more generally known and appreciated, or stood higher in the estimation of the army. Many—and amongst them no less a man than Sir C. Napier—watched his path with interest, and foretold his future greatness. In Lieutenant Anderson, with the chivalrous gallantry of the soldier, were combined accomplishments and learning which would adorn the collegian. He was deeply versed in the literature of his own country, and possessed not only talent but genius. With power such as the ablest might envy, he was modest and unassuming—most loved where best known. His ambition was noble, and he entered on this his last course with the hope which such a mind would naturally entertain. He was the brother-in-law and friend of Colonel Outram. The Bombay Army has never numbered in its ranks one worthier of its pride than him whose murdered remains now moulder at Moultan.

maintenance of very different relations with the Affghans to what actually now exist, the position of any European host approaching from the westward would be little bettered by their friendly reception in Affghanistan.

‘ However friendly that reception might be in the first instance, and however sincere the Affghan chiefs might be in their wish to continue on friendly terms with the Army of Infidels they had admitted into their country, it is scarcely possible that such amicable relations could be maintained long enough to afford the latter time to recover from the effects of the fatigue and privation it had undergone in coming so far; to replenish its exhausted stores, and to recruit its carriage cattle. For Affghanistan produces little beyond what is required for its own consumption; and the demands on such limited resources—to supply the wants of so great a host having no means of procuring foreign supply either of provisions or carriage cattle (as we did from India to a vast amount)—would inevitably soon create such a dearth in the land as must excite the irritation of the population against the cause of their distress. And no efforts of their chiefs could then restrain them from acting as hostilely towards those quondam friends, as heretofore they did against the British army. Warned by our example they might retrograde to the Persian frontier ere yet the severity of winter should increase their difficulties,—or they might occupy Candahar and maintain themselves during winter; but under such circumstances they must abandon all hope of advancing further, at any rate until vastly reinforced,—and, were they to await reinforcements, ere *they* could arrive from such a distance, they would find themselves so involved in warfare with the surrounding tribes, on whom they would have to prey for the means of subsistence, that all the power that could be brought to their aid would be required to extricate them from their perilous position.

‘ But, assuming the incredible hypothesis that Russia and Persia united could bring into *friendly* Affghanistan such an imposing force, and so well provided with *every* requisite, as would render them independent of the resources of that country—an incredible assumption, I say, for how could distant Russia and impoverished Persia furnish and support, so far from their resources, such a vast army as would be required to operate on India, when *we*, with our ample resources so near at hand, could scarce support (ere yet our difficulties arose) the comparatively small army which we sent in^{te}

a fifty-mile desert, which he could only attempt to cross in detachments that would be cut off in detail—or, himself to pass the desert, and concentrate his army at Dadur (six miles from the mouth of the Bolan pass) to attack the enemy the moment he emerges into the plain—or, having crossed the desert, to await at Bhaug (half-way between the desert and Dadur, where water and forage are abundant) until the entire force of the enemy had descended into the plain, when he would move forward to the attack.

‘The latter is the course I myself should adopt, because it would enable me utterly to annihilate the foe, who would have no retreat but the pass; and we well know how flying and defeated men would be dealt with by the ruthless Kakur and other tribes of the pass, in their attempt to escape by that way. The *first* is objectionable, as the invaders might attempt to turn our position by moving down to Gundava, and thence seek to penetrate to Larkana, or he might obtain a passage through the Murrie hills, and thus menace our frontier from various points. The *second* plan is also objectionable, as it might deter the enemy from descending the main pass, and so induce him to pour his detachments down the smaller passes of Seebee and Gundava (which also would be sufficiently nearly commanded from the position at Bhaug), and thus necessitate detached operations on our part.

‘I believe there are only two other passes besides those above adverted to, by which disciplined troops could descend from Afghanistan into the valley of the Indus: those of Dera Ghazee Khan and Dera Ismael Khan, in the Sooleiman range. The former has never, so far as I know, been explored by any European; but the information I was enabled to obtain regarding it satisfied me that it is impracticable for troops accompanied by artillery. Precise information respecting the other pass—Dera Ismael Khan—is, I believe, in possession of Government; I having, when occupied in the Eastern Ghilzie country, deputed Lieut. Broadfoot, of the Bengal Engineers, to examine it, who accomplished the somewhat perilous undertaking very effectually. I have not his report at hand, but my impression is that he pronounced the pass impracticable for artillery. However this may be, the debouches of both these passes are now effectually guarded by British detachments; and were either menaced by the invaders, there would be no difficulty in reinforcing the latter from Peshawar, and the former from Sukkur in ample time to repel the enemy.’

APPENDIX L.

COMPLIMENTARY ORDERS AND NOTICES, page 185.

THE successful termination of the Persian campaign gave occasion to many congratulatory and laudatory articles in the press as well as the official recognition of Government. We subjoin three or four extracts of varied character :—

On May 7, 1857, in the House of Lords, Lord Portsmouth spoke as follows : ‘I must be allowed to express my opinion that Her Majesty’s Government deserve great credit for breaking through the old course of routine, by appointing Sir James Outram, an Indian officer, to the chief command of the expedition. That was putting the right man in the right place, and they deserve every credit for it.’ Some two months later, Mr. Vernon Smith stated, in the House of Commons : ‘Long will the rapidity with which the Persian Expedition was fitted out be sung in story on these shores. . . . When Persia is again disposed to offer us an insult she will pause before she does so. . . . She will call to mind the victories which General Outram has achieved, and the bravery which upon the part of the youngest lieutenants of the service has been so conspicuously displayed.’

In notifying the ratifications of the Treaty with Persia, the Governor-General in Council thus expressed the sense entertained of the services of the Chief who had commanded the expeditionary force :—

‘The brilliant reputation of Lieutenant-General Sir James Outram, K.C.B., has acquired additional lustre from the promptitude, the vigorous energy, and ability with which he has exercised the command entrusted to him ; and the Governor-General in Council desires to record his high sense of the important services rendered by this distinguished officer.’

We read in the *Times* of May 18, 1857 :—

‘Skilful arrangements combined with intrepid conduct soon placed Mohumra in possession of the British; but this achievement, though extremely creditable in itself, does not represent the most striking feature of the expedition. The distinctive character of General Outram’s campaign is to be sought rather in the extraordinary boldness and promptitude by which the victory was improved, and the accumulation of results which a single success was thus made to produce. No sooner had the Persian army retired from its entrenchments at Mohumra, and commenced its retreat into the interior, than Sir James despatched a force on its track, although it was perfectly clear that the original strength of the enemy had been very considerable, and that his loss had been comparatively trifling; while, to crown the difficulties of the crisis, the British cavalry had not been able to complete its landing, and a single troop of horse only was available for the contemplated service. . . . It is not every general who would venture on making forty-five troopers do duty for the cavalry of an army, or who would send 300 men in pursuit of 13,000. Numbers, it is true, count in reality for little under such conditions, and the event has shown as much, but it requires a commander of no ordinary merit to act unshrinkingly on the conviction.’

Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor, Commissioner to Herat, thus addressed the Government of India on June 7, 1858 :—

‘I take this opportunity of reporting, that during my march through Persia, I have observed in many instances the good effects of the late occupations by British troops. The whole people of Fars (Southern Persia) are loud in their praises of the justice and humanity evinced on every occasion by all officers with whom they came in contact; the treating wounded soldiers and presenting them with a gratuity on their recovery was contrasted with the conduct of their own people, who instantly plundered them of the clothes and money they had received from their enemies; the prompt payment and liberal price given for every necessary article has kept up the impression of the unlimited resources of the Government, and the wealth of individuals.

‘The discontent which prevails in Persia at the present time is quite incredible, and the pent-up feelings of an oppressed people would burst forth into revolution if they only knew where to find a leader.’

APPENDIX M.

EYRE'S DISPERSION OF INVADERS AT HATGAON, page 213.

THESE notes by Major W. J. Johnson (dated July 14, 1863) are of interest, not only as a narrative of an exciting incident, but as illustrative of Outram's dealings with his subordinates, and of his attention to details. They give, moreover, a remarkable example of the fidelity displayed, under most trying circumstances, by remnants of regiments that had mutinied :—

NOTES BY BREVET-MAJOR W. J. JOHNSON, LATE COMMANDING
12th IRREGULAR CAVALRY.

' At the time Sir James Outram arrived at Benares the reinforcements with him were entirely destitute of cavalry, from which he experienced great inconvenience ; he, therefore, sent me off to Azimgurh with orders to bring up all the remnant of the 12th Irregular Cavalry that continued faithful to Government ; the greater part of the regiment (Holmes' corps) having previously mutinied, and murdered the officers and their wives at Segowlee. I received the General's orders to take command of these men, and to endeavour to bring them up, and join him again as speedily as possible *en route* to Cawnpoor. I started at once with Lieut. Charles Havelock in a canoe, and we were taken rapidly down the Ganges by the force of the current to Gazeepoor, from whence we went across the country to Azimghur, where I took command of the men, and commenced my march without delay. On our march we found provisions and forage scarce, and we were making forced marches ; but my men behaved loyally and well. When within reach of Outram's camp I sent to report my progress, and received this letter in reply :—

“ Camp Kalogan, September 9, 1857.

“ My dear Johnson,—I am right glad to find you are so near, and probably your services may be required sooner than you expected. I hear that 400 Oude people, with 4 guns, under a rampant Oude Zemindar, have crossed the Ganges, who purpose to plunder the country after the troops have passed on to Cawnpoor : where these fellows are located is said to be six coss from this camp, and five from our next camp. It is a great object to *chuppao* (attack) them to-morrow night, and if you could arrive at this ground (the 51st milestone from Allahabad) to-morrow, early enough to rest your horses well before night, we may arrange a simultaneous movement, so as to fall upon the fellows at daybreak on the 11th. To-morrow my camp will be at Thureearun (at the 64th milepost), from whence I will send a letter to await your arrival here, giving you minute instructions, so as to ensure your men and mine reaching the spot as nearly as possible at the same time.

“ Do not ask anything about these Oude plunderers, lest they may be put on their guard by hearing you are enquiring about them.

“ Sincerely yours,
(Signed) “ J. OUTRAM.”

‘ On receipt of this I made arrangements, and halted the next morning, near the 51st milestone, and awaited further instructions, which Captain Dawson brought me in the following note :—

“ Camp Kurranea, 1½ P.M.

“ My dear Johnson,—Captain Dawson, who takes this note to you, will explain the object of your *dour* (expedition), and will accompany you to Hutwa Kass, the place of rendezvous, with Major Vincent Eyre, who has with him two guns, and 150 Europeans. We calculate that Hutwa Kass is about 10 miles from your camp. I send you my own watch set to our time.

“ Sincerely yours,
(Signed) “ J. OUTRAM.”

‘ I carried out the instructions contained in the above, and in company with Captain Dawson we commenced our march again to join Brigadier Vincent Eyre, and owing to the General’s fore-

Major-General should—after strengthening the defences, destroying those works and positions of the enemy from which it had principally suffered, and reinforcing it to the extent deemed necessary by its Commandant—return to Cawnpore to expedite to the utmost of his power the organization of a force adequate to effect the thorough emancipation of its brave defenders and the well-disposed citizens of Lucknow. The force requisite for the accomplishment of these objects is being concentrated in Cawnpore—and in a very short period the Major-General hopes once more to hail in person those brave friends to whom he now bids adieu—to convey to them an expression of the admiration with which their past conduct has been regarded by the Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, and to congratulate them on the acquisition of fresh laurels.

The Major-General has reinforced the Garrison to the full extent deemed necessary by Brigadier Inglis; and with every confidence in the ability of that gallant officer and his glorious Garrison to maintain themselves in their present position, the Major-General bids them each, and all, a hearty God's-speed.

It would have afforded the Major-General very sincere pleasure to have been at liberty to have communicated to the assembled troops in person the message which he leaves to Brigadier Inglis to communicate to them. But the movement requisite to effect a junction with the Alum Bagh detachment, is one of great delicacy and peril; and its success depends in a great measure on the Major-General's intentions not being perceived until the moment of their execution.

APPENDIX O.

ADDRESS TO H.M.'S 78TH HIGHLANDERS, page 308.

Extract from the 'History of the Service of the 78th Highlanders.'

On January 26 the 2nd Brigade was paraded to witness the presentation of six good-conduct medals to men of the 78th Highlanders, on which occasion Sir James Outram addressed the regiment in a most complimentary manner; the substance of his speech he conveyed in a letter to Brigadier Hamilton, of which the following is a copy :—

Camp, Alam Bugh, Jan. 26, 1858.

‘My dear Brigadier,—I should be very sorry that the 78th should attribute anything I said to-day to the excitement of the moment, and therefore somewhat more perhaps than what I would deliberately record. What I did say is what *I really feel*, and what I am sure must be the sentiment of every Englishman who knows what the 78th has done during the past year; and I had fully weighed what I should say, before I went to parade.

‘While fresh in my mind, I will here record what I did say, in case you may think my deliberately and conscientiously expressed testimony to the merits of your noble regiment of any value.

‘The following is the spirit, and I think almost literally what I said :—

“78th Highlanders.—I gladly seize the opportunity of the brigade being assembled to witness the presentation of good-conduct medals to some of your deserving comrades, to say a few words to you; to tell you of my high estimation of the very admirable conduct of the whole regiment during the year, completed to-morrow, that I have been associated with you in the field, commencing in Persia.

“Your exemplary conduct, 78th, in every respect, throughout—”

the past eventful year, I can truly say, and *I do most emphatically declare*, has never been surpassed by any troops of any nation in any age, whether for indomitable valour in the field, or steady discipline in the camp, under an amount of fighting, hardship, and privation such as British troops have seldom, if ever, heretofore been exposed to.

“The cheerfulness with which you have gone through all this has excited my admiration as much as the undaunted pluck with which you always close with the enemy whenever you can get at him, no matter what his odds against you are, or what the advantage of his position; and my feelings are but those of your countrymen all over the world, who are now watching your career with intense interest.

“I trust that it will not be long before the campaign will be brought to a glorious conclusion, by the utter destruction of the hosts of rebels in our front, on the capture of this doomed city, their last refuge; and I am sure that you, 78th, who will have borne the brunt of the war so gloriously from first to last, when you return to old England, will be hailed and rewarded by your grateful and admiring countrymen, as the band of heroes, as which you so well deserve to be regarded.

“Good and glorious as your conduct has been, 78th, your goodness and your glory has been nobly emulated by all the troops of this division, which have shared your toils, your dangers, and your triumphs. To them also my acknowledgments are due, and they will be gratefully tendered when opportunity offers.

“Especially to the gallant 90th, now at your side, as they have ever stood by you, fought with you, and suffered with you, since we crossed the Ganges together. The great and brilliant services rendered by the 90th in the Crimean war, even they have been eclipsed by what it has already done in India.

“Nor must we forget, 78th, your gallant comrades of the 64th, though no longer with us, who served with you in Persia served with you here, and have suffered as you have done. No, I shall not forget the 64th in a hurry, nor shall I forget you.

‘Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) ‘J. OUTRAM.

‘To Brigadier Hamilton, Commanding 2nd Brigade,

‘Oude Field Force.’

APPENDIX P.

FINAL CAPTURE OF LAKHNAU, page 332.

*Recommendations of Officers contained in Sir James Outram's
Memorandum.*

... 28. I have to express my particular acknowledgments to Brigadier-General Walpole, who afforded me on every occasion the most cordial support, and very ably carried out the operations which fell to his share; also to Brigadier-General Sir James Hope Grant, commanding the Cavalry, whose vigilance and activity in the execution of his onerous duties, were unceasing.

29. Brigadier Wood, C.B., commanding the Field Batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Riddell, commanding the Siege Train, carried on their respective duties to my entire satisfaction. The services of Lieutenant-Colonel Turner, B.A., specially attached to the Force, were of the highest value to me, and I beg to tender him my cordial acknowledgment for the same.

30. It is a source of much gratification to me to submit the names of those Officers engaged in the operations on the north bank of the Goomtee, who have been honourably mentioned by Brigadier-General Walpole and their respective Commanders, viz. Brigadiers Horsford, C.B., and Douglas, commanding 5th and 6th Brigades; Lieutenant-Colonel Hill, commanding 2nd Battalion, Rifle Brigade; Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, C. B., commanding 3rd Battalion, Rifle Brigade; Captain Gibbon, R.A., who commanded the 9-Pounder Field Battery.

31. The Brigadier-General also particularly notices the conduct of Captain Barwell, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, and Captain Carey, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General; also that of Captain Warner, A.D.C., and Lieutenant Eccles, his Orderly Officer.

32. The Brigadiers wish to record the services of their respec-

tive Staffs :—Captain Macpherson, 78th Highlanders (wounded), Brigade-Major of the 5th Brigade ; Brevet-Major Mollan, Brigade-Major 6th Brigade ; and Brevet-Major Ross, and Lieutenant Walker, their Orderly Officers.

33. Brigadier Wood, C.B., favourably mentions the conduct and professional knowledge of Lieutenant-Colonel Turner, Lieutenant-Colonel D'Aguilar, Major Yates, Brevet Major Pennycuik, Captain Gibbon, Captain Mackinnon, Captain Remington, and Captain Johnston ; he also notices the assistance he received from Captain Frith, his Brigade-Major, and Captain Scott, in charge of the Commissariat arrangements.

34. Lieutenant-Colonel Riddle, commanding Siege Train, eulogises Captains Thring, Goodenough, and Walker, R.A. ; Captain Pearson, and Lieutenant Sineon, B.A. ; and Lieutenant Cuthbert and FitzMaurice, R.A. ; and Major Turner and Captain Young, Staff Officers.

35. Major Nicholson, R.E., highly applauds the energy displayed by the Officers of that Department, viz. Lieutenant Malcolm, Wynne, Swetenham, and Keith, R.E. ; and Lieutenants Watson, Tennant, Hovenden, and Nuthall, B.E.

36. Lieutenant-Colonel Wells records the services of Major Bruce, and Captains Provost, Duff, and Norton of the 23rd Fusiliers.

37. I have next to notice the services of the Officers engaged on the south, or the city side of the river.

38. Brigadier Napier ; Captain Hutchinson, Brigade-Major ; and Lieutenant Greathed, of the Engineers, afforded me, on different occasions, the greatest assistance by their professional advice, and I tender them my cordial thanks ; they were ably seconded by Lieutenant Tulloch, and Mr. May, attached to that department.

39. Major Brasyer led his Seikhs with his usual gallantry, and I regret to add, was severely wounded.

40. My thanks are also due to Captain Bennett, commanding Her Majesty's 20th Regiment.

41. Captain Coles, in command of two Squadrons of the 9th Lancers, did good service in pursuing the enemy when they abandoned their position in the Moosa Bagh. On this occasion the local knowledge of Captain Carey, Deputy-Assistant Quarter-Master-General of the 3rd Division, was of much use to me. Captain Dodgson, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Captain Gordon,

Deputy Judge-Advocate-General; and Ensign Hewitt, 41st Regiment N.I., Orderly Officer, were present at the occupation of the Moosa Bagh, having joined me from Alum Bagh, where they had been of much service in their respective appointments.

42. I have lastly to bring to His Excellency's consideration the services of those Officers who had the good fortune to be engaged in all the operations on both sides of the river.

43. Brigadier Douglas has carried out all his instructions with signal ability and success, and deserves my cordial acknowledgments; as does Major Nicholson, R.E., who evinced the most indefatigable industry in the construction of the heavy Batteries which it fell to his Department to execute, and in choosing sites for which he was constantly exposed to very heavy fire.

44. Lieutenant-Colonel Wells commanded the 23rd Fusiliers, until incapacitated by illness (on the last day's operation) when the command was assumed by Lieutenant-Colonel Pratt, who also commanded the left Column of attack on the 11th instant, across the river; Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor in command of the 79th Highlanders; Major Green, Punjaub Rifles; and Captain Cunliffe, who commanded the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, until the arrival of Captain Hume, who also deserves my thanks. Captain Middleton, Commanding the Field Battery, which was actively engaged throughout.

45. Brigadier Douglas mentions with approbation Captain Stevenson, Acting Brigade-Major; and Lieutenants Walker, 79th, and Utterton, 23rd Fusiliers, his A.D.C. and Orderly Officer.

46. I have the highest pleasure in acknowledging how much I am indebted to the Officers of my Personal Staff.

47. His Excellency is already aware of the opinion I have formed of the merits and services of Colonel Berkeley, H.M.'s 32nd Regiment, my Military Secretary; and the assistance I have derived from him throughout these operations is an additional obligation I am under to this most deserving Officer.

48. Captain Chamier, A.D.C., and Lieutenant Hargood, A.D.C. (horse killed), have worked with the unremitting zeal and activity which has characterised their conduct in all the operations in which I have been engaged since I left Allahabad in September last.

49. Captain Weston, 65th Regiment N.I., Orderly Officer, has signalised himself by the spirit and gallantry which he has displayed on several occasions, and has been of much use to me.

50. Captains Orr and Bunbury, of the Intelligence Department, have performed their duties with great ability, and Mr. Denison, C.S., who recently brought up Despatches from the Governor-General, accompanied the Forces, and was most active and zealous in rendering aid to the poor sufferers who were blown up in the explosion on the 17th instant.

51. Mr. Kavanagh, Assistant Commissioner, from his knowledge of the localities, rendered good service on several occasions.

J. OUTRAM, *Major-General,*
Comdg. the 1st Divn. of the Army.

N.B.—The casualties during these operations are included in the general casualty returns of the army occupied in the Siege, which accompanied the Commander-in-Chief's despatch; the total loss sustained in these operations under General Outram was as follows:—

Casualties during the operations North of the Goomtee, from March 6 to March 14 (not including those of the Cavalry division under General Grant, of which no separate returns were received).

| Killed. | Wounded. | Total. |
|--------------------|---------------------|--------|
| Officers, 5, | Officers, 9, | 139 |
| Rank and file, 21, | Rank and file, 104, | |

Casualties during the operations in the city, from March 15 to March 19.

| Killed. | Wounded. | Total. |
|---------------------------|-------------------|--------|
| Officers, 3, | Officers, 4 | 99 |
| Rank and file, 42, | Rank and file, 50 | |
| Total, killed and wounded | | 238 |

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